

Hilda Koyier

Leveraging AU Liaison Offices as resources of structural conflict prevention

African Union Liaison Offices (AULOs) are resourceful peace and security instruments of the African Union (AU), strategically positioned within member states to intervene at various stages of the conflict cycle. However, efforts to strengthen their practical role in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) have consistently lagged. Consequently, these offices remain underutilized instruments of the framework. This policy brief seeks to explain why and how the AU should leverage the capacity of AULOs, strengthening them to function more effectively so that they can proactively contribute to structural conflict prevention processes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The AU should regularly update the country-specific mandates of AULOs to better align their activities with evolving security dynamics in the host countries and strengthen AULOs' role in structural conflict prevention therein.
- The AU Executive Council should mobilize additional member state funding to support AULOs' operational activities, including structural conflict prevention, and ensure adequate technical staffing to sustain long-term engagement in fragile contexts.
- The AU should reinforce AULOs' integration into the Peace and Security Architecture by formalizing coordination with AU Commission departments, including Political Affairs, Peace and Security, and Regional Economic Communities.
- To reduce AULOs' siloed operations, the AU Chairperson and Special Representatives should establish formal engagement with UN Country Teams, civil society organizations, and think tanks to share knowledge and build long-term prevention partnerships.

Leveraging AU Liaison Offices as resources of structural conflict prevention

African Union Liaison Offices (AULOs) are resourceful peace and security instruments of the African Union (AU), strategically positioned within member states to intervene at various stages of the conflict cycle. However, efforts to strengthen their practical role in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) have consistently lagged. Consequently, these offices remain underutilized instruments of the framework. This policy brief seeks to explain why and how the AU should leverage the capacity of AULOs, strengthening them to function more effectively so that they can proactively contribute to structural conflict prevention processes.

Introduction

During the 39th AU summit, the regional body's outgoing chair, Angola's president João Lourenço, proposed convening an Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union in Luanda later this year.¹ The session would focus on examining strategies to address threats to peace, security, and development across the continent, with the objective of strengthening Africa's mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution. One of the ways through which the AU can pursue this objective is by maximizing the capacity of existing structural resources such as AU Liaison Offices (AULOs), which already play a crucial operational role in implementing the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), but face certain challenges that restrict their proactive engagement in structural conflict prevention. Strengthening AULOs for this purpose is both essential and beneficial for the AU: as an in-country presence of the AU, AULOs are uniquely positioned to

monitor developments on the ground and develop a deeper understanding of the political, social, and economic factors driving peace and security challenges in AU member states. They also facilitate the building of necessary relationships with key local and international stakeholders, furthering the AU's responsiveness, efficiency, and legitimacy to engage in conflict management and long-term peacebuilding. Unlike peace operations or electoral missions whose operations are time-bound and sector-specific, the key value-added of AULOs as instruments at the AU's disposal is their long-term approach.

An EU-financed evaluation conducted in 2017 demonstrates the instrumental role that AULOs have played in crisis situations of various countries such as Mali, the Central African Republic, Sudan, South Sudan, the Comoros, Guinea Bissau and Madagascar.² Overall, AULOs' presence on the ground significantly demonstrates the AU's solidarity with member states who are striving to move beyond a history of violence. Their field presence also enhances the AU's visibility and

¹ "Statement by his excellency João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, President of the Republic of Angola and Chairperson of the AU, at the opening ceremony of the 39th ordinary session of the assembly of heads of state and government of the African Union." <https://au.int/en/speeches/20260214/statement-his-excellency-joao-manuel-goncalves-lourenco-president-republic-angola>. (Last Accessed 25 February 2026).

² European Court of Auditors (2018). "The African Peace and Security Architecture—Need to refocus EU support. Special report No 20, Publications Office." <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2865/466192>. (Last Accessed 10 March 2026).

Box 1: African Union Liaison Offices

AULOs are one of the non-military peace and security instruments of the AU, established by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and strategically positioned within member states. Between 2004 and 2014, the PSC passed decisions that tasked the AU Chairperson to oversee the establishment and functioning of 14 liaison offices in AU member states. Other liaison offices existing today, such as those in Côte d'Ivoire, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Western Sahara, had already been established under the AU's predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The general rationale behind establishing structures identified as AULOs is to strengthen the AU's primary role in preventing and managing conflicts, with the aim of preserving the progress achieved in terms of peace and security in conflict-affected or post-conflict countries.

its activities, thereby strengthening the body's legitimacy. AULOs' proximity to member states also allows them to interact with a broad variety of actors such as Regional Economic Communities (RECs), civil society organizations (CSOs), and international partners, allowing them to serve as a bridge between those actors and the AU on matters important for the implementation of APSA.

However, despite their crucial contributions, AULOs are persistently neglected in formal policy design and resourcing, causing them to remain underutilized as instruments of AU conflict prevention and AU response. Over the years, AULOs have continually operated within a set of multiple structural and institutional challenges. These include outdated mandates that fail to match

the conflict situation of host countries, leading to a poor distribution of funds to the structures;³ limited financial resources, with a heavy reliance on external donors; insufficient technical staffing; a low level of institutionalization within the AU; and minimal integration within the AU's broader peace and security architecture.

Owing to all these shortcomings, the overall efficiency of AULOs is heavily constrained, largely reducing them to representational entities that are reactive rather than proactive in nature. This analysis is drawn, both from findings obtained during field research in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire and in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and from data collected in the aftermath of online interviews with former special representatives heading some of the AULOs. Ahead of the Ivorian presidential elections scheduled for October 2025, political tensions in the country were rising due to the exclusion of major opposition figures from the electoral list, prompting concern about a possible return to unrest. Findings from field research conducted between May and June 2025, show that there was limited engagement by the AULO prior to this turn of events, due to its restricted mandate and limited resources.

As the AU seeks to improve the effectiveness of the continent's conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, this is a timely opportunity to further strengthen and leverage AULOs as more strong resources for supporting member states in structural conflict prevention processes.

As the AU seeks to improve the effectiveness of the continent's conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, this is a timely opportunity to further strengthen and leverage AULOs as stronger resources for supporting member states in structural conflict prevention processes.

³ Particip Consortium (2017). Final Report. "Evaluation of the Implementation of the African Peace Facility as an instrument supporting African efforts to manage conflicts on the continent." https://www.academia.edu/36196637/_Evaluation_of_the_implementation_of_the_African_Peace_Facility_as_an_instrument_supporting_African_efforts_to_manage_conflicts_on_the_continent_Vol_2. (Last Accessed 8 March 2026).

Box 2: Establishment period(s) and AULO specific mandates

Year of establishment	Country	Mandate assigned during establishment period
1994 (closed in 2016)	Western Sahara (Laayoune)	To assist with the implementation of the UN/OAU settlement plan in cooperation with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), as had been mandated in UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 690 (1991).
1997 (closed in 2017)	Comoros (Moroni)	To support the resolution process of the Anjouanese secessionist movement.
2000 (closed in 2008)	Ethiopia (Addis Ababa) and Eritrea (Asmara)	To support and collaborate with the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to facilitate the implementation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities.
2001	Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa)	To support the then ongoing DRC peace process.
2003	Côte d'Ivoire (Abidjan)	To resolve the civil war that had broken out in September 2002.
2004 (closed in 2019)	Liberia (Monrovia)	To help the AU oversee the implementation of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), to which it was a signatory.
2006	Chad (N'Djamena)	To find a solution to the Darfur conflict through Chad, which had successfully mediated negotiations between the Sudanese government and two insurgencies, leading to the signing of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in April 2004.
2008	Sudan (Khartoum; relocated to Addis Ababa) and South Sudan (Juba)	To support the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
2010	Central African Republic (Bangui)	To support the inclusive political dialogue and peace consolidation efforts in the country.
2010	Guinea Bissau (Bissau)	To support Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) as a means to stabilize the country after multiple political crises, the most recent one having been the 2009 killing of former president João Bernardo Vieira by the army.
2011	Libya (Tripoli; now relocated to Tunis)	To stabilize the country after the Libyan civil war.
2013	Madagascar (Antananarivo)	To help with the implementation of the 2011 'Roadmap for ending crisis in Madagascar' after the 2009 unconstitutional change of government.
2014	Mali and Sahel-MISAHÉL (Bamako)	To reinforce the AU's presence in Mali and the Sahel region, after the transformation of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

AULOs' resourceful contribution to non-military conflict intervention processes

The generic roles of AULOs, which can be traced to two⁴ different PSC documents⁵, point towards the offices' contribution to the conflict cycle, ranging from early warning; mediation and support to electoral processes; monitoring implementations of peace agreement mechanisms; supporting post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) activities; to peacebuilding initiatives. Beyond the generic roles, each AULO also has a specific mandate assigned to it by the PSC upon its establishment, as listed in Figure 1. These country-specific mandates, however, are long overdue for revision. Owing to their outdated nature, most activities currently performed by AULOs tend to reflect their broader, more generic roles discussed below.

i. Early warning

One of the tasks assigned to AULOs, as outlined in their Terms of Reference (ToRs), centres around their provision of early warning information to the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) of the AU, one of the five pillars of the APSA. Over time, AULOs have contributed to the early warning process at the continental level in the following manner: By providing open-source information, they have supplied episodic incident reports and biweekly situation reports to the Africa Reporter online tool. AULOs have also sent daily narrative reports to the CEWS Situation Room. Between 2010 and 2011, a CEWS team visited the 14 AULOs to provide training on the AU reporting platform and on the standardized template used for situation reports. While this initiative initially strengthened reporting capacities, submissions from AULOs later became less frequent, partly due to operational constraints such as limited staffing and financial resources. At present, some offices occasionally send in narrative reports to the headquarters in the format of a memo, with CEWS also relying on CSOs in member states to collect early-warning data through field monitors.

ii. Monitoring and support to electoral and governance processes

AULOs also contribute to the strengthening of democratic governance by supporting election processes and the implementation of different policy instruments of the AU. For instance, the two major AU frameworks guiding electoral violence prevention include the 2002 OAU/AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa and the 2004 AU Guidelines for Election Observation and Monitoring Missions. Both instruments require the AU Chairperson (AUC) to dispatch an electoral assessment team to an AU member state with upcoming elections, in order to determine the conditions for free, fair, and credible elections. Typically, AULOs welcome and work alongside the deployed teams once they arrive in the designated member states. In Côte d'Ivoire, the AUC PAPS deployed a pre-assessment mission (Abidjan, 10–15 June 2025) to support the ongoing electoral process and the government's efforts to strengthen democracy, governance, and the country's stability. The AULO supported the AU delegation's mission by providing coordination and advisory assistance, while monitoring developments on the ground and sending occasional briefs to the Political Affairs Peace and Security Department (PAPS).⁶

iii. Mediation support and facilitation of political dialogue and peace processes

In general, AULOs are assigned the responsibility to accompany and support inclusive national dialogues, mediation, and reconciliation initiatives led by national stakeholders or AU envoys. To illustrate this, the AULO in Abidjan, along with other actors such as ECOWAS and the UN, played an instrumental role in offering mediation support to resolve the crisis that rocked the country in 2010/11, which arose from the disputed results of the October 2010 presidential elections. Acting as a last resort during the breakdown of communication between the government and opposition parties, the office

⁴ AU PSC Press Release (2011). "African Union and International Partners sign a Joint Financing Arrangement on Support for sustaining and strengthening African Union Liaison Offices." <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20111112>. (Last Accessed 26 February 2026).

⁵ AU Commission (2022). "Terms of Reference for Consultancy Service-Electoral Affairs Expert Deployment to the AULO, Chad". Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1–14 January. AUC/PAPS/AULO/C/002. <https://au.int/en/bids/20220101/terms-reference-consultancy-service-electoral-affairs-expert-deployment-aulo-chad>. (Last Accessed 26 February 2026).

⁶ Interview, AU Commission, 30 June 2025, online.

held multiple meetings with both sides of the conflict to facilitate dialogue. At the same time, the office worked closely with AU-appointed representatives, including the late, former Kenyan prime minister Raila Odinga and former South African president Thabo Mbeki, who engaged repeatedly with stakeholders to prioritize peace and stability in the country.⁷

iv. Monitoring the implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding policies

AULOs also play a central role in following up on the implementation of peace agreements endorsed by the AU or the PSC. Although liaison offices have not been actively involved in supporting the implementation of peace agreements in recent times, below are examples of how some AULOs have successfully contributed towards such processes in the past.

Sudan and South Sudan In the case of these two countries, the PSC established a liaison office to support the implementation of the CPA that was signed in 2005. To carry out this mandate, the AULO supported the organization of national elections in both the North and the South during the transitional period, preparing for the elections, as well as the planned 2011 referendum. Second, the AU launched the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) to follow up with the implementation of the CPA, which included other stakeholders such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Arab League, the UN, the EU, and Kenya, with whom the AULO would meet regularly to assess various aspects of the implementation of the CPA.⁸

Madagascar The AULO in Madagascar was established to support the implementation of the peace agreement, entitled 'Roadmap for Ending the crisis in Madagascar,' following the 2009 unconstitutional change of government in the country. To assist with the transition process and restoration of constitutional order, the AULO

monitored the political and security environment and guided the implementation of the roadmap. It also supported the organization of free and fair elections, considered as essential for completing the political transition. Lastly, it provided good offices to help facilitate dialogue between President Andry Rajoelina and former President Marc Ravalomanana.⁹

v. Peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD)

AULOs are instrumental in implementing and overseeing the activities of PCRD and Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) in post-conflict or fragile contexts. In the aftermath of the 2010/11 post-election crisis, the AULO in Côte d'Ivoire implemented QIPs, targeting places that brought communities together and areas which provided aid to women and assistance to displaced populations. They worked directly with the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), which maintained countrywide field offices. Project proposals were submitted by UNOCI to the AULO for review, with implementation undertaken by local technicians. These initiatives included the construction of markets and schools, along with the drilling of wells and the installation of water pumps. These projects were completed within three to six months and produced visible benefits for the local population, providing spaces where community members could gather and interact.¹⁰

Years later, following the political instability resulting from the election violence that unfolded in 2020, the AULO in Abidjan was also involved in a project on social cohesion and the peaceful resolution of intercommunal disputes. The AULO launched a project entitled 'Sous le Baobab,' which it implemented under the partnership of two locally based organizations. In the framework of this project, several meetings were held in the towns where intercommunal conflicts had resurged during the 2020 election period: Toumodi, Béoumi, Daoukro, Bonoua,

⁷ Interview, AU Commission, 30 June 2025, online.

⁸ Koyier, Hilda Milka (2025). "Understanding the Establishment and Practices of African Union Liaison Offices and ECOWAS Representations in Member States." Leipzig: Research Centre Global Dynamics (ANCIP Working Paper, 4). <https://ancip-project.de/docs/understanding-the-establishment-and-practices-of-african-union-liaison-offices-and-ecowas-representations-in-member-states/>. (Last Accessed 4 March 2026).

⁹ Butedi, Francois Nzolani (2018). "The Work of the African Union Liaison Office in Building Peace on the Ground: A Case Study of Madagascar", in: South African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 25, no.1, pp. 99–116. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2018.1417900>. (Last Accessed 7 March 2026).

¹⁰ Interview, AU Commission, 30 June 2025, online.

and Dabou. These meetings successfully facilitated dialogue between the local population, breaking down the wall of mistrust, and demonstrating the community members' interest in working towards promoting communal co-existence.¹¹

How AULOs can contribute to strengthening structural conflict prevention

i. Popularization of the AU's structural conflict prevention frameworks

The implementation of the AU's assessment tools, laid out in the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework has unfortunately not gained traction, as to date, only four member states have launched the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and the Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategy (CSVMS), nine years after its adoption. These countries are: Ghana (2017), Côte d'Ivoire (2019), Zambia (2020), and Malawi (2023).¹² In the communiqué of the 1251st meeting of the PSC, the PSC called on the AU Commission to "develop and implement concrete awareness-raising campaigns and actions to popularize the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF) and the two tools CSVRA and CSVMS..."

Because AULOs sit within the AU's governance eco-system, they enjoy the political legitimacy to handle matters in sensitive areas such as state vulnerability. This legitimacy can encourage trust from national governments and enhance their willingness to use the assessment tools. In this regard, each AULO could establish an awareness unit headed by a communication and advocacy expert through whom they could disseminate information to national governments, highlighting the benefits of using the two structural conflict prevention tools, such as how CSVRA results can inform national development programs and resilience strategies. As some RECs such as ECOWAS have similar tools

that enable them to conduct country-risk and vulnerability assessments among member states, AULOs could first approach the RECs to obtain insights on potential similarities within the different frameworks and the overall benefits gained by member states in relying on the two assessment tools.

ii. Institutionalized early response units to support national institutions

Continental early warning systems lack country-level early response mechanisms. Given AULOs' vast experience in intervening in ongoing crisis situations, they could leverage this expertise to support national institutions in facilitating early responses to conflict alerts and preventing escalation into full-blown crises. One way to achieve this is by institutionalizing early response mechanisms and units within AULOs. For example, the AULO in Côte d'Ivoire has maintained a long-time engagement with a national early warning and rapid response centre through a designated focal person.¹³ The data collected by this national structure and the recommendations it provides are, unfortunately, not shared with AU headquarters, but rather transmitted to one of the ministries of the Ivorian government, so that they can respond to alerts in a timely manner. In this context, the AULO could, in response to indicators highlighting the deteriorating nature of governance, assist national ministries by providing technical support to facilitate regular inclusive political dialogue or mediation interventions between the ruling party and the opposition and/or between the government and marginalized groups. This way they can operate as neutral observers in areas where national actors may be politically biased, facilitating faster solutions to developing conflicts.

iii. Multi-stakeholder convening platforms

In many member states, formal infrastructures for peace or coordination platforms are weak or

¹¹ Interview, locally based think tank, 16 June 2025, Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.

¹² ISS PSC Insights (2023). "Slow Progress on AU-Conflict Prevention Assessments." <https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/slow-progress-on-au-conflict-prevention-assessments>. (Last Accessed 11 March 2026).

¹³ Interview, national government body, 02 July 2025, online.

absent.¹⁴ Because AULOs already have a mandate related to peace and security and are present on the ground, they can effectively fill this coordination gap by organizing regular convening sessions and facilitating collaboration among peacebuilding actors who might otherwise struggle to engage with one another. In this regard, AULOs could create a knowledge exchange platform that regularly brings together different stakeholders in the peace and security sphere. The actors could include government ministries, civil society networks representing youth and women, religious leaders, REC representatives, UN Country Teams, and other locally based international organizations. During the convening sessions, the AULO and all the stakeholders could analyse conflict risks and share their own version of best practices, permitting them to bond over potentially similar approaches applied in the execution of their structural conflict-prevention work, creating a solid foundation for further networks and partnerships to be formed. During these sessions, the AULO can document the discussions, with the purpose of producing analytical briefs for transmission to the AU headquarters. These would help to consolidate institutional knowledge for the AU system and to inform the design of sustainable conflict prevention frameworks.

Conclusion

As a crucial peace and security instrument of the AU, AULOs bear great potential to proactively engage in structural conflict prevention and contribute to advancing the AU's conflict prevention agenda. However, they remain a largely neglected institutional resource of the AU. Over the years, the AU has developed strong normative and institutional frameworks under the APSA, but the overall institutional and operational capacity of AULOs has not evolved proportionately, despite the increasing intensity of conflicts across the continent. As a result, AULOs are reduced to reactive actors. At a period when the AU is looking to strengthen its conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, one of its top priorities should include strengthening

AULOs' capacities in the following areas to facilitate their active engagement in structural conflict prevention.

First, a key challenge facing AULOs is that many of their country-specific mandates have not been regularly updated, leaving them insufficiently aligned with the evolving political and security dynamics in their respective host countries. The AU should prioritize the regular reviewing and updating of their country-specific mandates. Doing so would allow these offices to better adapt their activities to changing local contexts and strengthen their capacity to contribute more proactively to structural conflict prevention and long-term stability within host countries.

Second, AULOs continue to face significant operational constraints due to limited and often unpredictable funding. Insufficient financial resources not only restrict the scope of their activities but also limit the deployment of the specialized technical expertise required to effectively perform the offices' mandates. To address these challenges, the AU Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) and the AU Executive Council should prioritize the mobilization of more financial resources from member states to facilitate AULOs' stable functioning and long-term engagement in structural conflict prevention.

Third, the poor integration of AULOs within the AU's Peace and Security Architecture limits formal coordination with key actors such as the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department (PAPS) of the AU Commission, other relevant AUC departments, and RECs. This contributes not only to fragmentation, but also to the duplication of efforts in the implementation of AU conflict prevention frameworks. To address this gap, the AU should reinforce AULOs' integration into its peace and security architecture by formalizing coordination mechanisms between these actors. This will improve policy coherence and reduce operational overlaps, enhancing the overall effectiveness of the AU's conflict prevention efforts.

Lastly, within the host country, AULOs often have minimal interaction with national governments, RECs, and locally based actors such as UN Country

¹⁴ Schmitz Jasmin (2025). "Strengthening Peace in West Africa", How Regional Infrastructures for Peace Function in Practice. Leipzig: Research Centre Global Dynamics (ANCIP Policy Brief No. 5). <https://ancip-project.de/docs/strengthening-peace-in-west-africa-how-regional-infrastructures-for-peace-function-in-practice/>. (Last Accessed 24 March 2026).

Teams, CSOs, and think tanks that have developed extensive conflict prevention expertise and established informal networks with each other. In this regard, siloed operations reduce AULOs' ability to proactively engage in structural conflict prevention due to limited technical know-how. The AU Chairperson and Special Representatives could facilitate formal multi-stakeholder engagement for AULOs through mechanisms like Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with these actors. This would enable knowledge sharing, broaden their scope of work, and support the development of long-term partnerships for structural conflict prevention.

Further Reading

- Butedi, Francois Nzolani (2018). "The Work of the African Union Liaison Office in Building Peace on the Ground: A Case Study of Madagascar," in: *South African Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 25, no.1, pp. 99–116. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2018.1417900>. (Last Accessed 7 March 2026).
- European Court of Auditors (2018). "The African Peace and Security Architecture-Need to refocus EU support. Special report No 20, Publications Office." <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2865/466192>. (Last Accessed 10 March 2026).
- ISS PSC Insights (2023). "Slow Progress on AU–Conflict Prevention Assessments." <https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/slow-progress-on-au-conflict-prevention-assessments>. (Last Accessed 11 March 2026).
- Koyier, Hilda Milka (2025). "Understanding the Establishment and Practices of African Union Liaison Offices and ECOWAS Representations in Member States." Leipzig: Research Centre Global Dynamics (ANCIP Working Paper, 4). <https://ancip-project.de/docs/understanding-the-establishment-and-practices-of-african-union-liaison-offices-and-ecowas-representations-in-member-states/>. (Last Accessed 4 March 2026).
- Particip Consortium (2017). Final Report. "Evaluation of the Implementation of the African Peace Facility as an instrument supporting African efforts to manage conflicts on the continent." https://www.academia.edu/36196637/_Evaluation_of_the_implementation_of_the_African_Peace_Facility_as_an_instrument_supporting_African_efforts_to_manage_conflicts_on_the_continent_Vol_2. (Last Accessed 8 March 2026).

Hilda Koyier

Leveraging AU Liaison Offices as resources of structural conflict prevention



About the author

Hilda Koyier is a researcher in the ANCIP competence network, based at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). In her research she examines the role of AU Liaison Offices and ECOWAS Representation Offices in non-military conflict intervention processes. Her research interests centre around conflict intervention processes of international and regional organizations. She has previously worked at a Brussels based think tank (ECDPM), conducting research on peace and security and migration issues in the context of Europe-Africa relations. Hilda has also completed the Bluebook Traineeship at DG INTPA of the European Commission and has a good understanding on the implementation of EU development policy in Sub-Saharan Africa.

She holds an Advanced Masters in European Integration (specialization in Policy-making in Security and Migration studies), from the Vrije Universiteit Brussels (VUB); a Joint Erasmus Mundus Master's Degree in Transnational Migration from the Université Libre of Brussels (ULB), University of Wrocław and University of Szeged, and a Bachelor's Degree in International Studies from the University of Nairobi (Specialization in Security Studies).

The Competence Network "African Non-military Conflict Intervention Practices"

The competence network African non-military conflict intervention practices combines empirical basic research with theory building and strategic policy advice. Funded by the German Ministry for Education and Research for the period 2022-2026, the collaborative project will (1) establish an online database of non-military interventions of the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)(from 2004 onwards), (2) empirically reconstruct non-military intervention practices and routines by specific African actors, and (3) advance the theoretical debate as well as strategic policy advice on these issues



For more information:
<https://ancip-project.de>



UNIVERSITÄT
LEIPZIG
Research Centre Global Dynamics |
ReCentGlobe

