YEARBOOK ON THE AFRICAN UNION

VOLUME

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2022

Edited by **Ulf Engel**

Yearbook on the African Union

Volume 3 (2022)

Yearbook on the African Union

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Foreword

This is the third edition of the *Yearbook on the African Union* (YBAU). It is first and foremost an academic project that will provide in-depth evaluation and analysis of the institution, its processes, and its engagements. It seeks to be a reference point for evidence-based policy-making and decision-making. It is a tall order to establish a yearbook as an academic resource, wishing to reach both scholarly communities as well as policy-makers and practitioners. The YBAU seeks to be the first port of call for bureaucrats, diplomats, practitioners, 'outinsider' experts, intellectuals, and consultants to have access to reliable information and analysis on the African Union (AU) that is also able to support policy- and decision-making. Yearbooks are excellent sources of 'instant' expert knowledge that scholars can tap into to comprehend long-term trends and patterns, but, by the same token, may be limited by the narrow time frames in which these patterns are encompassed. We firmly believe that this *Yearbook* is highly relevant and needs to be taken seriously as a source of information on an important African institution. Its systematic approach, historicity, and organisational sociology will help the *Yearbook* to continue to provide much-needed analysis and perspective even as institutions face challenges, adapt, and transform. Three strengths really stand out.

Contribution to an Evidence-based Project

The *Yearbook* emphasises the policy-makers and the policy-making of the AU, in contrast to other similar volumes that focus much more on structures, pillars, and institutional actors or on singular policy fields. This is essential because we rarely get a glimpse of the insider perspectives and the daily struggles of those agents that really give the institutions life. For us, as long-standing researchers of the AU, we know just how hard it can be to access reliable data that comprehend the origins and interstate patterns of decision-making and how power operates. This is also the case for AU policy-makers, and with increasing pressure to also strengthen the evidence basis behind proposals, position papers, and draft policies, the challenges become enormous. The contributors are all familiar with the work of the AU in their domains of expertise through regular interactions with policy-makers and research communities. They are able to speak authoritatively and in lucid terms on these subjects. It is against this background that the YBAU can make an incremental positive contribution by making reliable information easily accessible, supporting the longer-term

aim of a 'data driven' AU Commission. In a way, the YBAU seeks to 'speak reason' with AU policy-makers and members.

Shaping Global Policy

The chapters of the YBAU help to illustrate in great detail an important finding of research on the AU and African regionalism in recent years: that is to say, the role that African actors play in shaping norms, policies, and global affairs. The volume acknowledges the AU as a change agent of global affairs, even if it also scrutinises where this agency is performed, sometimes in an uneven and not so desirable manner. This promises to provide us with systematic analysis of AU agency, which provides us with insights from multiple policy fields, criss-crossing 'levels of analysis', as well as acknowledging their transnational forms.

Because the YBAU treats the AU as the multidimensional organisation that it is, there is the added value of showing agency across areas that less often gather much interest. We seek to move beyond the narrow fixation on political and security affairs in an effort to broaden the analytical envelope to capture the whole array of areas at the core of the AU's mandate. This is also important, for instance, to students who seek to cast a multidimensional eye on the AU's *Agenda 2063*. Similarly, in 2020, African agency concerning public health – through the work of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in coordinating the Covid-19 response – was an area that attracted a lot of regional and also global attention. The more knowledge we can shed on the inner workings of all AU activities, the more we can appreciate the scale and enormity of pan-African integration. At the same time, the many other chapters will cover both high-profile and low-profile facets of what the AU does.

Disconnects and Discontents

Several of the chapters in the YBAU also have another overarching theme, that being that in a great many places on the African continent it remains unclear and unknown what the AU is and stands for. In different ways, across the key substantive work areas of the AU that the volume covers, a cross-cutting ambition of becoming a 'people's Union' is falling short of the mark. On the one hand, the AU does govern. Its policies, interventions, and programmes do have an impact on the lives of citizens across the 55 member states. On the other hand, the diplomatic positioning of governments in the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECS), as well as what shared principles and rules that these governments will or will not abide by, are very hard for citizens to

decipher. Very few non-governmental organisations (NGOs) succeed in being accredited to attend meetings or summits, and there are very few channels of popular participation in AU affairs. Institutions envisaged as promoting popular participation, such as the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), have been slow in fulfilling their objectives; in future YBAUs, we need to understand why their growth remains stunted. This volume of the YBAU is focused on institutional and financial reforms and reflects on in how far the AU has progressed with reforming the organisation, meeting the objectives of *Agenda 2063*, and achieving its ambition to be people-centred. The YBAU will indirectly and over time help document where the disconnects and discontent become particularly troubling.

Editorial Board
Linnéa Gelot, Cheryl Hendricks, Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Paul Nugent, and Thomas K. Tieku

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I am still very grateful to Joed Elich at Brill Academic Publishers for taking the entrepreneurial risk to start this project. My sincere thanks are also to Franca de Kort, Peter Buschmann, and Fem Eggers, who have ensured that this edition of the yearbook has also seen the light of day.

My deepfelt thanks go to the members of the editorial board – Linnéa Gelot, Cheryl Hendricks, Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Paul Nugent, and Thomas K. Tieku – for keeping an eye on quality and guiding me when necessary. The first two editions of the Yearbook were critically reviewed by the editorial board and our contributors at a workshop held in Cape Town, South Africa (23–24 March 2023), hosted by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR). My sincere thanks to all participants for their extremely constructive discussions, the very collegial atmosphere, and their continued commitment to the project. Thanks to IJR and staff for having us!

The book review section has been managed by Jens Herpolsheimer. Again, I owe him for a great selection of titles and reviewers and also the critical accompaniment on this journey. And expectedly Forrest Kilimnik and Duc Tran have copy-edited with great consistency and imagination. Pleasure working with all of you! And as always, I take the remaining mistakes on my head.

I acknowledge generous funding by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) under a grant for the research network 'African Non-Military Conflict Intervention Practices' (2022–2026) as well as a German Research Council (DFG) grant on inter-regionalism between the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the European Union (EU) in the context of the Collaborative Research Centre 1199 (2020–2023). Both grants allowed me to travel to the African Union and some of the Regional Economic Communities and to continue dialogue with practitioners and other scholars.

Convinced that the *Yearbook on the African Union* will provoke critical responses of various kinds and hopefully also stimulate academic debate, I would be most grateful if these responses could enable the editorial team to improve on the product and contribute to making this endeavour a sustainable and intellectually fruitful one. As always, any constructive feedback is most welcome at: uengel@uni-leipzig.de

Ulf Engel

Figures and Tables

Figures

Tables

Abbreviations

AAAI	Adaptation of African Agriculture Initiative
AACC	African Audio-Visual Cinema Commission (Nairobi)
AAI	Africa Adaptation Initiative
ACBF	African Capacity Building Foundation (Harare)
ACDEG	African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
ACERWC	African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
ACHPR	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul)
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
AEZO	African Economic Zones Organisation (Tangier)
AFCAC	African Civil Aviation Commission
AfCHPR	African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (Arusha)
AfCTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AfDB	African Development Bank (Abidjan)
ACMI	Africa Carbon Markets Initiative (Vienna)
AfIRM	(AfCFTA) Implementation Review Mechanism
AFRAA	African Airlines Association
Afreximbank	African Export–Import Bank (Cairo)
Africa CDC	Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Addis Ababa)
Afripol	AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation
AfSA	African Space Agency
AfSEM	African Single Electricity Market
AGA	African Governance Architecture
AGA–YES	AGA–Youth Engagement Strategy
AGIA	Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa
AGN	African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
AGP	African Governance Platform
AIDA	Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa
AIDS	acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
AMA	African Medicines Agency
AMCEN	African Ministerial Conference on Environment
AMISOM	AU Mission in Somalia (Mogadishu)
AMSP	Africa Medical Supplies Platform
AOSTI	African Observatory in Science, Technology and Innovation
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture

ARBE	(AUC Department of) Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment
AREI	African Renewable Energy Initiative
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ARNS	African Regional Nutrition Strategy
ASF	African Standby Force
ASRIC	African Observatory in Science Technology and Innovation (Abuja)
ATMIS	African Transition Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union (Addis Ababa)
AUABC	AU Advisory Board on Corruption
AUBP	AU Border Programme
AUC	AU Commission
AUDA	African Union Development Agency–NEPAD
AUMISS	AU Mission in South Sudan
AUTJPF	AU Transitional Justice Policy Framework
AU Assembly	AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government
AU Council	AU Executive Council
AYAP	African Youth Ambassadors for Peace
AYM	Africa Youth Month
BASAS	Bilateral Air Service Agreements
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CAHOSCC	Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change
CAP	Common African Position
CAR	Central African Republic
CCPI	Climate Change Performance Index
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States (Tripoli)
CEO	chief executive officer
CESA 16–25	Continental Education Strategy for Africa (2016–2025)
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CID	Council for Infrastructure Development
CIEFFA	AU International Centre for Girls and Women Education in Africa (Ouagadougou)
CLB	Continental Logistics Base (Douala)
CMP	Continental Power Systems Masterplan
CoHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Lusaka)

COP	Conference of the Parties
Covid-19	coronavirus disease
CPLP	Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSOS	civil society organisations
C10	ministerial group of 10 EST champions
DIE	(AUC) Department of Infrastructure and Energy
DDR	disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration
DPAPS	Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTA	Digital Transformation with Africa
DTS	Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020–2030)
D4D	Digital for Development
EAC	East African Community (Arusha)
EAP	Encyclopaedia Africana Project
EASF	East African Standby Force
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States (Libreville)
ECES	European Centre for Electoral Support (Brussels)
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States (Abuja)
EEC	European Economic Community (Brussels)
EISA	Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy (Johannesburg)
EPF	European Peace Facility
ERM	Early Response Mechanism
ESSMGB	ECOWAS Stabilisation Support Mission in Guinea-Bissau
EST	education, science, and technology
ESTI	education, science, technology, and innovation
ETTIM	(AUC) Economic Development, Tourism, Trade, Industry, and Mining
EU	European Union (Brussels)
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUTM	EU military training mission
FAW	Fund for African Women
FemWise–Africa	Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation
FDI	foreign direct investment
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia (Mogadishu)
FMS	(Somalia) Federal Member States
FOCAC	Forum for China–Africa Cooperation
FTYIP	First Ten-Year Implementation Plan
FY	financial year

F15	Fifteen Ministers of Finance
GBV	gender-based violence
GCF	Green Climate Fund (Incheon)
GDP	gross domestic product
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
GEWE	(AU Strategy on) Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
GIZ	German development agency GIZ (Eschborn)
GMA	Great Museum of Africa
GTI	Guided Trade Initiative
G7	Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States as well as the European Union)
G20	Group of Twenty
HIV	human immunodeficiency viruses
HLPF	High-Level Political Forum
HRM	Human Resources Management
HHS	(AUC Department of) Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development
HROS	human rights observers
HRDG	Human Rights, Democracy and Governance
IAFS	India Africa Forum Summit
ICOA	International Civil Aviation Organisation (Montreal)
ICGRL	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICG	International Crisis Group (New York)
ICT	information and communication technologies
IDA	International Development Association (Washington, DC)
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (Stockholm)
IDPS	internally displaced persons
IEA	International Energy Agency (Paris)
IEDS	improvised explosive devices
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Djibouti)
IMF	International Monetary Fund (Washington, DC)
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPED	Pan-African Institute for Education for Development (Abidjan)
IS	Islamic State
IPSS	Institute for Peace and Security Studies (Addis Ababa)
ISS	Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria)
ISWAP	Islamic State of West Africa Province
I–RECKE	Inter-Regional Knowledge Exchange

JAES	Joint Africa–Europe Strategy
JAS	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah
JMC	Joint Military Commission
JNIM	Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin
JSA	Joint Strategic Assessment
LAS	League of Arab States
LCB	Lake Chad Basin region
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission (N'Djamena)
LNG	Liquified Natural Gas
MBRF	Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Knowledge Foundation
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MFF	Multiyear Financial Framework
MILOBS	military observers
MINUSCA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MISAHEL	AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel
MMF	Multiyear Financial Framework
MMTG	Joint Monitoring Mechanism on the Transition in Guinea
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force (N'Djamena)
MONUSCO	UN Organisation Stabilization Mission in the DRC
MoU	memorandum of understanding
MOUACA	AU Military Observers Mission to the CAR
MSC	(AU) Military Staff Committee
MVCM	(AU) Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission
MYCM	Mid-Year Coordination Meeting
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
NAPS	National Action Plans
NARC	North Africa Regional Capability
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels)
NDCS	nationally determined contributions
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NGR	National Governance Report
NID	National Inclusive Dialogue
NPHO	New Public Health Order
NPoA	National Programme of Action
NUF	Necessary Unified Forces
OAU	Organisation of African Unity (Addis Ababa)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Paris)

OIO	Office of Internal Oversight
OSAA	UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa
OSE	Office of the Special Envoy
PAIPO	Pan African Intellectual Property Organization
PanWise	Pan-African Network of the Wise
PAP	Pan-African Parliament (Midrand)
PAP 2	(PIDA) Priority Action Plan 2
PAPR–CAR	Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR
PAPS	(AUC Department of) Political Affairs, Peace and Security
PAU	Pan-African University (Yaoundé)
PAUVES	PAU Institute of Water, Energy Sciences and Climate Change (Tlemcen)
PAVEU	Pan African Virtual and E-University (Kinshasa)
PCRD	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PIDA	Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
PKO	peacekeeping operations
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PMPA	Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa
PQL	PIDA Service Delivery Mechanism Quality Label
PRC	Permanent Representatives Committee
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSOS	Peace Support Operations
P5	permanent five members of the UNSC
RECS	Regional Economic Communities
RJMEC	Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
RMS	Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
RSS	Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region
R–ARCSS	Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
R&D	research and development
SAATM	Single African Air Transport Market
SACU	Southern African Customs Union (Windhoek)
SADC	Southern African Development Community (Gaborone)
SADR	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
SAMIM	SADC Mission in Mozambique
SDGS	Sustainable Development Goals
SDGEA	Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa

SDRS	Special Drawing Rights
SEZS	special economic zones
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Stockholm)
SPLM/AIO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition
SRSG	Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General
SSR	security sector reform
STISA 2024	Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa
STCS	specialised technical committees
STC–ARDWE	STC on Agriculture, Rural Development, Water and Environment
STC–CICT	STC on Communication and Information Communications Technology
STC–ESTI	STC on Education, Science, Technology and Innovation
STC–FMAEPI	STC on Finance, Monetary Affairs, Economic Planning, and Integration
STC–HPDC	STC on Health, Population and Drug Control
STC–TTIIE	STC on Transport, Transcontinental and Interregional Infrastructure, and Energy
STC–YSC	STC on Youth, Culture and Sports
STG	Silencing the Guns
STP	Somalia Transition Plan
STRC	Scientific, Technical, Research Commission (Abuja)
STYIP	Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan
TAPS	Territorial Action Plans
TB	tuberculosis
TCCS	troop-contributing countries
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TMC	Transitional Military Council
TPLF	Tigray People Liberation Front
TSGS	Transitional Support Groups
TVET	Continental Strategy for Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UCGS	unconstitutional change of government
UMA	Arab Maghreb Union (Rabat)
UN	United Nations (New York)
UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade and Development (Geneva)
UNDESA	UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (New York)
UNECA	UN Commission for Africa (Addis Ababa)
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union (Ouagadougou)
UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Paris)

UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA	UN General Assembly (New York)
UNHRC	UN Human Rights Council (Geneva)
UNICEF	UN Children's Emergency Fund (New York)
UNIDO	UN Industrial Development Organisation (Vienna)
UNISFA	UN Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNITAMS	UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan
UNOAU	UN Office to the African Union (Addis Ababa)
UNSMIL	UN Support Mission in Libya
UNSC	UN Security Council (New York)
UNSCR	UNSC Resolution
UNSG	UN Secretary-General
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VAWG	violence against women and girls
VET	violent extremism and terrorism
VNR	(APRM) voluntary national reports
WGDD	(AUC) Women and Gender Development Directorate
WGYD	(AUC) Women, Gender and Youth Directorate
WHO	World Health Organization (Geneva)
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization (Geneva)
WISEYouth	Network of African Youth on Conflict Prevention and Mediation
WMO	World Meteorological Organization (Geneva)
WPS	women, peace and security
WTO	World Trade Organization (Geneva)
WYFEI	Women and Youth Financial and Economic Inclusion 2030 Initiative

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Introduction

Ulf Engel

1 The *Yearbook on the African Union*

Since its establishment in 2002, the African Union (AU) has become the centre
for the organisation of essential policy fields on behalf of its 55 member states.[1]
As the successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963,
the Union has also fulfilled a key function in negotiating roles and responsibili-
ties between itself and the eight officially recognised Regional Economic Com-
munities (RECs).[2] Furthermore, the Union has managed to establish itself as a
major actor in global affairs and interlocutor between member states, on the
one hand, and the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), on the
other. The Union has also become highly relevant for developing bilateral stra-
tegic partnerships (see Ulf Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 12). Overall, and more
analytically speaking, the Union has become the main African actor working
towards a specific globalisation project, that is to say, a way of integrating the
continent into the current global condition but at the same time also trying to
change this condition (see Engel 2023b).

So far, however, the various activities of the Union have not been systemat-
ically documented, neither by itself nor by academic institutions or research
projects. The *Yearbook on the African Union* was launched in 2021 exactly with
this explicit aim of providing accessible, reliable, and contextualised informa-
tion on the AU's evolution and activities. To this end, the Yearbook, as well as its
authors, acknowledges and respects the cumbersome processes of institution-
alisation, professionalisation, and communitarisation taking place at the seat
of the continental body in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). After all, the Yearbook is a

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1 The 38th Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government took
   place on 8 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa. The meeting literally transformed the next day
   into the 1st Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, held on 9–10 July 2022.

2 The eight RECs officially recognised by the AU are the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the Com-
   mon Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan
   States (CEN-SAD), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central
   African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the
   Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Develop-
   ment Community (SADC).

modest attempt to document progress, or lack thereof, in the development and implementation of collective African policies. It follows ongoing debates at the continental level and seeks to understand Africa's ever-shifting place in global politics. Unfortunately, due to the limited space available in the Yearbook and the complexity of the topic, the RECs cannot be investigated in more depth.

Of course, several very helpful open sources are already available. The decisions of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AU Assembly), the AU Executive Council (AU Council), and the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) are all published online.[3] Substantial information is also provided through the *Annual Report on the Activities of the African Union and its Organs* (AU Assembly 2022) by the chairperson of the AU Commission (AUC).[4] And regarding the implementation of *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want* (AU Assembly 2013), which acts as a guide for the AU's long-term activities, the AU Development Agency (AUDA–NEPAD) has started publishing a biennial *Continental Report on the Implementation of Agenda 2063* (AUDA 2020, 2022).[5]

In addition, there is also the laudable joint initiative by the AUC and the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to publish an *African Union Handbook* (see AUC and MFAT 2022), now in its 9th edition. The handbook provides factual overviews as well as detailed information on memberships, offices, and institutions – but not on policies. In contrast, the *Yearbook on the African Union* aims at providing detailed and contextualised information on the development of important policy fields. Its aspiration is to be both documenting *and* analytical. In addition to the handbook, since 2016 the AU's Directorate of Information and Communication has been publishing *AU ECHO*, which has become an interesting and informative annual magazine around core Union policies (African Union 2022). The latest edition was published on 23 December 2021. And regarding the AU PSC, undoubtedly one of the most important organs of the Union, for the past five years the think tank Amani Africa has published brief annual reviews (for the latest version, see Amani Africa 2023).

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3 Although there are still some gaps regarding some regular OAU decisions and some extraordinary sessions, the AU Common Repository is trying to fill them step by step. See URL: <https://archives.au.int> (accessed: 30 June 2023). See also Engel (2022a).
4 On the AU's website, the report on the year 2019 is the latest one (see AUC Chairperson 2020).
5 This follows a first 28-page report, among others, on the domestication of Agenda 2063 and progress made on the Union's flagship projects. The report was tabled in 2017 by the ministerial committee working towards the implementation of Agenda 2063 (AU MCI 2017).

2   The Yearbook's Approach

Worth noting is that the present volume is not the *Yearbook OF the African Union*, but a *Yearbook ON the African Union*. It cannot be emphasised strongly enough that the editor-in-chief and the editorial board are not pretending or claiming to speak on behalf of the AU – far from it. This is an academic project: nothing more, nothing less. The Yearbook brings together a group of scholars that have previously published not only on AU policies, but oftentimes also in interaction with AU officials, sometimes as long-standing consultants for the Union. The editors and contributors share an interest in the agency of the AU, the RECs, and other African actors.

In terms of the methodological background, we approach these subjects, to a certain extent, from a joint perspective combining historical institutionalism and organisational sociology. This allows us to develop an understanding of the various interests playing out in the AU in a historical perspective and of the dynamics between its actors and within specific institutions. And we also take a keen interest in the impact these activities have (had) in global politics. The approach is inductive, rather than deductive. The Yearbook is not guided by a specific theoretical approach but interested in what actually is happening in the corridors of the AU and beyond – some would call this a 'perspective of practice'.

Against this background, the target audience of the *Yearbook on the African Union* is broad and diverse. It ranges from researchers and fellow academics as well as journalists, based on the continent and abroad, who are covering the AU and related policies on a regular basis, to post-graduates of various kinds, who are making their first steps into the orbit of this exciting institution and who may need some guidance. But we also hope that the very people working in the institution and the RECs as well as their international partners, that is to say members of the donor community, may consider this publication to be of some value for their own work.

3   Features of the Yearbook

The *Yearbook on the African Union* comprises four parts: (1) the Year-in-Review, (2) chapters on AU policy fields, (3) book reviews, and (4) three appendices. In the first part, the Yearbook opens with three pieces: 'The World as seen from Addis', an overview on 'The State of the Union', and a reflection on the role of the Union's chairperson. Following an editorial review workshop held in Cape Town in March 2023, we decided to include two new chapters: (1) 'The World

as seen from Addis', to reflect in a more concise and essayistic way on Africa's position under the global condition and the changing international environment, as reflected in the innerworkings and activities of the AU (as part of the Year-in-Review); and (2) an analysis of AU climate change policies, to provide an overview on an emerging policy field with huge relevance for ordinary African citizens.

The chapter on 'The State of the Union', explores and highlights the most important internal developments of the AU as an institution. The AU is the result of a negotiated transformation from one international organisation to another, with the member states being the main actors in this process. In the 21 years since its establishment, the Union has continuously changed, with structures and policies coming under scrutiny and in turn leading to modifications and reformulations. In this edition of the Yearbook, again one issue stands out: the Union's twin financial and institutional reforms. In the past, the AU has been described as a heavily donor-dependent institution. For this reason, member states in 2015– 2016, respectively, agreed on several ambitious aims to increase ownership and sovereignty of the institution. Closely linked to the debate on the financial reform, in 2017–2018 the Union also decided to reform its institutions. The objective was to increase efficiency, thereby strengthening the AU as an actor in global politics.

The next chapter focuses on the activities of the AU chairperson. In accordance with Article 6 (4) of the 2000 *Constitutive Act of the African Union* (OAU 2000; §6[4]), the 'Chairman of the Assembly' is 'elected after consultations among the Member States'. In contrast to the powers and functions of the AU Assembly and that of the chairperson of the AUC, the role of the chairperson of the Union is not detailed in the Constitutive Act. It was only with the 2003 *Rules of Procedure for the Assembly* (African Union 2003a, §16) as well as the 2003 *Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union* (African Union 2003b, §7) that the – fairly limited – procedural and managerial functions of the chairperson were detailed. This makes it a very interesting office that has been carried out in varying ways since its establishment. In February 2022, Senegalese president Macky Sall took over this position for a 12-month period. In this chapter, the aims, activities, and achievements of the chair for the year 2022 are reviewed.

But first and foremost, the *Yearbook on the African Union* aims to review major developments in key policy fields of the continental body that took place in the calendar year of 2022. With an interest in the historicity of the institution, these policy fields do not necessarily mirror 1:1 the up-to-the-minute policy priorities of the Union. Rather our examination of these policy fields extends beyond the present moment, delving into their emergence and

development over a longer period. So, longue durée trumps 'discourses of new-ness'. Over the coming years, this approach hopefully also makes the Union's policies more commensurable across time. As laid out in its long-term guid-ing Agenda 2063 policy (AU Assembly 2013), the continental body is currently pursuing 15 so-called flagship projects (African Union 2023).[6] In addition, on a day-to-day basis the Union is prioritising activities in 14 key programme areas.[7]

However, by looking into the history of the organisation, more long-term priorities can be identified. Based on an analysis of all the decisions taken by the OAU/AU Assemblies and Councils as well the AU PSC between 1963 and today (see Engel 2023a), nine key policy fields have been identified. Over the years, they may have been framed in different ways, but these policy fields are the substantive issues the Union has been dealing with. These policy fields are at the heart of the second part of the Yearbook. In alphabetical order, they are (1) climate change (which is a new addition to this section); (2) education, science, and technology; (3) governance; (4) health; (5) infrastructure; (6) peace and security; (7) regional integration and trade; (8) strategic partner-ships; and last but certainly not least, (9) women and youth. Suffice, to say that the character of the chapters in part 2 will progressively change with time, taking into consideration new concerns and aims.

Third, the Yearbook also has a book reviews section. It is edited by Jens Her-polsheimer (Leipzig University). The aim of this section is to critically highlight important academic contributions that were published in the respective year under review (i.e. 2022) to the debate on the AU, the RECs, and their entangle-ments in continental and global politics.

And fourth, the Yearbook provides a brief service section. It comprises three appendices: a chronicle of key events, an index of key AU decisions, and an

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6 The 15 flagship projects include (1) the integrated high-speed train network; (2) the formu-lation of an African commodities strategy; (3) the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area; (4) the policy on an African passport and free movement of people; (5) the *Silencing the Guns by 2020* initiative (now postponed to 2030); (6) implementation of the Grand Inga Dam Project; (7) the establishment of a Single African Air-Transport Market; (8) an annual African economic forum; (9) African financial institutions; (10) the Pan-African e-Network; (11) the *Africa Outer Space Strategy*; (12) an African Virtual and E-University; (13) a cyber security project; (14) the Great African Museum; and (15) the *Encyclopaedia Africana*.

7 The 14 key programme areas are (1) conflict resolution, peace, and security; (2) infrastruc-ture and energy development; (3) agricultural development; (4) trade and industrial devel-opment; (5) a visa-free Africa; (6) democracy, law, and human rights; (7) promoting health and nutrition; (8) migration, labour, and employment; (9) promoting sports and culture; (10) education, science, and technology; (11) youth development; (12) economic integration and private sector development; (13) diaspora and civil society engagement; and (14) gender equality and development.

overview on selected office holders. The chronicle very briefly develops a time-line of the most important meetings and other key events. The index contains all decisions documented and available online by the AU Assembly, the AU Executive Council, the AU/REC Mid-Year Coordination Meeting (MYCM), and the AU PSC. Unlike the UN, the AU does not provide an index function on its website. Usually, the AU Assembly takes about 40 to 50 decisions at its annual gathering, and the AU PSC roughly issues 70 communiqués a year (the frequency of meetings has increased in recent years). In addition, there is an equal number of decisions taken by the AU Executive Council and the AU/REC MYCM. The index is meant to provide quick guidance and access to those important AU documents that are in the public domain (needless to say, there are, undeniably, many more documents available on the websites of the Union and its various entities).[8] The overview on key office holders provides information on the chairperson of the AU, the chairperson of the AUC and the commissioners, the countries serving on the AU PSC, and the members of the Panel of the Wise.

4 Structure of the 2022 Yearbook

The first part of the *Yearbook on the African Union*, the Year-in-Review, features the essay on 'The World as seen from Addis', a chapter on 'The State of the Union', and a contribution discussing the Union's chairperson. In this third edition of the Yearbook, the essay is on the changing global condition and how this is affecting the AU (Tim Murithi, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town). This is followed by a review of 'The State of the Union' (Ulf Engel, Leipzig University). Part 1 then moves on to analyse the aims, activities, and achievements of the AU chairperson for the year 2022, Senegalese president Macky Sall. This chapter is authored by Aïssatou Kanté (from the regional West Africa office of the Institute for Security Studies in Dakar, Senegal).

Part 2 of the Yearbook is made up of nine topical chapters that highlight dynamics in the Union's substantive policy fields. In chapter 5, Ulf Engel examines how AU climate policy has progressed. The 27th Conference of the Parties (COP 27) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt (9–17 November 2022). This was the second COP to be held on African soil after COP 17 had been hosted in

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8 Working with the AU's website was interrupted in 2023, after the organisation became the target of a massive cyber attack (3 March). With the help from Interpol forensic experts, the AU managed to recover the encrypted data without paying any ransom. But it took weeks to fully restore the various communication and information functions of the system.

Durban, South Africa (28 November–9 December 2011). In chapter 6, Ulf Engel reviews dynamics in the field of education, science, and technology. Among others, this chapter investigates several strategies that are meant to support the establishment of knowledge societies on the continent; it also briefly highlights ongoing debates about African arts, culture, and heritage as well as identity and post-coloniality.

In chapter 7, Annie Chikwanha (University of Johannesburg) looks at the implementation of the African Governance Architecture (AGA), which is based on the *African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance* (ACDEG). The African Charter was adopted in 2007 and became operational in 2012. The author takes stock of the implementation of the agenda in terms of the domestication of human rights and democracy standards and, to this end, the transformation of the practices of AU member states. In chapter 8, Edefe Ojomo (University of Lagos), Habibu Yaya Bappah (Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria & ECOWAS), and Ulf Engel dissect the broader context of the development of AU health governance. Despite the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, other diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/Aids, and Ebola continue to test the limits of Africa's public health policies.

In chapter 9, Tim Zajontz (Technical University of Dresden) and Mandira Bagwandeen (Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance at the University of Cape Town) scrutinise the development of infrastructure as one of the pillars of the AU's continental development agenda. Specifically, they recall the progress made regarding the *Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa* (PIDA), which is a strategic framework for developing continental (cross-border) infrastructures, such as energy, transport, information, and communication technologies, as well as transboundary water resources. Preventing, managing, and resolving peace and security issues remains the biggest challenge for the AU, as clearly demonstrated by the current rise in violent extremism and terrorism as well as the growing number of unconstitutional changes of government. This policy field is addressed in chapter 10 by Dawit Yohannes Wondemagegnehu (Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa office). He provides an examination of AU initiatives vis-à-vis transregional conflicts as well as the collaboration with the RECs and international partners in this respect. The chapter also addresses the evolution of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTA) was formally launched on 1 January 2021. With 54 member states, it is the largest trading bloc in the world. It has certainly generated new dynamics across the continent in the area of regional integration and trade. In chapter 11, Bruce Byiers (European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht) analyses the effects

of harmonising African policies on trade in goods and in services, investment, intellectual property rights, competition, and dispute settlement in a global context. He also looks at how this project relates to the regional integration policies of the eight RECs officially recognised by the AU as partners. In chapter 12, the development of the Union's strategic partnerships is explored by Ulf Engel. The focus is on the three multilateral partnerships the Union maintains with the Arab League, the EU, and the UN, respectively, as well as five bilateral partnerships with China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Türkiye. And, finally, in chapter 13 Cheryl Hendricks (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town) and Ulf Engel offer an analysis of AU policies of women and youth in general. They also take a closer look at the practices unfolding within the AU since the adoption of UN Security Council *Resolution 1325* (2000) on women and children in violent conflict as well as on the role of women and youth in conflict prevention, management, and resolution.

The book reviews section makes up the third part of the Yearbook. Jens Herpolsheimer (Leipzig University) has selected a range of interesting new publications that are likely to advance the field of the study of the AU and the RECs. In this volume of the Yearbook, seven monographs and one edited volume have been chosen for closer inspection. As a reader, or an author, please feel kindly invited to suggest titles published in 2023 for review in the next edition of the Yearbook.

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PART 1

The Year-in-Review

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The World as Seen from Addis: The Africa Union and the Evolving Geopolitical Context

Tim Murithi

1 Introduction: The Geopolitical Inflection Point

For the last two decades, the African continent has been advocating the remaking of the global order, but these appeals have continued to fall on deaf ears, that is until February 2022, when Russia's invasion of Ukraine caused a tumultuous disruption of the geopolitical landscape of the world (see Ulf Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 4). The global order – predicated on the notions of maintaining peace and security, embodied and anchored in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) – is now at a major geopolitical inflection point. This chapter assesses Africa's advocacy of a global paradigm shift by transforming the multilateral system, as well as reconfiguring the UNSC due to its inability to address contemporary crises.

2 The Existing (Dis)Order

Political realism conceptualises international relations as a realm where power politics play fundamental, if not all encompassing, role. A central tenet of realism is that the primary actors in the international system – nation-states – are first and foremost self-interested rational actors who operate through systems of alliances. The persistence of realpolitik has led many analysts and practitioners of international relations to view political realism as an inherent feature of reality rather than as an ideology, unlike its predecessor, idealism, which has its own ideologues and advocates. Consequently, in the great struggle to secure one own's selfish interests – in which life is nasty, brutish, and short – humanity has veered dangerously towards its own self-destruction. As an ideology that appeals to the baser instincts of human beings, political realism has within it the seeds of humanity's demise and destruction. Realpolitik, together with its array of practices evident in brinksmanship and sabotage, is unlikely to promote global order and, in fact, is undermining any efforts to stabilise international relations in the twenty-first century.

The world has reached crisis point due to the regurgitation of the realpolitik as a way of life and to historical and continuing geopolitics of exclusion. As a result, the world has entered a period of turmoil that is more akin to a Hobbesian state of nature, where unprincipled laws of the jungle privilege those who have the power and those who believe that they have the might and the right to impose their will upon others. In this interregnum, a plethora of morbid symptoms are manifesting, including nuclear sabre-rattling, which, through the prism of mutually assured destruction, threatens the existence of human society as we know it. The reassertion of the might-makes-right approach to the world is the antithesis of a rules-based international order.

Owing to the perspective and lived reality of the African continent, the rising lamentations and protestations appealing for the preservation of a rules-based international order ring hollow in African capitals. The events playing out across the world have already rendered any appeal for a rules-based international order anachronistic and outdated. Moreover, these events have also overturned any post–Cold War illusions about the presumed and inherent stability of a 'unipolar' world.

The current international void has created the conditions in which major powers and military alliances have been able to arbitrarily impose their will on other countries. Examples are the 1999 bombardment of Yugoslavia by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan; the 2003 US/ UK-led invasion of Iraq; the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia; NATO's 2011 military intervention in Libya; the 2014 Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea from Ukraine; the 2014 US/UK/France-led military invasion in Syria and the 2015 Russian invasion supporting the Syrian government; and the 2015 Saudi Arabian military intervention in Yemen. By tacitly upholding the notion of might-makes-right, these interventions have cumulated in the gradual and cumulative erosion of the so-called rules-based international order, contributing to a much more unstable world.

The illegal invasions of Iraq and Syria have spawned violent religious extremist movements, from al-Qaeda to the Islamic State, which have now spread like a virus, infecting the African continent through the chaotic vortex created by the NATO-fuelled crisis in Libya. In turn, the Sahel region – including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger – has been engulfed in chaos, which can now only be described as an arc of violent extremism. Similarly, in East and Southern Africa religious extremism is undermining stability in Somalia and Mozambique, both of which are now struggling with extremists collectively known as al-Shabaab (though the latter is not linked to Somalia, but – after a phase of 'home-gown' violent extremism – to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania).

The repercussions of the actions undertaken by the global power elite are not acutely felt in Washington DC, London, Paris, Brussels, Moscow, or Beijing as they are experienced in communities and societies strewn across the African landscape. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine is not a departure from the past, but a continuation of the reign of the powerful over the less powerful. The ultimate repercussions of this event are impossible to quantify, a reality that looms large in the minds of the African foreign policy-makers.

The juxtaposition of these illegal international interventions with the failure of the international system to prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the 1995 genocide in Srebrenica, the 2009 Sri Lankan pogroms against the Tamil, China's continuing forced containment of the Uighurs exposes the lie that there is such an objective thing called the rules-based international order. Those who continue to call for the protection of this illusionary rules-based international order have self-evidently not been on the receiving end of an unsanctioned military incursion and are viewed by their African counterparts as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution.

It is evident that the United Nations (UN) system of collective security is dying and in a terminal comatose state of paralysis, as it remains impotent against the egregious actions of some its most powerful members. The trajectory the UN collective security system is now mimicking and aping the death knell that ultimately destroyed the League of Nations, established in 1919, when Nazi Germany invaded Poland in 1939. From an African perspective, history is in a very real sense repeating itself.

The myth of the illusion that there is still a functioning system of international norms that restrain and constrain the subjective whims of nation-states must now be discarded with deliberate haste. It is now much more urgent, particularly for foreign policy elites, to internalise the reality that the UN system is dysfunctional and a clear and present danger to the continuation of human survival. The historical exclusion of a majority of the world in designing and upholding global order needs to be redressed. Concretely, this means that it is necessary to rethink and remake the global order. The immediate challenge is not to throw the UN baby out with the bathwater, but to urgently reinvent multilateralism and design institutions that can more effectively operationalise a global system of collective security.

3   Whose Rules-Based International Order is this?

The so-called rules-based international order had not necessarily worked in Africa's favour. Throughout the continent, there are daily reminders of the

historical rejection of a rules-based order and the treatment of Africans as global second-class citizens, at the beck and call of the Western or Eastern masters in the Global North. The transatlantic slave trade, which made the plantations in the southern confederate states of America and the estates of the nobility and merchants in Europe exceptionally wealthy, was fuelled by the trade in the bodies of Africans. European colonialism and apartheid were unilaterally brutal, extractive, and dehumanising for Africans, with remnants and vestiges persisting until today within the political and socioeconomic spheres of the continent.

Western pundits are quick to demand that Africa 'get over' this constant harping on about the past and sign up to the programme. These supposed experts argue that this is ancient history and that Africa should let bygones be bygones. An opposite outlook has been adopted by African societies: the past is not yet past, being still very much present and looming large across the pan-African landscape. The tormentors of yesteryear have not changed their attitudes and mindsets because there is no evidence to the contrary. The mistaken belief that throwing money at problems will resolve the challenges facing societies throughout the continent is apparent in the substantial amounts pledged at the US–Africa, European Union–Africa, Russia–Africa, and China–Africa summits. On this point, the so-called leaders of Africa do not do themselves any good by scurrying off to these pledging and group photo extravaganzas. In doing so, they manifest a lack of self-respect that convinces their Western and Eastern courtiers that they are easily manipulated and ripe for the picking.

The view from most African capitals is that these Western and Eastern geopolitical emissaries and courtiers are not 'friendlies' and are more akin to wolves in sheep's clothing, adorned with accessories. Attempts by Western and Eastern courtiers to cajole and strong-arm African governments to pick a side, in the latest might-makes-right invasion project by Russia in Ukraine, will continue to fall on deaf ears because the hypocrisy of the system is palpable for all those who have eyes to see.

4   Constructive Ambiguity and Non-Alignment: a Pan-African Strategy

Africa's standing in the world will continue to be one of constructive ambiguity and non-alignment as far as the current configuration of global order is concerned. To be clear, the non-alignment koala bear, so it could be called,

was in hibernation and was only resuscitated by the events surrounding the theatre of the Russia-Ukraine war, and the forceful compulsion by the Western and Eastern powers for all others to 'pick a side'. The German foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, speaking at the Council of Europe, in Strasbourg, uttered the phrase, 'we are fighting a war against Russia', undoubtedly a Freudian slip that revealed the actual reality of conflagration and the potential interminable trajectory of the crisis.

The absence of an endgame to the Russia-Ukraine crisis means that African policy-makers will continue to resist attempts to be cajoled into taking one side or the other. Any attempts to manipulate African governments through behind the scenes arm-twisting, threats of resource deprivation, or covert sabotage of African societies and economies would egregiously fail to accurately understand and read Africa's determination to maintain its non-alignment position.

5 Africa and the Remaking of the Global Order

Africa as a continent has put forward its own proposals as to how to remake the global order based on the principle of equality and historical redress for global exclusion. Africa draws upon its historical experiences as a freedom-seeking continent, based on the insights gained from the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles that were led by actors across its territory. The continent also draws upon its own insistence on the principle of self-determination, which animated the emergence of the continent's nation-states from the vestiges of colonialism. This focus on this principle is also evident in the work that is being done to advance economic empowerment. which serves as a key indicator of the abilities of a continent of people who can determine their own self-development and enhance their own livelihoods. Pan-African solidarity among African states and societies was strong during the campaigns and endeavours to remove the yoke of colonialism and apartheid. The pan-African project, embodied in the form of the African Union (AU) and articulated through *Agenda 2063*, remains more a work in progress, and much more remains to be done to consolidate and entrench democratic governance across the continent.

Africa is also continuing to struggle for a more just world and a more equitable global order. As targets of historical injustice, Africans continue to lead of the charge in promoting justice that is based on fairness, equality, accountability, and redress for harm done in the past. Consequently, Africa possesses the moral authority to declare and show how a more just global order can be reconfigured. African societies have worked together to promote reconciliation

between various groups, societies, and communities around the world, epitomised by the work of Nelson Mandela in South Africa, as well as by other regional, national, and communal initiatives by citizens across the continent. Consequently, Africans are also 'reconciliactors', evident in the position that was adopted by African governments and societies when the external colonisers left the continent. Despite the brutal and dehumanising system that was imposed by colonisers on the people of the continent, there was no rush to seek revenge and vengeance against the perpetrators.

Drawing upon these pan-African experiences, significant segments of the African foreign policy-making community are demanding that the global order is transformed, predicated on the pursuit of human freedom, self-determination, global solidarity, justice, and reconciliation. In particular, the transformation of the UN system, specifically the UNSC, through its replacement with new institutions that seek to strengthen global democracy, based on the renewal of such principles, would resonate with Africa's own historical experiences. In taking the practical steps towards the remaking of global order, the limitations of such an initiative must be examined.

6   Pan-African Efforts to Reform the UNSC

The daily proceedings within the UNSC perpetuate and reproduce this paternalistic exclusion of the African continent. More than 60 per cent of the issues discussed by the UNSC focus on Africa, yet the continent does not have any representation among the five permanent members (the P5) of the council. Given the fact that the P5 can veto all manner of decisions that the council must make, it is a travesty of justice at its most basic level that African countries can only participate in key deliberations and decision-making processes as individual non-permanent members of the UNSC. In effect, the UNSC negotiation and decision-making processes are the greatest manifestations of the unfairness that lies at the heart of the international collective security system. If achieving fairness in negotiations among states is the preferred route to ensuring global legitimation, then a fundamental transformation of the UNSC and the elimination of the veto provision are necessary prerequisites to such an end. The P5, together with many other influential states, are immensely benefiting from the status quo within this international system, reproducing a form of geopolitical diplomatic apartheid. Given the fact that the asymmetrical distribution of global political, economic, and military power has remained relatively unchanged since the end of the Cold War means that the potential beneficiaries of global democratic transformation would be the societies in the

so-called developing regions of the world – Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.

Africa has tried to voice its concern that the existing UN system must be changed for the better. Specifically, in March 2005, the AU issued a declaration known as *The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus*, which notes that 'in 1945, when the UN was formed, most of Africa was not represented and that in 1963, when the first reform took place, Africa was represented but was not in a particularly strong position' (AU Council 2005, §c[e]). The AU goes on to state that 'Africa is now in a position to influence the proposed UN reforms by maintaining her unity of purpose' (ibid.). Furthermore, it notes that 'Africa's goal is to be fully represented in all the decision-making organs of the UN, particularly in the Security Council' (ibid.). The fact is that, for almost twenty years, this appeal was disregarded and was rebuffed by the self-involved and self-interested powerful members of the UNSC, notably the P5, who are now clamouring to recruit the continent to prosecute their infinity war between Russia and Ukraine. This suggests that the conversation about the reform of the multilateral systems and the transformation of global order needs to go back to the drawing board and proceed on the basis of a blank slate. Specifically, when a new round of discussions and negotiations take place, the defunct and moribund Ezulwini Consensus should not be the starting point for African governments, and it should not constrain or limit Africa's suggestions and proposal for the transformation of the international multilateral system (see Ulf Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 3).

7   The Pathway to the Remaking of the Global Order: Practical Steps to a UN Charter Review Conference

Recognising that the moment would arrive when it became imperative to transform the UN, the founders of the organisation and included a practical mechanism to review the *UN Charter*. Specifically, chapter 18, Article 109 of the UN Charter provides for a General Conference of the Members for the Purpose of Reviewing the Present Charter (United Nations 1945, §109). Article 109 of the UN Charter cannot be vetoed by the P5 of the UNSC, which has in the past hampered, deliberately sabotaged, and deployed subterfuge among their client states to prevent any attempts to 'reform' the UNSC.

This charter review conference could be convened at a specific date and place if it is approved by 'a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security Council' (United

Nations 1945, §109[1]). Therefore, in practice there are no major obstacles to convening a conference apart from securing the necessary percentages described above. In addition, the decision-making process at such a conference would be relatively democratic in the sense that 'each member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference' (ibid.).

This charter review conference could be initiated through a process of mobilising the will of two-thirds of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and nine members of the UNSC. The latter provision means that the P5 cannot veto any proposed charter review conference. Such a conference could adopt a recommendation to substantially alter the UN Charter and introduce completely new provisions for a new and transformed multilateral system. The adoption of these new recommendations could be on the basis of a two-thirds vote of the conference, and each member of the UN would have one vote. There are already precedents for charter review processes leading to the establishment of new international organisations, notably the European Economic Community's (EEC) transformation into the European Union (EU) as well as the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the AU.

Therefore, there a charter review conference for the UN could lead to the formation of a revitalised and renewed multilateral system through broad-based and inclusive consultation that includes governments, civil society, business, trade unions, and academics. The recommendations adopted at a conference would be imbued with a degree of moral legitimacy and buttressed by the principle of equality. To move forward a group of progressive states is required, which African governments will most likely join, to begin drafting a UNGA resolution to put a charter review conference on the global agenda.

It would be naive to think that the beneficiaries of the current system, notably the P5, will allow such changes to take place simply because the African continent demands it. Consequently, Africa will have to utilise a strategy of engagement to build a coalition of the willing, as well as lead in the design and creation of new global institutions. The point is not that the UN is not doing good work in some places; rather, the aim of the next version of the UN should be able to achieve even more for the war-affected refugees and downtrodden of the world. In addition, a new system of global democracy should have its own reliable source of funding, being made available, for example, by taxing financial capital flows or issuing a levy on imports. The AU has recently adopted this proposed policy for funding its own operations. African policy-makers have an important role to play in contributing to the framing of the discourse relating to the changing world order. Ultimately, redesigning and improving the global order is ultimately about advancing the notion of our common humanity.

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The State of the Union

Ulf Engel

1   Introduction

In the year following the election of a new leader of the African Union Commission (AUC), three themes have continued to shape the development of the African Union (AU) and its organs: first, the continued reform of its finances; second, the implementation of the parallel institutional reform, including the ongoing fine-tuning of relations between the AU and the eight officially recognised Regional Economic Communities (RECs);[1] and third, implementation of *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want* – the policy programme adopted at the 50th anniversary of the AU and its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Based on the 2017 report submitted by Rwandan president Paul Kagame (Kagame 2017), the Union has identified a wide range of reforms that are needed to overcome its crisis of implementation and non-delivery regarding these three themes. The collective reform project was structured into four work packages: (1) the realignment of AU institutions, (2) connecting the AU to its citizens, (3) enhancing operational effectiveness and efficiency, and (4) ensuring sustainable financing (see this chapter, sections 2 and 3; see also *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 29–32).

The first cycle of AU statutory annual meetings of key decision-making bodies in 2022 started with the 43rd Ordinary Session of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) (20–21 January), followed by the 40th Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council (2–3 February), and the 35th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of the Heads of State and Government (5–6 February). After the Covid-19-inflicted restrictions in 2021, all meetings took place in person in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The second cycle of statutory annual meetings started with the 44th Ordinary Session of the PRC (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 20 June–8 July), followed by the 41st Ordinary Session of the AU Executive

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1 These are the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Council (14–15 July), and the 4th Mid-Year Coordination Meeting of the AU and the RECs (17 July). The latter two meetings both took place in Lusaka, Zambia, where the OAU had met 21 years ago to adopt the roadmap for the establishment of the AU.

In addition, two extraordinary meetings of the AU Assembly were held, both in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea: the first was a Humanitarian Summit and Pledging Conference (25–27 May); the second was the 16th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly (28 May), taking place under the theme 'Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa' (on the latter AUC Chairperson 2022a; see also Dawit Johannes, this Yearbook, chapter 10). Furthermore, another summit meeting (Niamey, Niger, 20–25 November) was organised together with two organisations of the United Nations (UN) – the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) – and Afro-Champions (of heads of state and government) on the theme 'Industrialising Africa: Renewed commitment towards an Inclusive and Sustainable Industrialization and Economic Diversification'.

Following the theme for 2021, 'Arts, Culture and Heritage: Levers for Building the Africa We Want' (see AU Council 2022e; see also *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 77), the AU adopted the 2022 theme, 'Strengthening Resilience in Nutrition and Food Security on the African Continent: Strengthening Agro-Food Systems, Health and Social Protection Systems for the Acceleration of Human, Social and Economic Capital Development' (AU Council 2022d; AU Assembly 2022a). The Union's nutrition campaign is mainly driven by the AU Nutrition Champion, King Letsie III of Lesotho, whose terms of office was extended from 2018 to 2021, to 2022, and then to 2024 (see AU Assembly 2022c[i]; AU Council 2022s). In this respect, the Conference of the Parties (COP 27) (Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, 6–20 November 2022), under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), played an important role regarding the aims of the AU member states, not only regarding agriculture and food security, but also regarding climate justice (see Ulf Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 5; see also below, section 5.6).

2   The Union's Finances

The Union's chronic budget problem continued: far too many member states are paying too late, too little, or not at all. This has created severe problems, among other issues, both in terms of planning and budget execution, resulting in a low absorption capacity. At the 41st Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council, member states, once again, were strongly reminded 'to pay their

assessed contributions on time to ensure adequate funding of the Union's annual budgets as required by the AU Financial Rules' (AU Council 2022m, §14).

At the same time, the Union remained highly dependent on the contributions of 'international partners', that is to say the donor community, especially the members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Against this background, the AU had decided in 2015 that it should raise 100 per cent of its operational budget (which includes maintenance, salaries, etc.), 75 per cent of the programme budget (which includes implementation of all AU policies), and 25 per cent of the budget for AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 24). Historically, the latter mainly refers to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was started in 2007 and was usually responsible for the bulk of this budget position (well above 90%).[2] As of late, it also extends to other missions (see below; and Dawit Yohannes, this Yearbook, chapter 10). In 2016, the Union also introduced a 0.2 levy on eligible imports to raise an additional $400 million for its AU Peace Fund by 2020 (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 24). The AU is planning its budget for the financial years (FYs), which begin on 1 January and end on 31 December.[3] In February 2019, the AU Executive Council introduced a three-year budget cycle – the Multiyear Financial Framework (MFF) – and based the annual budget ceiling on a three-year average execution rate (ibid., 26). Importantly, in July 2022 the AU Executive Council also decided to stop creating any new AU structures (AU Council 2022x, §12).

The AU Committee of Fifteen Ministers of Finance (F15) met (Rabat, Morocco, 13–14 June 2022) to discuss how the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian war against Ukraine was affecting the resilience of member states and the financial sustainability of the AU (AU F15 2022; see below section 5.4). The 5th Ordinary Session of the Specialised Technical Committee on Finance, Monetary Affairs, Economic Planning, and Integration (STC–FMAEPI) (Lusaka, Zambia, 18–22 July 2022) mainly addressed the evolution and state of Africa's debt; related frameworks for debt restructurings and debt relief initiatives, including write-off of the debt; and the increasing influence of credit rating agencies

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2   In April 2022, it was transitioned into the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), with a mandate until 31 December 2024. The AU special representative Francisco Madeira, who was investigated by the AU because of alleged incidents of corruption, mismanagement, harassment, and political interference, was declared a persona non grata by the Somali government on 6 April 2022. His deputy, Simon Mulongo (Uganda), was expelled in 2021 over similar accusations. See *The East African* (2022e, 2022f). See also Dawit Yohannes, this Yearbook, chapter 10.

3   The budget process is briefly explained in AU/NZ MFAT (2022, 208) and more detailed in Engel (2015).

in Africa. In the 35 years after the OAU Assembly had come up with a policy position on the issue (OAU 1987), this meeting finally adopted an updated the *Common African Position* (CAP) on the worsening debt problem. Among other things, the meeting discussed the issue of a pan-African credit rating agency (an idea that the STC–FMAEPI has been pursuing since 2019).

2.1 *Scale of Assessment*

Member states' contributions to the AU's budget follow a scale of assessment. During the Union's first decade, the culture of not and/or late paying membership fees resulted in a particular form of burden sharing: one group of countries bear the brunt of the AU's finances (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa). The system came to end following the popular uprisings in 2011 in North Africa and political upheavals in Libya and Egypt. In 2015, a three-tier system of assessed contributions was introduced that reflected countries' contributions to the continent's gross domestic product (GDP) (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 25). In 2019, the AU Assembly revised the scheme for the FYs 2020–2022 'on the principles of ability to pay, solidarity, and equitable burden-sharing to avoid risk concentration' (AU Assembly 2019, §4). No member state should pay more than $3.5 million and no one less than $350,000. Tier 1 countries (with a GDP above 4% of the continent's GDP) are contributing 45.15 per cent of the Union's assessed budget, tier 2 countries (GDP between 1% and 4%) 32.75 per cent, and tier 3 countries (GDP below 1%) 22.10 per cent (ibid., §7). The six tier 1 countries, contributing 7.52 per cent each, are Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Morocco (basically replacing Libya), Nigeria, and South Africa. There are 12 tier 2 countries, which are contributing between 1.38 per cent (Uganda) and 3.99 per cent (Ethiopia) to the budget. Tier 3 comprises the remaining 37 member states.

In 2022, the AU Assembly decided to extend the application of the current scale of assessment 2020–2022 by one year up to 2023 (AU Assembly 2022l, §4). In addition, given the problematic political circumstances, it wrote off 50 per cent of Libya's contributions to the regular budget (ibid., §5). The AU Executive Council also agreed to impose cautionary sanctions on São Tomé and Príncipe, Guinea, and Congo because they had decreased the payment of their assessed contributions; for the same reason, intermediate sanctions were imposed on South Sudan (AU Council 2022i, §12).[4] At the same time, sanctions were lifted for Chad, Djibouti, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, and Senegal (AU Council 2022w, §15[b]).

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4 Sudan had requested the year before to agree upon a four-year payment plan to clear the arrears.

2.2   *Supplementary Budget for* FY *2021*

In 2021, the AU Executive Council approved a comparatively small supplementary budget for FY 2021. At the 40th Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council, a supplementary budget of $1.596 million, to be entirely financed from the Union's reserves, was adopted (AU Council 2022a, §2). The bulk of the supplementary budget was meant to cover salaries and activities of the Reforms Unit until 31 March 2023 (see below) and the recruitment of an independent African consultancy firm. In the year prior, the AU Executive Council decided to allow for only one supplementary budget per FY and capped it at a maximum of 15 per cent of the original budget (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 24).

2.3   *Budget for* FY *2023*

Considering the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and increased food insecurity on the continent, the budget for FY 2023 continued to be considered 'an austerity budget and its provisions [were] prioritized and rationalized' (AU Council 2022m, §78).[5] The budget was adopted at the 41st Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council in July 2022. It totals $654.88 million, out of which member states agreed to contribute $205.00 million (31.30%) and international partners were expected to raise $435.98 million (66.57%) – the remainder (2.12%) was to come from the Administrative Cost and the Maintenance Fund (see table 3.1). As usual, AU member states were meant to take care of the operational budget of $163.68 million (97.94% to directly come from them, and the rest from the Maintenance Fund). For the programme budget of $239.03 million, member states are planned to contribute 18.58 per cent (in contrast to the medium-term target of 75%). In fact, international partners were expected to contribute 76.91 per cent ($183.83 million) to the programme budget. Combined assessed contributions by member states amount to 39.88 per cent of the operational and programme budget (FY 2022: 42.74%). And regarding AU-led PSOs, the entire budget of $252.15 million is to be solicited from donors. The overall dependency ratio on external finances in the FY 2023 budget is 65.57 per cent – down 0.3 percentage points from the previous FY (see table 3.1). And in addition, since 2017 a total of $272 million out of the planned $400 million has been collected outside this budget through assessed contributions towards the AU Peace Fund (AU Council 2022i, §§2–3; AU Council 2022w, §2).

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5   As discussed by the AU Committee of Fifteen Ministers of Finance (Rabat, Morocco, 13–14 June 2022).

TABLE 3.1 Approved AU Budgets for FYS 2021–2023

	FY 2021			FY 2022			FY 2023			Shortfall [b]
	$ million	MS (in %)	IP (in %)	$ million	MS (in %)	IP (in %)	$ million	MS (in %)	IP (in %)	$ million
Operational	172.09	93.56	0.00	176.35	90.12	0.00	163.70	97.94	0	0
supplementary budget 1	12.02	0.00	0.00							
supplementary budget 2[a]	1.596	0.00	0.00							
subtotal A	185.71	86.07	0.00	176.35	90.12	0.00	163.70	97.94	0	3.37
Programme	199.25	21.33	77.14	195.54	23.45	76.55	239.03	18.58	76.91	
supplementary budget 1	90.03	0.00	82.79							
subtotal B	289.28	14.69	78.90	195.54	23.45	76.55	239.03	18.58	76.91	83.15
AU-led PSOS	264.74	0.00	100.00	279.22	0.00	100.00	252.15	0.00	100.00	
subtotal C	264.74	0.00	100.00	279.22	0.00	100.00	252.15	0.00	100.00	63.04
Total original budget	636.08	31.99	65.78	651.11	31.45	65.87	654.88	31.30	65.57	149.56
supplementary budgets	103.65	0.00	73.04							
Grand total	739.73	26.75	69.35	651.11	31.45	65.87				

Notes: MS = member states, IP = international partners. Where percentages do not add up to 100, additional sources of finance from within the AUC have been utilised (e.g. reserves, administrative costs, maintenance fund, etc.).
a approved in 2022;
b FY 2023 shortfall in absolute terms compared to the 100/75/25 target (the achievement of which has been postponed to FY 2025).
SOURCE: AU EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (VARIOUS YEARS)

Some significant shifts can be seen in the new budget. In terms of taking on the biggest budget position (excluding AU-led PSOs) is traditionally the AUC ($232.16 million, or 57.65% – up from 56.51% in FY 2022). In FY 2023, the next three main recipients of funding are the AU Development Agency (AUDA, which emerged from the *New Partnership for Africa's Development*, NEPAD) ($29.05 million, or 7.21% – down from 9.33%), the Secretariat of the newly established African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) ($28.45 million, or 7.06% – up from 3.69%), and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) ($25.33 million, or 6.29% – considerably up from 3.65%).[6] This is followed by a number of AU organs whose budgets were cut: the Pan African University (PAU, $16.39 million, or 4.07% – down from 4.85%), the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (AfCHPR, $11.98 million, or 2.97% – down from 3.20%), the Pan-African Parliament (PAP, $11.93 million, or 2.96% – down from 3.22%), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM, $10.70 million, or 2.66% – down from 3.04%), and the African Commission for Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR; $5.24 million, or 1.30% – down from 1.53%).

On AU-led PSOs, the bulk of expenditure still goes to AMISOM/ATMIS ($223.87 million, or 88.79% of this budget component – slightly up from 88.74% in FY 2022),[7] followed by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin ($11.94 million, or 4.74% – up from 4.05%), as well as missions of military observers (MILOBs) and human rights observers (HROs) ($5.48 million, or 2.17% – down from 2.55%). The Early Response Mechanism (ERM) – in the past an essential component of the now abolished EU-funded Africa Peace Facility (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, fn. 8) – was financed with $9 million (3.57%, down from 4.66%).

Overall, staff costs were severely cut in the FY 2023 budget ($134.61 million vs. $151.93 million in FY 2022). At the same time, however, major institutions were strengthened. The main budget positions in this respect were the AUC ($74.89 million, or 55.56% – up from 51.65% in FY 2022), AUDA–NEPAD ($9.63 million, or 7.15% – up from 6.02%), the PAP ($7.67 million, or 5.70% – down from 5.73%), the AfCHPR ($6.71 million, or 4.99% – up from 4.60%), the

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6   The implementation of a fund for the Africa CDC totalling 0.5 per cent from the annual operational budget was put on hold 'until such a time the statute and structure of the Africa CDC are adopted' (AU Council 2022m, §81).

7   Reportedly, the Ugandan ATMIS contingent, dubbed the Uganda Battle Group (Ugabag), did not receive any payment in 2022 (and also not for nine months in 2021 – initially a soldier would bring home some $828 per month, after a $200 deduction to cover government costs; currently the net allowance is closer to $460). However, funds under the European Peace Facility (EPF), totalling $792.2 million for the period 2021–2024, have been disbursed; and an additional $120 million was approved on 6 July 2022. See *The East African* (2022a).

AfCFTA ($5.90 million, or 4.38% – up from 3.45%), the APRM ($4.61 million, or 3.42% – slightly down from 3.48%), the Africa CDC ($3.63 million, or 2.69% – almost constant vis-à-vis 2.71% the year before), the African Human Rights Commission ($3.49 million, or 2.59% – up from 2.34%), and the Pan African University ($2.12 million, or 1.58% – slightly up from 1.46%).

The *AUC Transition Plan* (see next section of this chapter, on institutional reform), which accounted for $12.78 million (8.46%) in the previous budget, was discussed under AUC 'programmes' and allocated $12.13 million (5.92%). In the 40th Ordinary Session, the AU Executive Council had allowed the AUC to mobilise $3.6 million from international partners to pay out staff to be retrenched in 'recognition of their contributions to the organization'; it also approved an extra $13 million to be drawn from the Reserve Fund 'to cover the cost of separation for potentially affected staff' by the reorganisation of the commission (AU Council 2022m, §121).

Despite the intention to successively reduce dependence on international partners, the aims to a large extent failed to be met (see figure 3.1). The financial shortfall against the 100/75/25 per cent target in the FY 2023 budget is $149.56 million (i.e. $3.37 million for the operational budget, $83.15 million for the programme budget, and $63.04 million for PSOs). The budget cap of

FIGURE 3.1   AU Financial Ownership in FYs 2021–2023 plus Projection for FYs 2024–2025 (in per cent of the respective total budget lines)

Note: The projection for FYs 2024–2025 is not based on AU internal planning documents, but simply an attempt to indicate which direction budget composition must go if the 100/75/25 target was to be achieved by FY 2025. A decision on benchmarking the budget has not yet been taken (save for the $250 million expenditure cap).

SOURCE: AU EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, VARIOUS YEARS

a maximum of \$250 million of member states' assessed contributions, which was introduced in 2019 (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 26), was still in place, and retained for FY 2024 (AU Council 2022m, §93). In the FY 2023 budget, the member states reached 82 per cent of this threshold.

In its 2021 *Budget Performance Report*, the AU Executive Council expressed concern 'about the continued low budget execution and performance rates by the AU Commission and other AU Organs'. It called upon the AUC to establish 'a performance monitoring and evaluation tool' in the Office of the Director-General (AU Council 2022m, §95). Acknowledging the crucial nexus between understaffing and low budget execution rates, the AU Executive Council pressed the Directorate of Human Resources Management (HRM) 'to develop an emergency action plan to fast track the recruitment of essential staff and to provide, in 2022', the Office of the Director-General and Directorate HRM 'with the critical staff needed to function effectively and to be able to fulfill their mandates' (ibid., §96). It also decided to protect the Maintenance Fund by allowing for no more than two-thirds of its funds be used and keeping one-third for emergencies (ibid., §98). Furthermore, all departments and directorates were instructed to submit quarterly reports on the status of implementation 'of recommendations emanating from budget hearings starting from September 2022' (ibid., §99).

2.4 *Audit Matters*

In principle, auditing practices at the AU continue to be characterised by a combination of a lack of institutionalising and implementing adopted decisions, on the one hand, and serious deficits in terms of human resources, on the other. Implementation of audit decisions are usually delayed, and responses from the AUC and other AU organs are often late (AU Council 2022m, §25). Detailed audit figures are publicly available for FYs 2014–2021.[8] Latest audit matters are contained in the *Report on the Sub-Committee on Audit Matters*, endorsed by the AU Executive Council in July 2022. The report notes several concerns regarding delays in finalising the review of the *Staff Regulations and Rules* (ibid., §9), errors and delays in bank reconciliations (ibid., §20), amounts incurred by unused flight tickets (ibid., §21), outstanding advance payments to vendors (ibid., §22), as well as the non-recovery of salary and travel advance

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8   The audits are prepared by the AU Board of External Auditors (see AU BoEA 2022), in 2022 chaired by Adolphus A. Aghughu, the auditor-general of Nigeria. In their last report (20 May 2022), the AU Board of External Auditors concluded that they were in accordance with the *International Public Sector Accounting Standards* and the requirements of the AU *Financial Rules and Regulations*. The revised AU Financial Rules and Regulations were adopted by the AU Assembly in February 2022 (AU Assembly 2022e).

payments to staff (ibid., §23). The AU Executive Council expressed 'serious concern' about delayed implementation of audit decisions as well as 'late responses from [the AU] Commission and other AU Organs'. It, therefore, directed them 'to provide a quarterly update on the implementation of Executive Council decisions related to audit matters and the challenges they face in this regard' (ibid., §25).

In addition, the *Report on Budget Performance for the Year 2021 for AU Organs*[9] from the Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) expressed irritation about the AUC's budget culture. The OIO was 'seriously concerned' about 'the low rate of implementation of programmes in most AU Organs' (AU Council 2022m, §28). Unrealistic plans, resulting in low implementations rates and budget cuts, remained a huge problem. The OIO therefore recommended to introduce a minimum rate of implementation thresholds (ibid., §29). Budget proposals should be aligned with the existing human resources capacities. Furthermore, the OIO pressed for establishing a nexus between budget execution reports and the impact of programmes (ibid., §33). The *Inception Report on Forensic and Performance Audit of the other AU Organs* discussed delays in the procurement process and challenges faced by the audit firm (Lochan & Co., New Dehli) in terms of a lack of cooperation between AU organs (ibid., §§39–41). The AU Executive Council also instructed AUC departments and other AU organs with low implementation rates to adopt audit recommendations 'without further delay, and to update the Sub-Committee [on Audit Matters] on challenges faced in implementation in order to address them on a timely manner' (ibid., §44).

And regarding the *Progress Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (AUC) on the Implementation of Recommendations of the PWC Forensic and Performance Audit on [the] AUC* (PricewaterhouseCoopers, for the period 2012–2018), the AU Executive Council called for imposing strong sanctions on staff who owed the AUC money and violated respective rules. It also requested the AUC 'to develop ethical and accountability frameworks and training programs to develop a culture of integrity and honesty within the AUC and other AU Organs' (AU Council 2022m, §53). In the end, effective budgetary control, financial management, and reporting remained critical issues that require better monitoring and optimisation (ibid., §54).

Regarding accounting, the various special funds developed over the last years remain important topics. Based on the *Report on the Detailed Analysis of all Dormant Special Funds*, the AU Executive Council directed the AUC in

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9 This includes the following AU organs: AfCHPR, the AU Advisory Board on Corruption (AUABC), AfCFTA, AUDA–NEPAD, ECOSOCC, PAP, ACHPR, APRM, Africa CDC, and AUC. See also AU Council (2022a, §§17–24).

February 2022 to implement several digital recording practices; it also closed seven of these accounts (AU Council 2022a, §§15–16). The current filing and archiving systems have been identified as one of the root causes of substandard accounting practices (ibid., §25[IV]).

The OIO also investigated members of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), the AU organ established in 2004 to provide a voice for different social and professional groups of AU member states, including civil society organisations (CSOs). In a report adopted by the AU Executive Council in February 2022, the OIO expressed 'grave concern on the recurring nature of the violations and lack of actions by the ECOSOCC General Assembly against those alleged to have violated Legal norms of the Union' (AU Council 2022c, §27). In strong words, the AU Executive Council directed the AUC chairperson to 'ensure that any acts of ECOSOCC members in violation of AU Legal Norms which mislead the general public and expose the AU to legal, financial and reputational risks are cancelled' (ibid., §30). Among others, this referred to two Nigerian citizens who had illegally opened a bank account in the name of ECOSOCC.[10]

3   Institutional Reform

The second pillar of the reform of the AU relates to its institutions and practices (see 'The Annual Interview', *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 13–18). Originally, the *African Union Administrative Reform Roadmap* had an implementation horizon of four years. In October 2021, the AU Executive Council requested the AUC to extend phase one of the AUC Transition Plan until the end of 2022 (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 28). This decision was confirmed by the AU Assembly in February 2022 (AU Assembly 2022c, §49).

On the implementation of previous decisions taken by the AU Executive Council and the AU Assembly, the AU Executive Council directed the AUC in February 2022 'to elaborate a roadmap and clear timelines for the full implementation' of a decision taken the year before on the implementation of all decisions adopted in the past ten years (AU Council 2022c, §2). It also called for a joint retreat between the PRC and the AUC. Subsequently a Joint Task Force on Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting on the Implementation of Decisions of the AU Policy Organs was established (AU Council 2022o, §3). It met the first time on 25–27 April 2022 (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) and was expected to report

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10   See *21st Century Chronicle* (2022). See also the decision of the AU Executive Council on the ECOSOCC activity report (AU Council 2022g).

to the 42nd Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15–16 February 2023).

3.1 *Reform of the* AUC

Major institutional reforms in line with the *Kagame Report* have already been implemented – for instance, the reduction of AU departments from eight to six, and the appointment of a director-general (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 28–32).[11] The core components of the AUC Transition Plan are a new quota system, an external skills audit, and an emergency recruitment plan (AUC Chairperson 2022b; see AU Council 2022m, §§113–119). In 2022, implementation of the institutional reform continued to be accompanied by high levels of insecurity, anxiety, and frustration among staff – and according to some observers almost a paralysis of the entire AUC (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 30f.). The deadline for submitting the outcome of the remaining reform priorities was extended by one year to February 2023 (AU Assembly 2022c, §49).

The AU Assembly also decided to make the Africa CDC an autonomous body (AU Assembly 2022k, §7[1]). Since March 2020, the Africa CDC had effectively organised the continent's response to the Covid-19 pandemic in an extremely professional manner (see 'The Annual Interview', *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 15–22). The Union also institutionalised the small Office of the Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security, headed by Bineta Dioup since its inception in January 2014 (AU Council 2022t, §110).[12] However, the AU Border Programme (AUBP) and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), one of the five pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (see African Union 2002, §12), were not re-created as units after disappearing from the AUC's organigram the year before (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 29; and Engel 2022a, 2022b). The portfolio Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) held a retreat on 29 May 2022 to discuss how to restore its operability in this respect.

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11   On 15 October 2021, the Moroccan career diplomat Fathallah Sijilmassi was appointed director-general, the highest non-elective position in the AUC.

12   In February 2022, the AU Assembly adopted new human resources structures for the AU Permanent Representation Office in Beijing (China, with a staff size of 11 positions), the Office Safety and Security Services in the AUC (111), ECOSOCC (Lusaka, Zambia, 34), the APRM (Midrand, South Africa, 114), the Pan-African Virtual E-University (Yaoundé, Cameroon, 14), the Secretariat of the AfCFTA (Accra, Ghana, 296), and the African Space Agency (Cairo, Egypt, 156) (AU Assembly 2022b). In addition, human resources were planned for the AU Continental Logistics Base (CLB, Douala, Cameroon) (see AU Council 2022m[c], §110).

3.2   *Adjusting AU–RECs Relations*

The exact division of labour between the AU and the eight officially recognised RECs and two Regional Mechanisms (RMs) remained unclear.[13] Despite the existence of a general protocol (28 January 2008, AU/RECs 2008a) and a special memorandum of understanding on peace and security (June 2008, AU/RECs 2008b), this has been a matter of debate and practical concern since the very establishment of the Union. In his report on reforms, Kagame highlighted the 'unclear division of labour' between the Union and the RECs (Kagame 2017, 5). To make relations between the AUC and the RECs more effective, the second annual summit of the AU Assembly was replaced in 2019 by the Mid-Year Coordination Meetings (MYCM) between the AU Bureau of the Assembly and the RECs (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 33).

A new protocol on relations between the AU and the RECs was adopted at the 33rd AU Assembly in 2020. Remaining details of the division of labour were to be finalised for the 35th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly.[14] However, the text remained work in progress.[15] Nevertheless, after the 35th Ordinary Session, several meetings helped in identifying nine areas of convergence, including infrastructure; agriculture and food security; education, science, technology, and innovation; industrialisation, investment, tourism, and private sector development; health; sports, culture, and heritage; humanitarian affairs; monetary and financial integration; and free movement of persons[16] and social integration (see MYCM 2022b).

The 4th MYCM was held on 17 July 2022 (Lusaka, Zambia). The following issues were discussed (see MYCM 2022a):[17] (1) a progress report on the Covid-19 pandemic (introduced by South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, the AU

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13   The latter refers to the coordinating mechanisms of the regional standby brigades for East (EASF, the East African Standby Force) and North Africa (NARC, the North Africa Regional Capability).

14   So far, the AU has only published the documents of the 1st MYCM (2019) on the AUC's website. The declaration of the 3rd MYCM (virtual, 16 October 2021) was adopted at the 35th AU Assembly (see AU Assembly 2022i).

15   For a critical comment on this, see the press release on the opening address of the AUC chairperson (AUC 2022a).

16   However, the 2018 *Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment* has only been ratified by four member states (Mali, Niger, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Príncipe).

17   See AU media briefing in Luska, 13 July 2022, by Isabelle Lememba (permanent secretary in Zambia's ministry of foreign affairs) and Ambassador Alexandre T. Radebaye (AUC deputy chief of staff). URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0NmD5Ut4Zf4> (accessed: 30 June 2023). See also the local report in *Lusaka Times* (2022) as well as AUDA–NEPAD (2022a).

'champion for the Covid-19 response'); (2) an update on the implementation report of the AfCFTA (presented by former Nigerien president Mahamadou Issoufou); (3) a reflection on the *First Ten-Year Implementation Plan* and discussion of the *Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan* of Agenda 2063 (introduced by AUC deputy chairperson Monique Nsanzabaganwa); (4) a report on the status of regional integration in Africa; (5) a debate of the tripartite free trade agreement between COMESA, EAC, and SADC; (6) a discussion of the report on the division of labour between the AU, the RECS/RMs, and member states; and (7) the introduction of the Inter-Regional Knowledge Exchange on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention (I–RECKE),[18] which is supposed to link the AU and the RECS/RMs (presented by the PAPS commissioner, Bankole Adeoye).

The Coordination Committee of the AUC, the RECS/RMs, and AUDA–NEPAD, led by the head of AU Reform Implementation Unit, Prof Pierre Mbonjo Moukoko, suggested that final details on remaining areas of convergence should be outsourced to an independent consultant company. On the basis of their findings, the committee suggested to convene an extraordinary coordination meeting in December 2022 to detail the recommendations to be submitted to the 36th AU Assembly in February 2023 (MYCM 2022b). These plans were endorsed in the draft declaration on the 4th MYCM (3rd revised version) – however, a formal declaration has not yet been issued (see MYCM 2022c).

3.3   *PAP and Regional Representation*

The conflict about regional representation in the PAP (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 37–38) was finally resolved. First, the AU Executive Council directed the AUC 'to arrange the holding of PAP' elections by the end of April 2022' (AU Council 2022b, §3). Successful elections of the new PAP president and the PAP Bureau were finally held on 29 June 2022. After interventions by the chairpersons of the AU and the AUC as well as the South African president Ramaphosa, the Southern African region was elected for the very first time to the parliament's presidency. At the 5th Ordinary Session of PAP, Senator Chief Fortune Z. Charumbira (Zimbabwe) was elected the new PAP president (he received 161 out of 203 votes cast, with 31 abstentions and 11 spoilt votes). He took over from Roger Nkodo Dang (Cameroon).[19] Recalling the principle of

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18   At the time of writing, the system was not yet operational. Also, important support measures for member states in the area of structural, long-term conflict prevention were put on hold. See also ISS (2022).

19   See AUC (2022b). Also elected to the PAP Bureau were the first vice-president Prof Massouda Mohamed Laghdaf (Mauritania), the second vice-president Dr Ashebiri Gayo (Ethiopia), the third vice-president Lúcia Maria Mendes Gonçalves dos Passos (Cape Verde), and the fouth vice-president Francois Ango Ndoutoume (Gabon).

geographical rotation of the members of the bureau, including the presidency, the AU Executive Council directed the parliament 'to apply the rotation formula outlined in the Modalities for Election of Bureau Members of the Sixth Pan African Parliament in all future elections of the Bureau' (AU Council 2022z, §6). At the same time, the AU Office of the Legal Counsel, in close collaboration with the Secretariat of the PAP, was invited 'to urgently review the Rules of Procedure of the PAP to ensure alignment with African Union values, rules, and regulations as well as established practices of the Union including the principle of geographical rotation' (ibid., §7).

4   Implementation of *Agenda 2063*

The most important policy document guiding the Union's actions is *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want* (AU Commission 2015 [2013]).[20] The related policy is managed through a *First Ten-Year Implementation Plan* (2014–2023). The second biennial continental-level report on the implementation of Agenda 2063's *First Ten-Year Implementation Plan* was published in February 2022 (AUDA–NEPAD 2022b; see AU Council 2022z). It noted a positive upward trend for most of the 20 goals, with an overall score of 51 per cent against the 2021 targets compared to the 32 per cent score registered in the previous report (AUDA–NEPAD 2022b, 81; see also AU Council 2022k). On 1 May 2022, Nardos Bekele-Thomas (Ethiopia) officially replaced Dr Ibrahim Assane Mayaki (Niger) as AUDA–NEPAD chief executive officer.[21]

In 2022, discussions started on the development of a follow-up plan – the *Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan* (2024–2033). Oversight is carried by a ministerial follow-up committee comprising ministers of national planning and development and of finance. An evaluation of the *First Ten-Year Implementation*

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20   The first edition of the Yearbook featured a chapter on 'development'. Its focus was on NEPAD, the APRM, and the transfer of NEPAD into AUDA. Among others, the author concluded that although these institutions and practices 'play essential roles in the cross-cutting discourse on development in an African continental perspective', in practice they are 'of limited relevance': the 'efforts taken … have not yet had a direct impact on regional or local levels' (Melber 2021, 62). On the role of APRM/AUDA in African governance, see Annie Chikwanha (this Yearbook, chapter 7). On human rights, democracy, and governance, see also AU Council (2022a, 2022f).

21   Since 2019, Nardos Bekele-Thomas has been the UN resident coordinator in South Africa. Previously, she was the senior director of the Office of the UN Secretary-General. She had also served as resident coordinator and UNDP resident representative in Kenya and Benin, respectively. Mayaki has been at the helm of NEPAD since 2009.

Plan is to be tabled at the 42nd Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council (see AU Council 2022z, §6). AU member states were requested to provide political and financial support to the process (a modest €20,000 per country), leverage existing and new collaboration and partnership arrangements, and provide dedicated focal points (ibid., §7). The validation workshop for the evaluation of the *First Ten-Year Implementation Plan* was held at the end of the year (Nairobi, Kenya, 19–21 December 2022).

5   Miscellaneous

In this section, some recurrent themes are covered, such as the ongoing process of ratification of key AU legal instruments as well as selected appointments and elections to the AU and international organs. This section also looks at major debates on global issues affecting the AU. In this volume, this includes the development of common positions of AU member states (regarding, e.g., energy policy, climate change, and UN Security Council [UNSC] reform), the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine, and the question of the observer status of Israel to the AU.

5.1   *Ratification of Key AU Legal Instruments*
The only update on the AU's website in 2022 on 'OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols and Charters' relates to the African *Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty* (the *Pelindaba Treaty*), which entered into force on 15 July 2009.[22] In 2022, both the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (23 February) and Morocco (18 April) ratified and deposited the legal instruments, bringing the total number of AU member states that had ratified the Pelindaba Treaty to 44.

However, during 2022 important legal instruments around questions of governance, human rights, as well as peace and security have not seen any ratification progress. On governance, for instance, regarding the 2003 *African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption*, so far 44 member states have ratified and deposited the legal instruments. The 2007 *African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance* has so far been supported by only 34 member states. And the 2014 *African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local Development* has been ratified by only 6 member states. In the area of human rights, 42 member states have ratified and deposited the 2003 *Protocol to the African Charter on Human and*

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22   OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols & Charters. URL: <https://au.int/en/treaties> (accessed: 30 June 2023).

People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, but other ratification processes have continued to lag behind: the 2003 *Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union* (19), the 2008 *Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights* (8), as well as the 2014 *Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights* (8). And on internally displaced persons (IDPs), only 31 member states have so far deposited legal instruments on the 2009 *African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa* (the *Kampala Convention*). And finally, in the field of peace and security, member states have been sluggish regarding both OAU and AU legal instruments. This goes for the 1977 *OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa* (36 states have ratified and deposited) and the 1999 *OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism* (43), as well as the 2004 *Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism* (21), the 2005 *African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact* (22), and the 2017 *Statute of the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation* (*Afripol*) (none).

5.2   *Selected Appointments and Elections*

On 5 February 2022, the Senegalese president Macky Sall (West Africa region) took over the presidency of the AU from Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi (DRC) (see Aïssatou Kanté, this Yearbook, chapter 5). The other members elected to the AU Bureau of the Assembly are the DRC as rapporteur (Central Africa), Libya (North Africa) as second vice-chair, and Angola (Southern Africa) as third vice-chair (AU Assembly 2022f). After Kenya finally withdrew its bid in mid-December 2022, the East Africa region will be represented by the Comoros, which, in all likelihood, will then become the new chairperson of the AU in 2023 – the first African island state to be elevated to this position.

For several policy fields, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), established in May 2004, is the central decision-making organ between the AU Assembly and AU Executive Council meetings. It is also the most important APSA pillar (see African Union 2002, §§2–9). The members are elected for periods of two or three years. And due to the mathematics involved in staggered elections, all 15 PSC seats were up for election/re-election in early 2022 for the first time in the history of the AU (see this Yearbook, appendix 3; see also Amani Africa 2022a). The following member states were nominated for a three-year period (re-elected countries marked by *): Cameroon*, Djibouti*, Morocco, Namibia, and Nigeria* (now continuously on the PSC since 2004); and the following member states entered the PSC for a two-year period: Burundi*, Congo (Brazzaville), The Gambia, Ghana*, Senegal*, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (AU Assembly 2022g, §§2–3; see AU Council 2022l).

The quest by the North Africa region for equal regional representation and a third seat (when the first PSC was nominated, only two North African member states had ratified the PSC Protocol) was deferred to the 41st Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council (however, the issue was not resolved at that meeting). Among the countries that had withdrawn their candidature are Mauritius and Zambia; Burkina Faso was disqualified after the coup d'etat on 23 January 2022 and its suspension from the AU. Member states whose candidature failed include Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia (Amani Africa 2022b, 3).

The three-year terms of office of all five members of the 4th AU Panel of the Wise – one of the five APSA pillars – had expired in October 2020. The fact that this once important body was dormant for some time is an indication of how important it was to the previous AU commissioner for peace and security (see Shewit Woldemichael 2023; Engel 2022c) – despite its status as an independent pillar of APSA (see African Union 2002, §11). In February 2022, the 35th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly finally took a decision on the composition of the new panel. The outgoing members are Hifikepunye Pohamba (Namibia, for the Southern Africa region), Ellen Sirleaf Johnson (Liberia, West Africa), Speciosa Wandira Kazibwe (Uganda, East Africa), and Honorine Nzet Biteghe (Gabon, Central Africa). The newly appointed members of the 5th Panel of the Wise are Domitien Ndayieye, Burundi's former president (2003–2005), for the Central African region; retired Justice Effie Owuor (Kenya, East Africa region); and Prof Babacar Kante, the former vice-president of Senegal's Constitutional Court (West Africa region). The former secretary-general of the Arab League (2001–2011), Amr Mahmoud Abu Zaid Moussa, was reappointed for a second term (Egypt, North Africa region) (AU Assembly 2022h, §5). At the February 2022 summit, the Southern African region could not agree on its candidate. In July 2022, the AU Executive Council, entrusted with this issue, appointed Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, a former deputy president of South Africa (2005–2008) and former executive director of UN Women (2013–2021), as the fifth member of the 5th Panel of the Wise (AU Council 2022v, §2). The AU Assembly also took note of the ongoing AUC efforts to establish a Network of African Youth on Conflict Prevention and Mediation (WISEYouth), to complement the Pan-African Network of the Wise (PanWise, established 2013), and the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (FemWise-Africa, established in 2017) (ibid., §10). Despite the original plan to finally fill the new position of director of the AU Peace Fund, no such appointment was made in 2022.

Again, the AU tried to appoint senior personalities for major positions in the international system (see AU Council 2022o). However, one of the most prominent attempts failed. The Kenyan ambassador Dr Monica Juma was nominated

secretary-general of the Commonwealth for the period 2022–2026 (AU Council, 2022j, §20) but had to withdraw her candidacy only two weeks later due to opposition from some member states (instead the British diplomat Patricia Scotland was re-elected at the Kigali Summit on 24 June 2022 for another four-year term) (see *The East African* 2022c, 2022d).

Two major candidatures for the UN system were pending. Both South Africa and Cameroon campaigned for the presidential election of the 79th Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 2024–2025, to be held in June 2023 (AU Council 2022y, §2). And both Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi expressed an interest to become non-permanent members of the UNSC for the period 2026–2027 (ibid., §4). Zimbabwe submitted its candidacy to become a non-permanent member of the UNSC for the period 2027–2028 (ibid., §5).

In July 2022, the AU Executive Council elected Litha Musyimi Ogana (Kenya) to serve on the ACHPR for the 2022–2026 term (AU Councill 2022u, §2). At the same meeting, the AU Executive Council also elected Suzanne Ntyam Ondo Mengue (Cameroon) and Dennis Dominic Adjei (Ghana) as judges of the AfCHPR for a term of six years (AU Council 2022t, §2).

5.3   *Common Positions*

Through the development of 'common positions' (see Adeoye 2020), the AU is trying to speak with one voice and advance the sovereignty of members states in current processes of globalisation (Engel 2023a). In the past, this has been a laborious process, often caught between lofty ambitions, on the one hand, and member states' insistence on their national sovereignty, on the other hand (the latter, of course, preventing member states to cede sovereignty to the AUC). In 2022, interesting dynamics could be observed in at least three policy areas: energy policy, climate change, and UNSC reform.

On 15 July 2022, the 41st AU Executive Council adopted the *African Common Position on Energy Access and Just Transition* (AU Council 2022n, §§31–41). AU members states were requested 'to accelerate efforts towards facilitating energy access and transition through the allocation and mobilization of domestic financing, developing carbon markets, the creation of a conducive environment for private sector participation and increased commitment to regional integration of energy markets' (ibid., §35). They were also called upon to define decarbonisation targets (ibid., §36). And the AUC was invited 'to accelerate the implementation of key initiatives', including the *Continental Power Systems Masterplan* (CMP), the *Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa* (PIDA–PAP2), the *Africa Renewable Energy Initiative* (AREI), the *African Single Electricity Market* (AfSEM), and the *African Energy Transition Programme* (AETP) (ibid., §37; see also Tim Zajontz and Mandira Bagwandeen,

this Yearbook, chapter 9). In terms of future options for energy generation, the common position concentrates on 'green hydrogen' and nuclear energy (ibid., §§38–39).

The Common African Position was drafted by Egypt, which, under the UNF-CCC, also hosted the COP 27. This policy field is coordinated by the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), which currently is headed by Kenya, together with the African Ministerial Conference on Environment (AMCEN) and the African Group of Negotiators (AGN). The CAP on climate change dates to 2015. It is based on the call 'to recognize the special needs and special circumstances of Africa' regarding the implementation of the Paris Agreements for mitigation and adaptation (AU Assembly 2022c, §109), 'reflecting equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of national circumstance' (ibid., §110). The AU urged the Global North 'to provide new, additional and predictable climate finance for adaptation' (ibid., §116). Failure of the Global North to commit $100 billion per annum by 2020 to address the impacts of climate change was met with dismay (ibid., §117). The AU reiterated its call for the Global North to mobilise at least $1.3 trillion per year by 2030 (50% for mitigation, 50% for adaptation) (ibid., §119). The Union's own policies in this respect were detailed in June 2022 in the *African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan* 2022–2032 (African Union 2022). Currently, the AU is working on a CAP on the climate change, security, and development nexus (see AU PSC 2022).

One of the first common positions to be developed concerned UNSC reform. Already in 2005, in the so-called *Ezulwini Consensus*, the AU had asked for two permanent seats with veto rights and five non-permanent seats (AU Council 2005, §e[2]). The debate gained new momentum when US president Joseph R. Biden expressed his support on 21 September 2022 for the African position, though this was seen by observers as an attempt to increase the African support for the US position regarding the Russian war against Ukraine (Biden 2022; see Solomon Dersso et al. 2022).

5.4   *Russian Invasion of Ukraine*

The Union's membership is divided over the Russian invasion of Ukraine (see Table 3.2). Three examples may suffice. For the first resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly's emergency session condemning the Russian attack, 28 AU member states supported the motion, 1 voted against (Eritrea), 17 abstained, and 12 did not partake in the vote held on 2 March 2022 (UNGA 2022a). The suspension of Russia from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on 7 April 2022 was only supported by 11 AU member states, with 8 votes against the motion, 25

TABLE 3.2   African Votes in Key UNGA Debates on Ukraine, 2022

		Condemnation of Russian attack A/ES-11/L.1 2 March 2022	Suspension of Russia from UNHRC A/RES/ES-11/3 7 April 2022	Territorial integrity of Ukraine A/ES-11/L.5 12 October 2022
	General vote	141–5–35 | 8	93–24–58 | 18	143–5–35 | 10
	African vote	28–1–17 | 12	11–8–25 | 10	30–0–19 | 5
1.	Algeria	A	N	A
2.	Angola	A	A	Y
3.	Benin	Y	—	Y
4.	Botswana	Y	A	Y
5.	Burkina Faso	—	—	—
6.	Burundi	A	N	A
7.	Cape Verde	Y	A	Y
8.	Cameroon	—	A	—
9.	CAR	A	N	A
10.	Chad	Y	Y	Y
11.	Comoros	Y	Y	Y
12.	Congo	A	N	A
13.	Cote d'Ivoire	Y	Y	Y
14.	Djibouti	Y	—	—
15.	DR Congo	Y	Y	Y
16.	Egypt	Y	A	Y
17.	Eq. Guinea	A	—	—
18.	Eritrea	N	N	A
19.	Eswatini	—	A	A
20.	Ethiopia	—	N	A
21.	Gabon	Y	N	Y
22.	The Gambia	Y	A	Y
23.	Ghana	Y	A	Y
24.	Guinea	—	—	A
25.	Guinea-Biss.	—	A	Y
26.	Kenya	Y	A	Y
27.	Lesotho	Y	A	A
28.	Liberia	Y	Y	Y
29.	Libya	Y	Y	Y

TABLE 3.2   African Votes in Key UNGA Debates on Ukraine, 2022 (*cont.*)

	Condemnation of Russian attack A/ES-11/L.1 2 March 2022	Suspension of Russia from UNHRC A/RES/ES-11/3 7 April 2022	Territorial integrity of Ukraine A/ES-11/L.5 12 October 2022
General vote	141–5–35 | 8	93–24–58 | 18	143–5–35 | 10
African vote	28–1–17 | 12	11–8–25 | 10	30–0–19 | 5
30. Madagascar	A	A	Y
31. Malawi	Y	Y	Y
32. Mali	A	A	A
33. Mauritania	Y	Y	Y
34. Mauritius	Y	Y	Y
35. Morocco	—	—	Y
36. Mozambique	A	A	A
37. Namibia	A	A	A
38. Niger	Y	A	Y
39. Nigeria	Y	A	Y
40. Rwanda	Y	—	Y
41. STP	Y	—	—
42. Senegal	A	A	Y
43. Seychelles	Y	Y	Y
44. Sierra Leone	Y	Y	Y
45. Somalia	Y	—	Y
46. South Africa	A	A	A
47. South Sudan	Y	A	A
48. Sudan	A	A	A
49. Tanzania	A	A	A
50. Togo	—	A	A
51. Tunisia	Y	A	Y
52. Uganda	A	A	A
53. Zambia	Y	—	Y
54. Zimbabwe	A	N	A

Notes: Votes are counted in the following order: yes (Y), no (N), abstention (A), no show (—).
SOURCE: UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (2022)

abstentions, and 10 member states not participating in the vote (UNGA 2022b). And the resolution that, after the annexation of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia regions, reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Ukraine was supported by 30 AU member states, with 19 abstaining and 5 not taking part in the vote on 12 October 2022 (UNGA 2022c).

The AUC therefore refrained from making pronounced or regular statements on this issue.[23] However, on 24 February 2022 the AU chairperson, the Senegalese president Macky Sall and the AUC chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, expressed 'their extreme concern at the very serious and dangerous situation created in Ukraine'. In a very brief statement, they called 'on the Russian Federation and any other regional or international actor to imperatively respect international law, the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Ukraine' (though the 'any other' part remained rather opaque). The statement further urged an immediate ceasefire and negotiations 'under the auspices of the United Nations, in order to preserve the world from the consequences of planetary conflict, and in the interests of peace and stability in international relations in service of all the peoples of the world' (AU Chairperson 2022). The spectre of a possible global escalation of the conflict beyond Ukraine and the region was clearly seen early on.

Also, the war soon exacerbated food insecurity in many countries in North Africa and the Horn of Africa. The AU and AUC chairpersons therefore went to see the Russian president Vladimir Putin (Sochi, Russia, 3 June 2022), and called on him to urgently resume the supply of grain from Ukraine and Russia to world markets (some 45% of African wheat is sourced from these two countries). The subsequent signing by Russia and Ukraine of agreements on the export of grain and agricultural products via the Black Sea was welcomed (AUC 2022c). However, before the visit to Russia two requests by the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky to address the 16th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly were turned down, and – despite a recommendation by the AU Bureau of the Assembly – the AU and AUC chairpersons did not meet the Ukrainian president (*The East African* 2022g).

On 22 July, the AUC chairperson reiterated the Union's call for an immediate ceasefire and political negotiations under the auspices of the UN. Furthermore, the AU reaffirmed 'its continued and steadfast commitment to multilateralism

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23   Since 1967, the Palestine question has enjoyed the same ritual status in the annals of the organisation as the condemnation of the sanctions imposed by the US on Cuba (see AU Assembly 2022p). The AU also strongly condemns sanctions on its own member state Eritrea (in this case imposed by the EU and the US), South Sudan (UN, US), and Zimbabwe (EU, US, UK), respectively (AU Assembly 2022o).

and the shared responsibility of all members of the international community to work towards global peace and stability'. At a technical level, at the 2nd Extraordinary Session of the Specialised Technical Committee on Transport, Transcontinental and Interregional Infrastructure, and Energy (STC–TTIIE) (virtual, 14–16 June 2022), the specialised technical committee requested the AUC 'to continue monitoring the evolving situation of the Russia-Ukraine crisis and its impact on infrastructure and energy sectors and advise Member States on appropriate mitigation measures' (AU Council 2022n, §42). It also detailed a list of eight mitigation measures (ibid., §43).

5.5 Controversy over the Observer Status of Israel

Traditionally, the AU and its predecessor, the OAU, rarely discuss 'foreign policy' issues.[24] Israel and the question of Palestine are an exception (see AU Assembly 2022n). When the AUC chairperson decided on 21 July 2021 to accredit Israel as an observer to the AU (which the country had enjoyed with the OAU), his decision was soon rejected by 21 AU member states owing to the country's occupation of the Palestine territories since 1967, including most SADC members, a group of North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia), as well as the Comoros and Djibouti (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 38f.). Although the AUC chairperson highlighted the double standards member states applied to this issue – Israel is recognised by 46 of the 55 AU member states and has 17 embassies and 12 consulates on the continent (see *The East African* 2022b) –, the AU failed to resolve the issue in 2022. Rather, it appointed an ad hoc committee at the level of heads of state and government to further consult on the matter. It includes Algeria, Cameroon, the DRC, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and South Africa (AU Assembly 2022d) and will report to the next session of the AU Assembly, planned to be held on 5–6 February 2023 (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia). Despite the continued British occupation of the Mauritian Chagos Archipelago since 1965, the United Kingdom still enjoys observer status with the Union (but also see the regular condemnation; AU Assembly 2022l).

5.6 Working Languages

Based on a motion proposed by Tanzania, Kiswahili – a language spoken by some 80 million people in East Africa (mainly, but not only in Tanzania, Kenya, and Mozambique) – became one of the AU working languages (AU Council

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24   The Union's strategic partnerships are discussed by Ulf Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 12 (also see AU Council 2022a).

2022h), next to Arabic, English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish (see OAU 2000, §25).[25]

6   Outlook

Three major themes have continued to dominate the Union's agenda in 2022: (1) the reform of its finances, (2) the ongoing parallel institutional reform, and (3) the implementation of Agenda 2063. While in some areas, particularly regarding financial and institutional reform, only little progress was made, other dossiers developed rather well – this will be elaborated in more detail in the subsequent chapters. However, a number of policy issues continue to constrain the pan-African project: member states show little enthusiasm to implement decisions swiftly; a roadmap to achieving the 100/75/25 per cent financial independence target has not been developed; the division of labour between the AU and the RECs still needs to be demarcated better; the number of common positions on global questions has to be increased (and the way to reach these common policies better defined); the practices of establishing and making use of strategic multilateral and bilateral partnerships have to be fine-tuned; and, above all, becoming a people's Union, despite remaining a daunting task, has to be better supported from the top (see Engel 2023b).

In 2023, the chairmanship of the AU will rotate to East Africa, which decided that the Comoros, led by president Azali Assoumani, will be the incoming chairperson of the Union. He was a military officer who staged a coup d'état in 1999 and has been elected president three times since (elected in 2002, 2016, and 2019). It will be interesting to see how the Union's position on unconstitutional changes of government will be developed further during his reign.

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25   Spanish was added in 2001, although the AUC had to be reminded in 2011 and 2020 to fully implement this decision.

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Senegal's Chairmanship of the African Union

Aïssatou Kanté

1   Introduction

At the 35th AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 5–6 February 2022), President Macky Sall of Senegal became chairperson of the African Union (AU). One year before, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had endorsed Senegal's candidacy at an extraordinary summit (Accra, Ghana, 3 February 2022). Senegal took over the position from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 46–63). This was the fourth time in the history of the continental organisation that Senegal had taken over its leadership. The previous occasions were those of presidents Léopold Sédar Senghor (1980) and Abdou Diouf (1985 and 1992). In February 2022, Senegal was also re-elected at the 40th Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council as one of the 15 members of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the period 2022–2024. This dual position as the chairperson and member of the PSC of the AU allowed Senegal to identify and implement key priorities as part of the organisation's agenda.

Despite the relatively short and rotational nature of the position, Senegal's tenure raised many expectations. This was because of the country's reputation for being relative stable in a West African region troubled by military coups d'état and terrorism. Politically, not only has Senegal never experienced a coup d'état, but it also had a peaceful transfer of power in 2000 and in 2012. Moreover, no terrorist attacks have occurred on its territory, albeit its proximity to Mali where violent extremism is prevalent.

Senegal's economy and landmass are relatively small compared to other regional hegemons, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire. Yet, Senegal has positioned itself as an influential player in regional and global affairs. This in part due to its significant participation in United Nations (UN) operations, such as the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the UN Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), or the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) as well as regional peace operations, such as ECOWAS missions in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia.

The management of the latter has benefited Senegal as the resolution of these has positively impacted on its internal security.

The influence and international legitimacy of Senegal is particularly important in a context where African organisations, including the AU and ECOWAS, are struggling to coherently respond to key political and governance challenges such as 'third termism' and unconstitutional changes of government (UCG). Such legitimacy is also essential for mobilising the support of international partners to assist African countries in coping with the socioeconomic consequences of exogenous shocks that undermine the continent's economic and social development and stability efforts.

This chapter is structured into four parts. The first part looks at the priorities that the presidency set for itself when it took over the organisation. The second part examines Senegal's continental initiatives focusing on promoting peace, security, and stability and tackling the multiple socioeconomic challenges across Africa. The third part discusses Senegal's initiatives at the international level to effectively integrate Africa into global governance, defend the continent's interests, and make the most of its partnerships to respond to its development challenges. Finally, the fourth part deals with the challenges Senegal faced during its chairmanship.

2   Senegal's Priorities as Chairperson of the AU

Senegal's assumption of the AU leadership came at a time when Africa was facing several challenges that threatened its stability. Among these were the protracted conflicts in Libya, the DRC, and Somalia; the resurgence of military coups in East and West Africa; and deepening violence and insecurity linked to terrorism in the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa, the Sahel, and the Lake Chad Basin with spillover effects in littoral West African countries. These challenges were compounded by the socioeconomic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic and later Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The conflict especially constrained post-Covid-19 recovery of African economies as it contributed to a rise in the prices of energy and basic commodities.

In his inaugural speech, President Sall defined the priorities Senegal would pursue during its tenure as the AU chairperson (Sall 2022a). Central to these priorities was the promotion of peace, security, and stability across Africa, particularly due to the resurgence of coups d'état in some parts of the continent, the persistence of interstate conflicts and internal crises, and the continual expansion of the terrorist threat. As such, Senegal focused on advocating

African solutions to African problems, facilitating a global coalition to better address challenges related to peace and security, and mobilising funding for appropriately mandated peacekeeping operations in Africa. Beyond peace and security, Senegal also highlighted health as an important priority, with the aim of facilitating the emergence of an African pharmaceutical industry capable of meeting the primary needs of African countries and of responding to pandemics. This was against the backdrop of efforts made by the South African president Cyril Ramaphosa to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 40–48).

On the economic front, tackling Africa's developmental challenges by leveraging the continent's immense potential was also identified as a priority. These challenges were considered to have to do more with the negative impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic and the higher prices of grain and fertiliser supplies that resulted from the Russian war against Ukraine. The latter proved President Sall right, who highlighted the urgent need to strengthen Africa's food sovereignty (see Sall 2022a). Accordingly, pursuing these priorities guided the AU chairperson's engagements with the organisation's multilateral partners, with the particular goal of positioning Africa better in global political, economic, and financial decision-making processes.

Senegal's foreign policy principles – such as good neighbourliness, respect for the sovereignty of states, commitment to international peace and security, and economic diplomacy – are in line with the priorities it defined for his presidency, which also align with the principles and objectives in the AU's *Agenda 2063*. Specifically, Senegal intended to take more into account the rise of a multipolar world, to encourage regional integration, and to commit to achieve development across the continent (MAESE 2019). The country also sought to strengthen cooperation with its various partners by mobilising the resources needed to finance its development and deepen regional integration through the development of infrastructure, the implementation of regional economic programmes, and the development of intracommunity trade.

3 The Chairperson's Initiatives at the Continental Level

3.1 *Enhancing Peace, Security, and Stability in Africa*

Concerning UCGs and political transitions, Senegal invited AU member states to apply the instruments for democracy and good governance and called for respect for the rule of law and the organisation of free, transparent, and inclusive elections. The country also highlighted the importance of

constitutionalism and the need for reflections on addressing the root causes of UCGs (Thiaw 2022a).

Prior to its election to the AU chairmanship and while serving in the position, Senegal took a firm position, invoking texts and normative instruments, including the *ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance*. The protocol defines modalities for organising free, transparent, and democratic elections. The country reiterated its position during the AU Forum of Reflection on UCG in Africa (Accra, Ghana, 15–17 March 2022) (see Thiaw 2022b). The position was further reflected in the declaration following this event (African Union 2022). In support of the transition processes, President Sall went to Mali and Chad (15 August).[1] These countries, among others in the continent such as Guinea and Burkina Faso, have experienced military coups and are undergoing political transitions. The visits to Mali and Chad were particularly important as both the AU and ECOWAS suffered a credibility deficit. In Mali, this was in relation to their handling of the recent military coup and in Chad, to the AU's response to the accession to power of the transitional president Mahamat Idriss Deby.

Before the visit to Mali in August, preceded in March by a telephone conversation with the transitional president Col. Assimi Goïta, Sall called for the resumption of dialogue for a negotiated solution to the crisis. Senegal's disposition towards Mali was influenced by challenges related to the imposition of sanctions by the AU and ECOWAS. With Mali being Senegal's first trading partner, the country's economy was greatly impacted by the Malian crisis. This contributed to Senegal shifting away from its initially firm position to a more flexible position by reaching out to Mali and affirming its place in the concert of African and international nations. This position reflects the more conciliatory attitude towards ECOWAS and the AU. It is also part of a reaffirmation of promoting African solutions to African problems, especially in the context of geopolitical rivalry, particularly in West Africa (see Pantucci 2023). In Chad, the AU chairperson praised the country's political progress and called on all parties to take part in the dialogue, as several opposition figures had refused to participate in the process.

The visits to Mali and Chad offered Senegal an opportunity to reiterate its call to strengthen cooperation between Sahel countries affected by violent extremism and coastal states while reaching out to the international community to support counterterrorism efforts in Africa. Senegal used the occasion

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1 Before these visits, the president went to South Sudan (18 July 2022) in support of the post-civil war transition.

of international events to call for and advocate greater responsibility by the UN Security Council (UNSC) (Sall 2022d). For example, at the 6th European Union–African Union Summit (Brussels, Belgium, 17–18 February 2022), Senegal also called on the European Union to support efforts of the Sahel states and the Accra Initiative through the European Peace Facility.

On tackling interstate conflicts and internal crises, the Senegal advocated dialogue and consultations based on African conflict resolution mechanisms (Thiaw 2022a). And it did so, for instance, in the crisis in the eastern DRC, initiating extensive mediation, calling for a ceasefire and dialogue, as well as appointing the Angolan president João Lourenço as facilitator of this protracted and challenging crisis. In choosing the Angolan president, President Sall wanted to rely on a member of the geographical area where the conflict is taking place so that a solution to the crisis can be found.[2] In addition, in his capacity as chairperson of the AU, Sall announced a voluntary contribution of $1 million to support the funding of the regional force of the East African Community (EAC), which struggles to exist on the ground. Senegal's contribution was part of the response to the challenges of financing AU-led peace support operations (PSOs) on the continent.[3] In its immediate neighbourhood, Senegal advocated dialogue and concertation in one of the main crises in 2022 revolving around Mali having detained UN peacekeepers from Côte d'Ivoire. The president's visit to Bamako on 16 August and discussions with ECOWAS heads of states and government on the margins of the 77th Session of the UN General Assembly (20–26 September 2023) also complemented mediation efforts by Togo.

Regarding the emergency of addressing humanitarian consequences, Senegal requested mobilising additional funds during the AU Extraordinary Assembly (Malabo, Equatorial-Guinea, 27 May 2022) on the humanitarian situation throughout the continent (Sall 2022c). Senegal pledged at the summit to contribute on its own $3 million for humanitarian action in Africa. This is notwithstanding the decision at the summit to establish an African humanitarian agency and a special fund. At the donor conference that followed the summit, only $140 million was pledged. This was significantly less than the $14 billion that was needed.

3.2 *Promoting Africa's Economic and Social Development*

Senegal's engagement as the AU chairperson on socioeconomic issues focused on updating the agenda for Africa's economic and social development through

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2 Interview with Senegalese diplomat, 26 April 2023.

3 Interview with an Addis Ababa-based diplomat, 26 April 2023.

a summit diplomacy strategy. Senegal hosted the World Bank's Summit of African Heads of State and Government for the Implementation of the International Development Association (IDA) Programme (Dakar, Senegal, 7 July 2022). The event, which brought together a dozen heads of state and government from across Africa and representatives of IDA donors, was aimed at discussing Africa's development challenges and ways to leverage World Bank financing to promote sustainable development and economic transformation on the continent. A key outcome was a call to action, including various commitments to economic recovery, food self-sufficiency, human capital development, digital development, combating global warming and energy transition, supporting domestic private sector development, and implementing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) (World Bank 2022).

This set the stage for the 17th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly on Industrialization and Economic Diversification (Niamey, Niger, 20–25 November) and the related Extraordinary Session of the AfCFTA. The summit was organised at the request of Senegal and opened by the Rwandan president Paul Kagame, who completed his term as chairman of the Heads of State and Government Steering Committee of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). During the event, President Mohamed Bazoum of Niger was appointed as AU champion for industrialisation to initiate discussions of how to revise the industrialisation model of the continent. The summit was coupled with a special session on accelerating the implementation of the AfCFTA, which was launched two years ago (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 182–188; and Bruce Byiers, this Yearbook, chapter 11). The session provided an opportunity for the heads of state and government to take stock of progress towards continental economic integration through trade and investment. Moreover, the summit called on states to sign or ratify the free trade agreement, resulting in states committing themselves to drawing up lists of products for which they are prepared to raise capital so that they can circulate freely in their countries.

Senegal also focused on addressing the food and nutrition crisis facing the continent, accentuated by the impact of the war in Ukraine. It specifically referred to the 35th AU Assembly, centred around the theme 'Strengthening Nutritional Resilience on the African Continent: Accelerating Human Capital, Social and Economic Development', and emphasised the urgency of achieving food sovereignty in Africa through greater quantity and better-quality production. This objective was reaffirmed at several fora, including the African Development Bank (AfDB) meeting of ministers of finance and agriculture (19 May 2022). The meeting launched the African Emergency Food Facility, a $1.5-billion plan to promote food production through agriculture, livestock,

and fisheries. Senegal's advocacy for food sovereignty culminated in its joint organisation of the summit on food sovereignty with the AfDB (Dakar, Senegal, 25–27 January 2023) (AfDB and African Union 2023).

Following this summit, Senegal hosted the 2nd Dakar Financing Summit for Africa's Infrastructure Development (DFS 2.0) on 2–3 February 2023. Discussions during the summit centred on the causes and consequences of infrastructure deficits and their persistence despite recent efforts to tackle them. The lack of adequate and proper infrastructure financing due to high interest rates and repayment delays was also discussed. The meeting resulted in commitments by AU member states, the AfDB, and partners to implement the second action plan of the *Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa* (PIDA). About 60 per cent of the programme's proposed 69 projects, however, need to undergo feasibility studies in order to attract the interest of private investors.

On gender and social development, the 2nd Men's Conference on Positive Masculinity was held in Dakar on 10 November 2022. This gathering was directly related to Senegal's objective to end violence against women and girls, promoting women empowerment and ultimately socioeconomic development in Africa. During the first conference, focusing on the theme 'Galvanizing Positive Masculinity to End the Scourge of Violence in Africa' (Kinshasa, DRC, 25 November 2021), the heads of state and government had adopted a declaration and a call to action to accelerate the prevention and elimination of violence against women in Africa. Senegal encouraged other AU member states to reappoint the DRC president Félix Tshisekedi as the AU's champion for positive masculinity and to support him in his advocacy for this cause.

With regard to health, Senegal prioritised pharmaceutical and medical sovereignty in Africa, particularly in light of the Covid-19 pandemic and its public health impacts. This was in line with the AU's agenda of supporting national health efforts, including the production of vaccines. The ultimate objective of supporting these national efforts is the emergence of an African pharmaceutical industry capable of meeting the continent's primary needs and fighting epidemics (Thiaw 2022a). In February 2022, President Sall participated with the presidents of Rwanda and Ghana in the inauguration in Marburg of the new German laboratory BioNTech, a partner of the Pasteur Institute in Dakar involved in the in-country production of vaccines.

Senegal also leveraged its position as chairperson of the AU to advocate the immunisation and the strengthening of African health systems at various meetings, such the 2nd Global Summit on Covid-19, organised by the United States (12 May 2022). During this online event, Senegal emphasised Africa's priorities

for combating the pandemic and tackling other health risks. In particular, Senegal called for greater diligence in the implementation of the initiative for the production of messenger RNA-based vaccines in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia, launched at the 6th EU–AU Summit. Furthermore, at the Forum on Immunization and Polio Eradication in Africa (Dakar, Senegal, 10 December 2022) Senegal promoted immunisation as the safest protection of vulnerable segments of the population, namely women and children, against epidemics.

4   Senegal's International Initiatives as the AU Chairperson

As the AU chairperson, Senegal continued to press for a form of multilateralism and global governance that prioritised a greater African voice. For Senegal, not only is the global governance system outdated and not in sync with contemporary realities, but Africa should also be open to all partnerships that are mutually beneficial and reflect the continent's development priorities.

4.1   *Effectively Integrating Africa into Global Governance*
As the AU chairperson, Senegal also focused on reforming the international economic and financial governance system with the objective of improving the access of African countries to financing for economic and social development. This objective was linked to the need to promote the recovery of African economies following the negative effects of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Senegal expressed the importance of African voices at various fora. Among these was the 54th Session of the Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development of the Economic Commission for Africa (Dakar, Senegal, 11 May 2022), held on the theme of 'Financing Africa's Recovery: Finding Innovative Solutions'. The president pushed reforming the international economic and financial governance system to give more voice to the continent. This, he argued, was especially important in view of the disproportionately negative effects of the war in Ukraine on African economies and the resultant uncertainties around achieving the 2030 sustainable development goals (see Sall 2022b).

In Senegal's outlook, the reallocation of special drawing rights (SDRs) is at the heart of these recommended reforms. This became a key focus for the country following the Paris Summit on the Financing of African Economies (Paris, France, 18 May 2021). More specifically, Senegal has criticised Africa's share of the SDRs vis-à-vis its share of the world's population. Like challenges

related to the suspension of debt servicing, the advocacy for reforms, however, did not result in significant progress, as developed countries continue to either be reluctant or have other priorities.

Senegal called for the definition of new criteria and conditions as well as the creation of new financial instruments to enable Africa to cope with the post-Covid-19 economic crisis. Specifically, the deficit and debt ratios should no longer be the only two parameters to determine the conditions for the access of African countries to financing for, among other areas, infrastructure. As such, Senegal called for a reform of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) regarding the rules applying to the conditions of access to credit and financial markets and for the revision of the criteria for assessing investment risk in Africa to allow for a fairer rating and lower insurance premiums, ultimately improving the competitiveness of African countries. To provide impetus for these reforms, President Sall announced the establishment of an AU Task Force to examine the financing of African economies, a pan-African rating agency, and an AfDB-led Financial Stability Mechanism (Sall 2022a).

Furthermore, Senegal sought to tackle challenges related to fair and equitable energy transition, even linking them to access to financing and the fight against climate change. Like other developing countries, Senegal, which is preparing to exploit gas on a large scale, opposed a decision by more advanced countries at the 26th UN Climate Change Conference (COP 26) (Glasgow, Scotland, 31 October–13 November 2021) to end external financing for fossil fuels. Instead, during the Group of Seven (G7) Meeting (Schloss Elmau, Germany, 26–28 June 2022), and subsequently at the Africa Adaption Summit (Rotterdam, Netherlands, 5 September 2022) as well as the COP 27 (Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, 6–18 November), the country called for financing to help in the adaptation to climate change to achieve a fair and equitable energy transition. The ultimate goal is for African countries to benefit from significant funding to ensure the development of their gas sector and thus enable them to meet their industrialisation objectives and access low-cost electricity from renewable energy sources or gas.

Linked to the advocacy for reforming the international economic and financial governance system was Senegal's push for better African representation within the international organisations and decision-making structures. This, in its view, would allow for a stronger African voice on thorny issues, such as combating climate change, providing debt relief for poor countries, and addressing imbalances in the global health system (Sall 2022b).

Throughout its tenure as the AU chairperson, Senegal pressed for upgrading the AU from an observer status to a permanent member of the Group of Twenty (G20). This led to a consideration of an AU membership by the G20 at

its next summit (New Delhi, India, 9–10 September 2023). Half of the G20 members had expressed their support for this membership. These include the US, the UK, the EU, France, South Africa, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and Türkiye. Senegal also advocated reforming the UNSC to ensure a more equitable representation of Africa, in line with the Union's 2005 *Ezulwini Consensus* and the 2005 *Sirte Declaration*. It managed to obtain the support of the US during the UN General Assembly in September 2022 and the US–Africa Leaders Summit (Washington, DC, US, 13–15 December 2022). Japan also expressed its support at the 8th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) (Tunis, Tunisia, 27–28 August 2022).

4.2 *Defending Africa's Interests*

With regard to Africa's external relations, Senegal defended the continent's non-alignment in the Russian war against Ukraine, although there was no common African position. Even so, through a joint statement with the chairperson of the AU Commission (AUC) Moussa Faki Mahamat, Senegal expressed 'their extreme concern at the very serious and dangerous situation created in Ukraine' and called for a de-escalation of the conflict and a ceasefire to allow for negotiations to take place.[4] The war affected the food security of African countries, disrupted energy supplies, and led to an increase in energy prices underpinned partly by the appreciation of the US dollar against their national currencies. This situation, combined with low agricultural productivity, led to concerns about the possibility of a famine outbreak in parts of the continent. Against this backdrop, Senegal doubled its diplomatic engagements through intense mediation and adopted a position of neutrality with the aim of not only achieving or contributing to a peaceful resolution of the conflict but also resuming grain and fertiliser exports to Africa.

The AU and AUC chairpersons met the Russian president Vladimir Putin (Sochi, Russian Federation, 3 June 2022) and called on him to urgently resume the supply of grain from Ukraine and Russia to world markets. The subsequent signing by Russia and Ukraine of agreements on the export of grain and agricultural products via the Black Sea was welcomed. In the spirit of neutrality, the AU, under Senegal's leadership, also established contacts with Ukraine. In the initial days of the war, President Sall talked to the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky. This was two days after speaking with the Russian president.

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4 However, on 2 March 2022 Senegal did not condemn the Russian attack against Ukraine in the special session of the UN – it rather abstained from the vote. It also abstained from the vote on suspending Russia from the UN Human Rights Commission (7 April 2022). But it voted in favour of a resolution that reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Ukraine (12 October 2022). See also Ulf Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 4, section 5.4.

In response to his request two months earlier, the Ukrainian president was offered a platform on the margins of a meeting of the Bureau of the AU Assembly on 20 June 2022 (BBC 2022).

Moreover, one of the fundamental principles of Senegal's foreign policy is its openness to the world and the maintenance of relations with all countries, regardless of their ideological or political stances. It is because of this principle that Senegal, although considered a pro-Western country, maintained relations with the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, 1922–1991) and subsequently the Russian Federation, China, and other partners. Thus, despite the crises that have shaken international relations in recent years and in which Russia was a protagonist, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and more recently the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Senegal has maintained an equidistant position that does not isolate Russia or involve Africa in this conflict. This pragmatic positioning, shared by several other African countries, could be examined as part of a new geopolitical dynamic in which African countries have understood that they have interests to defend and that they have no lessons to receive from any power, including on the choice of their partners.

4.3   *Africa Leveraging its Partnerships*

For the Senegalese presidency, establishing renewed partnerships to achieve its agenda and promote equality and balance between Africa and its partners was a key priority (Sall 2022a). This was delivered at various events where, in response, external partners expressed their readiness to strengthen their partnerships and cooperation with Africa (see Ulf Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 12). An example is the 6th EU–AU Summit, during which Senegal, acting in its capacity as the AU chairperson, advocated a new kind of the partnership between Europe and Africa, based on the latter's needs and priorities, particularly with regard to infrastructure development, digital technology, and energy transition as well as accessing vaccines against HIV/Aids and fighting the jihadist threat. Among the outcomes of the summit was a pledge by the EU to invest €150 billion over seven years as part of a new global investment strategy for infrastructure development in Africa. Contacts and exchanges also took place with the EU, via the steering committee, in view of the AU–EU ministerial follow-up meeting (Thiaw 2023). Also, following the 5th Korea-Africa Forum (Seoul, Korea, 3–5 March 2022) during which Senegal's minister for foreign affairs called for stronger Africa-Korea cooperation regarding a range of developmental and trade issues; in the end, a five-year declaration and cooperation framework was adopted.

Furthermore, Senegal used its participation in an expanded session of the summit of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), held

virtually from Beijing on 23 June 2022, in its capacity as the AU chairperson to advocate BRICS support for reforming global institutions and systems to reflect greater African representation and voices and addressing imbalances related to energy transition (see Fabricius 2022). Africa's membership in the G20, the partial reallocation of SDRS, and the implementation of the G20 initiative on the suspension of debt service were particularly highlighted.

This was followed by similar advocacy regarding other key international fora such as the 8th TICAD, the 31st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Arab League (Algiers, Algeria, 1 November), and the US–Africa Leaders Summit. At the TICAD, Japan pledged to promote establishing a permanent seat for Africa and reaffirmed its support for the integration process of African countries through AfCFTA. It pledged $30 billion in public and private investments over a three-year period in health, human resource development, stabilisation, food security, and green growth. The Algiers summit served as a prelude for Senegal's engagement with the Arab League for the preparation of the next AU–Arab World Summit and reviewing this partnership. And in Washington, DC, the US announced several partnerships regarding African health, infrastructure, and governance and expressed its support for the AU's membership in the G20. The US also pledged $55 billion to implement shared priorities with Africa and based on the AU's Agenda 2063, indicating a willingness to engage more actively in Africa in a geopolitical context where major powers are vying for the support of African countries and seeking to strengthen existing partnerships (Duss and Yabi 2022).

In the context of geopolitical rivalry, these summits and commitments constitute a way for Western and emerging powers to seek to strengthen their influence in Africa. This could intensify as the continent grapples with the economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Singh 2022). As such, there is the need for continued reflections on adapting and strengthening African diplomacy and partnership management. The implementation of the future *AU Partnerships Strategy and Policy Framework* should enable the organisation to better coordinate and tailor the organisation's partnerships to its goals and priorities as outlined in Agenda 2063 (Apiko 2021).

5 Challenges to the Senegalese Chairmanship

Senegal did not expect to achieve all its objectives as the AU chairperson. Rather, it sought to set the stage for continual discussions on these objectives and for adopting them by subsequent AU chairpersons in the medium to long

term. During a conference on the mid-term review of Senegal's tenure, the country's minister for foreign affairs noted that its 'ambition is to put in place a process that is so irreversible that those who come after him will be obliged to continue it in order to resolve these problems' (Le Quotidien 2022). The chairperson also faced internal challenges mainly resulting from the rivalry between Kenya and Comoros for the 2023–2024 presidency, which prevented Senegal from benefiting from a full bureau (ISS 2023). However, the chairperson counted on the support of his peers by relying in particular on champions for various themes that have been prioritised during his term of office.

Importantly, the major economic fallouts from the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian war against Ukraine contributed to changes in the priorities of key partners of Africa and affected the mobilisation of resources to help address challenges. This meant that Senegal faced challenges in attracting the needed partner attention and support of its priorities as the AU chairperson.[5] Similarly, the global attention paid to the conflict was such that the AU chairperson's priorities had to be redefined, by advocating solutions to emergencies. This meant that priorities, such as the restitution of looted assets, which had been mentioned by Senegal at the beginning of its tenure, were no longer high on the agenda. Senegal had considered this goal important as it saw its resolution as a way to help to combat prejudice and determinism and define an African identity that resists external influences.

6   Conclusions

Notwithstanding challenges within the AU and a difficult international context impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian war against Ukraine, Senegal's record was generally appreciated by its African peers and the diplomatic community at large (Seneplus 2022). While contributing to the implementation of the continental agenda, especially with regard to strengthening the continent's voice on the international scene, the country has managed to strengthen its international stature while pursuing its national interests. With more than 20 chairpersons who have succeeded each other at the head of the AU, it is important to draw lessons that can help avoid certain pitfalls and improve the quality of the mandates, especially since there is a growing interest of states in taking up this function, which is not clearly defined in the texts of the organisation. Even though Senegal's objectives were clearly defined, which made it easier to examine the scope of the parameters on which it committed

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5   Interview with Senegalese diplomat, 26 April 2023.

to carry the continent's voice, it seems to have set too many priorities for itself considering its own available resources. Future presidencies must be careful not to repeat this pitfall, especially since the AU Assembly had made a recommendation to that effect. Given the short duration of the AU chairmanship, the objectives of the chairperson must be realistic and measurable.

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PART 2

African Union Policy Fields

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Climate Change

Ulf Engel

1   Introduction

More than any other continent, Africa is affected by the consequences of climate change, although it only contributes less than 4 per cent of global CO_2 emissions. The increase in extreme weather conditions – including storms, cyclones, typhoons, flash floods, and drought-related hazards – have caused new levels of food insecurity and resulted in numerous setbacks in the development agenda of several African Union (AU) member states (see, for instance, Baptista et al. 2022). Africa is particularly vulnerable to climate change. At the same time, the continent has inadequate human, financial, and technological resources to adapt to and/or mitigate climate change. This has led to a debate on Africa's 'special needs and circumstances' (AU Assembly 2022, §109). In addition to the socioeconomic dimension, there is also an important nexus between climate change and violent conflict (see, for instance, Mbaye and Signé 2022).

The chapter is a new entry to the *Yearbook on the African Union*. Following this introduction, it is divided into three sections, namely facts and figures, policies and decision-making, and major policy developments in 2022. In the second section, a brief overview on climate change and its consequences on the African continent is provided. In the third section, key policies and frameworks adopted by the AU in relation to climate change are outlined. In the fourth section, major developments in 2022 are reviewed regarding climate change finance, new policy initiatives, and the 27th Conference of the Parties (COP 27) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) while exploring the nexus between peace and security, on the one hand, and climate change, on the other, and reviewing the ratification (or lack thereof) of important continental legal instruments addressing, among others, climate change. The chapter concludes by providing a brief 2023 outlook on AU climate change policies.

2   Facts and Figures on Climate Change in Africa

According to the World Bank, in 2020 sub-Saharan Africa emitted 760,868 kt CO_2 (2010: 692,188 kt, or +9.22%); the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 2,416,065 (2010: 2,128,655 kt, or +13.50%) (here and in the following: World Bank 2023). In comparison, this was still a small fraction of the global CO_2 output. In 2020, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 2.27 per cent of global CO_2 emissions (2010: 2.16%), and the MENA region for 7.20 per cent (2010: 6.63%). On the impact side of climate change, 83.6 per cent of all African countries are vulnerable to desertification; the continent is losing 3 million ha of forest a year (Stallwood 2023). Half of the African population is living in arid, semi-arid, dry, sub-humid, and hyper-arid areas. In the Horn of Africa, an unprecedented four consecutive rainy seasons have failed since October 2020 (Paddison 2023). Water scarcity is another dimension of climate change: only 13 out of 54 African countries have reached a modest level of water security in recent years (the top 3: Egypt, Botswana, and Gabon; the bottom 3: Somalia, Chad, and Niger). One of the striking examples of a climate change–related reduction of water is Lake Chad, which has shrunken by 90 per cent since the 1960s, from a surface area of 26,000 sqm to less than 1,500 sqm in 2018 (Oluwasanya et al. 2022).

The *Sixth Assessment Report* of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concludes that the African continent is severely affected by 'increasing weather and climate extreme events', leading to acute food insecurity and reduced water security. Climate change has also disproportionally adversely affected human physical and mental health in Africa, among other places. The report observes how climate hazards interacts with high vulnerability (IPCC 2023, 16). 'Across sectors and regions, the most vulnerable people and systems have been disproportionately affected by the impacts of climate change', in particular in African regions (ibid., 17).

According to the World Meteorological Organization's (WMO) latest report on *The State of the Climate in Africa* (WMO 2022),

> Africa's climate has warmed more than the global average since pre-industrial times (1850–1900). In parallel, the sea-level rise along African coastlines has also been faster than the global mean, contributing to increases in the frequency and severity of coastal flooding, erosion, and salinity in low-lying cities. Continental water bodies are steadily drying up, especially Lake Chad, leading to significant adverse impacts on the agricultural sector, ecosystems, biodiversity and the socioeconomic

> development of the surrounding nations. 2021 was either the third or the
> fourth warmest year on record for Africa depending on the data set used.
>
> WMO 2022, 3

Warming increased by +0.3°C/decade between 1991 and 2021 as opposed to +0.2°C/decade between 1961 and 1990. By 2030, 108 to 116 million people on the continent are expected to be exposed to sea-level rise risk. Because of increased temperatures, agricultural productivity growth has decreased by 34 per cent since 1961 (ibid., 6). Among the high-impact climate events described in the report are floods, tropical cyclones, droughts, heatwaves and wildfires, as well as sand and dust storms. Climate-related risks and socioeconomic impact on agriculture and food security, water resources, population displacement, and health.

Comparative data on climate change performance is difficult to gather. The *Climate Change Performance Index* (CCPI) only covers 63 countries worldwide, and only 4 from the African continent (Burck et al. 2023). In 2022, Morocco moved up one rank to no. 7 worldwide (with a score of 67.44 on a scale from 1 to 100), Egypt climbed one rank to no. 20 (59.37), South Africa fell 5 ranks to no. 44 (45.69), and Algeria moved up 6 ranks to no. 48 (of 42.26).

3   Policies and Decision-Making

Climate change as a distinct policy field has been on the agenda of the Union since 2007 when the AU Assembly took note of a report of the Commission on Climate Change and Development in Africa and the *Climate Information for Development Needs: An Action Plan for Africa – Report and Implementation Strategy*, jointly drafted by the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (AU Assembly 2007a, 2007b; see also UNECA and AUC 2010).[1] And since 2009, the AU Assembly has pronounced itself in favour of the UNFCCC, which was adopted on 9 May 1992. All AU member states have signed the 2015 *Paris Agreement* in which signatories of the UNFCCC committed to

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1 Since 1977, the AU's predecessor organisation, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), had been addressing the impacts of climate change – which were not then associated with the term climate change – such as desertification. In 1984, it established a Special Emergency Assistance Fund for Drought and Famine in Africa.

> [h]olding the increase in the global average temperature to well below
> 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the tempera-
> ture increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this
> would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.
>
> UNFCCC 2015, §2[1]A

The African position on climate change is championed by the Committee
of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC),
established in 2009. It is currently led by Kenyan president William Ruto
(2022–2024).[2] In addition, in February 2022 the AU Assembly of Heads of State
and Government appointed Mozambican president Filipe Jacinto Nyusi as the
champion for disaster risk management in Africa (AU Assembly 2022, §126).

The host country of the African Ministerial Conference on Environment
and Natural Resources (AMCEN) serves as the secretariat for the CAHOSCC.
Guided by the CAHOSCC and the AMCEN, international negotiations are con-
ducted by the African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change (AGN) (see
Chin-Yee 2021). The AGN was established at UNFCCC COP 1 (Berlin, Germany,
28 March–7 April 1995). Among other strategies, the AGN has developed the
2016 *African Renewable Energy Initiative* (see AREI 2016) and the 2015 *Africa
Adaptation Initiative* (see AAI 2023). Other major AU climate initiatives include
the *Adaptation of African Agriculture Initiative* (AAA, 2016), the Congo Basin
Climate Commission (2018), the Sahel Climate Commission (2019), and the
African Islands Climate Commission (2020) (see AU Assembly 2022, §102). The
AGN is chaired on a rotational basis by a member representing one African
region – currently chaired by Zambia (2021–2022). In the absence of a strong
coordination mechanism on climate policy between AU member states and
the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the AU Peace and Security Coun-
cil (PSC) has taken on this role – for the first time in 2018, again in 2021, and
also two times in 2022 (AU PSC 2018, 2021a, 2021b, 2022a, 2022b).

In addition to the AMCEN, the Specialized Technical Committee on Agricul-
ture, Rural Development, Water and Environment (STC–ARDWE) plays a key
role when it comes to climate change–relevant policies, such as ensuring food
security, conserving Africa's fauna and flora, and enhancing resilience to cli-
mate change and disasters. The bureau of the STC–ARDWE is currently chaired
by South Africa (the STC's last meeting was held virtually on 16–17 December
2021). Within the AU Commission (AUC), the Department of Agriculture, Rural
Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (ARBE) is usu-
ally taking a leading position. Since January 2017, the department is headed

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2   His immediate predecessor was South African president Cyril Ramaphosa (2020–2022).

by Commissioner Josefa Leonel Correia Sacko (Angola). The ARBE consists of two directorates: the Directorate of Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD) and the Directorate of Sustainable Environment and Blue Economy (SEBE). Climate change falls under the latter. However, some aspects of the climate change dossier are also dealt with by the Department of Education, Science, and Technology (ESTI) and the Department of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development (HHS).

4   Major Developments in 2022

4.1   *Climate Change Finances*

The political prelude for the climate change discussions in 2022 was made by the 35th AU Assembly (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 5–6 February). Member states urged their international partners 'to provide new, additional and predictable climate finance for adaptation and for those developed country Parties that have made pledges ... to fulfil their pledges at least prior to COP27' (AU Assembly 2022, §116). The summit also expressed its disappointment over unfulfilled pledges regarding the goal to raise $100 billion in support per year by 2020 from 'developed' to 'developing' countries (ibid., §117). Furthermore, member states stressed that their point of reference in this debate was the UNFCCC estimate on the cumulative needs of finance from international partners of $6 trillion by 2030. Hence, partners should mobilise jointly at least $1.3 trillion per annum by 2030 – 'of which 50% should be for mitigation and 50% for adaptation with a significant percentage provided on a of grant basis' (AU Assembly 2022, §119).

The Climate Policy Initiative, an analysis and advisory organisation that is headquartered in London, estimates that Africa will even need ca. $2.8 trillion between 2020 and 2030, or $277 billion annually, to implement its nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement (see Meattle 2022, v). The total annual climate finance flows in Africa for 2020, domestic and international, were only $30 billion, or about 12 per cent of the amount needed. Mitigation accounts for 66 per cent of these needs, adaptation for 24 per cent (Guzmán et al. 2022, IV).

4.2   *Climate Change Strategy*

Climate change is one of the (few) policy fields where the AU member states have developed a common position (UNECA 2022).[3] On 28 June 2022, the

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3   The AU's position was developed after a thorough review of the 2014 *Draft Continental Climate Change Strategy*, the 2015 Paris Agreement, the UN Sustainable Development Goals, the

African Union launched its *Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan* (2022–2032) (African Union 2022a).[4] The guiding principle of the strategy is 'transformative climate-resilient development'. It aims at 'building the resilience of African communities, ecosystems and economies, and supporting regional adaptation' (ibid., 6). The strategy is based on four intervention axes: (1) strengthening governance and policy, (2) adopting pathways towards transformative climate-resilient development, (3) enhancing means of implementation towards climate-resilient development, and (4) leveraging regional flagship initiatives. All intervention axes come with detailed lists of suggested actions, yet – short of a planning tool for a systematic results framework – the strategy does not detail who exactly should take which action, how the implementation of strategic objectives can be verified, and what the assumptions guiding a successful implementation are. Instead, it is stated that

> [a] detailed M&E [monitoring and evaluation] Plan will be developed before the start of the implementation of the Strategy, specifying actors, roles and responsibilities for various activities, and reviews. Their involvement will depend on their ability and capacity to deliver results and utilise knowledge in specific areas. The Plan will also include budgetary frameworks to support the implementation of the Strategy. The M&E Plan will be used to manage accountability and relationships.[5]
>
> IBID., 74

Among other foci, the Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan emphasises climate change finances, loss and damage, and technology transfer. Citing the UNEP *Adaptation Gap Report* (2020), the AU claims that the adaptation funding gap for African countries is currently $70 billion per year (African Union 2022a, 59). In terms of loss and damages, the

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Africa Programme of Action on Disaster Risk Reduction, the 2015 (UN) *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction*, as well as national and regional climate change frameworks. The AU's position has also to be seen, among others, in the context of the *African Green Stimulus Programme* (African Union 2021a), the *Green Recovery Action Plan* (2021–2027) (African Union 2021b), and the *Integrated African Strategy on Meteorology* (*Weather and Climate Services*) (2021–2030) (African Union 2021c). A first version of the AU strategy was already drafted in 2020 (UNECA 2020).

4   The adoption of the Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan was preceded by ministerial consultations (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 28 February 2022), which agreed on a complementary 'common position' on the role of women in climate change policies (African Union 2022b).

5   The implementation matrix (African Union 2022a, 77–94) includes columns on 'responsibility', 'timeframe', and 'cost' – they are still to be filled.

AU argues that there is also a large risk protection gap: 91 per cent (or $1 billion) of losses from climate risks in Africa are uninsured (ibid., 62). And the AU also stresses that 'African technology concerns and needs are not adequately addressed in climate negotiation processes' (ibid., 64). To address the AU's concerns about carbon pricing, a new *Africa Carbon Markets Initiative* (ACMI) was inaugurated on 8 November at COP 27 to develop voluntary carbon markets. It aims at producing 300 million carbon credits annually by 2030 and 1.5 billion credits annually by 2050. This would unlock 6 billion in revenue by 2030 and over 120 billion by 2050; the ACMI would also support 30 million jobs by 2030 and over 110 million jobs by 2050 (ACMI 2023, 7).

In preparation of COP 27, a second important African common position was developed on energy access and the principle of 'just transition' (AU Council 2022, §31; see Tim Zajontz and Mandira Bagwandeen, this Yearbook, chapter 9).

4.3   *COP 27*

The second COP to be hosted on African soil after COP 17 (Durban, South Africa, 28 November–9 December 2011) was held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt (9–17 November 2022). The conference had five key outcomes (UNFCCC 2023a, 2023b): (1) recognition of the need for a loss and damage fund for vulnerable countries hit hard by floods, droughts and other climate disasters; (2) reaffirmed commitment to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels; (3) a new focus on accountability when it comes to the commitments made by sectors, businesses, and institutions; (4) a call for 'developed country' parties to provide resources for the second replenishment of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) 2024–2027 (launched in July 2022);[6] and (5) the UNFCCC framed COP 27 as a crucial shift towards 'implementation' of the ambitious climate change agenda with a focus on 'just transition'.

However, although participants agreed in principle, most of the details remain to be worked out – certainly involving some cumbersome political haggling. Participants failed to reach agreement on who should pay into the loss and damage fund, where this money will come from, and which countries will benefit (UNFCCC 2023b, §§25–28). And if the 1.5°C target on global warming was to be met, the parties will have to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by 43 per cent by 2030 (ibid., §14). A plan on how exactly to ensure transparency

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6   Initial confirmed contributions to the GCF were $9.3 billion. The first replenishment (2020–2023) resulted in another $10 billion of funding. As of 19 August 2022, another $10 billion had been pledged (GCF 2023). The biggest donors for GCF-2 are the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan, which account for a combined 67.85 per cent of the pledges thus far.

and accountability with non-state actors must still be worked out. On financing a global transformation to a low-carbon economy and climate-resilient development, the parties expressed concern that the 'developed' parties have failed to mobilise jointly $100 billion of support per year for 'developing countries' by 2020. The conference noted that it requires investments of at least $4–6 trillion a year globally to achieve the collective goals (ibid., §§36 and 33).

Before COP 27, the AGN had identified 11 specific thematic issues of concern for Africa (UNECA 2022):[7]

> doubling adaptation finance by 2025; clarification on the support arrangements to address loss and damage; closing the climate financing gap; scaling up Africa's mitigation ambition and implementation; strengthening the linkage between technology and financial mechanisms; the global stock take on progress on the Paris Agreement; transparency; gender and climate change; agriculture; Article 6 and carbon pricing; and Africa's unique needs and particular circumstances.

Considering the concrete agreements reached in Sharm El Sheikh, from an African perspective only little progress has been made in global climate change negotiations. Although the adoption of the facility on loss and damage has been seen by UNECA's director for technology, climate change, and natural resources management as 'a pleasant surprise' (Adam 2022), progress in terms of funding and technology transfer is very limited.

4.4   *Climate Change and Peace and Security*

The nexus between climate change and violent conflict has been discussed by the PSC since 2015, beginning with discussions about the impact of the El Niño effect on peace, security, and stability in Africa and humanitarian consequences (see AU PSC 2015). In 2022, two PSC meetings addressed climate change. At its 1079th meeting (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 21 April 2022), the PSC continued its coordinating role between AU member states and RECs regarding African climate change policies, which it had first assumed in 2018 (AU PSC 2018) and again in 2021 (see AU PSC 2021a, 2021b). At the 1079th meeting, the PSC was concerned with the integration of the RECs into African climate policies in general and the forthcoming COP 27 in particular (AU PSC 2022a).

At its 1114th meeting (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 18 October 2022), the PSC specifically reiterated its 'deep concern the unprecedented threats being posed

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7   See also the instructive interview with the AGN head, Ephraim Mwepya Shitima (Zambia), in the lead-up to COP 27 (Shitima 2023).

by climate change to human security in particular and to the peace, security, stability and development of the African Continent as a whole' and the way climate change endangered not only the national development goals of the member states, but also the aspirations contained in the AU *Agenda 2063* and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (AU PSC 2022b, §1). For member states, and in particular island countries,[8] it is imperative 'to further enhance their national climate change resilience, mitigation and adaptation capacities, among others, by redoubling investments in disaster risk reduction and credible climate early warning systems' (ibid., §2).

4.5   *Ratification of Legal Instruments*

There are no dedicated legal instruments on the Union's climate change policy per se, but there are a limited number of commitments with immediate relevance to the issue. The 1968 *African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources* (entered into force on 16 June 1969) has been signed by 46 AU member states, but so far only 33 member states have ratified and deposited the legal instruments (the latest being Angola in 2014). The document has not been signed by Cape Verde, Eritrea, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe. The 2003 *Revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources* (entered into force on 23 July 2016) has been signed by 44 AU member states – but so far only 17 have ratified and deposited (interestingly this time, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe singed the convention but have not yet ratified/ deposited). And the 2012 *Agreement for the Establishment of the African Risk Capacity* (ARC) *Agency* (entered into force on 15 April 2020), which is to help African governments to better plan, prepare, and respond to natural disasters triggered by extreme weather events, as well as outbreaks of epidemics, has only been signed by 35 AU member states, and ratified/deposited by 11 (and even the host country of the meeting that launched the ARC, South Africa, is not a signatory yet).

5   Outlook

At least three conferences on climate change important for Africa will be hosted in 2023: (1) The 2nd Conference of Heads of States and Government of the Sahel Region Climate Commission (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 17 February

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8   This includes Cape Verde, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Seychelles.

2023); (2) the African Climate Summit (Nairobi, Kenya, 4–6 September 2023); and COP 28 (Dubai, United Arab Emirates, 30 November–12 December 2023). One of the most interesting issues to be negotiated will be the UNFCCC loss and damage fund. In addition, further climate change adaptation funding will be at the fore. And in terms of developing further key AU positions, the AUC still needs to finalise a report of the AUC chairperson on the nexus between climate change and peace and security on the continent (AU PSC 2022b, §11; see also Gateretse-Ngoga 2022).

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Education, Science, and Technology

Ulf Engel

1 Introduction

Based on the 2000 *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, with its reference to 'the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, particular in science and technology' (OAU 2000, §3[m]), the African Union (AU) has developed specific policies in the field of education, science, and technology (EST). This commitment was renewed in *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want* (African Union 2015). Following a brief look at basic facts and figures as well as an overview on policy coordination, this chapter analyses progress, or lack thereof, made in the following AU EST policies: the *Continental Education Strategy for Africa* (2016–2025), hereinafter CESA 16–25; the *Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa* (STISA 2024); the *Continental Strategy for Technical and Vocational Education and Training* (TVET); the Pan African University (PAU), the *Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa* (DTS 2020–2030); and the *African Space Policy and Space Strategy*. In the last part of this chapter, the AU's policies promoting African identities and knowledge orders are discussed: How has the AU developed further its approaches to arts, culture, and heritage?

2 Fact and Figures about EST in Africa

To find reliable, up-to-date, and comparable data on the status of EST in Africa remains a painstaking task. The comparative figures provided below all show that when compared globally the African continent is still lagging behind (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 67–82). The data also suggests that there are considerable differences between (and within) African countries and regions. Partly, this data is reflective of fragile academic institutions and overdependence on international funding of research and development (R&D). Related expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa was 0.44 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2007 (latest figures, World Bank 2023) – as compared to 1.60

per cent in the Middle East and North Africa (the MENA region) in 2020, or to a global average of 2.63 per cent in 2020 (2010: 2.02%).[1]

Education (all figures World Bank 2023): The net primary school enrolment rate for sub-Saharan Africa was 75 per cent in 2009 (latest figure) – as compared to 94 per cent for the MENA region to a global average of 89 per cent (both 2018). In 2020, the primary school completion rate for sub-Saharan Africa was 71 per cent (2010: 69%) – as compared to 93 per cent for the MENA region (2010: 91%) or to a global average of 90 per cent (2010: 89%). For girls, these figures are even lower: in 2020 in sub-Saharan Africa their primary school completion rate was 69 per cent (2010: 64%) – as compared to 92 per cent for the MENA region (2010: 88%) or to a global average of 90 per cent (2010: 88%). Literacy rates in the age group above years in sub-Saharan Africa was 67 per cent in 2020 (2010: 59%) – as compared to 80 per cent for the MENA region (2010: 76%) or to a global average of 87 per cent (2010: 84%). And tertiary, or university, enrolment in sub-Saharan Africa was only 10 per cent in 2020 (2010: 8%) – as compared to 41 per cent for the MENA region (2010: 31%) or to a global average of 40 per cent (2010: 29%). In Africa, disparities in education are particularly prevalent between boys and girls, rich and poor, urban and rural and that underlying structural inequities can be observed: children from wealthy families benefit more from education spending (*Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 68). Despite the many gains made since 2000, the challenges to achieve the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) number 4 'Quality Education' continue to be daunting (see United Nations 2023), partly also because of the devastating effects of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Science (all figures World Bank 2023): As in previous editions of the *Yearbook on the African Union*, three indicators are briefly looked at here – the number of patent applications (resident), trademark applications with the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), and scientific and technical journal articles. In 2020, 1,834 patents applications were registered for sub-Saharan Africa (2010: 1,181), 15,557 for the MENA region (2010: 13,869), and worldwide 2,304,400 (2010: 1,160,899). The number of trademark applications (resident) was 52,736 for sub-Saharan Africa (2010: 22,681), 614,797 for the MENA region (2010: 37,486), and 14,809,400 worldwide (2010: 4,267,000). Finally, research output in the natural and technical sciences as measured by journal articles confirms the above observations on an African continent that is facing tremendous

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1 Figures are not entirely consistent with last year's figures. Some seem to have been adjusted retrospectively by the World Bank (sometimes also concerning the base year 2010).

challenges to build up its EST infrastructure: for 2018 (latest figures), there was a total of 29,476 articles coming from sub-Saharan Africa (2010: 15,862), while scientific output in the MENA region was 119,302 (2010: 60,746) and worldwide 2,554,319 (2010: 1,940,650), respectively.

Technology (all figures World Bank 2023): In 2021, and reflecting a huge catching-up process, 93 mobile cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 people were counted in sub-Saharan Africa (2010: 44) – as compared to 117 in the MENA region (2010: 89) and 105 worldwide (2010: 76). The number of fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people in sub-Saharan Africa was 0.76 in 2021 (2010: 0.16) – as compared to 13.53 in the MENA region (2010: 2.53) and 17.79 worldwide (2010: 7.82). And in 2020 the percentage of individuals using the internet compared to the total population was 29 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa (2010: 6%), 76 per cent in the MENA region (2019: 25%), and 60 per cent worldwide (2010: 29%).

3   AU Coordination of EST Policies

The policy field of EST is 'championed' by a Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government (C10), led by Macky Sall (Senegal). The committee also comprises Sierra Leone (Western Africa), Egypt, Tunisia (Northern Africa), Malawi, Namibia (Southern Africa), Kenya, Mauritius (Eastern Africa), as well as Chad and Gabon (Central Africa). The establishment of the C10 in this policy field was already planned by the AU Assembly in June 2015, but it was only endorsed in January 2018 (when the C10 met unofficially for the first time). The official inaugural meeting then took place on 2–3 November 2018 in Lilongwe, Malawi. The detailed political work is discussed by the ministerial Specialised Technical Committee on Education, Science, Technology and Innovation (STC–ESTI). Uganda (represented by Dr Monica Musenero Masanza) left as outgoing rotational chair of the bureau (2020–2022), followed by the Central African Republic (CAR, 2022–2024). The committee's 4th session, which was originally scheduled for 2021, was held on 1–2 September 2022 (virtual). The meeting's recommendations were to be submitted to the AU Summit in 2023 for consideration (see African Union 2022).

Policy implementation is the responsibility of the AU Commission (AUC). Because of the institutional reform of the AU (see Ulf Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 4), the portfolio Department of Human Resources, Science and Technology was changed in 2021 to the Department of Education, Science, Technology and Innovation (ESTI). In October 2021, the AU Executive Council elected the Algerian professor Mohamed Belhocine as the new commissioner (see

Yearbook on the African Union 2021, 70). Before the AUC's institutional reform, the department had comprised three divisions: human resource and youth development; education; and science and technology. The total number of staff e was slightly above 70. Under the new organogram of the AUC, which was still being implemented in 2022, a leaner structure was envisaged (with the staff cut to 44 and the number of divisions reduced to two: education; and science, technology, and space, respectively). The ESTI department is led *ad interim* by Hambani Masheleni (a senior policy officer who has been with the AUC since 2006 and head of the education division).

The various subpolicy fields are administered by an array of institutions. In education, these are the PAU, the Pan-African Institute for Education for Development (IPED), and the AU International Centre for Girls and Women Education in Africa (AU/CIEFFA, based in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso). And in science and technology, these agencies include the African Observatory for Science, Technology and Innovation (AOSTI, Malabo, Equatorial Guinea) as well as the Scientific, Technical, Research Commission (STRC, Abuja, Nigeria), which also hosts the African Scientific, Research and Innovation Council (ASRIC).

For the implementation of the policy field ESTI, the AU usually partners with the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Planning and Coordinating Agency (through its Science, Technology and Innovation Hub) of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), as well as bilateral donors, such as Germany's development agency, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH.

4   EST Policy Initiatives

As has been discussed in the previous *Yearbook on the African Union* (2022, 71), according to its own analysis the AU has made some progress in implementing Agenda 2063's aspiration 1, subgoal 2. Accordingly, by 2063, 'Well educated and skilled citizens, underpinned by science, technology and innovation for a knowledge society is the norm and no child misses school due to poverty or any form of discrimination' (African Union 2015, 2). As reported in the last *Yearbook on the African Union* (2022, 71), in its second monitoring report on the *First Ten-Year Implementation Plan* of Agenda 2063, the AUC and the AU Development Agency (AUDA–NEPAD) took note that while in 2019 only 25 per cent of this aim had been achieved, by 2021 the implementation status had

increased to 44 per cent (AUC and AUDA–NEPAD 2022, 4).[2] However, Covid-19 has severely derailed these ambitions, resulting in also lower school enrolment rates.

4.1 *Continental Education Strategy for Africa 2016–2025*

CESA 16–25 is inspired by the AU's Agenda 2063 and the UN SDG 4 'Quality Education'; it was adopted at the 26th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30–31 January 2016) (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 73; see also Awaah et al. 2022). The Covid-19 pandemic is considered 'the worst shock to education systems in recent global history, with the longest school closures and interruptions to education' (UNICEF and AUC 2021, 34). Across the worlds, but particularly on the African continent, education systems were ill-prepared. There was a lack of access to distance learning, and above all, the digital divide was felt tremendously (e.g. access to internet and computers in schools, as well as limited home-schooling opportunities) (ibid., 35). In general, the pandemic has had devastating consequences for children's rights (see ACERWC 2022; Namatende-Sakwa 2023 et al.). Apart from the pandemic, in an assessment of the weaknesses of AU member states, the UN Economic and Social Council in early 2022 highlighted three more factors that are constraining implementation of CESA 16–25: (1) limited government financing for education, (2) the digital divide, and (3) the lack of educational, demographic and labour market data for policy planning and programming (UN ECA 2022, 10).

Nevertheless, some comparative data is available. According to the 2022 *Global Knowledge Index* from the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Knowledge Foundation (MBRF), five African countries are ranking above the global average score of 62.73 for the indicator group 'pre-university education': Mauritius (rank 32/132, score 75.84/100), Seychelles (rank 38, score 74.4), Tunisia (rank 50, score 71.68), Egypt (rank 79, score 64.95), and Cape Verde (rank 80, score 64.31). And at the bottom end of the index are the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, rank 128, score 25.7), Mali (rank 129, score 22.81), Guinea (rank 130, score 21.67), Chad (rank 131, score 14.56), and Niger (rank 132, score 13.84) (UNDP and MBRF 2023). And regarding the indicator group 'higher education', only two African countries are above the global average score of 45.7, namely Seychelles (rank 37, score 53.92) and Botswana (rank 54, score 47.5) – with Mauritius coming very close (rank 63, score 45,69). The five least performing African countries include Benin (rank 127, score 28,93), Mali (rank 128, score 27.3), Niger (rank 129, score 25.1),

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2 For the period 2014 to 2023, and based on data submitted by 38 of the 55 AU member states.

Mauritania (rank 131, score 22.39), and the DRC (rank 132, score 17.85). As highlighted in the previous *Yearbook on the African Union*, looking at these and other reports, academically a 'growing sophistication in evaluating education programs in Africa' can be observed (Evans and Mendez Acosta 2021).

4.2 Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa

The STISA 2024 strategy was adopted in June 2014 (African Union 2014). It aims at (1) building and/or upgrading research infrastructures; (2) enhancing professional and technical competencies; (3) promoting entrepreneurship and innovation; and (4) providing an enabling environment for science, technology, and innovation (STI) development throughout the African continent (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 74). The *Second Continental Report on the Implementation of Agenda 2063* did not report any specific progress in implementing the Union's STISA 2024 policy (AUDA–NEPAD 2022; for a rather optimistic read, see Kahn 2022). A recent study provides evidence of 'uneven progress in promoting gender equality in the operations' of research-promoting councils (Jackson et al. 2022).

According to the UNDP/MBRF 2022 *Global Knowledge Index*, only two African countries are ranking above the global average score of 26.46 for 'research, development, and innovation': The Gambia (rank 37/132, score 29.83/100) and Seychelles (rank 50, score 26.64). South Africa (rank 53, score 26,39) came close. At the bottom of the ranking are Senegal (score 128, rank 12.76), Niger (rank 129, score 12.72), Ethiopia (rank 130, score 12.12), Burkina Faso (rank 131, score 11.89), and Côte d'Ivoire (rank 132, score 10.43).

4.3 Continental Strategy for Technical and Vocational Education and Training

The 2018 strategy provides 'a comprehensive framework for the design and development of national policies and strategies to address the challenges of education and technical and vocational training to support economic development and the creation of national wealth and contribute to poverty reduction' (African Union 2018, 6; see *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 74). Implementation is now the responsibility of AUDA–NEPAD. Again, the Second Continental Report on the Implementation of Agenda 2063 did not report any specific progress in implementing the Union's TVET policy (AUDA–NEPAD 2022). Select evidence seems to suggest that some AU member states have made considerable progress in the digitalisation of their national TVET policies, but implementation progress in more general terms is being curbed by a combination of factors related to governance, technical equipment, training, financing, and human resources (IIEP 2022, 64–68).

The only five African countries on the UNDP/MBRF 2022 *Global Knowledge Index* ranking above the global TVET average score of 51.88 are Botswana (rank 29/132, score 60.06/100), Namibia (rank 32, score 59.3), Lesotho (rank 47, score 56.36), South Africa (rank 51, score 55.59), and Mauritius (rank 65, score 52.69). And at the lower end of the spectrum are Tanzania (rank 127, score 35.11), Mali (rank 128, score 34.77), the DRC (rank 130, score 29.51), Chad (rank 131, score 28.33), and Mozambique (rank 132, score 25.6).

4.4   *Pan African University*

The Pan African University (PAU), launched on 14 December 2011 as one of the 15 flagship projects of the AU, operates under the ESTI department. It is head-quartered in Yaoundé, Cameroon, with campuses in the five regions of the continent.[3] According to the PAU *Strategic Plan* (2020–2024), the period 2012–2018 was the initiation phase, 2019–2024 is the consolidation phase, and 2025–2030 will be the 'achieving excellence' phase (PAU 2019, 5).[4] Since its inception, the PAU has awarded almost 2,600 scholarships for students from 51 AU member states (67.85% male, 32.15% female). The majority of scholarships were for MA programmes (77.46%). Between 2012 and 2022, 1,617 students have graduated from the PAU (66.85% male, 33.15% female) (see Belhocine 2022). During the period 2011–2022, the university – together with the Institute of Water, Energy Sciences and Climate Change (PAUWES), based at the Abou Bakr Belkaïd University in Tlemcen, Algeria – was financially supported to a great degree by the GIZ. This institute is in the process of introducing a much-needed MA programme 'Climate Change'.

The PAU governance structure is still work in progress (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 74). Although a vice-president for the PAU Council was elected for a three-year term in February 2022 (Prof Amany Abdullah El-Sharif, the dean of the girl's Faculty of Pharmacy at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt), the positions of rector and vice-rector remain vacant (AU Council 2022c, §3; Belhocine 2022).[5] Achieving financial sustainability and getting continental and international accreditation of the PAU remain the most challenging aspects of this pan-African higher education project (Belhocine 2022). The

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3   Governance, Humanities and Social Sciences in Yaoundé, Cameroon (PAUGHSS); Life and Earth Sciences in Ibadan, Nigeria (PAULESI); Water, Energy Science, and Climate Change in Tlemcen, Algeria (PAUWES); Basic Science, Technology and Innovation in Nairobi, Kenya (PAUSTI); and Space Sciences in Cape Town, South Africa (PAUSS).

4   The PAU website – like many other websites of the AUC – is not up to date. See URL: <https://pau-au.africa> (accessed: 30 June 2023).

5   The president of the PAU Council is Prof Kenneth Kamwi Matengu (Namibia), starting in January 2022, and the first vice-president is Prof Paulo Horácio de Sequeira e Carvalho (Angola).

current PAU budget is \$16.39 million, out of which 23.57 per cent are coming from international partners, that is to say donors (AU Council 2022d, III, §75).

Human resources were approved both for the Pan African Virtual and E-University (PAVEU, Yaoundé) and the IPED (Kinshasa) (see AU Assembly 2022, §2[e]; and AU Council 2022d, §110[b]). The personnel for PAVEU comprise 15 positions (including one P5, that is to say one rank next to the highest technical position below the position of a director-general). Annual staff costs are estimated at \$1.2 million. The IPED has a staff size of 28 (with two P4 and one P6 positions). Annual staff costs are estimated at \$2.13 million.

4.5   *Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa*

The AU adopted a DTS 2020–2030 for the digitalisation of the continent in the coming decade (9 February 2020; see *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 75f.), falling within the purview of the commissioner for infrastructure and energy, Dr Amani Abou-Zeid (Egypt). In February 2022, the AU Executive Council endorsed the *AU Interoperability Framework for Digital ID* and the *AU Data Policy Framework* (AU Council 2022a, §37). It also resolved to develop (1) an AU digital education and implementation plan, an AU digital agriculture strategy and implementation plan, and an e-commerce strategy and continental artificial intelligence (AI) strategy; (2) a continental cybersecurity strategy; (3) a continental child online safety and empowerment policy; (4) a strategy for the digital transformation of the postal sector in Africa; (5) a continental strategy to enhance harmonisation of digital policy, legal, and regulatory frameworks to support the establishment of Africa's Digital Single Market; (6) a DTS implementation architecture and a *M&E Framework*; (7) furthermore, a redesigning of the Pan African e-Network to deliver e-health and e-education services; (8) a continental AI strategy; and (9) statistics on digital connectivity and e-readiness of African countries (AU Council 2022d, §38).[6]

According to the UNDP/MBRF 2022 *Global Knowledge Index*, only two African countries are above the global average score of 44.83 for 'information and communications technology': Seychelles (rank 44/132, score 52.98/100) and Mauritius (rank 51, score 50.98).[7] Conversely, the bottom five performers in this respect include Mozambique (rank 128, score 18.21), Niger (rank 129, score 15.98), Burundi (rank 130, score 15.74), Ethiopia (rank 131, score 15.20), and Chad (rank 132, score 15.09) (UNDP and MBRF 2023).

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6   For an overview on African-European cooperation in this field, see Daniels et al. (2023).

7   The year before five African countries ranked above the global average.

4.6   *African Space Policy and Space Strategy*

The Union's space policy was approved by the 26th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30–31 January 2016). It aims to bring together 'a number of fragmented initiatives that have a regional dimension' (AU Commission 2016, 7). The Second Continental Report on the Implementation of Agenda 2063 highlighted progress in five areas (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 76). The human resources approved for the African Space Agency (AfSA), to be hosted by Egypt, include 156 positions, including 22 at the level of P5 and 7 at the level of director-general (D-1 or D-2) (see AU Assembly 2022, §2[g]). Annual staff costs are estimated at $13.10 million.

By 2022, reportedly, 20 AU member states were running space programmes, 13 with their own space agencies,[8] and with a total of 48 African satellites orbiting in space. The combined space budgets were estimated at $535 million (Guijarro 2022).

4.7   *Ratification of Legal EST Instruments*

AU member states remain fairly slow in ratifying and depositing the legal instruments their heads of state and government have adopted in the field of EST. The AUC website lists six legal instruments relating to EST (African Union 2023a). There is only little change compared to 2021 on the status of these legal instruments. Only two, the *Statue of the African Space Agency* and the *Revised Statute of the Pan African University* have entered into force (29 January 2018 and 31 January 2016, respectively). Two more member states have ratified and deposited the legal instruments relating to the *African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection* (27 June 2014): Cape Verde (5 February 2022) and Niger (16 March 2022) – bringing the number of member states that have deposited to 13. And thus far, the *Statute of the Pan African Intellectual Property Organization* (PAIPO) (30 January 2016) has been signed by six member states – none have ratified or deposited. And the *Statute of the African Observatory in Science Technology and Innovation* as well as the *Statute of the African Science Research and Innovation Council* (both 30 January 2016) have not been signed, ratified, or deposited at all.

5   Outlook: EST in Context – Arts, Culture, and Heritage

The Union's EST policies are deeply embedded in a specific, historically evolved and unequal global political economy of knowledge production and

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8 Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

the related lively debates. However, in 2022 only few attempts were made to systematically address this policy field. While in previous years, for instance, dedicated policies on engaging the African diaspora have been formulated (see *Yearbook of the African Union 2021*, 77–79), in 2022 the main decision-making bodies of the AU did not discuss this issue in depth. Rather, implementation of activities along the 2021 AU Theme of the Year 'Arts, Culture and Heritage: Levers for Building the Africa We Want' was extended by one year to December 2022 (AU Council 2022b, §7). These activities mainly relate to the launching of the temporary site of the Great Museum of Africa (GMA), one of the *Agenda 2063*'s flagship projects, in Algiers (Algeria); the launching of the temporary secretariat of the African Audio-Visual Cinema Commission (AACC, Nairobi, Kenya); and the finalisation of the AU's *Draft African Common Position on Restitution of Cultural Property and Heritage*. Furthermore, the AU renewed the call on member states to spend at least one per cent of their national budgets on arts, culture, and heritage (ibid., §5).

In the last edition of the *Yearbook on the African Union*, it was argued that the unequivocal rhetorical thrust to commemorate Africa's past and build on its arts, culture, and heritage is at odds with the small number of AU member states that have ratified the 2006 *Charter for African Cultural Renaissance* (replacing the 1976 *African Cultural Charter for Africa*). Through this document, the AU wants, among many other things, to 'develop all the dynamic values of the African cultural heritage that promote human rights, social cohesion and human development' (African Union 2006, §3[k]); it also aims to 'provide African peoples with the resources to enable them to cope with globalization' (ibid., §3[l]). In 2022, Madagascar became the 18th member state to deposit the legal instruments of ratification of this charter (African Union 2023b). The original text of the charter required a two-thirds majority for it to enter into force. However, the member states later decided to lower this very high quorum to 15 member states. Accordingly, the charter entered into force on 14 October 2020.[9]

In the meantime, the academic debate on decolonising knowledge production about the African continent has reached new levels (see, for instance, the works of Falola 2022a,[10] 2022b; Jansen and Walters 2022; and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2022). The policy implications of these insights have yet to be fully grasped and

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9   See the explanation by the AU Legal Counsel, Ambassador Dr Namira Ngem (Egypt), on 25 May 2021. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJmchr7_e_4> (accessed: 30 June 2023).

10   Here the Nigerian historian makes an interesting suggestion on how to use African autoethnographies and poetological narratives to develop African epistemologies.

articulated by both AU decision-makers and international partners. The latter can at least be credited with the fact that the political debate is now focusing on the restitution of African art looted during colonialism (see Savoy 2022), and this is also clearly perceived in the media in Europe and North America (see, for instance, Deutsche Welle 2022; NBC News 2022; VoA 2022).

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Governance

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1 The African Governance Architecture

This chapter reviews the governance work undertaken by the African Union (AU) in 2022. The 2022 post–Covid-19 environment has seen an upsurge in democracy and governance work by the AU organs. This has all taken place within the framework of the African Governance Architecture (AGA), which was designed to create dialogue and share lessons and best practices in generating and analysing trends, challenges, opportunities, and prospects for democracy-building and enhancing governance in Africa. This thrust has led to the creation of several platforms, such as the *Palm Tree Circle Series*, the *Democracy and Governance (DG) Trends and Debates*, the *Africa Talks*. The latter focuses on the role of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) in promoting good governance and democracy in Africa.

The foundation for the AGA was laid out in the following instruments, all of which call attention to the ruptures in democratic processes that are caused by unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs): the 1999 *Algiers Declaration*, the 2000 *Lomé Declaration*, the 2000 *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, the 2002 *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council*, and the 2007 *African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance* (ACDEG) (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 83).

The AU has always been criticised for its lack of consultation with member states' civil society stakeholders as this is essential for accountability and providing a sense of ownership of regional initiatives. In 2022, there was a noticeable increase in engagement of civil society organisations (CSOs) by AU organs in their governance work, cutting across all key activities undertaken during the year. Also, the merger of two previously separate departments into the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) in 2021 seems to be now consolidated and is gaining traction as officials from the two areas of responsibility have been working together throughout the year concerning all major events on governance. The new PAPS director of governance and conflict prevention, Patience Z. Chiradza (Zimbabwe), joined the AU on 1 September 2022, and this has lessened the burden of streamlining the governance and security work in the merged department.

Though the AU acknowledges the linkages between governance and enduring conflict in the region (see also Dawit Yohannes, this Yearbook, chapter 10), the AGA Secretariat in the PAPS appears to have slowed down on leading the regional governance work. Instead, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), defined as 'an instrument voluntarily acceded to by Member States of the African Union for self-assessment, peer-learning and self-monitoring in democracy and good governance' (APRM 2022a), has stepped up in shouldering most of the governance work. Space for the APRM to engage with the AGA was opened by the reforms initiated by the Rwandan president Paul Kagame: these reforms made the APRM the lead organ for monitoring and evaluating governance on the continent as well as generating knowledge on the status of governance (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 27–32; and *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 29–33). Prior to this, the *Africa Governance Report* was compiled by the Addis Ababa–based United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).[1] The reforms placed the APRM as the dominant player, becoming an integral part of the AGA (see Semela 2021). Beginning in 2019, the APRM started to support AU member states to develop their capabilities to monitor and evaluate the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and to raise awareness of them in Africa. Experience sharing forums take place at the continental and global levels in the Regional Forum for Sustainable Development and the High-Level Political Forum (HLPF). The latter is the international mechanism for tracking implementation of the SDGs and the submission of the voluntary national reviews on the progress of the SDGs (see United Nations 2022).

The APRM's reviews have been compiled into a massive database that includes information on all countries where it has conducted reviews (see APRM 2022a). These inclusive consultations show commitment to the institutionalisation of Afrocentric good governance as defined and led by African citizens. Despite the mass popularisation of the need to adhere to democratic power alternations, the region continues to experience UCGs, which go against the AU's principles of good political, economic, social, and corporate governance, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and peaceful resolution of conflicts as specified in the ACDEG (African Union 2007). Due to continued conflicts in the region, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) keeps urging member states to address and improve their governance practices. The major challenge facing the APRM is that the recommendations from the country reviews are acted on at the national level through the *National*

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1   Published in 2005, 2009, 2013, 2016, and 2018, respectively.

Programmes of Action (NPAs), which are aligned with national medium-term strategic frameworks and plans for implementation. This leaves the final decision in the hands of the reviewed country, and the APRM does not have any powers of enforcement. The Union's 20th anniversary in 2022 was a useful moment for reflecting on the AU's progress towards meeting its core objectives. AU organs were urged to celebrate the anniversary throughout 2023 with a series of activities and events across various themes and member states.

2   AGA Programmatic Debates

The *Accra Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa*, signed on 17 March 2022, mandated the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the AGA, and the APRM to strengthen national ownership of governance processes and AU standards, norms, and protocols to consolidate democratic governance; prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts; and undertake post-conflict stabilisation, reconstruction, and development (African Union 2022a).[2] This task requires collaboration to increase continental efforts to mobilise political and financial resources for more ratification of the AU and RECS/RMS governance and human rights instruments, with emphasis on those promoting social justice. The Accra Declaration was submitted to the PSC for initial adoption and to the 16th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly (Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, 28 May 2022). Addressing UCGs constituted a significant amount of the governance work undertaken by the AGA and the APRM, which is presented below (see also *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 140–142).

Partly in response to the Accra Declaration, experts drafted guidelines on constitutional amendments for member states with input from other actors such as the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), the European Centre for Electoral Support (ECES), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy (EISA), and the Training for Peace. This drafting event was hosted by the AU Liaison Office in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Some RECS and AU organs met in Niamey, Niger, on 24–26 August 2022 and recommended that a roadmap be developed to ensure the promotion and implementation of these

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2 The Reflection Forum opened by President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo (Ghana) was attended by representatives of AU member states, PSC members, AU organs/institutions, the RECS/RMS, as well as CSOS (Accra, Ghana, 15–17 March 2022).

guidelines. The Accra Declaration specified the need to consider enhancing the already existing mechanisms of the AU Commission (AUC), particularly by PAPS, with a view to providing impact-oriented technical assistance in African constitution-building processes to member states and the RECS/RMs. Guidelines are essential for designing democratic constitutions, but the problem in upholding these supreme laws are likely to remain a challenge as there is no mechanism that tracks deviations from such constitutions and no enforcement mechanisms. Most of the piecemeal changes are usually suggested by election observation teams.

The AUC and the Joint Secretariat Support Office of the African Development Bank (AfDB) and UNECA brought together many RECS for a technical consultative meeting (Nairobi, Kenya, 23 May 2022). The meeting was arranged by the AU Technical Working Group on the Union's master plan, called *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want* (see African Union 2015), to assess preparations for the evaluation of the *First Ten-Year Implementation Plan* (FTYIP) and the formulation of the *Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan* (STYIP) of Agenda 2063. Six RECS – the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – representatives of the AU Development Agency–New Partnership for Africa's Development (AUDA–NEPAD), the APRM, and the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), the AfDB, and the UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) plus some member states participated (African Union 2022b). The FTYIP evaluation is a response to a 2018 AU Executive Council decision on approving the Agenda 2063's FTYIP *Monitoring and Evaluation Framework* and *Indicator Handbook* (AU Council 2018, §32). Building consensus on the approach for the evaluation was the main purpose, together with the establishment of a roadmap and milestones to be achieved in the evaluation process. The AUC Agenda 2063 Coordination Unit reiterated the importance of having all stakeholders and member states emphasise the need for articulating an Agenda 2063 that benefits the African citizenry.

The AUC, the PAPS, the Secretariat of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), and its Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (HRDG) organised a stakeholders' seminar on the ACDEG (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26–27 July 2022) through the joint Secretariat of the AGA and APSA (African Union 2022d). This was in preparation for the roadmap for the implementation of the 2022 action plan of the Sub-Committee on HRDG to

incorporate the discussion on 'African Shared Values',[3] as enshrined in the ACDEG. Emphasis was placed on the ACDEG in the context of 'Shared Values' and included a review of the state of democratic governance in Africa, with a specific focus on UCGs, an examination of states' obligations and mechanisms of application under the ACDEG, and the sharing of lessons learned regarding the role of state institutions and structures in the ratification, domestication, implementation, and reporting on the ACDEG.[4] This event was prompted by the 16th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly, which also resulted in the *Declaration on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa* (African Union 2022c). The declaration called for a recommitment to the relevant principles, norms, and shared values contained in the 2000 *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, the 2002 *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC*, and the 2007 ACDEG as well as all other relevant AU instruments. Recommendations from the proceedings reiterated the need for civic education on the ACDEG and the need for an institutional anchor in member states to drive and facilitate the accession and ratification of instruments. Collaboration between member states and the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG to advocate accession, domestication, and reporting on the ACDEG was also encouraged.

3   AGA Practices

The AGA's main dialogue forum is the annual High-Level Dialogue on Democracy, Elections and Governance. The 11th High-Level Dialogue on Democracy, Governance and Human Rights in Africa was hosted in Cotonou, Benin (14–25 November 2022). It was preceded by several events that were all organised around the same theme. A key recommendation was that CSOs should develop partnership mechanisms and frameworks to harmonise programme activities designed to safeguard democracy by combating UCGs. However, sustainability to contain this is only possible when both resources and technical competence to prevent UCGs are available (see African Union 2022f).

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3   The debate on shared values goes back to an AU Assembly theme (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30–31 January 2011) that was chosen to incentivise member states to ratify the ACDEG and deposit the legal instruments.

4   Under the ACDEG's compliance mechanism, member states are obliged to report every two years to the AUC on domestication of the ACDEG principles into national law (African Union 2007, §49[1]). The AUC is then requested to present a synthesised report, through the AU Executive Council, to the AU Assembly (ibid., §49[3]). As hardly any AU member state has followed this reporting mechanism, the AUC has never produced these reports.

The PAPS deployed a special pre-electoral political mission to Abuja, Nigeria (26 November–4 December 2022) to assess the country's level of preparedness for free and fair elections that were scheduled for February 2023. The team was guided by several AU normative frameworks: such as the 2002 *Declaration of Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa* and the ACDEG. The mission engaged broadly with a wide range of key stakeholders on the electoral landscape process, including the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the inspector-general of police, political parties, the media, CSOs, and representatives of youth and women's organisations. The pre-election mission was timely since Nigeria made monumental steps in February 2022 in implementing some of the recommendations from the previous election observations in 2019 (Okorie 2023). The *Electoral Act* of 2022, repealing earlier legislation from 2010, introduced significant changes to elections in Nigeria, including establishing financial independence of the INEC, extending the time frame for the publication of the election notice, encouraging early party primaries, providing for a central electronic voter database, and creating the INEC's power to review and exclude political nominees from acting as voting delegates or aspirants.

In November 2022, the AU finally took steps to facilitate the inclusion of the ACDEG into the school curricula of member states. The PAPS Constitutionalism and Rule of Law Unit organised three expert meetings (Kinshasa, DRC, 28–30 November 2022) to fine-tune this course (African Union 2022g). The ACDEG teacher's guide was designed to serve as a tool for implementation of the protocol in response to the 2015 request of the AU Specialised Technical Committee on Education, Science and Technology to develop a strategy for inculcating democratic values from childhood. Another pedagogical tool for rule of law actors in Africa was also developed following recommendations from five prior regional workshops organised by the former Department of Political Affairs in 2019. The RECs and RMs provided input into the 'rule of law teacher's guide' (Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, 12–14 August 2022). The two courses are a positive move towards entrenching democratic values in the region, thereby contributing to developing informed critical citizens who demand accountability.

The PAPS has made considerable progress in tackling governance and conflict issues as one entity, but still the APRM remains confined to the governance realm only and in this respect plays its part as an 'unofficial' early warning mechanism. The mandate given to the APRM specifies the division of labour on governance work, leaving governance and conflict prevention to the PAPS to work directly with the PSC on peace and conflict matters. However, in 2018 it was also designated as a potential early warning tool (AU Assembly 2018).

Regarding AUC–RECS relations, the PAPS launched a new platform, the Inter-Regional Knowledge Exchange (I–RECKE) (Lusaka, Zambia, 16 July 2022). I–RECKE was advertised as a pan-African mechanism for collating knowledge and sharing lessons learned and experiences on governance and conflict prevention on the continent (Vaudran et al. 2022). It aims to facilitate a more coherent and regular early warning interaction among the members of the African Governance Platform (AGP) (see also Ulf Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 4). Acknowledging that most conflicts emanate from governance, I–RECKE is meant to coordinate and share information between the AUC, RECS and RMS, and other AU organs. On governance issues, I–RECKE thus seems like a duplication of what the AGA is supposed to be doing. Since the merger of the departments of political affairs, on the one hand, and peace and security, on the other, the AGA has lost traction as more responsibilities for governance monitoring and enhancement have shifted to the APRM. The AU and the RECS launched the I–RECKE project on 17 July at the 4th AU/RECS Mid-Year Coordination Meeting (MYCM). I–RECKE will have a rotational co-chair system that includes the commissioner for political affairs, peace, and security and a REC or RM chief executive. The organ reports to the MYCM. The REC/RM representatives in Addis Ababa will be key in facilitating knowledge sharing and the rotational I–RECKE technical advisory group consists of directors or heads of divisions responsible for political governance, peace and security, and early warning/conflict prevention in the RECS/RMS. I–RECKE's potential value lies in connecting the different governance and security players on the continent. With enhanced collaboration among the different actors, the challenges Africa faces could receive more attention and hopefully improve cooperation between the APSA and the AGA (see Vaudran et al. 2022). By the end of the year, I–RECKE was still not operational.

4   APRM Governance and Member States' Activities

The Sierra Leonean president Julius Maada Bio took over the chairpersonship of the APRM Forum for a term of two years, though the South African president Cyril Ramaphosa has yet to present his report on his two-year tenure as chair of the APRM Forum to the AU Assembly. New members of the African Peer Review (APR) Panel of Eminent Persons were appointed: Matthew Gowaseb (Namibia), Lydia Wanyoto-Mutende (Uganda), and Ambassador Ahmed Araita Ali (Djibouti). These replaced the outgoing members: Ambassador Ombeni Sefue (Tanzania), Dinis Salomão Sengulane (Mozambique), Ambassador Attia

Mona (Egypt), and Professor Fatma Z. Karadja (Algeria). The 100th meeting of the panel was held after this infusion of new members to give them the opportunity to become acquainted with one another and discuss the calendar of missions while deliberating on the allocation of countries, organs, and programmes for their period of service. On 13 November 2022, the APR Panel of Eminent Persons had its first ever joint retreat with the AU Panel of the Wise in eThekwini, South Africa, to discuss collaboration on conflict prevention and resolution on the continent (African Union and APRM 2022).[5]

In 2022, the APRM made giant strides in positioning itself as the key leader for advocating good governance in line with the AU's policy vision document Agenda 2063 (see African Union 2015). Since its formation on 9 March 2003, the APRM has come to embrace all the AU regions, with 42 of the 55 AU member states as members. Over almost the last two decades, the APRM has now conducted country reviews in 24 member states, second-generation peer reviews in 5 member states, and 4 targeted peer reviews in 3 member states. At the same time, however, it must be acknowledged that the last reports in some signatory states date back several years. On a positive note, the 31st Summit of the APRM Forum of Heads of State and Government (virtual, 4 February 2022) peer reviewed the following countries: the first country review of Namibia and the second-generation reviews of Nigeria and South Africa. Uganda and Mauritius presented their progress reports on the implementation of their APRM NPAs. Burundi acceded to the voluntary body at the 31st Summit of the APRM Forum. The Burundian president Maj-Gen Évariste Ndayishimiye signed the memorandum of understanding (MoU) at the APRM Forum Summit with the chief executive officer of the APRM Continental Secretariat, Edward Maloka, after the country acceded as the 42nd APRM member state. Following Guinea's accession to the APRM on 10 October 2022 (the process took 17 years), the relevant authorities in Conakry, Guinea, began to prepare for a *Targeted Review Mission on UCG*.

Kenya held an inclusive validation exercise of its *National Governance Report* (NGR) (Naivasha, Kenya, 11–13 October 2022). The NGR was supported by the APRM Continental Secretariat and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) to actualise the *Framework for National Governance Reporting* and the implementation of the decision taken at the 32nd AU Assembly (Addis Ababa, 10–11 February 2019), which urged all AU member states to develop NGRs as a self-assessment tool for promoting good

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5   This meeting was a follow-up to the first joint retreat of the AU PSC and APRM the year before (eThekwini, South Africa, 19–21 December 2021).

governance as well as the recommendation made by the 4th Ordinary Session of the Specialised Technical Committee on Public Service, Local Government, Urban Development and Decentralization (Cairo, Egypt, 31 August 2022). This is the first inclusive initiative that will hopefully spur other countries to follow suit and act on the recommendations from the country reviews.

Comoros, which is not an APRM member, officially launched the APRM Targeted Review Mission on UCG in Moroni in October 2022 and completed the exercise ten days later. This country's Targeted Review Mission on UCG was carried out in accordance with the decision of the 16th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly on terrorism and UCGs (see AU PSC 2022). The APRM Targeted Review Mission on UCG was also undertaken as part of the Africa Governance Report, which is drafted by the APRM in collaboration with members of the AGA and is presented every two years to the AU Assembly during its ordinary sessions. Both the APRM and AGA were mandated to focus on issues related to UCGs on the continent with a view to determining the causes and to proposing possible lasting solutions in the third edition of the biennial Africa Governance Report to be presented to the AU Assembly in February 2023.

Noting the lack of awareness regarding the necessary continuity of country peer reviews, the APRM conducted some media training workshops in June in Maseru, Lesotho. The event considered the need for public participation and included CSOs in publicising the need for continued governance monitoring (APRM 2022d). Part of the intention was to create a network of communicators, both national and regional, to raise awareness of the mechanism within Lesotho. Another AU organ, the African Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, was involved in the exercise too, demonstrating the shift towards collaboration in enhancing governance among AU organs.

The APRM Continental Secretariat expanded its reach to many governance actors during 2022, and in November, in Nairobi, it partnered with Kenya's APRM National Secretariat to organise technical consultations on the forthcoming report on SDG 16 and the governance goals of Agenda 2063 (APRM 2022g). These technical consultations were supported by the APRM's strategic partners such as UNECA, the regional office of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in Addis Ababa, the Oslo Governance Centre, and the SDG Center for Africa. Jean-Yves Adou, acting director of APRM monitoring and evaluation (M&E), pointed out that the APRM took the initiative to produce a new progress report on SDG 16 and governance aspects of Agenda 2063 (ibid.). The current chair of APRM Focal Points (Sierra Leone) emphasised the significance of this initiative 'it is imperative to rely on accurate and reliable African data to understand the current status quo of SDGs and Agenda 2063 aspirations, especially the said goal, to ensure that rule of law, justice and peace building are

entrenched through our activities as policy makers or takers' (ibid.). The new report was expected to be launched on the margins of the Africa Sustainable Development Forum in Niger by March 2023.

5   APRM Practices

The APRM was busy working on the APRM *Governance Index*, a project sponsored by the AfDB. The steering committee for this new index met to finalise the draft conceptual and measurement framework before submission for validation to APRM member states and the APRM Focal Points (Johannesburg, South Africa, 29 June–1 July 2022). The intention was to build consensus on the methodology and approach for building the index; the nature of data to be used in building the index; and the policy relevance of the APRM Governance Index, which is anchored on the five pillars: democracy and political governance (DPG), economic governance and management (EGM), corporate governance (CG), socioeconomic development (SED) and state resilience to shocks and disasters (SRSD), and the key specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound (SMART) indicators for each pillar and the development of metadata of the indicators (APRM 2022e). The APRM Governance Index differs in that it will receive input from CSOs and will utilise country self-evaluation data to some extent. This is a noble move from the usual one glove fits all approach used by most indices.

The APRM and the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), in cooperation with UNDP South Africa and the Department of Public Service and Administration of South Africa (DPSA), organised a regional workshop on 'Strengthening National Institutional Capacities for the UN Decade of Action and Delivery for Sustainable Development and the AU Agenda 2063' (Cape Town, South Africa, 27–29 October 2022). The APRM and UNDESA AU–UN Regional Collaboration Platform for Africa was revived as a platform for discussing continental development priorities and devise innovative ways to implement policies efficiently. These methods would broaden inclusion, with a distinct focus on gender and good governance. And these dialogues were designed to aid in aligning Agenda 2063 with the SDGs, but the gap remains at the national level where citizen-centric approaches are crucial for positive outcomes. This was the third annual regional workshop designed to explore common challenges in building effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels in Africa to accelerate the implementation of the 2030 *Agenda for Sustainable Development* and Agenda 2063 (see UNDESA and APRM 2022).

The APRM was the first AU organ to take Africa's governance challenges to the HLPF at the UN headquarters in July to support African efforts in enhancing the monitoring and evaluation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063, as designated by the decision of the AU Assembly in 2017 (APRM 2022b). The HLPF is the international mechanism for tracking the implementation of the SDGs with countries submitting voluntary national reports (VNRs) on progress towards certain SDGs ever year. Partnering with the AU's Permanent Observer Mission to the UN, the APRM held different side events to showcase the progress made with regard to Agenda 2063 and the SDGs. APRM reviews were acknowledged as key inputs for the reporting on some of the SDGs and Agenda 2063 aspirations. The APRM also supported two VNR Labs: the first VNR Lab collaborates with UNDESA to address issues of national development planning and VNR reporting challenges in Africa, and the second VNR Lab provides a platform for Ghana to highlight best practices and lessons learnt from implementing the SDGs.

The APRM also launched another initiative, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Implementation Review Mechanism (AfIRM) (Cape Town, South Africa, 30 October–1 November 2022). The APRM, in collaboration with the AfCFTA Secretariat, convened a continental validation meeting to legally accept this AfIRM proposal. This new tool will track efforts by state parties to implement the AfCFTA agreement. This initiative followed the signing of a MoU between the APRM and AfCFTA secretariats and brought together intergovernmental organisations, non-state actors, and development partners. The AfCFTA Secretariat was tasked with developing relevant tools for the review mechanism with support from the APRM and lessons learned from the Trade Policy Review Mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This AfIRM work has positioned the APRM to actively engage in regional integration efforts. Furthermore, it is possible that specific regional trade protocols, such as COMESA and SADC, may also be assessed within this framework to ascertain their strengths and weaknesses, providing important lessons learned for the AfCFTA.

6   Emphasis on Women and Youth

Following AU protocols, the APRM's expanded mandate includes the empowerment of women. In line with this mandate, the APRM participated in the 4th African Women Leadership Programme (Cairo, Egypt, 13 September 2022). The aim was to support and equip African female executives with knowledge

concerning Africa's development agenda and current challenges towards climate change, in preparation for the 27th Conference of the Parties (COP 27) (Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, 6–20 November 2022) to the *UN Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC). The APRM *Continental Governance Programme* officer in charge attended the event and shared the information about the APRM reforms on promoting women's engagement in continental programmes, including peace and security issues. These reforms were meant to act as input for Agenda 2063 recommendations concerning the ongoing STYIP to ensure active participation of women in executing Agenda 2063 (African Union 2015).

In line with AU protocols, standards, and norms on public participation, the AGA enhances popular involvement and citizen engagement in democracy, governance, human rights, and humanitarian affairs in the quest to achieve "The Africa We Want". As part of this process, the AGA developed an elaborate strategy – the *AGA Youth Engagement Strategy* (AGA–YES) (African Union 2018) – to include the largest citizen group on the continent: the youth (comprising 60% of AU's population). Both the AGA–YES and the *Women's Engagement Strategy* were reviewed in 2022 in Kenya, and this resulted in the development of a roadmap and timeline for the consolidation and finalisation of the draft *AGA-APSA Comprehensive Citizen's Engagement Strategy*. The AGA's emphasis on a structured and controlled citizen input process will continue to keep most African citizens unaware of their citizenship rights and maintain the current distance between the regional policy-makers.

The AUC celebrated the 'Africa Youth Month' (AYM) in November 2022, under the theme 'Breaking the Barriers to Meaningful Youth Participation and Inclusion in Advocacy' (African Union 2022d). The theme was a clarion call to all youth development stakeholders: governments, international organisations, development partners, private sector actors, civil society, and all youth on the continent and in the diaspora to challenge the barriers that inhibit meaningful youth engagement in Africa. The *African Youth Charter* charges youth with becoming owners of their own development (African Union 2006, §26). Youth-led movements across the continent have been advocating change in their respective areas of focus at the subregional level. The aim of the 2022 AYM was to convene youth under the auspices of the Pan-African Youth Forum and amplify a unified youth movement to transform youth inclusion in Africa. The 2022 AYM theme also called upon governments and partners to mobilise and support the *1 Million Next Level Initiative* by creating and accelerating opportunities for youth through the building of an ecosystem of youth networks across the region (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 227f.). Member states and

partner organisations were encouraged to sponsor and support youth participants to attend the three-day Pan-African Youth Forum event at the AUC in Addis Ababa. Attendees were members of youth organisations, networks, and national youth councils that focus on education, employment, engagement, entrepreneurship and innovation, and health and well-being.

The 3rd APRM Youth Symposium was held in Kampala, Uganda (4–9 July 2022). A consortium of partners collaborated to bring over 800 youths form 55 AU member states to this event: the APRM Continental Secretariat; the government of Uganda; the AUC Women, Gender and Youth Directorate; the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention; the International Organization for Migration (IOM); the European Union, from its presence in Uganda; UNICEF; the German development agency, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ); and the Youth for Tax Justice Network (APRM 2022f). The symposium was celebrating the AU's 20th anniversary under the theme 'AU@20: Repositioning the Youth Agenda for a Transformative Continent'. The intergenerational dialogue was designed to accelerate youth participation in democracy and good governance. The participants also provided input for and validated the APRM Youth Toolkit for targeted reviews. The outcome was a lobbying document directed at the APRM heads of state and government to come up with an APRM Forum *Decision on Upscaling Youth Participation in Democracy and Good Governance*. The inclusion of a youth component in the country reviews is a big step forward given the 'youth bulge' in all African countries. This is likely to set the tone for national governance inclusion mechanisms.

7   APRM Partner Relations

The APRM, the key agency in governance on the continent, has a number of strategic partners that all provide support in different ways: the AfDB, the UNDP, UNECA, SIDA, the German development agency GIZ, Delaware State University, the ACBF, and the UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA). The financial support for the country reviews comes mostly from the member states.

The revitalised APRM has been on a quest to bring in new partners. The APRM delegation courted Japan as a cooperation partner by participating in a series of meetings on the margins of the 16th Asia–Africa 20 Meeting (17 May 2019), which was hosted by the embassy of Tunisia, while welcoming a new panel member, Ambassador Ali, who spent over a decade as ambassador of

Djibouti to Japan (APRM 2022c). This provided a strategic opportunity for the APRM to piggyback on the relations between the continent and Japan (see Ulf Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 12). Scrutinising the gaps in the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), it was clear that the APRM ought to be within TICAD, where its work on enhancing governance would bring some added value. The APRM was perceived as a way of enriching the monitoring of the *Nairobi* or *Yokohama Plan of Action* and feed into the overall context of TICAD. A consensus was reached to officially submit a request to the Japanese government to appoint the APRM as a formal member of the TICAD Joint Monitoring Committee.

Though the APRM has many partners, it has managed to maintain its autonomy regarding its content and modus operandi in general. The reviews are not influenced by the APRM Continental Secretariat, and the APRM Forum makes its own assessments freely.

8 Outlook

The dual approach of tackling governance issues in the region will continue, with the APRM dominating the arena and making significant inroads into all sectors. Within PAPS, the governance activities will likely continue to work directly with those dealing with direct conflict triggers, such as elections and matters of political exclusion that led to physical conflicts. As the APRM continues to expand and gain visibility, it may likely end up gaining more governance support. It is very possible that as the key AGA actor, considering its demonstrable project management experience and flexibility, the APRM may assume the leadership of the AGA Secretariat in the future.

In 2023 and 2024, 17 African states will be holding elections. In direct connection, the economic challenges most of these countries are facing are too often a precursor to political instability. Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Benin, Gabon, the DRC, South Sudan, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe are some of these countries. Many are being confronted with an inflation risk of more than 50 per cent and have debt-servicing costs due to their highly unreliable and depreciating currencies (Rahman 2023). These problems are exacerbated by largely informal economies and the true (black market) currency exchange rates and prices, which are markedly different to those formally reflected. This makes it unlikely that such countries, like Zimbabwe and South Sudan, will be capable of hosting free and fair elections, thereby implying the need for preparations to intervene with measures to prevent conflict. If African countries

are to perform better, then a concerted focus will have to be directed towards improving government effectiveness and strengthening citizens' abilities to hold their governments accountable.

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Health

Edefe Ojomo, Habibu Yaya Bappah, and Ulf Engel

1 Introduction

This chapter examines major activities of the African Union (AU) in public health during 2022. The Covid-19 pandemic – which was declared by the World Health Organization (WHO) in January 2020 as a public health emergency of international concern – continued to dominate this policy field throughout 2022. After a global surge of the pandemic at the beginning of the year due to the spread of the Omicron variant, the pandemic later subsided significantly. The AU further institutionalized its pandemic response mechanisms, buying time for member states to increase their societies' resilience to the virus. The handling of Covid-19 again highlighted the challenges of public health policies on the continent, including scarce funding, precarious national health systems, and high dependence on donors and pharmaceutical companies. Health challenges were exacerbated by a range of other infectious diseases, the effects of climate change, violent conflict, and – triggered in part by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine – increasing food insecurity.

Against this backdrop, the African Union calls for a New Public Health Order (NPHO) (on the concept, see Nkengasong et al. 2017). Seen as a paradigm shift, this policy rests on five pillars: (1) strengthening public health institutions at the country and continental levels; (2) strengthening the public health workforce; (3) expanding local manufacturing for health products; (4) increasing domestic resources (including financing); and (5) fostering active partnerships with international partners, development finance institutions, philanthropies, and the private sector – based on Africa's priorities (Africa CDC 2023, 11). On the margins of the 77th Session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (New York, United States, 21 September 2022), African heads of state and government issued a 'Call To Action: Africa's New Public Health Order' (see Africa CDC 2022).

2   Africa Health Facts and Figures

In 2021, life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa was 60 years (2011: 58 years), as compared to 73 years in the Middle East and North Africa (the MENA region, 2011: 72 years), or to a global average of 71 years (2011: 71 years) (here and in the following: World Bank 2023). In 2019 (latest figures), communicable diseases accounted for 54 per cent of all deaths in Africa (2010: 62%), as compared to 11 per cent in the MENA region (2010: 14%), or a global percentage of 18 (2010: 24%). In Africa, the under-five mortality rate remained the highest worldwide (per 1,000 live births): 73 (2011: 98). In the MENA region, this rate stood at 22 (2011: 27) and worldwide at 38 (2011: 50). Even though substantial improvements in universal health coverage (UHC) have been made in Africa, overall health throughout the continent remains poor. In 2019, the WHO's UHC service coverage index (SCI) – which covers (1) reproductive, maternal, new-born, and child health; (2) infectious diseases; (3) non-communicable diseases (NCDS); and (4) service capacity and access – shows that 7 of the 47 WHO Africa Region member states had high service coverage, 29 a mid-level service coverage index value, and 12 had low coverage.[1] In general, however, there has been an upward trend: in 2019, the regional population-weighted UHC SCI was 46, up from 24 in 2000 (WHO Africa 2022, 8–9).

Nevertheless, despite major improvements over time communicable diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/Aids continue to place a massive burden on African public health care systems. In 2021, the WHO Africa Region accounted for 234 million malaria cases (2000: 211 million), out of which 619,000 people died (2000: 897,000). In 2021, the incidence rate in Africa (per cases for 1,000 population at risk) was the highest worldwide: 229.4 as opposed to a global average of 59.2, and the same goes for the mortality rate (deaths per 100,000 population at risk): 58.2 in contrast to a global average of 14.8. Africa accounts for 95 per cent of all cases and 96 per cent of all deaths resulting from malaria worldwide (WHO 2022a, 15–18). AU member states with the highest number of malaria cases include Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Mozambique, and Angola. Nevertheless, considerable progress has been made. The AU's 2022 *Malaria Progress Report* notes that '[s]ince 2000, malaria incidence and mortality have declined by 37% and 59%, respectively' (AU Commission 2023).

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1   The other African states are covered by the WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean (EMRO), including Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia – but not Algeria. The office is located in Cairo, Egypt.

In 2020 and 2021, the total number of people newly diagnosed with tuberculosis (TB) and reported cases decreased (from 7.1 million in 2019 to 5.8 million in 2020, with an increase to 6.4 million in 2021). However, in the WHO Africa Region the decline in the growth rate was only noticeable briefly (2020: −2.3%); instead, a significant increase from 1.37 to 1.48 million cases followed in 2021 (WHO 2022b, 6). The number of cases increased in 2020 and 2021 in the Central African Republic (CAR), the DRC, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia, while case numbers continued to go down in Ethiopia, Namibia, and South Africa.

On the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), 'the multiple and overlapping crises that have rocked the world have had a devastating impact on people living with and affected by HIV, and they have knocked back the global response to the AIDS pandemic' (UNAIDS 2022, 2). Out of the global total of 34 million people living with HIV, the vast majority live in sub-Saharan Africa (an estimated 23.5 million or 69%). Women are disproportionally affected (58%); of all pregnant women living with HIV, 92 per cent are in sub-Saharan Africa. And also, the majority of all Aids-related deaths affect this world region (71%) (ILO 2023).

In addition to malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/Aids as well as other diseases, the Covid-19 pandemic still massively preoccupied Africa's public health systems. By December, almost 12.5 million Covid-19 cases had been reported by AU member states. More than 250,000 people had reportedly died from the virus, 'representing a cumulative case-fatality ratio of 2.1%' (Africa CDC 2023, 3). More than 95 per cent of the infected people (11.5 million) had recovered. On average, less than 70 per cent of African people had been vaccinated (and mostly only once) – with major differences between AU member states (for instance, the vaccination rate in Mauritius was 88% and in Liberia 80%, but only 0.2% in Burundi and 7% in the DRC) (ibid.). These developments undermined the progress many African countries have made in achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular SDG 2 'Zero Hunger' and SDG 3 'Good Health and Well-Being' (UNDP 2023).

3   The AU's Health Governance Architecture

The AU's health policy is developed by the ministerial Specialised Technical Committee on Health, Population and Drug Control (STC–HPDC). Initially planned to be held in November 2021, but then postponed because of the Covid-19 pandemic, the 4th Ordinary Session of the STC–HPDC was held

virtually from 30 May to 1 June 2022.[2] Within the AU Commission (AUC), administrative coordination and implementation of the AU health policies rests with the portfolio Department of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development (HHS). Since July 2021, it has been led by Ambassador Minata Samaté Cessouma (Burkina Faso), the former commissioner for political affairs (2017–2021). The department has two directorates: the Directorate for Health and Humanitarian Affairs (HHA) and the Directorate for Social Development, Culture and Sports (SDCS). The former is made up of two divisions (Humanitarian Affairs and the AIDS Watch Africa Secretariat), and the latter of three divisions (Labour Employment and Migration; Social Welfare, Drug Control and Crime Prevention; and Culture and Sport). Important substructures of the AU health governance architecture are the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) and the African Medicines Agency (AMA).

The Africa CDC is a specialised technical institution of the AU responsible for promoting effective disease prevention, founded in 2017 after the Ebola outbreak in West Africa (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 16–20, and 120–122) and based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Its founding director, Dr John N. Nkengasong (Cameroon), retired in the spring of 2022 and went back to the United States, where he had worked for many years (he was sworn in as the US global Aids coordinator and special representative for global health diplomacy on 13 June 2022). The Africa CDC has since been led by acting director Dr Ahmed Ogwell Ouma (Kenya). Following the Covid-19 outbreak, the AU has focused on further institutionalising and expanding the Africa CDC at both the secretariat and regional coordinating centre levels. The AU Assembly decided to upgrade the current AU Covid-19 Response Fund to the Africa Epidemics Fund (AfEF) 'to mobilize resources for preparedness and response to disease threats on the continent' (AU Assembly 2022c, §6). In this respect, the AU Executive Council had suggested that 0.5 per cent of the AU's annual operational budget should be allocated to the Africa CDC as reserve funds for preparedness and response activities (AU Council 2022a, §6). By 31 December 2022, the AU Covid-19 Response Fund had received $38.33 million in cash and donations (Africa CDC 2023, 7).

Based on a request by the AU Executive Council (AU Council 2022a, §9), the AU Assembly furthermore delegated authority to the council to amend the statute of the Africa CDC with the aim of making it an autonomous body of the Union. The amended statute was approved (and entered into force) by an AU Executive Council decision in July 2022 (AU Council 2022f). However,

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2 The STC–HPDC is meant to meet every other year. Previous meetings took place in 2015, 2017, and 2019.

despite the huge political support for the Africa CDC on the continent, the AU Executive Council was also concerned about 'the slow progress on implementation of the Phase I operationalization of Africa CDC' (ibid., §5). Therefore, it directed the AU Commission 'to expedite the full implementation of the recommendations of the Phase I operationalization of Africa CDC', requested the AUC 'to submit the revised Africa CDC organizational structure and a detailed report on the operations of the Africa Epidemics Fund', and tasked the Commission with submitting 'the framework of operations … for consideration by the Executive Council in February 2023' (ibid., §§7–9).

AMA is a newly established regional agency responsible for promoting the beneficial and sustainable production and supply of medicines across the continent (see AU Assembly 2019; and *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 108). By the end of 2022, the *Treaty for the Establishment of the African Medicine Agency* was signed by 30 AU member states, and 23 had ratified and deposited the legal instruments. The treaty entered into force on 5 November 2021, upon the deposit of the 15th instrument of ratification. The 1st Ordinary Session of the Conference of the States Parties (CoSP) to the AMA Treaty (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1–2 June 2022) adopted AMA rules and procedures and elected its bureau, chaired by Ghana (African Union 2022a). The 41st Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council then decided in July 2022 that the seat of AMA should be in Rwanda (AU Council 2022h, §5). To fast-track the operationalisation of AMA, the CoSP held its 1st Extraordinary Session (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3–4 November 2022). The meeting endorsed modalities and timelines for the appointment of the members of the AMA Governing Board and the draft terms of reference of the AMA director-general (African Union 2022b).

Based on a report tabled by President Paul Kagame (Rwanda), the AU's champion for domestic health financing (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 108–109), the AU Assembly took note of the preparation of a Regional Health Financing Hub (RHFH) design and an operational manual by the African Union Development Agency (AUDA–NEPAD) (AU Assembly 2022b, §50). This goes together with the development of the *Africa Scorecard on Domestic Financing for Health*, which will help to monitor the performance against AU commitments (ibid., §52). In this respect, the AU Assembly also welcomed developments in some Regional Economic Communities (RECs)[3] to operationalise pilot RHFHs and plans to develop a *Private Sector Engagement Framework and Monitoring and Evaluation Plan* (ibid., §53) as well as a *Health Financing*

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3 The East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Tracker to help with domestication and identification of a final set of indicators (ibid., §54).

4 Health Policies

In 2022, AU health policies centred on Covid-19 vaccine access and production, international partnerships (see below, section 6) and the theme of the year: 'Building Resilience in Nutrition and Food Security on the African Continent: Strengthen Agriculture, Accelerate the Human Capital, Social and Economic Development' (see below, section 5). In addition, the STC–HDPC adopted the following documents and reports (AU Council 2022e, §28): (1) the campaign on accelerated reduction of maternal mortality in Africa (CARMMA); (2) the terms of reference for the revised maternal, new-born, and child health (MNCH) task-force; (3) the concept note for the Mama Afrika Award; (4) the end-of-decade review report on traditional medicines (2010–2020); (5) the roadmap for the continental hepatitis technical working group; (6) the *Continental Framework on the Control and Elimination of Neglected Tropical Diseases* (NTDS) *in Africa by the Year 2030*; (7) a *Common African Position* (CAP) on NTDS; (8) the progress report on the Africa leadership meeting on investing in health (ALM) declaration; (9) a biosafety and biosecurity legal framework; (10) and a legal framework and standards for infection prevention and control in healthcare facilities. And on nutrition, the STC–HDPC approved the following documents: (1) the African Union continental nutrition report; (2) the continental report on the Cost of Hunger in Africa (CoHA) study; (3) the mid-term review report of the Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy (ARNS); and (4) the terms of reference for the African Task Force on Food and Nutrition Development (ATFFND).

The Union's collective political efforts to build-up resilience of AU member states vis-à-vis the pandemic were led by the presidents of South Africa (Cyril M. Ramaphosa, the AU Covid-19 champion), Rwanda (Paul Kagame, responsible for the Partnership for African Vaccine Manufacturing [PAVM]), as well as Ghana (Nana Akufo-Addo) and Senegal (Macky Sall) – the latter duo coordinating efforts to develop and implement a CAP or continental framework for securing an additional $100 billion of the reallocated International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Special Drawing Rights (SDRS) from so-called developed countries to support the post-pandemic recoveries of African economies and put the African economies on a path to resilience (AU Council 2022b, §3).

While praising the AU Commission for its efforts in preparing member states to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic, the AU Executive Council also noted with concern 'the rising debt levels in Africa, exacerbated by the COVID-19

pandic' (AU Council 2022b, 10). The council directed the AU Commission 'to examine the available debt relief options and investment programmes which can contribute to rapid economic recovery' of member states' economies (ibid.).

The *Africa CDC Ministerial Executive Leadership Programme* (MELP) was launched in 2022. It is a tailored programme that aims to achieve a political strategy for transformative leadership through the NPHO. It is open to all health ministers from the 55 AU member states. A first forum is planned to be held on the margins of the 36th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in February 2023. In July 2022, on the margins of the 41st Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the AU and the 4th Mid-Year Coordination Meeting (MYCM) of the AU and RECs in Lusaka, Zambia, the Africa CDC and the AU convened a meeting of African heads of state and government. This led to the launch of the *Lusaka Call To Action: Strengthening Public Health Emergency Operations Centres (PHEOCs) in Africa*. The initiative seeks to accelerate the establishment and/or strengthening of PHEOCs in all AU member states by 2026 (Africa CDC 2023, 12). The 2nd International Conference for Public Health in Africa (Kigali, Rwanda, 13–15 December 2022) echoed the debates around the NPHO in and around the African continent (Moser et al. 2023).

Targeting malaria and NTDs, Rwanda also convened a summit on the margins of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (Kigali, Rwanda, 23 June 2022). Ahead of the seventh replenishment of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, this summit galvanised political and financial commitment to continue the fight against malaria during the Covid-19 pandemic. But recalling the African Union's commitment 'to reduce malaria incidence and mortality by 75% in all Member States by 2025, compared with 2015, and to eliminate malaria in all Member States by 2030' (AU Assembly 2022, §22), the continental body expressed concern 'that many Member States are not on track to meet the continent's target of eliminating malaria by 2030' (ibid., §39). Owing to the pandemic, domestic funding for malaria policies has faced many obstacles and in some cases been reduced.

5   Nutrition Policies

The 35th AU Assembly (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 5–6 February 2022) decided to dedicate the theme of year 2022 to the enormous topic of 'Strengthening Resilience in Nutrition and Food Security on The African Continent: Strengthening Agro-Food Systems, Health and Social Protection Systems for the Acceleration of Human, Social and Economic Capital Development' (AU Assembly 2022a,

§7; African Union 2023).[4] This confirmed a trend that the topics of health and nutrition were moving much closer together. In the future, the nutrition dimension of the AUC HHA directorate's work will gain more prominence. This is also reflected in the recommendation to change the name of the STC–HPDC to STC on Health, Nutrition, Population and Drug Control (AU Council 2022e, §27[a]).

In general, the AU remained committed to ending hunger in Africa and reducing stunting to 10 per cent and underweight to 5 per cent by the year 2025 – the targets set at the 23rd AU Assembly held in 2014 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea (see AU Assembly 2014, §3). King Letsie III of Lesotho has served as the AU nutrition champion since 2016; his tenure was extended for another three-year term (2022–2024). He is closely coordinating with the Africa Leaders for Nutrition (ALN) initiative, a platform that was launched by the African Development Bank (AfDB) and endorsed by the 30th AU Assembly (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 28–29 January 2018). The AU's policy on how to end hunger is detailed in the *African Regional Nutrition Strategy* (2015–2025) (African Union 2015), the *Strategy for Agricultural Transformation in Africa* (2016–2025) (AfDB 2016), and the *Health Research and Innovation Strategy for Africa* (2018–2025) (AUDA–NEPAD 2019). To improve food and nutrition security, in 2022 the 35th AU Assembly resolved 'to promote nutrition-sensitive agriculture' and support the 'development and implementation of nation-wide food system-based approaches, including supportive policies and programs to promote industrial food fortification, biofortified food crops, based on innovative crop breeding technologies' (AU Assembly 2022d, §§1 and 2).

However, the AU also noted 'the unprecedented needs due to the intersection of conflict, climate change, the coronavirus pandemic, and rising costs restricting access to food', recognising that only three years were left to reach the Malabo targets (AU Council 2022g, §6). The AU Executive Council therefore requested the AU Commission 'to present a comprehensive report to the Assembly in February 2023 on the impact of the AU theme of the year for 2022 highlighting key achievements, challenges, and strategy for implementing the key recommendations arising from the AU theme of the year on nutrition beyond 2022' (ibid., §7). The 2022 *Global Nutrition Report* (DIPR 2022) revealed the dramatic scale of Africa's challenge (see also AUDA–NEPAD 2022). Some 13.7 per cent of infants in Africa have a low weight at birth; the average stunting rate is 30.7 per cent (against the global average of 22.0%). At the same time,

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4   The original theme proposed by Côte d'Ivoire in 2021 was 'Building Resilience in Nutrition and Food Security on the African Continent: Strengthen agriculture, Accelerate the Human Capital, Social and Economic Development' (see AU Council 2022d).

adults are exhibiting signs of malnutrition: 10.0 per cent of women suffer from diabetes, compared to 9.8 per cent of men. And obesity is widespread (20.8% of women, 9.2% of men).

6   International Partnerships

Throughout the pandemic, the African Union has nurtured strategic international partnerships to organize access to vaccines and other medical supplies and build up manufacturing capacity in Africa. Since early 2020, a complex international public health infrastructure has emerged around both state and non-state actors, including philanthropists. In this context, the WHO remained the AU's major partner. The activities of its Africa Regional Office concentrated on policy coordination, surveillance, upscaling laboratory capacity, case management training, infection prevention and control, operations supporting logistics, risk communication and community engagement, and human resources deployment. The WHO continued to facilitate technology transfer for local production in sub-Saharan Africa, in close cooperation with national, continental, and global stakeholders – the so-called COVAX Manufacturing Task Force, which is co-led by the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, the international vaccine alliance Gavi, and the UN International Children's Fund (UNICEF). Partner organisations include the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations, the Developing Countries Vaccine Manufacturers Network, and the Biotechnology Innovation Organization.

In November 2020, the AU had established a Covid-19 Vaccine Acquisition Task Team (AVATT), which helped in the creation of the African Vaccine Acquisition Trust (AVAT) – a special-purpose vehicle, incorporated in Mauritius. The major AVATT/AVAT partners are the Africa CDC, the African Export–Import Bank (Afreximbank), the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and the World Bank. In addition, *Partnerships for African Vaccine Manufacturing* (PAVM) were introduced in April 2021 to accelerate Covid-19 vaccine production in Africa while strengthening the ongoing work of the *Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa* (PMPA) and supporting the goals of the AMA; it was endorsed by the AU Assembly in February 2022 (AU Assembly 2022b). The aim was to manufacture 60 per cent of Africa's vaccine needs locally by 2040. The Africa CDC defined its 22 priority diseases which would benefit from local vaccines manufacturing. Its focus of work in this area is human capacity development in partnership with the International Vaccines Institute (IVI)

(Africa CDC 2023, 11). Furthermore, the AU launched an *Africa Medical Supplies Platform* (AMSP) as a non-profit initiative. The online platform was developed under the leadership of the AU special envoy on Covid-19 and coordinator of the AVATT, Strive Masiyiwa – a London-based Zimbabwean billionaire businessman and philanthropist.

Additional funding for AU initiatives came from the European Union (EU), which, among others, pledged on 12 May 2022 a support package totalling €300 million for vaccination in Africa through the COVAX facility and support totalling €100 million for accessing other Covid-19 tools (both to be channelled through the Covid-19 Response Mechanism of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria). In addition, the EU pledged €427 million for a then yet-to-be established Global Pandemic Preparedness Fund (EU Commission 2022b). The fund was finally launched on 9 September 2022 in the form of a 'financial intermediary fund', hosted by the World Bank. Previously, the EU had supported a centre for mRNA technology transfer in South Africa with €40 million (EU Commission 2022a). The Group of 7 (G7) launched a Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), mainly with emphasis on energy transition, but also with a focus on public health (Schloss Elmau, Germany, 26–28 June 2022). G7 members committed to mobilise $600 billion in public and private capital by the year 2027 (G7 2023).

Beyond Covid-19, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (hereinafter the Global Fund) remained the main financing vehicle for African countries to deal with major diseases. In the 7th replenishment for the period 2024–2026, the global community pledged $15.7 billion to the Global Fund – with a total target of $18 billion (The Global Fund 2023). In addition, bilateral programmes continued to be of relevance, such as the United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), launched in 2003 and now overseen by former Africa CDC director Dr Nkengasong. Under this programme, the USA has invested over $100 billion in the global HIV/Aids response (see PEPFAR 2023). Though PEPFAR is targeting individual African countries, there is a strong element of coordination with the AUDA–NEPAD and the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).

7   Outlook

In 2022, the African Union's health agenda remained broad and multifaceted, with the Covid-19 pandemic still being a priority issue. Through its various institutions and mechanisms, the AU has consolidated its 'first responder

policy' and, in collaboration with international partners, managed to support AU member states and RECs in various ways. Nevertheless, pressing tasks will remain in 2023 regarding the health agenda. At the policy level, this includes the adaptation of the *New Public Health Order Declaration*. Financially, the challenges associated with domestic health financing and the operationalisation of the Regional Health Financing Hubs in the RECs will persist. And at the operational level, the manufacturing of vaccines in Africa (Covid-19) has to make tangible progress. Furthermore, the development of the *Covid-19 Recovery Framework for Africa* has to be accelerated for consideration and adoption by the 4th Ordinary Session of the Specialized Technical Committee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (STC–ARBE). Moreover, in the field of nutrition policy, the impact of the African year of 'Strengthening Resilience in Nutrition and Food Security on the African Continent' needs to be critically assessed and further progress on the Malabo targets monitored closely. And finally, the recently adopted *African Green Stimulus Programme* and the *African Union Green Recovery Action Plan* (see AU Assembly 2022b, §129) need to be systematically aligned with the above policies.

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Infrastructure

Tim Zajontz and Mandira Bagwandeen

1 Introduction

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had immense negative repercussions for Africa, with rising food, fertiliser, and energy prices contributing to higher living costs in many places across the continent (see Tim Murithi, this Yearbook, chapter 2). The African Union (AU) commissioner for infrastructure and energy, Dr Amani Abou-Zeid, stated in June 2022 that the conflict had created 'a double crisis' for Africa. It caused disruptions to global supply chains and further depressed economic growth at a time when African countries were just beginning to recuperate from the social and economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. The commissioner emphasised that soaring energy prices and higher costs of transport across Africa had negative knock-on effects for agriculture, industry, trade, tourism, and other economic sectors, while African treasuries faced increasing pressure to finance their budgets and service debts (African Union 2022f). The war in Ukraine also laid bare the extant capacity constraints in Africa's energy and electricity sectors. AU officials, consequently, reiterated the importance of expediting regional and continental infrastructure programmes and reinforced efforts to solicit infrastructure finance for overcoming Africa's industrial and transport infrastructure deficits and driving the 'green' energy transition. At the same time, European governments and companies turned to Africa in desperation to supplement their energy imports from Russia, thereby investing anew in African fossil fuel infrastructure. Repercussions of the war against Ukraine in Africa reiterate the centrality of infrastructure and its cross-sectoral impacts on the region and, simultaneously, underscore the intensifying geopolitics of infrastructure development on the continent.

This chapter first outlines key developments in AU decision-making and implementation structures in the infrastructure sector. Secondly, it documents AU efforts at 'greening' Africa's infrastructure, focusing particularly on activities and positions at the 27th Conference of the Parties (COP 27) (Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, 6–20 November 2022) to the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC). Relatedly, it also touches on the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa (AGIA), which was launched on the margins

of cop 27 (see Annual Interview, this Yearbook, chapter 3). Additionally, this section of the chapter also discusses developments throughout 2022 within the au's *Programme for Infrastructure Development for Africa* (pida) and the growing importance of infrastructure development in the context of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and related au policies aimed at industrialisation (see also Bruce Byiers, this Yearbook, chapter 11). Lastly, the third section of this chapter focuses on the au's external infrastructure partnerships and their increasing geopoliticisation.

2   Decision-Making and Implementation

The transition from the first (2017–2021) au Commission (auc), led by Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, to the second (instated in February 2021) was marked by continuity at the top decision-making level thanks to Abou-Zeid's reappointment as the commissioner for infrastructure and energy (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 121–122). Within the *Institutional Architecture for Infrastructure Development in Africa*, implemented in 2012, the auc Department of Infrastructure and Energy (die) oversees infrastructure policies and coordinates decision-making on infrastructure-related matters for the Council for Infrastructure Development (cid). It is advised by the Infrastructure Advisory Group, which convenes infrastructure experts and high-level officials from relevant bodies at least biannually. The cid, for its part, is composed of top officials from the auc, the eight officially recognised regional economic communities (recs), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (uneca). It provides programmatic guidelines for the sector, arbitrates and approves programmes and harmonisation measures, and advises the specialised technical committees (stcs) and the au Executive Council, which in turn is answerable to the au Assembly of Heads of State and Government (ibid., 129–131).

At the centre of the implementation structure in the infrastructure sector is the au Development Agency, which emerged from the New Partnership for Africa's Development (hence its composite acronym auda–nepad). auda–nepad coordinates the implementation of projects with key stakeholders, such as the recs, the AfDB, uneca, as well as various external development partners and specialised agencies. auda–nepad also monitors the progress of pida, which entered its *Priority Action Plan 2* (pap 2; 2021–2030) in 2021 (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 128–130). Considering auda–nepad's central role in the implementation structure of the au's infrastructure policies and programme, the appointment of the agency's new chief executive officer was a

noteworthy event in 2022. Nardos Bekele-Thomas's appointment was endorsed by the 35th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 5–6 February 2022). She took over the role from Dr Ibrahim Assane Mayaki on 1 May 2022. Bekele-Thomas was previously the senior director of the Office of the UN Secretary-General and served, among others, as resident coordinator for the UN in South Africa and as the UN Development Programme (UNDP) resident representative in Kenya and Benin (UN Africa Renewal 2022).

At the highest AU decision-making level, at the 40th Ordinary Session (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2–3 February 2022), the AU Executive Council took several decisions related to the infrastructure sector. It adopted the *Financing Strategy* for PIDA PAP 2 (2021–2030). The PIDA Financing Strategy was developed by the AfDB and validated during the ministerial session of the STC on Transport, Transcontinental and Interregional Infrastructure, and Energy (STC–TTIIE) in June 2021. With this strategy, the AU hopes to address financial bottlenecks that have severely compromised the progress of many PIDA projects during the PIDA *Priority Action Plan 1* (PAP 1) (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 133–136). It foresees strengthening coordination among stakeholders to foster an enabling environment and political support for the preparation of projects, and it aspires to mobilise alternative financing, not least from the private sector, throughout the entire life cycle of projects (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 130). Accordingly, the AU Executive Council, at its meeting in February 2022, 'urge[d] Members States to increase financial commitment for infrastructure development especially for infrastructure project preparation' (AU Council 2022a, §20). The AU Executive Council furthermore welcomed the introduction of the PIDA Service Delivery Mechanism Quality Label (PQL). The label is awarded to PIDA projects that excel in adhering to international best practices in infrastructure development (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 130). The AU Executive Council 'encourage[d] [its] adoption and application across the regions and the infrastructure sub-sectors as Africa's standard for early-stage appraisal of infrastructure project [*sic!*]' (AU Council 2022a, §21). The PIDA steering committee was directed by the AU Executive Council to 'consider the continuity and/or role of the [PIDA] Task Force going forward' (ibid., §22). The PIDA task force comprises representatives from the AUC, AUDA–NEPAD, the AfDB, and UNECA.

Another decision by the AU Executive Council that will potentially have decisive effects on future developments in, as well as the governance of, Africa's information and communications technology (ICT) sector is the council's request for the AUC to develop a *Continental Cybersecurity Strategy* (AU Council 2022a, §38[1]II). It seems appropriate – some would argue overdue – for the AU to take action in this respect, not only because (African) societies are

increasingly facing security threats in cyberspace but also because norm-setting in the ICT sector should not be relinquished to external actors that provide ICT infrastructure across the continent. As discussed below, a race is underway between Western powers and China to build up the African ICT infrastructure. Implementing continent-wide standards and norms regarding digital governance and cybersecurity could avoid the manifestation of a regulatory patchwork and the misuse or weaponisation of ICT by deviant actors.

In the transport sector, the AU Executive Council adopted technical specifications for the African railway network, related norms and standards, and the roadmap towards developing the African common market of railways (AU Council 2022a, §12). Furthermore, the AU Executive Council deliberated on policy and regulatory instruments of the *Single African Air Transport Market* (SAATM), a flagship project of *Agenda 2063*.

3   Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM)

At the 40th Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council, the council adopted key performance indicators based on the *Yamoussoukro Decision*[1] of 1999, which constitutes the institutional framework for the liberalisation of air transportation in Africa and contains recommendations on reduction of air transport costs as well as the revised Windhoek Aviation Security and Facilitation Targets (the AU Executive Council urged the 'remaining Member States' to join the SAATM) (AU Council 2022a, §7). By 2021, 35 member states, representing 89 per cent of intra-African air traffic, had signed a solemn declaration to operationalise the SAATM (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 124). At the 41st Ordinary Session the AU Executive Council (Lusaka, Zambia, 14–15 July 2022), the council approved the SAATM Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and it 'request[ed] the AFCAC [African Civil Aviation Commission] in collaboration with the Commission and other key partners to establish the SAATM Dispute Settlement Mechanism Administrative Council and Secretariat hosted by AFCAC and reporting to the YD [Yamoussoukro Decision] Monitoring Body' (AU Council 2022b, §43[VI]). The policy guidelines for the negotiation of the *Air Services Agreement* between AU member states and non-African states and regions were also approved (ibid., §45).

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1   The Yamoussoukro Decision is a treaty adopted by most AU members states that establishes a framework for the liberalisation of air transport services between African countries, as well as fair competition between airlines. The treaty was signed by 44 African states in 1999 and became binding in 2002.

Following the SAATM-related decisions of the AU Executive Council, air transport experts and officials of the AU member states, the RECs, the AFCAC, the African Airlines Association (AFRAA), and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) met in Accra, Ghana, from 28 November to 2 December 2022. Participants deliberated on the implementation of regulatory instruments of the Yamoussoukro Decision (African Union 2022n). The workshop also provided a platform to gain input from partners to accelerate the implementation of the SAATM. In global comparison, air traffic penetration in Africa is low, and flight fares remain relatively high, while insufficient air transport infrastructure, infrequent or limited availability of services, and disruptions and delays are considered obstacles to growth in the market (ibid.).

At the Accra workshop, the AUC's acting head of the Transport and Mobility Division, Eric Ntagengerwa, highlighted that the SAATM 'aspires to establish a single African air transport market with a direct positive influence on the success of Africa's regional integration agenda through the improvement of transport connectivity between African capitals, facilitating the free movement of people, goods and services, and serving as one of the key enablers for the of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)' (African Union 2022n). Furthermore, by removing the need for *Bilateral Air Service Agreements* (BASAs) between countries, the SAATM is expected to improve and facilitate business and commercial traffic between countries, with expected spillover effects for socioeconomic development, job creation, investment, and innovation.

In November 2022, the AFCAC introduced a *Pilot Implementation Project* (PIP), which incorporates 18 AU member states[2] with 'favourable environments to accelerate the implementation of SAATM' (African Union 2022n). Participating countries agreed to launch SAATM flights between their territories, and participating airlines signed a strategic partnership framework to reduce costs and increase the size of the available fleets. Overall, according to a study commissioned by the AU, the economies of signatory states are projected to gain \$4.2 billion in gross domestic product (GDP), 596,000 new jobs, and a 27 per cent reduction in airfares if the SAATM is fully implemented (cited in Orucho 2022).

4   Continental Power System Master Plan

Another crucial infrastructure governance instrument in the energy subsector that saw some implementation progress in 2022 is the African Single Electricity

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2 Cape Verde, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, and Zambia.

Market (AfSEM). The AfSEM is expected to gradually harmonise policies, regulations, technical norms, and standards to address financing needs and market barriers, with the aim of having a fully integrated African electricity market by 2040 (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 132–133). In 2022, efforts were underway to develop a *Continental Power System Master Plan*, which aims at streamlining energy generation across all five regional power pools.[3] The AfDB signed off on technical assistance support to the value of just over $2 million in February 2022 (AfDB 2023). The master plan will provide a roadmap for the establishment of an integrated continental power transmission network in the context of Agenda 2063 and for the gradual integration of the AfSEM, officially launched in June 2021 (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 126–128). According to the AfDB, the master plan's primary objectives are to 'identify subsystems of a stable and reliable intra-regional and inter-regional power systems network and ensur[e] their orderly development to form the physical foundation to the envisaged' (AfDB 2022a).

Africa has increased overall electricity generation over the past decade, rising from 16,144 megawatts (MW) in 2013 to 31,690 MW in 2021 (AUC and AUDA–NEPAD 2022, 33), and AU member states have increased the number of MW on their national grids. For example, between 2020 and 2021, Senegal added 234.5 MW of electricity to its national grid, while Rwanda and Sierra Leone added 238.4 and 67 MW, respectively (ibid.). During the same period, Egypt and Côte d'Ivoire added 3,140 MW and 275 MW of electricity, respectively (ibid.). Furthermore, work on the Ethiopia–Kenya electricity highway is underway. Various interventions, such as investments in renewable energy projects to support industrial development, explain the increase in electricity generation (ibid.). At the same time, further massive investment in energy infrastructure is deemed vital in order to close the remaining wide energy access gap, as will be discussed in the following section on major developments in the infrastructure policy field in 2022.

5   Major Developments in 2022

The war in Ukraine was a significant concern in AU decision-making circles, including in those concerned with the infrastructure sector. At the 2nd Extraordinary Session of the STC–TTIIE (virtual, 14–16 June 2022), the STC approved a document titled 'Implications of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis on the African Energy and Infrastructure Sectors'. This contained recommendations

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3   The five power pools are the Central African, East African, Southern African, and West African Power Pools as well as the Maghreb Electricity Committee.

for member states on how to mitigate the crisis and manage emerging risks while simultaneously taking advantage of emerging opportunities (Africa–EU Energy Partnership 2022). For Abou-Zeid, the impacts of the war in Ukraine on global energy markets underlined the need to accelerate the implementation of AU initiatives in the energy sector and related infrastructure projects. She stated that 'Africa can step in as an alternative source energy market through its number [*sic*] of projects under the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) and other similar initiatives like the African Single Electricity Market (AfSEM) that can be expedited to first address Africa's energy needs and [then] export to other regions' (quoted in African Union 2022f).

The impacts of the Russia-Ukraine crisis on the infrastructure and energy sectors were also a significant concern of the AU Executive Council during its meeting in Lusaka in July 2022. The council requested from the

> Commission, in collaboration with specialized Pan-African institutions and all relevant stakeholders, to continue monitoring the evolving situation of the Russia-Ukraine crisis and its impact on infrastructure and energy sectors and advise Member States on appropriate mitigation measures and intensify the development of data systems on energy consumption and behaviour in the Continent.
>
> AU COUNCIL 2022B, §42

It also requested the AUC and specialised agencies to coordinate the implementation of several recommendations aimed at mitigating the effects of the war against Ukraine. These recommendations included the development of the *African Energy Security and Financing Plan*, meant to promote intra-African trade and increase African oil production; accelerating the development of regional gas and electricity projects and infrastructure in Africa to support Africa's energy transition, industrialisation, clean cooking, agriculture, petrochemicals, and export of natural gas to other markets; the integration of the electrification of railways and other sustainable transportation systems into current development plans to reduce the impact of fluctuations in oil and gas prices on transport costs; the creation of interconnected multi-modal logistics zones to facilitate the movement of goods and to reduce transport and distribution, as well as storage and costs; and the acceleration of the implementation of key projects under PIDA PAP 2 and the AfSEM 'to strengthen intra-Africa interconnectivity and tap into the opportunities for energy trade that the Russia-Ukraine Crisis provides for Africa' (AU Council 2022b, §43). But it was not only the acute energy crisis caused by the war that made energy a crucial theme in the AU's infrastructure policy realm in 2022. Throughout the

year, AU institutions and agencies deliberated on initiatives and policies that prioritised a gradual energy transition towards renewable energy sources and implementing climate-resilient infrastructures.

5.1 Efforts at 'Greening' Africa's Infrastructure

Preparations for COP 27 informed AU policy-making on environmental issues, climate change mitigation, and renewable energy throughout 2022. The AU commissioner for infrastructure and energy, Abou-Zeid, herself an Egyptian national, said in June 2022, 'Africa should achieve the best possible outcomes from COP 27 dubbed as the "African COP"' (quoted in African Union 2022g). The 2nd Extraordinary Session of the STC–TTIIE approved a *Common African Position on Energy Access and a Just Energy Transition* for COP 27. Commissioner Abou-Zeid was cited at the meeting, saying that '[t]he world needs to recognize Africa's unique realities and support its efforts to close the huge energy access gaps without being straight-jacketed into approaches that do not match our circumstances' (quoted in African Union 2022f). The statement reflects a gradual approach to the transition towards fossil-free energy sources, which is widely supported among African decision-makers. Not only do several African economies remain heavily dependent on the export of fossil fuels, sufficient investments in renewable energy infrastructure to effectively close Africa's energy access gap have hitherto also failed to appear. Abou-Zeid expressed her concerns that achieving Goal 7 of the UN *Agenda 2030*, that is to say access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all, was at risk if innovative approaches and collaborative efforts failed to materialise (ibid.).

Preparations for COP 27 also informed the agenda of the Bureau of the STC on Communication and Information and Communications Technology (STC–CICT), which held an ordinary session on 22–23 June 2022. The bureau, which serves for two years, convened the ministers of communication or of ICT from Congo (Brazzaville), South Africa, Niger, Rwanda, and Egypt. The session was chaired by Congo and focused on the role of digitalisation in the continent's recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic, the mitigation of adverse impacts of climate change, and the enhancement of energy access and transition. At the ministerial session of the Bureau of the STC–CICT, Commissioner Abou-Zeid stressed that '[t]he opportunities that digital agriculture and digital energy present to transition to clean and sustainable energy systems, increased productivity, food security and mitigate the risks stemming from climate change and global warming should clearly be explored and solutions put forward' (quoted in African Union 2022g). Furthermore, the bureau emphasised the importance of a well-coordinated and common African approach ahead of COP 27 in Sharm el-Sheikh.

The AU consolidated its agency in global climate governance through a number of activities. The AUC, together with the AfDB, UNECA, and the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, hosted the Africa Pavilion, which, since the 2011 COP 17 in Durban (South Africa), serves as the central venue for discussion and exchange on African concerns and priorities in global climate negotiations. Furthermore, the AU organised several side events, including an Africa Day, a side event titled 'Global Energy Crisis and Security: Opportunities to Accelerate the African Single Electricity Market (AfSEM) and Continental Power System Masterplan (CMP)', and a High-Level Forum on Financing Energy Transition in Africa (African Union 2022a). At the latter, which was co-hosted by the International Energy Agency (IEA), the executive director of IEA, Fatih Birol, reminded attendees that 600 million Africans, or 43 per cent of the continent's population, still lacked access to electricity, and nearly 1 billion Africans did not have access to clean cooking (African Union 2022i). The AU commissioner Abou-Zeid criticised the situation that Africa only received 3 per cent of global climate finance, 'leaving an annual financing gap of US\$ 90 billion for its energy access and transition goals', which crucially depends on the development of the required infrastructure (ibid.). With the intention to close this financing gap, the AU entered into new partnerships in 2022.

5.2   *Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa*

Throughout 2022, the AU liaised with international partners to advance (financial) cooperation to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change and leverage investment in green energy sources and technologies on the continent. A joint article by Macky Sall, AU chairperson, and Charles Michel, president of the European Council, published just before the 6th EU–AU Summit (Brussels, Belgium, 17–18 February 2022), emphasised that '[t]he EU will provide public and private investment capacity, as well as expertise with the green infrastructure and technologies that are vital to our common fight against climate change and to transforming African economies' (European Council 2022b). On 9 November 2022, on the margins of COP 27, the Egyptian government, the AU, the AfDB, and the infrastructure investment platform *Africa50*, in partnership with several global organisations, launched the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa (AGIA). The collaborating global partners are the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the French Development Agency, the Rockefeller Foundation, the United States (US) Trade and Development Agency, the Global Center on Adaptation, the Private Infrastructure Development Group, and the African Sovereign Investors Forum (African Union 2022j). According to the AU, the mission of the AGIA is to raise capital to accelerate Africa's just and equitable transition to net-zero

emissions. The actors involved identified four pillars for collective action: (1) project preparation and development to support the transformation of projects from the conceptualisation stage to bankable propositions; (2) technical assistance and capacity-building regarding project ratings to establish green eligibility criteria and project rating guidelines for infrastructure projects; (3) co-financing and de-risking instruments to mobilise equity and debt financing for green infrastructure from AGIA members and other sources; and (4) the facilitation and mobilisation of funds from global and African institutional investors and the leveraging of such funding at African and international capital markets through green bond issuances and private investments.

The AfDB, in its *African Economic Outlook Report* (2022), estimated that the cumulative financing needs for Africa to respond appropriately to climate change range between $1.3 and $1.6 trillion, averaging $1.4 trillion in 2020–2030 (AfDB 2022b). Broken down annually, $127.8 billion is needed. However, this is hardly sufficient as adaptation costs are estimated at $259–407 billion. Furthermore, if the international-to-domestic commitment ratio of 2020 remains constant, the adaptation financing gap in Africa from international sources will range between $66 billion and $260 billion in 2020–2030 (ibid.). The AfDB president, Akinwumi Adesina, noted that 'the needs in Africa are simply enormous. Only by working together and pooling our resources together can we make transformative impacts and set Africa on a clear path to achieving NetZero emissions and to mitigate climate change' (African Union 2022j).

The AGIA aims to raise $500 million to provide capital for early-stage project development (African Union 2022f). This aligns with calls made at the 7th PIDA Week (Nairobi, Kenya, 28 February–4 March 2022) for prioritising more financing for the early stages of infrastructure development (as discussed below). AGIA funds will assist in creating a pipeline of bankable green infrastructure projects that could generate $10 billion worth of investments (ibid.). The AGIA will prioritise infrastructure developments in energy, transport, water and sanitation, healthcare, and ICT. Another declared focus is linking rural and urban areas through connectivity infrastructure. In addition, large-scale green energy initiatives, such as mega-solar or green hydrogen projects, and smaller venture capital initiatives, like cleantech projects, energy storage, or e-mobility solutions, will also be supported, according to the AU (ibid.).

5.3 *Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa*

The 7th PIDA Week was held under the theme 'Putting Africa on a Firm Footing for Recovery, Growth, and Resilience Through Infrastructure' (African Union 2022d). The conference prioritised assessing and taking stock of the financial investments in Africa's infrastructure development. The event brought

together various African stakeholders to critically examine infrastructure development against the backdrop of the impact of Covid-19 on African economies and, simultaneously, deliberate on financial prospects for future infrastructure projects. Representing then president Uhuru Kenyatta at the opening of the event, Kenyan cabinet secretary James Macharia highlighted that

> [a]s African countries, we need to focus on policies and strategies that will promote and increase domestic resource mobilization, attract private investment and create an environment that attracts the growth of quality infrastructure projects. I, therefore, urge for deeper engagement between PIDA, the private sector, and development partners.
> AFRICAN UNION 2022D

Under Agenda 2063, AU members prioritised developing 'world-class infrastructure [that] crisscrosses Africa' to stimulate and promote regional integration, trade, and economic transformation (AUC and AUDA–NEPAD 2022, 31). External finance and a diverse range of foreign actors have gotten heavily involved in Africa's infrastructure development, notably China, which steadily emerged over the 2010s to become Africa's largest bilateral infrastructure financier (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 137–140). At the same time, African governments and African development finance institutions (DFIS) have also substantially increased their spending on infrastructure (African Union 2022n). Under PIDA PAP 2 (2021–2030) (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 128–130), 69 infrastructure projects were selected by AU member states, representing a collective aggregate capital expenditure of $160 billion (African Union 2022d).

However, Raila Odinga, the former Kenyan prime minister (2008–2013) and, since 2018, the AU high representative for infrastructure development, emphasised in his address at the 7th PIDA Week that Africa's data on infrastructure remains 'humbling and disturbing' as 80 per cent of the continent's infrastructure projects are failing at the feasibility and business-planning stages (African Union 2022c). Moreover, data on Africa's performance on global transport and energy indices remained dismal compared to other developing regions such as Asia and South America. Ultimately, Odinga noted, 'in a nutshell, [that] all our best efforts of recent decades are not good enough' (ibid.). He stressed the need to learn from the mistakes of PIDA PAP 1 (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 133–136). For PIDA PAP 2 projects to be successful, financing for project scoping, feasibility, designing, and planning should be prioritised. Commissioner Abou-Zeid affirmed that PIDA PAP 2 was carefully developed to address challenges relating to project bankability. She said, 'Africa has infrastructure

projects that meet investment criteria. The projects are inclusive, sustainable, and gender smart and will certainly better the lives of fellow Africans' (African Union 2022d).

Odinga recommended that the NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility at the AfDB, the AU Service Delivery Mechanism, and the specialised agencies for cross-border projects can serve as valuable financing sources for project preparation and implementation (African Union 2022c). Furthermore, he stressed that PIDA PAP 2 needs a financing strategy that prioritises private sector involvement and public-private partnerships (PPPs). Similarly, Commissioner Abou-Zeid appealed to 'private sector financiers, donors, and partners to invest in … projects that produce a win-win outcome' (ibid.). AUDA–NEPAD and the AfDB identified five necessary enabling factors for successfully implementing PIDA PAP 2 projects: (1) national ownership over infrastructure projects by African governments and citizens, with regional projects being included into national development plans; (2) regional commitment whereby the RECs should deliberate carefully and include prioritised regional projects in their regional infrastructure master plans; (3) capacity-building for transnational project management to improve the coordination and management of stakeholders involved in large-scale, complex projects; (4) strong advocacy from regional institutions, such as the AUC, AUDA–NEPAD, UNECA, AfDB, and Afreximbank, which should play a more dominant role in mobilising resources for projects; and (5) enhanced project quality standards to ensure high-quality infrastructure assets and services (ibid.).

5.4   *Infrastructures for Industrialisation and Economic Diversification*
In the context of the AfCFTA, the political quest for continental and regional coordination of infrastructure development has seen further impetus (see Zajontz 2024). Besides reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, 'adequate infrastructure' is seen as a key prerequisite for boosting regional trade and industrialisation and even features in the preamble of the 2018 *Kigali Agreement*, which established the AfCFTA (African Union 2018). Indeed, the lack of sufficient economic infrastructure, not least transnational transport infrastructure, has driven up costs of doing business on the continent, with economists showing that logistics and transport costs in Africa are three to four times higher than in other world regions (Plane 2021). As the AfCFTA secretary-general, Wamkele Mene, underlined during the 7th PIDA Week, 'infrastructure development, at the national, regional and continental levels, has become pivotal to the success of the trade pact' (Mene 2022). Infrastructure was also a central issue at the 17th AU Extraordinary Summit on Industrialisation and Economic Diversification (Niamey, Niger, 25 November 2022). The summit was part of the

Africa Industrialization Week's annual commemorative activities, convened under the theme 'Industrialising Africa: Renewed Commitment Towards an Inclusive and Sustainable Industrialization and Economic Diversification'. The AU recognises that

> [t]o achieve the aspirations of the AfCFTA, Africa's industrialisation and transformation agenda needs to be supported at the highest national, regional, continental, and global levels. Such a focus will be key to accelerate efforts in a selected number of key policy areas – such as energy and road infrastructure, trade facilitation, financial sector development, education development, agro-industrial transformation, green industrialisation and technological innovation and transformation. Advancing the AfCFTA and Africa-Industrialization side-by-side with deliberate efforts to realize the mutually reinforcing interdependences between the two will provide Africa's critical success pillar and condition for Agenda 2063.
>
> AFRICAN UNION 2022K

African leaders reiterated their determination to ensure that the continent's industrialisation and economic diversification is financed through secure financial sources. Additionally, emphasis was placed on urgently identifying and addressing impediments to productivity and growth through infrastructural development, energy, access to finance, digitalisation, innovation, and skills development (African Union 2022l). Additionally, in collaboration with development partners, the AU will develop and disseminate among member states an annual *African Industrial Development Report* based on an *African Industrial Development Index*, and it will speed up the construction of the African Industrial Observatory (ibid.).

In terms of concrete economic infrastructure for industrialisation, the development of special economic zones (SEZs) and industrial parks (IPs) was among the ten key commitments made at the summit. These facilities are considered to be crucial instruments for 'economic reforms, promot[ing] quality Foreign direct investments (FDIs), and accelerat[ing] industrialization across the continent' (African Union 2022l). According to the *African Economic Zones Outlook* (edition 2021), more than 200 SEZs are operational in Africa, and 73 projects are nearing completion in 47 countries (Africa Economic Zones Organisation 2021, 6). Not only will new SEZs be developed, but support will also be extended to existing SEZs and IPs as a means to overcome existing industrial infrastructure constraints (African Union 2022m). It is envisioned that these facilities will eventually become hubs for regional value chain integration. Furthermore, nearly 150,000 hectares of land have been demarcated to implement economic zones across the continent. And $2.6 billion

in investments has been mobilised for agro-processing, manufacturing, and services (ibid.). Despite this, research suggests, at best, mixed development results, with Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and colleagues (2022, 456) recently showing that, while 'African SEZs are on a steep upward trend and are changing in nature', their 'ability … to attract industrial activity, proxied by firms, and generate employment remains limited', and 'African SEZ governance policies (over)rely on fiscal incentives and performance requirements'.

Following the African Industrialization Week, the AU and the African Economic Zones Organisation (AEZO) held the 5th AU Symposium on SEZs during the 7th AEZO Annual Meeting (Abuja, Nigeria, 30 November–2 December 2022). The events were convened under the theme 'African Special Economic Zones: Engine for Resilience and Accelerator for Sustainable Industrial Value Chains Development'. The events coincided with the 30th anniversary of Nigeria's SEZ scheme and brought together over 400 participants and stakeholders (African Union 2022m). Discussions highlighted cross-cutting issues related to the role of SEZs in accelerating sustainable industrial value chain development (in alignment with Agenda 2063).

6 AU External Partnerships and the Geopolitics of Infrastructure

Infrastructure development has become central to Africa's external relations, including those of the AU. The latter cooperates with a myriad of external actors on infrastructure programming, financing and project implementation. Besides so-called traditional donors, such as the US, the European Union (EU), and Japan, China has become Africa's biggest bilateral infrastructure financier (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2020*, 137–142). Thereby, the AU has taken on the role of an increasingly important supranational 'broker' that has institutionalised its cooperation in the infrastructure sector with various external actors. Simultaneously, there has been growing competition between Western actors and China for influence in Africa's infrastructure sector, which has been tangibly expressed through competing connectivity initiatives, notably China's *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI), the EU's *Global Gateway*, and the US-led *Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment* (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 130–135). In 2022, the AU engaged with its external partners on various occasions.

6.1 *The Rise of AU–EU Infrastructure Inter-Regionalism*
At the 6th EU–AU Summit, heads of state and government as well as government officials from AU and EU member states agreed on a 'joint vision for a renewed partnership', which, among several commitments, foresees an

Africa-Europe Investment Package of €150 billion under the umbrella of the EU's Global Gateway initiative, which was launched in 2021 (European Council 2022a). The package hopes to leverage public and private investments in the following areas: energy, transport, and digital infrastructure; energy transition; green transition; digital transformation; sustainable growth and decent job creation; transport facilitation and efficiency of connected transport networks; and mobility and employability of students. It is expected to complement additional instruments in the health and education sectors. While a share of this finance constitutes already budgeted EU funds, which are now 'rebranded' with the Global Gateway label, the fact that the EU earmarks half of all projected Global Gateway investments (€300 billion between 2021–2027) to Africa underlines the geopolitical and economic importance of the latter for the EU. The EU considers the AU a key partner in implementing the Global Gateway initiative, and the initiative's clear focus on infrastructure development has consolidated what can be called infrastructural inter-regionalism between the two regional organisations (see also Ulf Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 12). Both institutions emphasise, in the summit declaration titled 'A Joint Vision for 2030', synergies between the Global Gateway and Agenda 2063, with 'due consideration to the priorities and needs of the African countries' and 'investment in energy, transport and digital infrastructure aligned with the PIDA PAP II' (African Union 2022l).

On the margins of COP 27, the AU and the EU announced a cooperation initiative on *Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa* as part of the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package. According to official EU statements, the initiative will streamline existing and new climate change adaptation programmes that are worth over €1 billion and will improve coordination and reinforce policy dialogue on climate adaptation strategies between the EU and AU (European Commission 2022a). At COP 27, during a ministerial side event focusing on the initiative, the executive vice-president of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, pledged that the EU would 'raise further investments for clean, secure and climate resilient infrastructure' (quoted in European Commission 2022b). He named the 'Great Green Wall', the EU–AU transboundary water management initiative, and strategic corridors as examples of cooperation in developing climate-resilient infrastructure (ibid.). However, despite EU commitments to intensify cooperation with the AU and its member states in expediting Africa's energy transition and mitigating the effects of climate change, Russia's war against Ukraine lay bare Europe's, and not least Germany's, energy vulnerability and, in turn, sparked renewed interest among European firms and governments in African oil and gas deposits (see Browning et al. 2022). According to estimates from the IEA,

Africa could, for instance, substitute up to one-fifth of Russian gas exports to Europe by 2030 (ibid.). This, of course, will require investments in necessary infrastructures, such as additional pipelines and terminals to export liquified natural gas (LNG). While this might align with the gradual approach in transitioning towards renewables mentioned above, it arguably contradicts some of the more ambitious objectives regarding Africa's green energy transition (which have featured prominently in AU–EU infrastructure inter-regionalism).

6.2   *The Geopolitical Race to Build African ICT Infrastructure*

At the 11th African Internet Governance Forum (Lilongwe, Malawi, 19–21 July 2022), Commissioner Dr Abou-Zeid emphasised the importance of digital infrastructure and technologies in building resilient and sustainable economies. She stressed the need to ensure that 'digitalisation is deep-rooted' in African economies to work towards creating 'a single digital market for a united Africa' (African Union 2022h). The forum was held under the theme 'Digital Inclusion and Trust in Africa'. It prioritised four major thematic areas: affordable and meaningful internet access; cybersecurity, privacy and personal data protection; digital skills and human capacity development; and digital infrastructure (ibid.). In addition, Abou-Zeid underlined 'the need for Africans to collectively devise ways to keep pace with the increasing demand for digital infrastructure, bridge connectivity gaps, especially the urban-rural disparity and address the gender digital divide and create decent jobs for Africa's younger population' (ibid.). She also called on 'regional and international partners to invest in bankable and impactful projects under [the] Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), which packages regional and continental priorities in the energy, transport and digital sectors' (ibid.).

In recent years, a growing interest in Africa's ICT sector and related infrastructure projects is discernible among European and US decision-makers, which is not least a reaction to geopolitical concerns arising from the dominant position Chinese firms have established in the sector. Thus, the development and governance of digital infrastructure has gained increasing importance within AU–EU infrastructural inter-regionalism. Not long after the 6th EU–AU Summit, the Africa–Europe Digital for Development (D4D) Hub Multi-Stakeholder Forum was held on 18 March 2022 under the theme 'Digital Transformation for Sustainable Development in Africa'. The AUC and the European Commission co-hosted the event to promote exchanges and collaboration with the private sector, enterprises, civil society organisations, and experts in the digital field from both continents (African Union 2022e). The declared aim was to develop an operational digital cooperation plan for Africa's sustainable development. The AU and EU agree that digital technologies are necessary

to drive inclusive job creation and sustainable development. In December 2018, both parties launched the EU–AU Digital Economy Task Force to identify policy recommendations and actions to address the primary barriers to developing and accessing digital infrastructure and services and to increase cooperation in the digital field. The recommendations of the task force are mirrored in the AU *Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa* (2020–2030) and have informed the design of cooperation projects such as the AU–EU D4D Hub (ibid.). The Bureau of the STC–CICT (22–23 June 2022) urged member states to work towards implementing the strategy. It aims to create an integrated and inclusive African digital society and economy (African Union 2022g).

With only 33 per cent of African people connected to the internet, compared to the world average of 63 per cent, closing the digital divide and 'connecting the unconnected' is a declared top priority of AU–EU infrastructure inter-regionalism (African Union 2022k). Cooperative efforts especially need to ensure that women, rural populations, and young people reap the benefits of the continent's digital transformation (African Union 2022e). At the Africa–Europe D4D Hub Multi-Stakeholder Forum in March 2022, the AU commissioner Abou-Zeid pointed out that:

> These exceptional times have also shown the urgency to invest in secured [*sic!*] and affordable Africa's [*sic!*] digital infrastructure, digital skill [*sic!*], digital identity, data management and build on Africa's innovation potential and entrepreneurship. The African Union welcomes the enhanced partnership with the European Union that is based on respect, transparency, equal opportunity, [a] win-win approach and agreed tangible outcome [*sic!*] and further engagement with African and European stakeholders to accelerate the digital transformation of our continent.
>
> AFRICAN UNION 2022E

In a similar manner, the US government has markedly stepped up its efforts to facilitate US investments in African ICT infrastructure and services. On 14 December 2022, at the US–Africa Business Forum in Washington, DC, which was part of the US–Africa Leaders Summit (13–15 December 2022), attended by 49 African heads of state and government and the AUC chairperson, the US president Joseph Biden announced the launch of the Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA) initiative. The DTA 'intends to invest over $350 million and facilitate over $450 million in financing for Africa in line with the African Union's Digital Transformation Strategy and the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa' (White House 2022). According to the White House, the DTA will

foster an inclusive and resilient African digital ecosystem, led by African communities and built on an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet. This initiative will also seek to empower women and other marginalized people through and within the digital ecosystem. DTA aims to help countries rebuild economies impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and advance U.S. national security, diplomatic, commercial, and development priorities. It will also advance commitments to invest in global infrastructure, including digital connectivity, under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment.

WHITE HOUSE 2022

As this excerpt demonstrates, security concerns are a crucial driver of US efforts to step up cooperation with African partners in the ICT sector, revealing another dimension of the increasing geopoliticisation of infrastructure development in Africa. The Chinese firm Huawei, for instance, is currently estimated to control 70 per cent of African 4G networks and is busy installing 5G infrastructure across the continent (Howell 2022). The market dominance of Chinese firms has not only economic but also potential security and human rights implications. A fortiori, the implementation of the AU Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa, adopted on 9 February 2020, as well as the drafting of a Continental Cybersecurity Strategy, can be expected to be – at least indirectly – affected by intensifying competition among Western actors and China for African ICT infrastructure and service markets. Ultimately, both Western and Chinese actors are setting technological norms in this growing sector by developing the necessary infrastructure and providing ICT-related technology (see Qobo and Mzyece 2023). At the same time, they are 'exporting' digital governance norms and standards with potentially far-reaching implications for African societies.

6.3 *China's Continuous Role in Africa's Infrastructure Sector*

In 2022, the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) convened neither at the summit nor at the ministerial level. A BRI Forum did not occur either. These are usually the events where the Chinese government publicly announces significant cooperation plans in the infrastructure (and other) sectors with partner countries and regions. In recent years, the Chinese government and the AU have intensified their cooperation in the infrastructure sector, emphasising the synergies that both sides expect from aligning China's BRI with continental and regional priority projects (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 133–134; Zajontz 2024). The Coordinators' Meeting on the Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the 8th FOCAC Ministerial Conference (virtual, 18 August 2022) was

chaired by the then Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi and attended by, among other African officials, the deputy AUC chairperson, Monique Nsanzabaganwa. At the meeting, the African and the Chinese sides offered a joint statement:

> While strengthening traditional areas of cooperation such as infrastructure, investment and financing, agriculture, manufacturing and telecommunication, both sides will deepen cooperation in new fields including energy, digital economy, health, marine economy, vocational education, and women and youth development. Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and Public-Private Partnership (PPP) will be encouraged to help Africa realize industrialization and enhance its status in the global industrial and supply chains.
>
>   FOCAC 2022

The statement furthermore recalled the *Declaration on China-Africa Cooperation on Combating Climate Change*, which was introduced at the 8th FOCAC Ministerial Conference (Dakar, Senegal, 29–30 November 2021). It reiterated that it 'call[s] on the international community not to level down support and input to Africa because of the Ukraine issue, but to actively help African countries address food security, climate change, energy crisis and other global issues' (FOCAC 2022). This shows that China has been responsive to some of the priorities expressed by the AU in the infrastructure sector, including the leveraging of infrastructure finance, the industrialisation-infrastructure nexus, and climate-resilient and 'green' infrastructure.

In a by-line article on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and the AU, the head of the Chinese mission to the AU, Ambassador Hu Changchun, lauded various achievements of the last twenty years of Sino-African cooperation. He also wrote,

> we need [to] speed up practical cooperation in various fields.… We need to push forward the synergy of the BRI, Global Development Initiative, FOCAC Nine Programs and the AU Agenda 2063 as well as African development agendas, in order to continuously strengthen our creative cooperation in the area of health & disease control, trans-regional infrastructure, energy & climate change, digital economy, food security & loss, trade & investment, etc.
>
>   CHINESE MISSION TO THE AU 2022

Ambassador Hu also referred to (geo)political controversies that have arisen over China's role as Africa's biggest infrastructure financier (see *Yearbook on*

the African Union 2020, 140–142; Bagwandeen et al. 2023), expressing that '[u]ltimately, it is for the Chinese and African people to judge the results of China-Africa cooperation'. Hu further stated that '[s]ome forces disregard facts, smear China-Africa cooperation, and fabricate disinformation such as 'debt trap'. Their true intention is to deny the friendship between China and Africa and the well-being of African people' (Chinese Mission to the AU 2022). The AU's external partnerships in the infrastructure realm are evidently affected by intensifying competition and contestation between Western powers and China.

7   Outlook

Infrastructure will remain a priority for AU bodies in 2023. The 42nd Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council is expected to be concerned with, among other things, the development of the second ten-year implementation plan for the Agenda 2063. Several of the latter's flagship projects are in the infrastructure sector, including the African Integrated High-Speed Railway Network, an integrated e-economy, and the SAATM. Hence, deliberations on the next Agenda 2063 implementation plan will set the course for these projects. We can also expect the infrastructure-industrialisation nexus to be further articulated and deliberated on, considering the AU theme for 2023 being 'Acceleration of AfCFTA Implementation'. As discussed in this chapter, the success of the AfCFTA itself is, in official (AU) discourse, often closely associated with the development of regional infrastructure.

As we have elaborated on in this and in previous *Yearbooks on the African Union*, a myriad of external actors are engaged in Africa's infrastructure sector, and AU policies and projects are often dependent on cooperation with external partners, not least regarding their financing. The 2nd Dakar Financing Summit for Africa's Infrastructure Development, scheduled for February 2023, will be an important yardstick for the mobilisation of infrastructure finance for PIDA PAP 2. We can furthermore expect a high-level delegation from the AU to attend the 3rd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, which the Chinese government announced to hold in 2023 (see Wang et al. 2022). The forum will give important indications as to the future of the BRI and, more concretely, as to how the Chinese government intends to foster overseas equity investment in infrastructure, considering that sovereign loan financing has become economically and politically risky in certain countries and regions, including in Africa (see Carmody et al. 2022; van Wieringen and Zajontz forthcoming). In the light of the intensifying geopoliticisation of infrastructure in Africa, as discussed above, infrastructure is also likely to top the agenda in the

AU's relations with the US government as well as in AU–EU inter-regionalism throughout 2023.

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Peace and Security

Dawit Yohannes Wondemagegnehu

1 Introduction

In his speech during the 36th Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Assembly (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 18–19 February 2023), the United Nations secretary-general (UNSG) António Guterres underlined that Africa needed 'action for peace' to combat rising violence and promote democratic freedoms on the continent (UNECA 2023). He stressed this dire imperative, citing rising terrorism, insecurity and conflict, and democratic backsliding on the continent. The UNSG specifically referenced the spike in violence by armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the progression of terrorist groups in the Sahel and elsewhere. The UNSG's depiction of the pulse of Africa's peace and security in 2022 is similar to the one made by the chairperson of the AU Commission (AUC) in 2021. The chairperson of the AUC, Moussa Faki Mahamat, commented on the security situation in Africa in the previous year, stating that it was one deeply marked by the metastasis of terrorism and the dangerous resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs) (AUC Chairperson 2022a). Reading the two speeches together indicates that despite some changes, there are more continuities in conflict trends and their impact than a significant breakthrough in consolidating peace across the continent from one year to another.

Worrying security trends on the continent and the limitation of the Union's response through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) result from various historical, structural, systemic, geopolitical, and institutional factors. While these factors are at play in producing Africa's security predicament over the past two decades as well as before, 2022 brought into sharp focus the challenges of Africa's collective response to crises against a profoundly ailing global order. Some observers speak of an emerging crisis of African multilateralism (ISS 2023b), others extend the argument arguably to a looming crisis of legitimacy of the AU as a leading peace and security actor.[1] One key factor that

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1 Author's note during a meeting of AU partners, Addis Ababa, 25 January 2022.

underpins the limitation of Africa's multilateral response is the ambivalent relationship between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECS)/ Regional Mechanisms (RMS), a key element of 'Africa's complex institutional environment driven and at the same time contested by AU member states, regional organisations, and the AUC with various and changing interests' (Engel and Gomes Porto 2014, 135). On top of these, the prevailing conflict contexts on the continent are the most defining set of factors shaping the AU's response to conflict and aspirations for supporting peace efforts on the continent.

This chapter offers a broad overview of the AU's engagement across various country and regional conflicts to give more practical insight into this complex interplay during 2022. Conflict dynamics and the attendant AU responses were shaped by several major defining trends. According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), four major trends shaped African peace and security in 2022, namely deepening and expanding violent extremism and terrorism (VET); persisting regionalised conflicts; UCGS; and protracted political transitions (ISS 2023c). Reflecting the enduring nature of the threat, VET, especially in the context of violent conflict, continued to be a major source of insecurity in all the five regions similar to the previous years with the Sahel emerging as the epicentre of global terrorism (IEP 2023, 31). Five African countries featured in the list of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism in 2022, namely Burkina Faso, Somalia, Mali, Nigeria, and Niger. Apart from these major hotspots, terrorism remained a major threat in Cameroon, Mozambique, the DRC, Egypt, Chad, Kenya, Togo, Benin, and Libya (ibid., 8).

Protracted conflicts that dominated the previous years in Somalia, the DRC, and the Central African Republic (CAR) continued throughout the year. These conflict situations had their own local nuances and variations. For example, the conflict in the DRC was shaped by the re-emergence of the March 23 Movement (M23), a rebel group that was dormant for many years, and the political tension with Rwanda. Likewise, Somalia's fight against al-Shabaab assumed a different dimension, with Somali government forces and their local allies taking the lead and regional and international partners supporting the new offensives. The conflict in northern Ethiopia was the only exception to the persisting trend of regionalised conflicts. Despite the highly intense nature of conflicts almost through 2022, the year ended with an AU-brokered peace deal, a rare fit for the AU, which was struggling to address several crises on the continent.

Various African countries also witnessed UCGS in the form of successful and attempted coups d'état. Burkina Faso saw two instances of a power grab by the military in a single year. In addition, 2022 witnessed numerous incidences of

attempted coups and plots. According to Amani Africa (2023, 2), there were coup attempts in Guinea-Bissau (February), São Tomé and Príncipe (November), Chad (December), and The Gambia (December), in addition to two coup plots in the DRC (February) and Burundi (September). Most of these interruptions of civilian rule were manifestations of widespread governance deficits that cut across most countries on the continent. The military interfered, blaming civilian rulers for failing to provide good enough security and governance, especially in those countries under serious security predicaments.

Furthermore, political transitions, especially those in the context of civil war and UCGs, increasingly became more protracted and difficult to consummate. Political actors failed to agree on electoral deadlines, and parallel governments continued to preside in Libya. South Sudan politicians extended the transitional period after failing to meet critical milestones of the process. Transitional processes and their milestones were also contested in other contexts, such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, and Mali.

Evidently, the above-mentioned conflict trends were primarily propelled by structural drivers and root causes at the local, country, and regional levels. At the same time, these trends were significantly shaped by other contributing factors. For example, interstate tensions between the DRC and Rwanda exacerbated local and regional conflict dynamics, especially in the DRC. Geopolitical contestations and superpower power rivalry played out in weakening international and regional security cooperation. France's dwindling security cooperation in Mali and the CAR is a case in point. Long-standing inter-communal disputes with their own local drivers, including climate change and its impact on loss of livelihood, were enmeshed in complex, regional violent extremist activities in the Sahel.

Much like the previous years, the AU responded to diverse security trends and drivers in various ways. Arguably, engagement through the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was the most visible form of engaging in crises. According to the statutory *Report on the Activities of the PSC and the State of the Peace and Security in Africa* (hereafter the *PSC Annual Report*), 'the PSC held 71 meetings in which 92 agenda items were considered compared to 85 in 2021, out of which 7 were held at ministerial level' (AU Assembly 2023, 3). These meetings considered various conflict situations and broad thematic issues on governance, peace, security, and stability, including climate change issues, financing, and renewal of AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) (ibid.). The PSC also undertook field missions in South Sudan and Somalia, while its planned mission to Sudan did not materialise due to reluctance of the host government.

The AU sustained its engagement in Somalia by transitioning the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) into the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). It also offered material and political support to missions by regional actors, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). Furthermore, the AU facilitated and supported various peace processes. The signing of the *Cessation of Hostilities Agreement* (CoHA) between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) generated favourable optics for the AU, which was struggling to find its feet in various peace processes on the continent, such as in the CAR, Libya, and Sudan. In addition, the AU sought to respond to conflict situations through participation in Transitional Support Groups (TSGS) in the aftermath of UCGS as well as through the engagement of its special envoys for specific country situations, liaison offices, and various activities supported by the AUC.

Evidently, these engagements are no match for addressing Africa's conflict predicament. A combination of largely old and persisting factors account for the AU's limitation in meeting the continent's peace and security challenges. Limited ownership of AU decisions, norms, and policies had a clear implication in averting the outbreak of crisis and enforcing recommendations in ongoing conflicts. Cases like Chad and Sudan indicate that governments shunned the AU's position on charting transitional processes. The AU continued to show reluctance to deal with perceived sensitive issues in some of its member states in a timely manner. This was particularly evident through the PSC's lack of meaningful discussion on country situations such as Tunisia, Mozambique, and Cameroon, among others (ISS 2023c). A very rigid reading and interpretation of national sovereignty by AU member states is behind this persisting challenge.

In addition, the AU has failed to decisively move forward in certain country situations. In Sudan, this was attributed to the AU's lack of clout and a meaningful entry point in a context marked by different response providers and a divided geopolitical context that incentivised the belligerence of political actors. In other cases, such as the Sahel, crisis situations had deepened and become so complicated that there was little room for the AU to manoeuvre. The AU further recognised that inflexible and cumbersome processes and inadequate financial and technical resources were also key challenges in implementing its mandate of preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts (AU Assembly 2023, §33). The persisting limited financing for ATMIS underscores the gap between the AU's aspiration, on the one hand, and its capacity to deliver on its peace and security mandate, on the other.

2   Regional Overview of the AU's Peace and Security Engagement

2.1   *The Horn and East Africa*

2.1.1   Ethiopia

Conflict dynamics in Ethiopia, especially the Tigray war, remained enigmatic regarding continuity and inflexions in the conflict trends, as well as changes in the AU's role compared to the previous year. As Reuters succinctly put it, 'a year that began with no end in sight for one of the world's deadliest conflicts finished on a note of cautious optimism after a November ceasefire agreement' (Reuters 2023). For the most part of 2022, the conflict showed some level of continuation compared to 2021. There was also continuity regarding the regional and international dimensions of the conflict, including how it divided public opinion and polarised the international community's response.

At the same time, the Tigray conflict underwent significant evolutions throughout the year. The first few weeks of 2022 witnessed a continuation of the government offensive to regain control of territories, which managed to push the insurgents back to Tigray. Military offensives have unfolded side by side with a feeble attempt to resolve the crisis peacefully. A government-declared humanitarian truce in March, reciprocated by the Tigrayan forces, remained in force for a few months. The truce resulted in a lull in fighting and led to a drastic reduction in violence, except for some limited clashes and shelling incidents (ACLED 2022a). However, the truce did not last beyond August 2022 as the conflict resumed in the border areas of Tigray, Amhara, and Afar. Ethiopians held new year celebration in September under the shadow of the conflict, despite unconfirmed reports of the resumption of secret talks between the government and the Tigrayan forces in Djibouti and the announcement of the TPLF that indicated its readiness to chart a path for peace under an AU-led process on the evening of the new year. The conflict continued to escalate, and the government forces and their allies gained the upper hand in the military campaigns, capturing major towns in Tigray in October (Reuters 2022).

A first attempt at the AU-led process was in early October, to which apparently the former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta, one of the troika of negotiators, was not informed early enough and thus could not attend. Combined with other logistical challenges, this delayed the commencement of the talks by about two weeks. The AU announced news of peace talks on 25 October 2022 in Pretoria, South Africa, amid a heightened military campaign within Tigray. Prior to that, in September 2022, the AUC chairperson established a high-level panel to specifically support the peace efforts in Ethiopia (AU Assembly 2023, §72). The high-level panel was headed by the high representative for the Horn

of Africa, former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, and comprised Kenyatta and Dr Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, former deputy president of South Africa, and a member of the AU Panel of the Wise.

The peace talks came following intense regional and international diplomatic efforts, both official and backdoor negotiations. Amid various initiatives, the AU's engagement through the high representative was the most pronounced one despite contending views on the peacemaking roles of the AU and Obasanjo as a peace envoy. Prior to the peace talks, the peace envoy engaged in shuttle diplomacy that also involved talking to the leaders of the Tigray forces. He also briefed the PSC (4 August and 21 October) and the UN Security Council (UNSC) (28 September) (AU Assembly 2023, §69). The AU's engagement through the high representative emphasised the following key calls, namely (1) an immediate, negotiated ceasefire and cessation of hostilities; (2) immediate, unhindered humanitarian access, based on adherence to and compliance with international humanitarian and human rights laws; and (3) commencement of an inclusive nationwide dialogue and reconciliation process (ibid., §70).

However, the Pretoria peace talks were the culmination of sustained international pressure on the parties, albeit divergent views on ways of resolving the crises. The Ethiopian government maintained a firm position that any peace initiative should be within the AU framework, anchored in the ideals and principles of 'African solutions to African problems'. On the contrary, the TPLF was reluctant to a greater peacemaking role of the AU, showing an inclination for a more international process. The AU also asserted its leadership role in the peace talks, claiming that the AU-led mediation process was the only viable and effective approach towards finding a lasting solution to the situation in Ethiopia (ACCORD 2022b). Besides, sustained international pressure by the US, the European Union (EU), and the UN must have played a key role in compelling the parties to commit to the AU peace process.

Owing to the optics generated by the Pretoria process and its clear impact on the conflict dynamics, the AU emerged as having a more pronounced role/success than the previous years. While the peace process involved other international players, the mediation process is officially considered an AU-led process. Apart from the AU mediators, the UN, the US, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) supported the process. This notwithstanding, the AU affirms its central role, stating that 'the AU Commission led and facilitated the Ethiopian Peace process, working with the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the High-level Panel established by the Chairperson of the Commission to convene the Peace Talks' (AU Assembly 2023, §196).

Despite expectations of a prolonged mediation process, the peace talks lasted for ten days only and resulted in the signing of a CoHA (Pretoria, 2 November 2022) between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, ending a two-year-long war in northern Ethiopia. The agreement has various substantive provisions, including the permanent cessation of hostilities; the protection of civilians; humanitarian access; disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of TPLF combatants; confidence-building measures; international boundaries and federal facilities; the restoration of federal authority in the Tigray region and representation in federal institutions; transitional justice measures; as well as the establishment of an monitoring compliance and verification mechanism.

Specific details on the AU's operational roles in managing the Pretoria process are still limited. However, a few fundamental roles could be highlighted with possible implications for future processes elsewhere on the continent. The first refers to the use of the AU's normative and legal provisions as a basis for the negotiation and the agreement that came out of it. In conjunction with the Ethiopian constitution, various AU policy documents provided the legal and normative basis for the negotiations. For example, the preamble of the agreement indicated a commitment of the parties to the AU agenda of *Silencing the Guns* by 2030. Likewise, Article 2 stipulates the key principles that undergird the process, namely 'Respect for the [2007] African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance' and ensuring 'accountability and justice in accordance with the FDRE [Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia] constitution and the AUTJP [AU Transitional Justice Policy] framework'. In addition, the substantive provisions of the agreement have direct links with four of the six indicative pillars of the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy framework, indicating the potential vitality of AU's policies and strategies in implementing the *Pretoria Agreement.*

Second, the AU played a key role in convening the direct negotiations focused on silencing the guns and ensuring humanitarian access. The parties met for secret talks in Djibouti before Pretoria (*Sudan Tribune* 2022b). Nonetheless, the Pretoria talks were the first direct official talks between the parties under the auspices of the AU. The PSC Annual Report to the 36th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly highlights the AU's role in facilitating the direct talks as follows:

> In the initial stage of the Talks, the High-Level Panel guided the Parties towards focusing on two major areas: the identification of Agenda points for the Talks, and the process towards permanent cessation of hostilities in line with the AU's Agenda to Silence the Guns in Ethiopia, the Horn and the Continent as a whole.
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> AU ASSEMBLY 2023, §73

Third, though it is difficult to get precise information, it can be inferred that the AUC provided technical support to the mediation process. As the AU Mediation and Dialogue Division was still building up its own capacities, it mobilised personnel to provide hands-on technical support to the peace process and its implementation. A LinkedIn post by an AU member who was closely involved in the mediation process underlined that along with the parties' full ownership of the agreement, the key variable of the process was the AU's determination to continue accompanying the process and the parties in implementing the peace agreement. The post further indicates that

> This is within a context of scarce-to-none budget, staffing and even more limited operational support. And yet despite these challenges our four-person team continues to thread the pieces together, meeting demands and expectations – with the incredible support of the Norwegian government, ICRC and other partners who quietly show up for us in ways we need, how and when we need the support.

Fourth, the AU supported the follow-up engagements to the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, especially on the CoHA and the DDR processes. The AU facilitated the negotiations that led to the *Nairobi Declaration* on 12 November 2022. The negotiations were part of Article 6 of the Pretoria Agreement that provides for 'the creation of an open channel of communication between the senior military commanders of both parties within 24 hours of the signing of the Agreement and that the senior military commanders would meet within 5 days of the signing of the Agreement to discuss and work out detailed modalities for the disarmament process' (AU Assembly 2023, §75). As part of the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement and as a confidence-building gesture, the AU also convened the Joint Committee Meeting (Shire, Tigray, 1 December 2022), composed of representatives of the FDRE, the TPLF, and the AU. The meeting aimed to work out a comprehensive implementation plan for the disarmament of heavy weapons (AUC Chairperson 2022d). Furthermore, the AU launched its Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission (MVCM) in Mekelle, Tigray, on 29 December 2022 (AUC Chairperson 2022f). The AU undertook the preparatory work to establish a Joint Monitoring Committee and a Panel of Experts to monitor the implementation of the CoHA for a period of six months (AU Assembly 2023, §77).

Apart from the mediation process, the AU maintained its engagement through various PSC sessions. Unlike the previous years when Ethiopia did not feature in the PSC formal sessions, the council deliberated on the country's situation three times in 2022 (1097th, 1115th, and 1120th sessions). The PSC

mostly focused on supporting the peace efforts of the AU high representative and affirming the AU's leading role in line with the ideal of 'African solutions to African problems'.

The 1097th PSC session on 4 August 2022 was held under the theme 'Updated Briefing on the Situation in the Horn of Africa' when the humanitarian truce was still holding. Reflecting on the promising signs and a possibility of an AU-led peace initiative, the PSC particularly requested the AUC to mobilise all required resources to further enhance the peacemaking efforts of the high representative (AU PSC 2022p, §2).

The PSC's subsequent meeting (1115th session, 21 October 2022) was held in a much-changed context following the resumption of fighting on 24 August, but under the prospect of initiating the AU-led peace talks on Ethiopia scheduled to take place from 24 October 2022 in South Africa. Therefore, the PSC's press statement was geared towards supporting specific aspects of the planned peace talks in South Africa, including welcoming the composition of the mediation panel, encouraging the parties to commit to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and other measures that contribute to supporting the peace process in general (AU PSC 2022u). After the signing of the Pretoria Agreement, the PSC was briefed by the AU high representative (1120th session, 9 November 2022). As a reflection of the prevailing environment of cautious optimism, the PSC endorsed the CoHA and strongly urged the signatory parties to honour and fully implement the agreement in its spirit and letter (AU PSC 2022z, §3).

Analysis of the AU's role in 2022 and going back to the outbreak of the Tigray war offers a complex picture with profound lessons for the continent. Initially, there were valid reasons to accuse the AU of failing to act in the face of early warning signs of deepening crises in Ethiopia, especially in Tigray. The AU was also criticised for doing much less than its global counterparts. For example, the AU's PSC has only met three times to discuss Ethiopia since the outbreak of the conflict in November 2020 (8 November 2021, 10 February 2022, and 4 August 2022), while the UN held around 14 meetings (ACCORD 2022b). Still considered an underdog for the major part, including outright rejection by one of the conflict parties, the TPLF, the AU finally managed to forge 'a surprise deal' after weathering heavy criticism for its earlier inaction (ICG 2023b). At the same time, the AU's role, including the mediation process, was characterised as a sideshow for a US-engineered deal where the mediators played little to no roles (*Addis Standard* 2023).

Against this complex backdrop, the Ethiopia case has several lessons for the AU and its member states. For one, it is a strong reminder that the AU still has a huge yet unfulfilled potential role in resolving crises, especially in contexts where subregional actors are unable or unwilling to take leading roles. One key

decisive factor in this regard is how the AU manages to mobilise a unified political will within Africa and strategically engages with external actors (see Ulf Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 12). Another lesson is the huge cost of failing to prioritise political solutions to crises and the continued imperative to narrow the gap between early warning and early actions. Moreover, the Ethiopia case further illustrates that the AU needs to have a frank examination of its current conflict prevention practices not to risk another bloody war on the continent.

2.1.2   Somalia

Somalia's political and security dynamics were shaped by two major dimensions. The political tensions and crises of the previous year carried over to 2022, especially due to the contested electoral process. The protracted electoral process and increasing attacks from al-Shabaab had undermined peace efforts, shifting the focus from stabilisation, reconciliation, and development activity priorities. However, a major milestone was achieved following the election in May 2022. Not only did the election finally bring to a close a delayed and fraught electoral process, but it also ended in a manner that allowed almost everyone to accept that there was no contestation after the fact.[2] The security conditions also remained very fluid with contending dynamics of increased fatalities and the onset of a new Somali-led offensive against the Salafi-jihadist al-Shabaab group.

The year 2022 was one of the deadliest for Somalia, with over 6,500 reported fatalities, compared to less than 3,500 reported fatalities in 2021, and a steady rise in militant Islamist events and fatalities, increasing 11 per cent over the past year (ACSS 2022). Increased fatalities and rising political violence had various drivers. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS 2022), 'battles, mainly between government operations and Islamic militants, account for 72 per cent of all violent events involving al-Shabaab in 2022 – more than any other militant Islamist group theatre on the continent'. This trend was also exacerbated by growing activity of the local operatives of the Islamic State (IS) and rising tensions in Somaliland. Somalia also experienced its worst drought in over four decades. As of May 2022, around 6.1 million Somalis had been affected by drought conditions, and around 6 million faced acute food insecurity at crisis levels or worse.

Following the election on 15 May 2022, Sheikh Sherif took the helm of the presidency and with political and security dynamics taking a different direction than the previous years. The turbulent political dynamics seemed

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2   Interview with a Somalia analyst, virtual, 13 April 2023.

to be stabilising with some level of improvement in the relation between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Federal Member States (FMS). To tackle the fluid security dynamics, the president forged a unified front involving local actors, FMS, religious leaders, and external actors to take on al-Shabaab and expanding the approach to encompass the military, religious, and financial aspects (ISS 2023d). The renewed campaign also benefited from local revolts against al-Shabaab in Hiiraan, Hirshabelle State, with grievances cementing the alliance between the federal government and the local actors. The new Somali-led offensives, involving clan militias and support from international security partners, liberated vast territories in central Somalia. The offensive also marked a breakthrough in the 15-year war as it also progressed into al-Shabaab's southern strongholds (ICG 2023c). But this did not totally eliminate the al-Shabaab threat. Far from it, the group remained very adaptive, hinting that the group is still worth reckoning with. As the *PSC Annual Report* noted the group 'retained its capacity to launch simultaneous complex attacks; enhanced its ability to rapidly mobilise forces and conduct of swift intelligence-led targeted operations; enhanced its propaganda and deception tactics and intensified public executions of individuals' (AU Assembly 2023, §87).

As in previous years, the AU maintained its engagement with varying degrees of success under these complex political and security dynamics. Key mechanisms of the AU engagement included the sustenance of its PSOs, political engagements through the PSC, and the AUC's involvement in support of the AMISOM reconfiguration. The latter was a key focus of the AU to ensure the reconfiguration addresses the mission's practical challenges, notably ensuring its financing and force generation issues and supporting the political conditions in Somalia, as critical enablers of the mission's mandate.

On 8 March 2022, the PSC authorised the ATMIS to replace AMISOM, coming into effect on 1 April (AU PSC 2022h). This ushered a chapter in the prolonged discussion on the fate of AMISOM post-2021. The PSC authorised ATMIS with similar mandates to AMISOM, but with some reconfigurations in its operational arrangements and its phased approach to exiting Somalia. A Somalia analyst indicated, 'The biggest change is perhaps that the idea of a "transition" is more thoroughly embedded within the rationale of the new mission', which has a four-phased timeline to work with the Somali government to implement the *Somalia Transition Plan* (STP) (ISS 2022a). Accordingly, ATMIS is envisaged to transfer security responsibilities to the Somali security forces through the following four phases: (1) reconfiguration, (2) joint shaping and clearing operations and the handing over of some forward operating bases to the Somali security forces, (3) decisive operations and handing over of the remaining

forward operating bases, and (4) withdrawal and liquidation of ATMIS (AU PSC 2022h, §10). Another central element of ATMIS was reconfiguring its forces into more mobile and agile forces that would allow the mission to undertake quick reactions to rapidly degrade enemy forces.

However, the mission's transition happened without financial certainty. At its 1075th session on 12 April 2022, the PSC underlined that ATMIS was lacking the required resources to effectively implement its mandate, including predictable, sustainable, and adequate financing (AU PSC 2022i). This predicament continued almost throughout the year, prompting consideration by the PSC in its subsequent sessions, including pointing out its possible implication for the planned departure of the mission in December 2024. The PSC furthermore called for addressing the outstanding challenges of the mission concerning the implementation of the STP (1112th session, 10 October 2022). The PSC particularly identified the need to address the issue of force generation and integration from troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to ensure the implementation of the STP and the transition of security responsibilities from ATMIS to the Somali security forces (AU PSC 2022t). While the issue of force generation refers to concerns over the training and preparation of the Somali troops that will take over the security responsibility from ATMIS, the latter speaks to the long-standing lack of unified command and control within the mission.

Not surprisingly, the mission's planned first reduction of its troops, which was due to start in December 2022, was delayed following a request from the FGS. At its subsequent meeting (1121st session, 11 November 2022), the PSC endorsed the extension of ATMIS phase 1 reconfiguration for the reduction of 2,000 ATMIS troops from 31 December 2022 to 30 June 2023 (AU PSC 2022a1, §§2, 11). The PSC also underlined ATMIS's chronic financing challenges, stressing the urgent need for the UNSC to consider financing ATMIS through the UN-assessed contribution to AU PSOS (ibid., §7).

The AU's engagement in Somalia unfolded side by side with the involvement of key global, regional, and subregional actors. As in previous years, the UN's role has been critical in supporting the AU's engagement in Somalia. The UNSC's blessings were conferred on the PSC's major decisions. The *Resolution 2628 (2022)*, adopted by the UNSC on 31 March 2022, endorsed AMISOM's reconfiguration into ATMIS (UNSC 2022a). Likewise, the UNSC *Resolution 2670 (2022)* adopted the PSC's request to extend ATMIS until 30 June 2023 (UNSC 2022e). Through the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), the UN continued to provide logistic support to AMISOM/ATMIS, including adjusting its support in line with the reconfiguration of the mission, financed through the assessed budget and voluntary contributions (UNSG 2023, 12). However, the UN fell short of funding ATMIS through its assessed contribution, which would have

ensured more predictable, sustainable, and reliable financing of the mission's operations.

Beyond the financial challenges, the mission struggled to fill the leadership vacuum. The mission had to operate without a mission head following the controversial departure of Franciso Madiera (*The East African* 2022). In September, the AUC chairperson appointed Ambassador Mohammed El-Amine Souef, from the Union of Comoros, as his special representative to Somalia and ATMIS (AUC Chairperson 2022c). The year also ended with various vacant leadership positions, including force commander and other civilian posts (ISS 2023e).

Overall, the AU struggled to find its role in the new context. As the Somalis took more front roles in the military campaigns, which had been the mission strengths, the mission was yet fully competent in its supporting functions. In the end, funding uncertainty significantly undermined its operations and ultimately overshadowed the AU's focus on other strategic matters. This persistent predicament in Somalia continued to illustrate financing as the main gap in the AU's peace efforts broadly on the continent.

2.1.3   South Sudan

The difficulty in consummating South Sudan's transitional process was a major defining feature of the peace and security trends in 2022. There were delays in meeting key milestones of the *Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan* (R–ARCSS), expected to be concluded by February 2023. This had clear implications for conclusively ending the protracted conflict in the short and long terms, as it hinged on progress in key aspects such as power sharing, political governance, security, and judicial reform.

Especially the security and political implications of the delays were paramount. As the implementation of the R–ARCSS faltered, there were renewed clashes in March 2022 between the government's South Sudan People's Defence Forces and Riek Machar's Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army. In Opposition (SPLM/AIO) (HRW 2022). These clashes threatened the unravelling of the overall agreement, as highlighted by Machar's announcement of the withdrawal from the peace monitoring body over 'unprovoked attacks on their bases by government troops' (ISS 2022c).

The reverberations of the delay were also clear in impacting the political trajectory of South Sudan. As the interim chairman of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) indicated, 'critical timelines have been missed in the implementation of governance tasks of the Roadmap, such as reconstitution of the Political Parties Council and the National

Elections Commission' (RJMEC 2023). Such processes are critical ingredients for kickstarting legitimate electoral processes. The failure to implement the agreement was also unfolding within other conflict and insecurity trends across the country. Such dynamic trends were driven by subnational and inter-communal violence, crime, and wide-scale impunity.

Despite these serious uncertainties, South Sudan appeared to have averted a worsening political and security crisis when the parties to the R–ARCSS signed a roadmap on 4 August extending the transitional period for 24 months. The signatories cited 'failure to complete critical benchmarks on the agreed time' for the extension (*Sudan Tribune* 2022a). The new agreement seemed to have paid off despite major implementation challenges. The PSC Annual Report noted the following key progress regarding security: 'the permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements were still holding; the impasse over the command-and-control structure of the armed services was resolved, and 27,110 troops of the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF) graduated during Phase 1 on 30 August 2022' (AU Assembly 2023, §96). On the political front, the report also affirmed that some progress was made, including the 'formation of governance institutions' (ibid., §94).

The AU maintained its engagement through the PSC meetings and a field visit, the AU Ad Hoc High-Level Committee for South Sudan (C5) and the provision of technical support through the AUC and the AU Mission in South Sudan (AUMISS) (ibid.). The AU PSC had three dedicated sessions on South Sudan, an increase compared to one session in the previous year. The slight increase is attributed to dynamics around the looming deadline of the end of the transition period and given the justifiable concerns for possible insecurity and political instability that may reignite as a result (Amani Africa 2023).

The PSC recognised and supported the various efforts of the conflict parties and regional and international actors to address the 2018 R–ARCSS and South Sudan's political transition in general (1060th session, 25 January 2022). Some provisions of this session are worth highlighting. The PSC underscored the 'importance of PCRD programs in achieving sustainable peace and stability in South Sudan, which mandates the AU PCRD Centre to prioritise South Sudan amongst its priority areas of focus' (AU PSC 2022c, §10). This signifies the AU's intent to link the ongoing revitalisation process of peacebuilding policies and structures with country-level engagements. A similar observation can be made about the PSC's request to the AUC 'to deploy all the necessary technical support for the DDR and SSR [security sector reform] programme in South Sudan' (ibid., §10).

Following this decision, the PSC undertook a field visit to South Sudan on the second anniversary of the formation of the transitional government on

22 February 2022. This visit aimed at encouraging 'the country as it embarks on the end-phase of the transition and start the laborious process to the post-transition era' (AU PSC 2022c, §15). The field visit enabled the PSC to review the overall situation 'particularly the status of the implementation of the R-ARCSS and the challenges to be addressed' (AU Assembly 2023, 10). Likewise, the permanent representatives of the AU Ad Hoc High-Level Committee for South Sudan (C5) undertook a 'solidarity visit' to South Sudan in June 2022.

The PSC held its subsequent meeting on 11 July 2022 (1092nd session). As in the previous PSC sessions, the council's focus was on the implementation of the R-ARCSS, including highlighting the progress made and calling for the completion of some of the outstanding tasks. Some key progress the PSC recognised include the incorporation of the R-ARCSS into the 2011 *Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan*, the unification of the command-and-control structure of the security forces, and the initiation of the national consultations on the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing (AU PSC 2022n, §2). The PSC further pointed to the imperative to finalise outstanding tasks related to the NUF and constitution-making and electoral processes. As in the previous session, the PSC called for the utilisation of existing AU structures and policies, including the AU PCRD Centre and the AU Panel of the Wise, to support the implementation of the *Revitalized Peace Agreement* (AU PSC 2022n, §§2, 3, 10 and 12).

The PSC's third session of the year on South Sudan (1123rd session, 30 November 2022) was held after the political actors agreed to extend the transition period as mentioned above. According to Amani Africa (2023, 9), the agreement was met 'with criticism from the Troika (Norway, United Kingdom, and US) who expressed their dissatisfaction over the South Sudanese leaders for extending their time in power without delivering on their commitment to the Agreement'. Therefore, the PSC underscored the imperative to expedite the reconstitutions of relevant commissions to complete the constitution-making and electoral processes by December 2024 (AU PSC 2022c1, §4). The PSC used the occasion to request the AUC to consider reactivating the AU High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan and the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee to address the situation in Abyei (AU PSC 2022c1, §12).

Apart from these PSC sessions, the AUC provided technical assistance supporting transitional justice. For example, it was noted that the AUC Office of the Legal Counsel was engaging South Sudan's Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs regarding deploying a technical team to Juba to review the roadmap of the Hybrid Court of South Sudan (AU Assembly 2023, §98).

Overall, South Sudan was emblematic of a case with some level of complimentary engagement between the AU and IGAD, however limited. This

may not be a surprise as both organisations were guarantors of the R–ARCSS, even though they had different levels of engagement, history, and roles. Most importantly, South Sudan illustrated the challenges of implementing a peace agreement in the face of the limited political will of the signatories and the imperatives to make concerted efforts to avert relapse. As in the previous year, the AU's engagement in South Sudan appeared to have been overshadowed by ongoing and more violent conflicts and crises in the region, notably the war in northern Ethiopia, the fight against al-Shabaab in Somalia, and Sudan's turbulent political transition.

2.1.4   Sudan

Like other crises across the continent, Sudan continued to reel from intersecting political, security, and economic crises that spilled over from the previous years and decades. The fallout from the 2021 military takeover that interrupted Sudan's complex political transition continued throughout the year with various manifestations. The risk of political crises remained high throughout the year. Demonstrations against military rule calling for the return of civilian administration were widespread across the country, leading to the death of civilians. The political vacuum deepened with the resignation of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok in January 2022, just six weeks after his reinstatement. His stint in office following his reinstatement by the military rulers in November was short-lived, not least due to the continued violence against civilian protesters. He was also frustrated with the lack of progress in the transition process and the military's failure to respect the 'non-interference' agreement to appoint key officials and cabinet members (CNN 2022).

Apparently, the political impasse had negative ripple effects on the stability and security of Sudan at large. This is illustrated by incidences of security breaches, including in the capital and widespread intercommunal clashes in different parts of the country (AU Assembly 2023, §101). Political violence involving paramilitary forces also intensified in different parts of Sudan, especially in Abyei, Darfur, and Blue Nile. Escalating ethnic tensions and ethnic polarisation largely account for the violence in the Blue Nile state, especially over an attempt by the Hausa leader in the Blue Nile to establish an emirate within the state and due to heavy fighting between the Hausa and Berta ethnic groups (RVI 2022). In Darfur, interethnic fighting resumed, involving Rizeigat and Fulani pastoralist militias in South Darfur and the Rizeigat militias and Masalit militias in West Darfur, with the Arab-identifying militias often supported by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) (ACLED 2022b).

The year was marked by improving interstate relations, owing in part to the declaration by the leaders of Ethiopia and Sudan to resolve the border dispute

in June (Thomas and de Waal 2022). The al-Fashaga region, the territory contested between Ethiopia and Sudan, had seen renewed fighting, albeit for a short while, prior to the announcement of the leaders (ACLED 2022b). The dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) did not see any major breakthrough regarding an overarching agreement involving Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Ethiopia continued the finalisation of the construction of the dam and filling of the reservoirs despite protests from Egypt and Sudan. However, the agreement between Ethiopia and Sudan to share data on operations of the GERD support operational and irrigation planning by downstream states was considered a sign of progress (Horner and Soliman 2023).

The AU's engagement in Sudan was primarily focused on restoring constitutional rule and, to a lesser extent, on the security situation in Abyei. The AU maintained its suspension of Sudan over the military's role in overthrowing the civilian administration in 2021. The AU prided itself for being 'a critical component of the group of international organisations facilitating the processes of returning the country to constitutional order' (AU Assembly 2023, §101).

The AU was part of the Trilateral Mechanism, which was mediating the political crisis along with IGAD and the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS). The AU's other channels of engaging with the transition in Sudan included the PSC, the AUC chairperson, and the commissioner of the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), as well as the chairperson's special envoy, Professor Hacen Lebatt (AU Assembly 2023). The PSC held three sessions on Sudan and an additional one on Abyei. According to Amani Africa (2023, 10), the PSC's engagement in Sudan was 'comparatively low not only against its own record of active involvement on the Sudan file but also does not conform with its own decision adopted at the 1041st session held in October 2021 to receive regular (monthly) updates on the evolution of the situation in the country'.

Following the resignation of Prime Minister Hamdok, the PSC (1060th session, 25 January 2022) took note of ongoing talks to form a civilian government and appoint a prime minister and welcomed the appointment on 12 January 2022 of the civilian cabinet of ministers comprising technocrats (AU PSC 2022d, §3). At the same time, the PSC urged the Sovereign Council to organise an all-inclusive political process with the participation of all political forces. In addition, the PSC noted the commencement of the initiative of UNITAMS for an intra-Sudanese political process while stressing the need for the AU to coordinate the international community efforts in Sudan (ibid., §15). The AU's remark was considered an indication of the leadership tussle between the AU and the UN in the process of facilitating a return to civilian rule (Amani Africa 2023, 10).

The psc's subsequent engagement (1076th session, 14 April 2022), was a joint session on the political transition processes in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan. This session was convened following the formation of the AU-IGAD-UN Trilateral Mechanism in April, resulting from an agreement to coordinate the existing parallel efforts (ibid.). Accordingly, the psc welcomed the efforts by the AU, IGAD, and UNITAMS to jointly facilitate the intra-Sudanese consultations to restore constitutional order and expressed its support for the trilateral facilitation process (AU PSC 2022j, §7).

The psc held its last session of the year on Sudan (1117th session, 2 November 2022). It took note of consultations to appoint a prime minister and the initiation of the draft constitutional document by the Sudan Bar Association (AU PSC 2022x, §§1, 6). The psc also reiterated its commitment to undertake a field mission to Sudan to have 'a first-hand appreciation of the current situation towards contributing to the resolution of the crisis' (ibid., §12). However, the psc's plan to conduct the field mission did not take effect, as Sudan's military authorities were reluctant 'to receive the delegation' (Amani Africa 2023, 6). This signals 'a declining influence of the AU on the situation in Sudan in general and the transitional process in particular since the end of the hybrid UN and AU Mission to Sudan (UNAMID)' (Amani Africa 2022, 11). Since the last psc session, a broad range of civilian political forces and the military signed the *Sudan Political Framework Agreement* on 5 December 2022. This was expected to pave the way for a two-year, civilian-led transition ahead of elections (UN SCR 2023). The AU, through a communiqué on the situation in Sudan, welcomed the signing of the agreement and called upon the signatory parties to remain open to the political forces that have not signed the agreement (AUC Chairperson 2022e).

Apart from the political crisis and the management of the transition, the AU, through the psc, also engaged with the political and security situation in Abyei. While the final status of Abyei remained unclear, rising ethnic tensions exacerbated the security situation. Particularly, the reciprocal attack between Misseriya and Ngok Dinka militias contributed to 'tripling the level of political violence in the first half of 2022 as compared to the whole of 2021' (RVI 2022).

In the next psc meeting on Abyei (1108th session, 29 September 2022), three issues stand out. The first refers to offering the psc's political support and calls (reminders) for implementing aspects of prior agreements and decisions with long-term and short-term objectives. These include 'finalising the establishment of the Abyei Area Administration, the Abyei Area Council, and the Abyei Police Service; demarcation of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ), and organising the referendum' (AU PSC 2022s, §§ 5, 6, 7). The second refers to the expressed support of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and

underscores the imperative to maintain the force (ibid., §§10, 12). The third concerns the PSC's request to the AUC to undertake different tasks aimed at supporting the work of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee and facilitating the implementation of the AU's decisions towards the sustainable resolution of the Abyei issue (ibid., §15).

Overall, the AU's role in Sudan offers key insights into the broader continental peace efforts. The first refers to the continued limitation to enforcing the AU's decisions, policies, strategies, and norms on its member states. While the AU has a long history of supporting political and security processes in Sudan, it has been increasingly difficult to leverage its roles in resolving the protracted political and security crises. To an extent, geopolitical contestation, including rising superpower contestation, limited the AU's engagement and scope. The new context allowed the key political actors to rally for political and economic support from possible backers near and afar. This helps the parties offset the AU's political and diplomatic leverage, such as the AU's sanctions that were aimed at returning Sudan to civilian rule. The second concerns the mediation and peacemaking scene in Sudan, which is also marked by the presence of too many players, albeit effective coordination. The AU's political clout and history of engagement remain limited in such a context. And third, Sudan illustrated that the AU and the broader international community's engagement largely lacked a sense of urgency. Instead of acting decisively, driven by what is necessary, status quo–preserving diplomacy and politics prevailed with limited impact on resolving Sudan's political and security crises.

2.2   *North Africa*

Libya's political and security dynamics stood out as a major issue in the region. The onset of Libya's crisis entered its 10th year. The hangover from insecurity trends of the previous year weighed heavily on Libya's peace and security dynamics in 2022. The postponement of the elections in December 2021 underpinned the lingering political crises over the deadlock on the agreement for a new date and (modalities) for the national and parliamentary elections. The High National Election Commission postponed the sequential presidential and parliamentary elections, given the limited progress in finalising the list of candidates and due to controversy over the electoral law (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 154–157). The drawn-out political stalemate contributed to political, economic, and security instability in 2022 (UNSG 2022c). Also, superpower rivalry and geopolitical contestations continued to play out throughout the year.

Two rival governments presided over the political scene, each having separate electoral roadmaps. The House of Representatives appointed former

interior minister Fathi Bashagha as prime minister in February 2022. The failure of the incumbent prime minister Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibah to hold the elections was cited as the reason for the appointment of the new prime minister (SCR 2022). Bashaga's appointment challenged the legitimacy of the incumbent prime minister. Despite the persisting political crises, the ceasefire agreement that was signed in 2021 continued to hold while the build-up of armed groups allied with the various political factions threatened a return to the civil war of the preceding years.

The response landscape was equally dynamic with many bilateral, regional, and international initiatives and bilateral arrangements, including the backing of rival factions. As the main backer of the peace process, the UN continued to play a key role. The UN extended the mandate of its Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until 23 October 2023 (UNSC 2022b). The missions continued to support the work of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC), including facilitating the implementation of the 2020 ceasefire agreement (SCR 2022).

The uncertainties around Libya's political and security situations and the geopolitical rivalries, including within the UNSC, shaped the functionality of existing response mechanisms. For example, political factionalism threatened to upset the composition of the 5+5 JMC. According to the UN, 'some members of the JMC, aligned with General Khalifa Haftar, reportedly announced they were halting engagement with their counterparts to press for a handover of power from Dbeibah to Bashagha' (UN SCR 2022). Likewise, the search for a special envoy for Libya, who also heads UNSMIL, remained contested for a major part of the year, partly because of disagreement among the UNSC members. This only made some headway in September 2022 when Abdoulaye Bathily (Senegal) was appointed as the UNSG's special representative for Libya and head of UNSMIL (UNSMIL 2022).

Major external players continued to shape Libya's security situation, differing especially on completing the political transition. A report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) identified four major groups of external actors, each having their respective inclinations and support for the major political factions in Libya as follows:

> (1) The first group composed of Algeria, Turkey and the UAE and supporting Dabaiba; (2) a second group, comprising Egypt, France and the US that officially recognises the Dabaiba government but tacitly supports Bashagha; (3) a third group, consisting of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, recognising the Dabaiba government and has given a more wary reception to the Bashagha-Haftar alliance, and (4) finally

> Moscow the only foreign capital to recognise the Bashaga government
> but with unclear position on how to complete the transition process.
> ICG 2022A, 8−9

The adverse implications of these external actors remained too evident as
their support of competing factions continued to fuel Libya's crisis (AU Assem-
bly 2023, §110). As the new UNSG's special representative assumed his post,
he affirmed the imperative to 'coordinate bilateral and multilateral diplomatic
initiatives and to coalesce behind the efforts of the UN' (Eaton 2022). In addi-
tion, as in the previous years, the presence of foreign forces and mercenar-
ies continued, despite various UNSC resolutions and PSC decisions calling for
their unconditional withdrawal (AU Assembly 2023, §110).

As in previous years, the AU's role in Libya was shaped by the complex peace
and security environment, competing interests, and multiple actors with more
pronounced vested interests. The AU continued its participation in the Libya
Quartet, which also consists of the League of Arab States (LAS), the UN, the AU,
and the EU (UNSG 2021). The AU Liaison Office in Tunis, Tunisia, was another
mechanism for engaging with the situation in Libya. In February 2022, the AU
Assembly approved the relocation of the office to Tripoli, Libya, with requi-
site human and financial resources to adequately support the AU's efforts in
Libya (Amani Africa 2023). The AU's primary focus remains unchanged from
the previous year, emphasising the following issues: immediately withdrawal
of foreign forces and mercenaries, convening the National Reconciliation Con-
ference, and addressing the parallel governments and the associated political
crises (AU Assembly 2023, §113).

The AU's notable engagements in 2022 include the deployment of a special
mission of the Ad Hoc High-Level Committee on Libya and a single PSC ses-
sion (1091st session, 29 June 2022). To foster national reconciliation, the Ad Hoc
High-Level Committee on Libya deployed a special mission to Libya in June and
October 2022 for consultations with the Libyan authorities on the role of the AU
in organising the National Reconciliation Conference (AU Assembly 2023, §111).

In addition, during the 1091st session, the PSC offered its political support
to ongoing political processes, notably to the *Permanent Ceasefire Agreement*
(23 October 2020), as well as commitments to the Berlin Conference, the
Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, the 5+5 JMC, and the Libyan-owned cease-
fire monitoring mechanism (AU PSC 2022m, §§5, 12). The PSC particularly
underlined the imperative for sustaining the AU's involvement in key political
processes, especially in supporting the implementation of the *National Recon-
ciliation Strategic Vision* and the planned National Reconciliation Conference
(ibid., §10). Apart from these two major mechanisms, the AU engaged with

the situation in Libya through the AUC chairperson. He issued a statement on 23 July 2022, calling on the warring parties to silence their guns following the fighting and armed clashes between rival militias around the capital in June (AUC Chairperson 2022b).

These engagements notwithstanding, the extent of the AU's involvement remained unclear within some of the frameworks such as the UN-led talks, including the one in Cairo (Amani Africa 2022). Libya is one typical case illustrating how the AU's role is constrained in contexts marked by the presence of many regional and international actors operating with little coordination. At the same time, it highlights existing opportunities to leverage UN–AU partnership platforms to support peace efforts in the country.

Apart from Libya, the political situation in Tunisia was another key issue to watch in the region. Amid tough economic situation, Tunisia witnessed political protests over the incumbent president's 2021 decision to suspend the parliament and the constitution and subsequently rule by decree (*Al Jazeera* 2022c). The protests also extended against a planned constitutional referendum and parliamentary election. Despite opposition protests, the constitutional referendum took place on 25 July 2022, establishing a presidential regime. In addition, the parliamentary election happened on 17 December 2022, and the AU sent an election observation mission to observe the election (AU Assembly 2023, §42).

2.3   *West Africa*

2.3.1   Guinea and Guinea-Bissau

Guinea's political situation remained 'restive' following the military takeover of power in 2021 (AU Assembly 2023, §127). As anticipated, the country entered a difficult and contested implementation phase in 2022 (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 158–159). The contestation is mainly over the duration of the transitional period. The military rulers' proposal for a 36-month transition in May 2022 was rejected by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

The PSC discussed the political crises in Guinea in four of its sessions. The 1064th session, on 10 February 2022, was held after the formation of the National Transitional Council, the appointment of a transitional government led by a civilian prime minister and the adoption of a roadmap for the transition (AU PSC 2022g, §1). Accordingly, the PSC welcomed this political development. In addition, the council requested the AUC to provide technical support to the Joint Monitoring Mechanism on the Transition in Guinea (MMTG) to support the council, particularly on electoral support, social cohesion, and constitutionalism (ibid., §6).

Guinea also featured in the PSC's 1076th session, (14 April) which also discussed the political transition processes in four other countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Sudan. On Guinea, the PSC called for the operationalisation of the MMTG to ensure coordinated support and follow-up of the transition in Guinea (AU PSC 2022j, §24). The PSC also encouraged the transition leaders to expedite the transition timetable in line with the deadline provided by the ECOWAS extraordinary summit held on 25 March 2022 (AU PSC 2022j, § 25). The PSC reiterated its call for the operationalisation of the MMTG (1106th session, 19 September 2022) (AU PSC 2022r, § 22).

The PSC's subsequent engagement on the situation in the Sahel and Guinea was at the ministerial level (1116th session, 31 October 2022). The PSC welcomed the report of the ECOWAS Technical Mission, indicating the agreement reached with the transitional authorities on a 24-months transition calendar and called for adoption and support for this agreement (AU PSC 2022w, §18). The council also reiterated its request to the AUC to develop a support programme for the countries in transition, especially Guinea, on key transition issues such as national reconciliation, governance, and DDR and SSR (ibid., §20). However, Amani Africa (2022, 17) notes that 'no substantial progress has been registered during 2022 in operationalising the transition support and monitoring mechanism the PSC established at its 1030th session'.

Against a long history of political instability in Guinea-Bissau, the attempted coup on 1 February 2022 precipitated a concerning political situation (AU Assembly 2023, §128). The political tension deepened among others after President Umaro Mokhtar Sissoco Embaló dissolved the National Assembly, announcing for election to take place in December 2022, which did not take place as planned. The one PSC meeting on the issue (1126th session, 13 December 2022) came after the deployment of the ECOWAS Stabilisation Support Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ESSMGB) in April (AU Assembly 2023, §130). The PSC fully supported the ECOWAS deployment and reaffirmed its commitment to renew the mandate if required (AU PSC 2022d1, §5; AU Assembly 2023, §131). The PSC decided to deploy a fact-finding mission for engaging with stakeholders and to assess the preparation for the election as a basis for possible support (ibid., §12).

2.3.2   The Lake Chad Basin (LCB) Region and the Threat of Boko Haram
The Lake Chad Basin (LCB) region continued to endure insecurity, especially due to rapidly shifting trends. This particularly underscores the need for a nuanced perspective of the major insecurity trends and some improvement due to various peace efforts. The region's insecurity mainly emanates from the continued operation of various Boko Haram factions, intercommunal fighting,

and banditry against the backdrop of persisting governance and socioeconomic challenges and their diverse manifestations.

Inarguably, the threat from various Boko Haram factions stood out as the most menacing, with various degrees of regional dimensions and reverberations. The aftereffects of the death of Boko Haram leader Abubaker Shekau in 2021 continue to be felt in 2022. His death left the field open for rivalry among various Boko Haram factions vying for dominance and control of territories. Three main factions emerged as main protagonists under the Boko Haram brand. These include the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP), the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah (JAS), and the Bakura faction (AU Assembly 2023, §64). The region also witnessed the resurgence of the Ansaru faction, which reaffirmed its allegiance to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

The continued operations of these factions had clear implications for insecurity in the region. According to the ACSS, the resurgence of Boko Haram in 2022 was linked to a 57 per cent increase in violent events and a 70 per cent jump in fatalities (ACSS 2023). The various factions of Boko Haram were using similar tactics to perpetuate violence that disrupt state authority and presence and terrorising civilian populations, including using human and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDS) (AU Assembly 2023, §64). In addition, ISWAP was also associated with violence in the region, with levels that are almost comparable to Boko Haram factions (ACSS 2023).

The regional outreach of the Boko Haram factions was also quite diverse. While Nigeria and northern Cameroon were the main epicentres of the terrorist threat, the JAS–Boko Haram faction also operates mainly in the Diffa Region of the Republic of Niger, carrying out kidnappings, attacks, and other criminal activities (ISS 2022d). The PSC Annual Report highlights the areas of operations of the major factions as follows: 'ISWAP operates from the remote Lake Chad Islands, JAS operates from the Mandara mountains within Nigeria and Cameroon, as well as parts of Lake Chad islands and the Bakura faction operates from fringes of the Lake Chad across the borders of Niger and Chad' (AU Assembly 2023, §64).

Reflecting the regional nature of the threat landscape, response efforts have also assumed a regional dimension, with the participation of key national actors. As in previous years, key responses mechanisms have been centred around the operations of the AU-authorised MNJTF, the military campaigns of the national armies in the region, and the implementation of the *Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region* (RSS). The AU has supported the implementation of the MNJTF's activities and the RSS.

The PSC's three sessions throughout the year addressed various aspects of the two major response mechanisms: the MNJTF and the RSS. The PSC considered the report of the chairperson of the AUC on MNJTF (1057th session, 14 January 2022). One key outcome of the session was the endorsement of the chairperson's report and the renewal of the MNJTF mandate for 12 months, effective from 1 February 2022 (AU PSC 2022a, §14). The PSC also requested the AUC to mobilise the required support for addressing the capability gaps of the mission (AU PSC 2022a, §8). In addition, the PSC underscored the need for the full implementation of the RSS and support through the AU PCRD Centre as well as encouraged countries in the region to institutionalise the RSS through the implementation of the *Territorial Action Plans* (TAP) to ensure local ownership and support (AU PSC 2022a, §9).

The PSC held its subsequent meeting to receive an update on the situation in the region (1086th session, 31 May 2022). The meeting appeared to be geared towards garnering support for stabilisation efforts through the RSS. The PSC requested the AUC to initiate and support various engagements towards implementing the RSS. These include supporting affected countries in the region through RSS interventions, establishing joint funds and mobilising resource among others to stimulate economic activities and development; and identifying and addressing capacity needs in the region (AU PSC 2022k, § I–IV). The PSC also requested the AUC to support CSOs in the LCB through the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and identify and initiate peace-strengthening projects through the AU PCRD Centre in Cairo (ibid., §§ V–VI) The latter signals a common trend throughout the year to utilise existing mechanisms and instruments to support ongoing peace and stabilisation efforts. The PSC also requested the AUC to expedite the finalisation of the policy on stabilisation as a tool that informs the design and development of similar mechanisms for stabilisation on the continent (ibid., §vii).

The PSC also considered the impending expiry of the MNJTF mandate in February 2023 (1126th session, 22 December 2022). Accordingly, the PSC decided to extend the mandate of the MNJTF for another year, effective from 1 February 2023 (AU PSC 2022e1, §10). The PSC also called for restructuring the mission into a multidisciplinary force with robust police and civilian components (ibid., §9). This was an affirmation of the need for a comprehensive approach to addressing the threat of terrorism (AU Assembly 2023).

2.3.3 The Sahel: Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger

2.3.3.1 *West Africa: Sahel*

As in the previous year, multiple drivers of insecurity intersected to shape the peace and security landscape in the Sahel. Despite country-level variations, the

region was overall marked by deepening insecurity. The PSC Annual Report broadly characterised the general security situation in the region as deteriorating due to a combination of factors: 'heightened insurgency, jihadist insurrection, transnational organised trafficking networks and complex political transitions fuelled by the resurgence of military coups' (AU Assembly 2023, §120). Other familiar trends of insecurity carried over from the previous years also persisted, including intercommunal fighting, attacks on civilians, and food insecurity exacerbated by the adverse impacts of climate change.

2.3.3.2   *Mali*

Mali's political and security landscape was mainly marked by a deepening political crisis, sustained violent extremist threats, the unravelling of international security partnerships, and the fraying of relationships with some of its neighbours. Mali began the year under ECOWAS and AU sanctions following the double coups of 2021. The sanctions defined Mali's tenuous relationship with the regional bloc. Mali's contestation with the regional bloc continued largely over the military junta's proposal to extend the transition period for up to five and a half years (CRS 2022a). On 9 January, ECOWAS responded with a decision to uphold the initial sanctions and imposed further economic and financial sanctions (ECOWAS 2022a, §§9, 12). ECOWAS also threatened to activate its standby force to enhance preparedness should the need arise to deal with the destabilising impact of the contested transitional process (ibid., §12). However, ECOWAS's bid for wider support within the UN to impose new sanctions did not get traction as the move was blocked by China and Russia (*Al Jazeera* 2022b).

In June, the transitional leaders made some concessions by coming up with a revised transitional period of 24 months, shorter than the originally proposed five years (ECOWAS 2022b). Halfway through the year in July, ECOWAS partially lifted the sanction. The decision followed after the transitional authorities agreed to hold elections in February 2024, adopted a new electoral law, and initiated a process to draft a constitution (ICG 2023a, 1–2).

The year also witnessed a souring of the relationship between Mali and some of its neighbours. Mali's relations with some of its neighbours reeled from the ECOWAS sanctions, as Bamako retaliated by imposing restrictions on regional security partner troop rotations, flight clearances, manoeuvres, and patrol routes (CRS 2022a). At the same time, Bamako strengthened its ties with some of its coastal neighbours, notably with Guinea and Mauritania, to offset the adverse implications of the ECOWAS sanctions (ICG 2023a, 14).

A more pronounced manifestation of Mali's difficult relations with its neighbours was the dispute with Côte d'Ivoire. The dispute between the

two neighbours was triggered when Mali detained 49 Ivorian soldiers at the Bamako airport on 10 July 2022. The main reason behind the detention of the soldiers remained contested. While Ivoirian authorities insisted the troops were deployed to provide backup duties for the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), Bamako alleged they were mercenaries (*African News* 2022b). Reflecting this contention, an ICG report states that other political reasons are behind the incident, such as

> The Ivorian president is often criticised … for playing a major role in the ECOWAS decision to sanction Mali and for working behind the scenes against the transitional authorities as well as Bamako's irritation by the presence in Abidjan of former senior officials with ties to the late President Keïta, whom it accuses of working to destabilise Mali.
>   ICG 2023A, 14

A Togolese mediation effort was underway for the resolution of the debacle. December 2022 witnessed two major (contrasting) events in this regard. On 23 December, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali signed a memorandum of understanding to resolve the issue through diplomatic means. A few days later, a Malian court sentenced the soldiers to 20 years imprisonment and three others to death in absentia (*Al Jazeera* 2022d).

The unravelling of Mali's participation in international and regional security partnerships was another worrying dynamic in the region. Three distinct but related aspects mark this consequential trend in the country's security situation. First, the political tension between Mali and France escalated throughout the year. The relationship between the two countries had its own ebbs and flows in the previous years, including rising anti-French sentiment (*France 24* 2022a). However, France's dissatisfaction with and criticism of Mali's decision to cooperate with Russian paramilitaries accounts for the breakdown of their relationship (ICG 2023a). The low point of worsening relations was the closure of France's two missions in Mali, Operation *Barkhane* and Task Force *Takuba,* in 2022.

Likewise, Mali withdrew from the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) in May 'after some G5 countries opposed Mali holding the organisation's presidency', claiming that they were being manipulated by 'a state outside the region aiming desperately to isolate Mali' (*France 24* 2022b) – an apparent reference to France. The decision was underpinned by ongoing tension between Mali and France, which also played out in regional security cooperation platforms, such as the G5 Sahel. The UN reacted to Mali's decision as 'a step back for the Sahel' (*UN News* 2022a).

Thirdly, MINUSMA also faced a difficult year. Several of its TCCs threatened to pull out their troops, including Côte d'Ivoire, the UK, Germany, Benin, and Sweden. According to the ICG, a number of factors account for this move, namely limited cooperation from Malian authorities, including restricting the mission's movement, the mission's high casualty rate, the presence of the Russian Wagner group, the withdrawal of France's Barkhane operation that was protecting mission personnel (ICG 2022b).

The AU's engagement in the various security and political crises took place against this backdrop of more pronounced engagement of ECOWAS, the UN, and various regional and bilateral security arrangements. The AU focused mainly on the political crisis following the 2021 coups, supporting a smooth transition and addressing the country's broader insecurity. The diplomatic and political row between Mali and Côte d'Ivoire also received attention in PSC meetings (1106th and 1116th sessions).

At the first engagement on Mali in 2022, the PSC emphasised its full support for the ongoing ECOWAS political process and for managing Mali's return to constitutional order (1057th session, 14 January 2022). It particularly endorsed the ECOWAS communiqué, which imposed additional economic and financial sanctions against Mali (AU PSC 2022b, §§1, 2). It also endorsed a prior decision of ECOWAS in December 2021, which reiterated the need for the transitional authorities in Mali to respect the deadline of the elections, without which additional sanctions would be imposed accordingly (AU PSC 2022b). However, according to Amani Africa (2022, 15), the economic and financial sanctions against Mali did not receive unanimous support as 'several members cautioned against wholesale endorsement partly on account of the sanctions not being targeted and the foreseeable adverse impact of these sanctions on the wider Malian public'. The report further underlined that 'there were PSC members who expressed concern about the trend in the PSC of rubber-stamping the work of sub-regional bodies and the attendant risk of the PSC surrendering its primary responsibility and failing to exercise its authority as prescribed in the PSC Protocol' (ibid).

The PSC subsequent engagement on Mali took place within the broad discussion on political transitions in Chad, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan (1076th session, 14 April 2022). This meeting took place after the Malian transitional authorities announced in April their plan for a two-year transition 'process' before elections were held, while ECOWAS was insisting on 12 to 16 months (*African News* 2022a). The PSC urged the transitional authorities to work towards a possible agreement on the *Transition Roadmap* for swift return to constitutional order, including the electoral calendar (AU PSC 2022j, §19). It also underlined the imperative for the immediate resumption of dialogue

between signatories of the 2015 *Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation for Mali*, which emerged from the Algiers process (ibid., § 20).

The PSC subsequently discussed Mali as part of the update on other political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Guinea (1106th session, 19 September 2022). The PSC particularly commended the progress in implementing the Transition Roadmap in Mali (AU PSC 2022r, §23). The progress alluded to by the PSC includes the adoption of a new electoral law and the creation of the Independent Electoral Management Authority; the enlargement of the composition of the National Transitional Council; the adoption of a timetable for political, institutional, and electoral reforms; as well as the appointment of the members of the committee responsible for drafting the preliminary version of the new constitution (ibid.). The PSC also acknowledged the progress made in the implementation of the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, in particular the holding of the 2nd Decision-Making Level Meeting (Bamako, Mali, 1–5 August 2022) (ibid., §24). This meeting also expressed its concern over the tension between Mali and Côte d'Ivoire, calling for an amicable resolution of the issue with the support of ECOWAS (ibid., §26).

In a meeting on the Sahel and Guinea (1116th session, 31 October 2022), the PSC noted and encouraged positive developments such as 'the implementation of the transition calendar and the resumption of the work of the Monitoring Committee of the Peace Agreement' (AU PSC 2022w, §§13, 15). It also expressed its deep concern over the deteriorating security situation and the tension between Mali and Côte d'Ivoire concerning the prolonged detainment of 46 Ivorian military officers in Mali (ibid., §§14, 16).

Apart from these PSC sessions, the AU, the UN, and ECOWAS convened a third meeting of the TSG on Mali (Lomé, Togo, 6 September 2022). One key contribution of this meeting was consultation with the Malian authorities in identifying the country's priorities, including 'support to the transitional process and to key stabilisation processes such as SSR and DDR, advocacy and call for the lifting of Mali's suspension and … coordinated international support for the strategic priorities of Mali' (TSG 2022, §4).

2.3.3.3   *Burkina Faso*

Likewise, various forms of security and political crises intertwined, raising the spectre of insecurity in 2022 in Burkina Faso. The country experienced two coups d'état in 2022. The coup plotters capitalised on growing popular discontent over the ruling regime's failure to contain the threat of VET. The first coup, on 23 January, ended the brief civilian rule of President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, being replaced by Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba. On 30 September, the country witnessed the second coup within a single year when Captain Ibrahim

Traoré removed Damiba from power. Along with deepening political crises, violent extremist groups such as Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin's (JNIM) consolidated their stronghold and acquired additional territorial gains (Policy Commons 2022).

The AU PSC considered the situation in Burkina Faso through one dedicated session, as part of its response to the political transition processes in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan and in the context of the situation in the Sahel. The stand-alone PSC meeting followed after the first coup d'état (1062nd session, 31 January 2022) to allow ECOWAS to make a declaration concerning the unfolding coup (Amani Africa 2023, 16). One of the key outcomes of this meeting was the unequivocal condemnation of the coup d'état and reaffirmation of its zero tolerance of UCGS (AU PSC 2022e, §2). The PSC's condemnation of the coup was consistent with the extraordinary summit of ECOWAS on 28 January 2022 (ibid., §3). The AU suspended Burkina Faso from all AU activities until the effective restoration of normal constitutional order in the country (ibid., §5). This demonstrates that the AU followed a different approach than ECOWAS. The latter did not sanction the military junta, as it did in Mali, citing its satisfaction with the latter's two-year timeline for a return to civilian rule (*Deutsche Welle* 2022).

One of the PSC's thematic meetings on political transition (1076th session, 14 April 2022) also looked into the situation in Burkina Faso. This session took place after the coup leaders adopted a three-year transitional charter on 1 March. The PSC appeared to have a favourable assessment as various provisions of the communiqué were dedicated to welcoming and encouraging various political developments in Burkina Faso (see AU PSC 2022j, § 27–30). Another PSC session took place against the backdrop of the second coup, on 30 September 2022 (1116th session, 31 October 2022). One primary focus of this session was the strong condemnation of the coup, affirmation of the AU's zero tolerance of UCGS, and a strong call to the Burkinabe authorities to expedite the transition process (AU PSC 2022w, §§10, 11).

Overall, the AU's engagement in the Sahel region took place in a complex environment marked by an existing insecurity trend intersecting persisting violent extremist threats, political crises, cross-border criminality, and intercommunal fighting. The AU's role in managing the region's multiple crises took different forms, notably engagement through the political roles of the PSC and supporting key processes such as the meeting of the TSG.

Apart from these mechanisms, the AU took part or supported other strategic and political processes. The AU participated in the *Joint Strategic Assessment* (JSA) on governance and security in the Sahel. The AU, UN, ECOWAS, and G5 Sahel established the Independent High-Level Panel on Security and

Development in the Sahel, led by the former president of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou. The JSA aimed to assess the situation in the Sahel and find ways to foster international engagement and map out responses to the region's complex challenges (UN News 2022b). The JSA is structured around four strategic pillars: governance, security, financing, and political cooperation partnership. The findings of the JSA were planned to be presented at the 36th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in February 2023. The findings are also expected to inform the long-awaited revision of the *AU Strategy for the Sahel Region* (AU PSC 2022l, §10). The strategy could create coherence and coordination in light of the proliferation of actors, response mechanisms, and regional strategies and identify the AU's added value therein. The AU also continued its engagement through the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), which required more resources to enable the mission to effectively discharge its mandate (AU PSC 2022l, §10). The G5 Sahel, which is a mission by countries in the region but authorized by the PSC and the UNSC, continued its operation in 2022. However, the mandate of the G5 Sahel joint force, which expired on 13 July 2022, was not renewed within this calendar year (Amani Africa 2023, 22).

2.4   *Central Africa*

2.4.1   Central African Republic

Due to various sources of insecurity, the CAR's political and security situation remained fraught. Continued fighting between various armed groups and a looming constitutional crisis threatened to upset a fragile status quo. Various political developments dating to the previous years contributed to the status quo, including the AU-brokered 2019 *Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR* (PAPR–CAR), the adoption of a *Joint Road Map for Peace for the CAR*, and the mitigation of tensions around the electoral processes of 2020.

Fighting continued through the year, pitting the various armed groups and government forces and their external backers, namely Russian military contractors (i.e. the Wagner Group) and the Rwandan army, with civilians caught in the crossfire (ICG 2023b). As government forces and their external allies conducted more offensive operations, the rebels changed their approach, focusing their campaign on less protected communities and the illegal trafficking of natural resources (IPI 2022). Also, political crisis was brewing when President Faustin-Archange Touadera and his party, the United Hearts Movement, initiated a constitution review process in August (AU Assembly 2023, §45). The political opposition and civil society considered this as a signal that the president was seeking a third term, triggering a backlash. Further deepening of the political crises seemed to be averted as the country's constitutional

court annulled the constitution review process in September, and the ruling regime revoked and abrogated the contested decrees (AU Assembly 2023, §45).

Peace efforts in the CAR were unfolding within the tenuous security landscape. In March, the Republican Dialogue was conducted to bring peace to the country. Though demanded by the opposition, the process did not involve any rebel groups and was boycotted by almost all the political opposition. The CAR's traditional security partners, France and the EU, ended their military cooperation apparently due to the growing roles of Wagner (ICG 2023b). The mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) was extended for one year until 15 November 2023. While the mission played key roles on the political and security fronts, it also faced some challenges in operating in the country, albeit with some improvement towards the end of the year. According to the mission's head, Valentine Rugwabiza, these challenges include 'attacks on MINUSCA's personnel and the seizure of contingent-owned equipment and the obstruction of freedom of movement, including through restrictions on night flights' (UNSC 2022c).

Though no longer a key player in the CAR's stabilisation efforts, the AU, as guarantor of the PAPR–CAR, still wields diplomatic capabilities that have the potential to resolve the country's crises (ICG 2023b). The AU's notable forms of engagement in 2022 on the CAR were two PSC sessions. The PSC's first session focused on the situation CAR and the operations of the AU Military Observer Mission to the CAR (MOUACA) (1093rd session, 25 July 2022). The meeting took place against the backdrop of the conclusion of the Republican Dialogue and therefore encouraged the implementation of the adopted recommendations (AU PSC 2022o, §2). The PSC also offered its support to MOUACA, underscoring its critical role in implementing the PAPR–CAR and requested the AUC to continue engaging the EU for financial support and continuation of MOUACA's activities (ibid., §8).

The second PSC meeting focused on the situation in the CAR and MOUACA (1116th session, 31 October 2022). One of the key outcomes of the session was the PSC's request to the AUC to initiate a gradual drawdown and closure of MOUACA (AU PSC 2022v, §9i). The PSC Annual Report explained the factors that precipitated the MOUACA's closure as follows:

> However, due to various challenges, including the COVID-19 Pandemic, deterioration of the security situation, inadequate logistic support and the delayed construction of the camps of the Joint Special Security Units (USMS), the mission could not be fully deployed as envisaged, neither was their deployment extended beyond Bangui for the entire two years period of the mission.
>
> AU ASSEMBLY 2023, §48

Amani Africa's *Annual Report* offers a more detailed and critical explanation of MOUACA's trajectory and fate. MOUACA is presented as 'yet another manifestation of the challenge of proper design and implementation of decisions' (Amani Africa 2023, 12). The report lists the set of factors behind the mission's closure, including 'the insufficient utilisation of funds available through the European Peace Facility (EPF), the slow pace of the recruitment of the military observers, and the flawed design of the mission' (ibid.).

2.4.2   Chad

Chad typifies many of the other conflict systems on the continent, where various forms of new and existing political and security regional and national dynamics have interlaced to perpetuate insecurity. In this case, long-standing national and regional stabilisation challenges coincided with the political crises around the transition process that deepened following the death of the former president Idriss Déby in 2021 and the power grab by his son, Mahamat Idriss Déby. In 2022, a major political development that was keenly awaited was progress made on the transition process, especially the transfer of power from the military to civilian rule. However, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) did not observe the deadline for relinquishing power following an 18-month transition period.

On the contrary, the regime appeared to be more authoritarian and exclusionary. One major indication was the military regime's handling and instrumentalisation of the national dialogue process, which was intended to forge a national consensus on constitutional reform, election plans and other contentious political issues (Bétinbaye et al. 2022). Prior to the national dialogue process, officially known as the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue, a peace negotiation was held in Doha, Qatar, between the military rulers and 40 opposition groups (March to August). One key outcome of the negotiation was an agreement on launching the national peace dialogue that led to the signing of *The Doha Agreement for Peace and the Participation of Politico-Military Movements in the Chadian National Inclusive Sovereign Dialogue* (*Voice of America* 2022a). The PSC Annual Report characterised the process as a 'non-inclusive, non-credible and non-transparent process' given the boycott of key stakeholders, such as the Transformers Party, the coalition of the Waki-Tama civil society platform, and the Front for Change and Concord (AU Assembly 2023, §51).

The National Inclusive Dialogue (NID) process, which started in August and was concluded on 8 October 2022, was no less contentious regarding both the process and its outcomes. Similar to the Doha talks, key political and societal actors, including those mentioned above, were absent from the process. In addition, the NID's various committees and subcommittees were headed by

individuals with closer ties to the military junta (Bétinbaye et al. 2022). The key outcome of the process was even more 'provocative' as it extended the transition period by two years and allowed all members of the TMC to partake in the 2024 elections (ICG 2023b). Such controversial moves sparked popular protests that were already widespread over various issues around the transition. The regime responded with a violent crackdown on peaceful protests and activities of the political opposition, exacerbating the political tensions. The government also allegedly faced an attempted coup, which it foiled in December 2022, indicating the deepening political crises in the country (*Al Jazeera* 2023a).

The political uncertainties unfolded alongside the long-standing insurgency by various rebel groups challenging the Chadian government. A new rebel group joined the fray operating in the north of the CAR along Chad's southern border and vowed to oust the Déby regime. In addition, ethnic tensions lingered, not least due to the dominance of northern ethnic elites in Chad's ruling regimes, 'fuelling the discontent of the south and among factions in the north' (ICG 2023b).

Chad's multiple crises drew responses from various actors. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) fully dedicated its 2nd Extraordinary Session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government (25 October 2022) to Chad following the deadly protests in October. The regional bloc also appointed the DRC's president and ECCAS chairperson, Felix Tshisekedi, as the facilitator of the transition process in Chad (AU Assembly 2023, §54).

The AU's engagement in Chad was centred around the political transition, primarily through the PSC, as well as the AU's high representative for the political transition and the AU Transition Support Mechanism (AU Assembly 2023, §51). The AU PSC addressed the situation in Chad three times – at a specific session dedicated to Chad and at two others focusing on political transitions in various countries. Chad was one of the countries featured in the PSC session on the political transition processes along with Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan (1076th session, 14 April 2022). This meeting was convened after the commencement of the Doha talks but before the NID. It focused on three key issues: condemning the crackdown of peaceful demonstrators; urging the transitional authorities to ensure the planned national dialogue would be inclusive and transparent; and calling on the AUC to continue to offer financial and technical support, particularly to the dialogue process (AU PSC 2022j, §§13–18).

This was followed up by a similar meeting four months later (1106th session, 19 September 2022). The meeting was held after the end of the Qatar-mediated negotiation and following the commencement of the NID in August. Therefore, it supported these processes, affirming the need to ensure inclusivity and

underscoring the primacy of dialogue in due course (AU PSC 2022r, §§13, 14). At the same time, the PSC reaffirmed its call for the TMC to respect the 18-month transition and unequivocally reiterated that all TMC members would not be allowed to run in the election to be held at the end of the transition (ibid., § 16). The latter indicates that the PSC deemed the military's assumption of power in 2021 as a form of UCG without calling it by its name (Amani Africa 2023, 12).

An emergency session of the PSC (1121st session, 11 November 2022) was held to consider the report of the AUC chairperson on the situation in Chad. The meeting came in the aftermath of the conclusion of the NID, which extended the transition period to additional two years and allowed TMC members to run for election, contrary to the PSC's call for observance of these key provisions (see AU PSC 2022r, §16). Unlike other sessions, the PSC issued a press statement instead of a communiqué, broadly expressing its total rejection of any form of UCG (AU SC 2022b1). According to Amani Africa (2023, 13), the members of the PSC were divided on 'whether the outcome of the national dialogue flouting PSC's decisions would trigger the application of suspension on Chad'. As a result, the PSC only reaffirmed its rejection of UCGs and its earlier decisions on Chad (AU PSC 2022r). The PSC also requested the AUC to expeditiously deploy to Chad the AU Panel of the Wise to gather first-hand information in consultation with all relevant stakeholders on the ground and brief the AUC before 31 March 2023 (AU PSC 2022b1).

2.4.3   Democratic Republic of Congo

As in previous years, lasting peace remained elusive in the DRC due to persisting insecurity and tension. While there were various contributing issues and factors, two stand out in explaining the dire security situation in 2022. First, the re-emergence of the M23, an armed group with alleged ties to Rwanda and dormant for nearly a decade, led to renewed fighting, especially in the eastern DRC. The M23 intensified its attacks and controlled key towns and cities, including the border town of Bunagana, launching attacks on the Congolese army and occupying territory in North Kivu (UNSG 2022a, §17). In addition, the recurring attacks by Allied Democratic Forces and other armed groups contributed to worsening security situation in the DRC.

Second, the escalating security crises in the DRC was also taking on a more evident regional dimension. The involvement of regional actors is not new in the DRC's decades-long crises. However, the rivalry among key regional actors became more pronounced, especially between the DRC and Rwanda. Although the relationship between the two countries had also been strained in the previous years, Rwanda's alleged support of the increasing activities of the M23 raised the spectre of a military confrontation between Kigali and Kinshasa.

Short of open war, the tension manifested in various forms, such as trading accusations and blames, strained diplomatic relations, (temporary) border closures, and suspension of transportation channels between the two countries.

The year witnessed intensified regional initiatives straddling mediation, dialogue, and military deployments, especially to stabilise the security situation in the eastern DRC. The political initiatives primarily consist of the *Nairobi Process*, led by the East African Community (EAC), and Angola's mediation efforts in its capacity as chairperson of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) through the *Luanda Process* (AU Assembly 2023, §59). The Nairobi Process, which commenced in 2022, has a dual-track approach. The political track, which commenced in April, prioritised engagement between the DRC and all local armed groups and unconditional disarmament of foreign armed groups (ibid.). As part of the Nairobi Process, Kenya facilitated dialogue and a ceasefire agreement between the DRC government and 56 armed groups operating in the eastern DRC (UNSG 2022b, §17). However, the M23 factions did not participate in the three rounds of talks and continued to engage the Congolese forces in fighting in the eastern DRC (*Voice of America* 2022b).

The Nairobi Process aimed to complement the Luanda Process. The 16th Extraordinary AU Assembly (Malabo, Equatorial-Guinea, 28 May 2022) tasked Angola, as the chair of the ICGLR, to mediate and ease tensions between the DRC and Rwanda with a view to promoting good neighbourliness. The Luanda Process entailed various engagements, including the Tripartite Summit among the leaders of Angola, the DRC, and Rwanda in July 2022, which led to an agreement on a roadmap for a pacification process in the eastern region of the DRC (ACCORD 2022a). The Luanda Process also led to the adoption of the *Luanda Roadmap*, with de-escalation measures, including discussions around addressing the issue of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and establishing a joint permanent commission to monitor the implementation of the roadmap and the signing of a ceasefire agreement. But notwithstanding this ceasefire agreement, the M23 was not bound by the agreement, and it intensified its attacks, occupying more areas in the Rutshuru area (UNSG 2022b, §2)

On the military front, the EAC deployed its troops in the DRC, already a member of SADC and the ECCAS, following Kinshasa's application for membership. According to the communiqué of the 3rd EAC Heads of State Conclave on the DRC, the EAC force sought 'to restore peace and stability in the eastern DRC' (EAC 2022). The EAC force, with contingents already being deployed since August 2022, has a specific aim of 'compelling those groups which are outside of the Nairobi process to commit to the current ceasefire agreement'

(AU Assembly 2023, §58). It was composed of South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, although an EAC member state, Rwanda, was excluded from this deployment, given its alleged support for the M23.

These emerging regional efforts unfolded alongside the presence of the UN, which maintained its engagement in the DRC. The mainstay of the UN's engagement had been sustaining its beleaguered peacekeeping mission, the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). The UNSC granted an extension of the mission until 20 December 2023 while it implements its 'drawdown/transition' plan (UNSC 2022d). At the same time, the mission faced fierce criticism that it failed to stem the violence in the country, 'despite some successes, notably in supporting highly complex elections in 2006, 2011 and 2018' (ICG 2023b, 11). In the aftermath of local protests demanding the mission's departure, the mission leadership claimed that MONUSCO was a target of concerted mis-and disinformation campaigns (UN 2022).

The AU's role in addressing the DRC insecurity must be situated within the kaleidoscope of such regional and global efforts. The AU is one of the guarantors of the *Framework Agreement for Peace, Security and Cooperation for the DRC and the Region*, signed in 2013. This notwithstanding and despite growing insecurity, the PSC held only one dedicated session on the situation in the eastern DRC which endorsed the various initiatives to stabilise the security situation in the eastern region of the DRC (1103rd session, 31 August 2022), namely the EAC-led Nairobi Process and the mediation efforts of Angola in the capacity as ICGLR chairperson (AU PSC 2022q).[3] The PSC's engagement was considered to be waning throughout the years, suggesting that the council 'tended to show deference to the lead role of regional and global actors rather than being on the driver seat' (Amani Africa 2023, 14). As in other countries and regional cases, such as the Sahel, Libya, and Mozambique, the AU was less prominent in the DRC than other actors. This was largely attributed to the fact that the AU had historically left the 'front seat in the peace and security sphere to the UN' in the DRC (ICG 2023b, 10).

2.5 *Southern Africa*

The conflict in Mozambique remained the most prominent source of instability in the Southern Africa region. The conflict trend ebbed and flowed in contrasting ways. It showed signs of slowing down in comparison to 2021 in terms of number of attacks. Counterinsurgency efforts – including operations

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3 The PSC also convened a follow-up on the 10th Regional Oversight Mechanism of February 2022 in Kinshasa (1078th session, 19 April 2022).

by SAMIM and the Rwandan military contributed to ensuring (parts of) Cabo Delgado, the epicentre of the insurgency, were more secure than the previous years (Cheatham et al. 2022). At the same time, geographically, the conflict expanded for the first time to areas beyond the provinces of Cabo Delgado and Nampula (ISS 2022b).

As in the previous year, countering the insurgency continued in multiple dimensions. Operations by SAMIM and the Rwandan military buttressed the Mozambican security forces, arguably contributing to pulling 'the country's north back from the brink' (Cheatham et al. 2022). The strength of Rwanda's military and police contingent was increased from 1,000 in 2021 to 2,500 by the end of 2022. However, ambiguity on the nature of Rwanda's agreement in supporting Mozambique's counterinsurgency continued, especially on the powers assigned to Rwanda's forces and the source of funding for Rwanda's mission, despite President Kagame's assertion that Rwanda pays its own way (ISS 2023a).

In 2022, SAMIM's deployment received two mandate extensions. SADC approved the extension of SAMIM's mandate at its Extraordinary Summit (Lilongwe, Malawi, 12 January 2022) (SADC 2022a, §11). On 12 April, SADC also decided to downgrade SAMIM's mandate from a full enforcement operation (scenario six according to the African Standby Force [ASF]) to a peacekeeping mission (scenario five) (SADC 2022b). This was due to the need for a broader and more multidimensional approach for addressing insecurity in Mozambique beyond the exclusive focus on military solutions. The change in mandate was also attributed to reduced insurgent attacks but not necessarily a de-escalation per se (Daily Maverick 2022). The 42nd SADC Summit (Kinshasa, DRC, 17 August 2022) extended the SAMIM mandate for one year (SADC 2022c).

While the lack of limited communication and coordination was a concern between Rwanda and SAMIM deployments at the onset, their relations showed signs of improving. According to military officials, SAMIM, Rwanda, and Mozambique started tackling their initial coordination problems and were working smoothly – citing Operation Buffalo, an integrated operation involving the various forces, as an indication of their coordination efforts (*Daily Maverick* 2022).

As in the previous years, the AU's role in Mozambique was overshadowed by the regional intervention of Rwanda and SAMIM. This notwithstanding, the AU has various and arguably more roles than the previous year, straddling political, material (logistics and finance), and ideational support. The AU PSC convened two meetings on Mozambique, an improvement from the previous year, when the council did not have a session on Mozambique. First, the PSC endorsed SAMIM's deployment within the ASF framework (1062nd session, 31

January 2022), almost six months following the mission's deployment (AU PSC 2022f, §2). This raises questions about the AU's broad role in PSOs on the continent, as the AU did not have the mission command and control, and SAMIM claimed it was not required to adhere to the AU PSO doctrine (ISS 2022e). The PSC also welcomed SADC's decision to extend the mandate of SAMIM for a further three months. The PSC matched this political support with a material one, instructing the AUC to provide SADC with equipment. It indicated that the equipment includes those identified at the Continental Logistics Base (CLB) in Douala, Cameroon, and those from the second batch of military aid being donated by China to the AU to support the efforts of SAMIM (AU PSC 2022f, §7).

On the basis of this PSC decision, the AUC supported SAMIM with $2.14 million from the Early Response Mechanism (ERM) and endorsed SADC's request of $15 million coming from the EPF. According to the PSC Annual Report, the AUC 'also donated about $8.7 million worth of military and non-military equipment from the CLB in Douala, Cameroon to SADC in support of SAMIM operations' (AU Assembly 2023, §117).

The second PSC meeting on Mozambique was convened at the ministerial level (1119th session, 7 November 2022). One key outcome was expressing support for SADC's decisions made in August 2022. The PSC's endorsement included 'the extension of the mandate of SAMIM for one year, de-escalating the intervention from scenario 6 to scenario 5 and subsequently scenario 4, to allow deployment of a multi-dimensional peace support operation inclusive of civilian, military and police components' (AU PSC 2022y, §5). The AU's role in Mozambique also includes ideational engagement and solidarity visits. Both PSC communiqués underscored solidarity with the SAMIM and Mozambique, calling on AU member states, the UN, the EU, and the broader international community to provide material, technical and financial resources, indicating the AU's ideational support for Mozambique (AU PSC 2022f, 2022y).

These diverse engagements notwithstanding, Mozambique offered various insights and lessons for managing African peace and security. The first refers to the continued but lacking imperative for the concrete (re)interpretation of the subsidiarity principle. At face value, it appears that the principle of subsidiarity was at play behind the deployment of SAMIM, with regional actors (i.e. SADC) taking the lead and the AU playing a supporting role. However, this does not seem to be fully the case. While the AU explicitly indicated that SADC's deployment was within the ASF framework, SADC's initial statements were not matching the AU's emphasis. Rather, initial statements by SADC officials that they were not expected to consult the AU would indicate ambivalence around the AU's role and, consequently, signal a departure from the ASF original concept.

This changed in 2022 as SADC appears to have made an overture towards explicit recognition of the AU's role. SADC's turn of face is unlikely a result of deliberate policy discussions on the reinterpretation of the subsidiarity principle and affirmation of the AU's critical role therein. Rather, resource-related issues and concerns appear to have propelled the overture. One Southern African analyst suggested that SADC was required to get the AU's endorsement to access the ERM and the EPF. This demonstrates the AU's critical role in future debates on the relationship between the AU and the RECs, including facilitating external support to regional PSOs. Additionally, as in the previous years, Mozambique continues to signpost the imperative of fast-tracking discussions around the AU's role in PSOs in general and the fate of ASF in particular. To say the least, it is a test case indicating the unclarified role of ad hoc security arrangements, such as bilateral arrangements (e.g. Rwanda) and regional deployments by SADC within the ASF concept and uneasy relations around these deployments.

3   Outlook

The continent's peace and security trends are Janus-faced, simultaneously marked by a high degree of enduring conflict trajectory but also by a substantive level of dynamism and evolution. A case in point is the trajectory of the conflict in northern Ethiopia and how the conflict dynamics swung from being one of the most devastating conflicts to the centre of a swiftly concluded peace deal that might not have been anticipated even by the conflict parties. Similar dynamism is also bound to happen around other conflict contexts. Therefore, outlining a realistic expectation and outlook for 2023 should be framed within the above-mentioned caveat.

The limited political commitment of member states to engage in conflict prevention and governance issues is now a well-recognised factor that undercuts prevention and response efforts, including the PSC's. This is unlikely to change, while there might be rhetorical support to enhance the PSC's role in conflict prevention. The behaviour of member states is not going to change much, and 2023 is expected to be business as usual in this regard, including in having frank and open discussions around sensitive country issues. Buoyed by its achievement in the Pretoria peace process, the AU might strive to engage more in various peace processes. This will be notable in the case of Libya, where the AU had been persistent about engaging and supporting the planned reconciliation process.

Likewise, the process of negotiating peace deals and their implementation at the same time has revealed the imperative for strengthening key

implementing frameworks of the AU's peacebuilding and PCRD policy. Various PSC communiqués made reference to offering country-level support in various conflict situations. However, it was evident that the AU does not have the institutional capacity and resources for supporting key processes such as SSR, DDR, and broader PCRD support. Therefore, it is expected that the AU might focus on consolidating its peacebuilding structures such as the PSC subcommittee on PCRD and the AU PCRD Centre.

The dire VET threat is increasingly forcing the search for new solutions. Large UN peacekeeping operations, such as MINUSMA, are confronted by various challenges to effectively tackle the scourge of terrorism. The enduring threat is also inviting the engagement of external actors, including mercenaries. Contrary to the prevailing understanding that countering VET requires a multidimensional approach, some countries in the Sahel have preferred engaging with private security actors whose unique strength lies in offering quick military solutions. Considering this, the AU might expediate the revision of its Sahel strategy based on the ongoing JSA on governance and security. The revised strategy might open up a space for the AU to take on more political roles, possibly in peace enforcement and military engagements. Internal challenges within members of the G5 Sahel and the non-renewal of the mission suggest the AU may resuscitate its long-standing plan to deploy a force of 3,000 in the Sahel.

However, the AU's ambition to respond to crises through peace enforcement mechanisms such as the ASF remains in need of major rethinking. Despite a great deal of investment and preparation, the ASF remained dormant. This is largely because of the lack of political will to authorise ASF deployments, the outdated nature of the ASF model, and most importantly the lack of financial wherewithal to foot the bill of deployments. As a result, the AU is likely to embark on process that will revitalise the ASF in a manner that recognises the growing roles and ambition of the RECs/RMs. In addition, the AU might exert more effort to get adequate and predictable funding for AU PSOs through UN-assessed contributions and operationalising its Peace Fund.

The outbreak of various crises on the continent has surprised many policy-makers. This remains one indication that the AUC needs to refocus on strengthening the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). This is critical as an attempt to mainstream the CEWS appeared to have undermined the CEWS's pivotal role in conflict prevention, including its long-standing engagement with the RECs/RMs (Engel 2022). Finally, the AU's ability to shoulder its peace efforts rests on the institutional capacity of the AUC, especially the PAPS portfolio department. It is expected that the AUC might infuse more dynamism

to ensure that PAPS will boost its capacities in the context of the AU reform process that had created hope and uncertainty.

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Regional Integration and Trade

Bruce Byiers

1   Introduction

In February 2022, the 35th Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government agreed on 'Accelerating AfCFTA Implementation' as the AU's 2023 'Theme of the Year' (AU Assembly 2022a, §133). As this chapter discusses, that decision reflects not only the continuing high-level political buy-in that the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) project receives, but also that meaningful trade has yet to take place under the agreement, more than two years after the official launch of continent-wide trade on 1 January 2021. Although January 2022 therefore saw the first anniversary of the launch of AfCFTA trade, as the AfCFTA secretary-general Wamkele Mene put it at a ministerial retreat that month, 'since then, we have made only modest progress' (Mene 2022a) – negotiations continued in 2022, particularly to agree on the rules of origin that would allow 90 per cent of trade to take place tariff free. Nonetheless, 2022 did see numerous institutional developments and the establishment of mechanisms that will support the functioning and use of the AfCFTA, thereby helping to achieve its ambitious goals of promoting not just trade but also inclusive, industrial development. Visible progress may also be important for the AfCFTA secretary-general, whose mandate is up for renewal in 2024 (du Plessis 2022).

This chapter discusses the different degrees of progress made concerning the AfCFTA agenda, considered the central focus of the AU's trade and regional integration agenda. Beginning with an update on progress with the AfCFTA negotiations, it also discusses the so-called *Guided Trade Initiative* (GTI), a pilot scheme for AfCFTA trade that was launched in 2022; the various new AfCFTA-related bodies established, before touching on phase II of AfCFTA negotiations. At the same time, the chapter touches on the continuing ambiguities around relations between the regional economic communities (RECS), the AfCFTA Secretariat, and the AU Commission (AUC) and steps being taken to overcome these.

2   AfCFTA Progress

The year 2022 saw a further five AU member states deposit their instruments of ratification of the AfCFTA with the Secretariat – Tanzania, Cape Verde, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Morocco, and Guinea-Bissau, bringing the total by the end of 2022 to 46 countries (tralac 2023). Although not yet formal state parties, outstanding cases include Mozambique, where the agreement is said to have been ratified at the national level but not yet submitted to the AfCFTA Secretariat, and other countries where the domestic process is reportedly delaying progress. Although not state parties, these have often been invited and reportedly present at meetings of, for example, the AfCFTA Council of Ministers.

By January 2022, 87.7 per cent of tariff lines had been agreed upon for liberalisation, with agreement on rules of origin pending for textiles, automobiles, sugar, and tobacco (Mene 2022a). This is close to the AfCFTA objective of liberalising trade in 90 per cent of tariff lines (non-sensitive goods), where the objective is to achieve liberalisation on 97 per cent of tariff lines with a phasing down of these 'sensitive goods' beginning after five years, that is to say from January 2026 (ITC 2022). By November, the number of agreed rules of origin had increased to 88.3 per cent of tariff lines (AU Assembly 2022b, §4), reflecting progress in the outstanding sectors, the majority of this reportedly due to textiles and clothing (according to tralac 2022).

Notably, the rules of origin for 81 per cent of tariff lines had already been agreed by December 2020 (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 187). The slowdown in progress reflects the difficulty of agreeing on these final key sectors, where some large countries fear becoming a 'dumping ground' for products from other African states, in the words of the director general of the Nigerian Office for Trade Negotiations (Edeh 2022). This is in line with the long-standing position of the South African minister of trade, industry and competition, who stated that rules of origin 'must serve to spur increased investment in local African productive capacity and job creation' (South African Government 2020), leading him to adopt a more protectionist approach than low-income African countries would prefer in order to engage in the textiles value chain. In the words of the AfCFTA secretary-general Mene: 'In view of the possible compromises on the outstanding rules of origin concerning various issues, high-level political leadership is required for the conclusion of the negotiations, which would enable us to meet the agreed threshold of rules of origin' (Mene 2022a).

Partly in response to these blockages, but also reflecting a pragmatic implementation strategy, July 2022 saw the launch of the AfCFTA GTI (Mold and

Mangeni 2022). This saw eight countries begin to trade under the AfCFTA in a limited group of 96 identified commodities, including, among others, ceramic tiles, tea, coffee, processed meat products, corn starch, sugar, pasta, glucose syrup, dried fruits, and sisal fibre, 'in line with the AfCFTA focus on value chain development' (ITC 2022). The goal of the initiative is to demonstrate the functioning of the AfCFTA instruments and gain feedback on their effectiveness and any teething problems experienced in participating countries. Shipments of coffee from Rwanda and car batteries from Kenya were ceremoniously sent off to Ghana with AfCFTA certificates of origin. Though symbolically important, they also highlighted that tariff reductions under the AfCFTA are only a minor part of promoting intra-African trade: the first consignment of batteries took six weeks to travel from the port of Mombasa in Kenya to Tema in Ghana, having travelled via Singapore (Hairsine 2022).

FIGURE 11.1   AfCFTA State Parties and GTI Participants
SOURCE: HAIRSINE (2022)

As a consequence, the AfCFTA secretary-general proposed to monitor and document intra-AfCFTA trade over 2022 as the base year in his report to the Permanent Representatives' Committee in November 2022 (Mene 2022e). Overall, the GTI is being seen as a tangible sign that the AfCFTA can make

visible, practical progress in governing intra-African trade flows between exist-
ing free trade agreements, even if these initial flows remain small.

As well as trade in goods, the AfCFTA Agreement covers trade in services
with five identified priority sectors for liberalisation (see *Yearbook on the Afri-
can Union 2022*, 188). While some progress was made in 2022, actual removal of
barriers to trade in services has not yet taken place. Mold and Mengeni (2022)
report that by late 2022, 48 countries had made initial offers of liberalisation
in the five selected priority sectors (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2022*,
188). Indeed, there is now a suggestion that trade in services under the AfCFTA
might also begin in a pilot form akin to the GTI for goods (Kagina 2023).

The above work on trade in goods and services are regarded as part of
phase I of AfCFTA negotiations. Although somewhat delayed, due to Covid-
19 related restrictions during 2020 and 2021, in November 2022 the AfCFTA
secretary-general was able to report that the negotiations for phase II have
also been concluded: the *Protocol on Investment*, the *Protocol on Competition
Policy*, and the *Protocol on Intellectual Property Rights*. Although these will
still require implementation regulations to be prepared and discussed, this
arguably represents a further important benchmark in AfCFTA progress. The
Protocol on Investment, for example, seeks to promote investment and policy
coordination across the continent by addressing barriers to investment entry,
helping reduce investment approval time and costs, enhance transparency,
and address fragmented investment regulatory frameworks on the continent
with recourse to protection where these are not respected (Mene 2022b).

In addition to the GTI, a series of other instruments to support AfCFTA
implementation were initiated in 2022. These include the AfCFTA e-Tariff
Book (AfCFTA 2023), an online tool for firms to explore the new tariff benefits
of trading under the AfCFTA; the *Rules of Origin Manual* (AfCFTA Secretariat
2022a); the Pan-African Payments System, launched in January 2022 to facil-
itate cross-border payments in local African currencies without the need to
convert to hard currencies first (Mene 2022b), with the first transaction taking
place in 2023; an agreement between the AfCFTA Secretariat and the African
Export–Import Bank (Afreximbank) for an AfCFTA Adjustment Fund worth
$10 billion (ibid.). As discussed in the *Yearbook on the African Union 2021* (2022,
194f.), the Women and Youth in Trade Committee was established as part of
the formal AfCFTA institutional architecture, as well as the Independent Con-
tinental Youth Advisory Council on the AfCFTA (ICOYACA), with affiliated
national chapters. As part of this, an AfCFTA Secretariat–led conference on
women and youth in trade further nominated President Samia Suluhu Has-
san of Tanzania as champion for the foreseen AfCFTA *Protocol on Women and
Youth in Trade* (AfCFTA Secretariat 2022b). By November 2022, the *Protocol on*

Digital Trade and the *Protocol on Women and Youth in Trade* were both reportedly at the design stage, to be concluded by July 2023.

3 AfCFTA Institutions and Coordination

As discussed in the previous *Yearbook on the African Union* (2022, 182), the AfCFTA Secretariat is autonomous from the AUC, answering instead to the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government through the AfCFTA Council of Ministers. Nonetheless, it receives its budget through the AU and from international partners. Somewhat paradoxically, or perhaps reflecting the real world, in its decisions in July 2022 the AU Executive Council 'reiterates the need for full ownership of the AfCFTA' and 'at least 50% of its program budget for 2024 to be funded by the Member States, African financial institutions and from Africa's private sector' (AU Council 2022, §89). The desire to promote 'ownership' may help explain why some international partners have informally expressed frustration at the difficulty of finding ways to directly support the AfCFTA Secretariat. It may also explain the move by the AfCFTA Secretariat to coordinate with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) on the possibility of a Trade Policy Review Mechanism to help underpin ownership and, ultimately, AfCFTA implementation.

During 2022, the AfCFTA Secretariat was able to further build up its human resources, reportedly hiring around one-third of the foreseen 300 staff members (du Plessis 2022). In doing so, the secretary-general has expressed pride in particular with his young staff, with 33 per cent of staff members being under the age of 35, regional representation from across the continent, and gender parity (Mene 2022d).

An underlying question mark for the AfCFTA Secretariat, also discussed in the AU *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, has been its relation to existing continental and regional trade regimes. Given the autonomy of the AfCFTA Secretariat from the AUC, but coexistence with pre-existing regional free trade areas and customs unions at the level of AU-recognised RECs – such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the East African Community (EAC) – and sub-REC level – such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) (though in theory the UEMOA customs union is now integrated with that of ECOWAS) – the AfCFTA Secretariat continues to seek to define its relationship with those bodies. A second

coordination meeting of the heads of the RECs on the implementation of the AfCFTA was held in June in Arusha, Tanzania, where an *Indicative Action Plan* was proposed for discussions for AfCFTA-REC collaboration in the implementation of the AfCFTA. In his report to the Permanent Representatives' Committee of the AU in November 2022, AfCFTA secretary-general Mene suggested that a Committee on RECs 'would be useful in addressing complementarities and divergences between the AfCFTA and REC regimes' (Mene 2022e).

Although the AfCFTA is, in the strictest sense, a trade agreement between existing trade agreements, the need for clearer lines of cooperation is best highlighted by the announcement in April 2022 that the AfCFTA Secretariat would be engaging in efforts to support trade along the Abidjan Lagos Corridor (AfCFTA Secretariat 2022), a trade corridor that includes only ECOWAS countries, for which trade will continue to be governed by the ECOWAS customs union. This built on the endorsement of a 'corridor approach to trade facilitation interventions towards implementation of the AfCFTA' by the AU Assembly of Heads of Government in February 2022 (Erasmus 2022). But the heads of state also decided to 'advance the emergence of trading and investment corridors across sub-regions of the continent' at the extraordinary summit held in November 2022 (AU Assembly 2022b §4), with a focus on 'green technology enabled manufacturing clusters in urban corridors to create jobs for young people' and to enhance the technological component of 'industrial outputs from connected regional value chains'.

A similar need for institutional coordination arguably arises from Africa's industrialisation agenda. Industrialisation is a core objective of the AfCFTA in the original agreement and an area that gained additional prominence under the AfCFTA Secretariat with the establishment in 2022 of the AfCFTA Trade and Industrial Development Advisory Council, endorsed by the AU Assembly in February 2022 (AfCFTA Secretariat 2022a). Comprised of a mix of academics and practitioners from across the continent, this advisory body was conceived to support the AfCFTA Secretariat in its goal of promoting regional value chains (RVCs), an objective that is also a long-standing goal of most, if not all, RECs, even if these have had limited success (see, for instance, Byiers et al. 2018). Indeed, in a speech to the Ugandan private sector in October 2022 (Mene 2022d), the AfCFTA secretary-general Mene mentioned the possibility of a need for a new continental industrialisation strategy. February 2022 had already seen the launch of the AfCFTA *Private Sector Strategy* in collaboration with the MasterCard Foundation, with a focus on four priority sectors – agro-processing, automotive, pharmaceuticals, and transportation and logistics – for quick wins, based on the potential for import substitution and existing production capabilities on the continent (Mene 2022b).

At the same time, industrialisation falls under the mandate of the AU's Commission for Economic Development, Tourism, Trade, Industry, and Mining (ETTIM) (e.g. African Union 2022), with the request to have an extraordinary summit on industrialisation dating back to the AU Assembly of February 2020 (Alqali 2022). The AU commissioner Albert Muchanga's statement to ministers of industry on 3 November 2022 reflects this, recalling that 'the industrial political framework of Africa is the Action Plan for the Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa (AIDA)' (Muchanga 2022). Although he admits that 'not very much has been done' to implement the AIDA clusters (ibid.), his suggestion was to propose an AU champion for industrialisation and productive transformation, with the Nigerian president Mohamed Bazoum being appointed at the 17th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly. The same summit agreed that the AUC should work with the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the African Development Bank (AfDB), Afreximbank, and the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) to develop a new industrialisation framework 'for the next 20 years' to be presented at the 36th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in 2023.

At the same time, the AU is itself undertaking an exercise to better define the division of labour between the AU and the RECs more broadly, under the lead of the AU Reform Implementation Unit of the AUC. The 4th Mid-Year Coordination Meeting (MYCM) between the AUC and the RECs (Lusaka, Zambia, 17 July 2022) discussed ongoing work to better define this relationship but a draft report appears to still be a work in progress, reflecting again the difficulty of finding agreement in how the RECs should interact with continental bodies.

4   Private Sector Engagement

Like the AU and RECs, the principle focus of the AfCFTA in promoting regional economic integration is through the creation of 'formal institutions', understood as the formal 'rules of the game' and the accompanying organisational structure to encourage and shape commercial exchange. While necessary, such structures are not sufficient for trade to take place. That is broadly recognised but has long been a challenge for regional and continental organisations. The AfCFTA Secretariat has been keen to point out that the AfCFTA cannot work without the private sector, yet the nature of trade negotiations means that private sector engagement depends on the way national processes are formed and thus also the way state–business relations play out within each national political economy context (see, for instance, Byiers and Woolfrey 2023, who contrast South Africa and Nigeria in this regard). The AfCFTA Private Sector Strategy

mentioned above, and plans for an AfCFTA Business Forum launched in 2022 seek to address this apparent gap. At the same time, private sector surveys, for example from CEOs across the continent, point to remaining challenges to address gaps such as 'access to trade information, trade-enabling infrastructure and trade finance' (PAFTRAC 2022). Even if the AfCFTA is not fully in implementation mode, such findings are important given the widely varying tariff preference utilisation rates by firms engaged in trade, where these are lower for intra-African regional trade than in trade agreements beyond Africa (UNECA 2021).

5   Conclusions

As one senior UNECA officer put it: 'The AfCFTA enjoys broad consensus and strong political backing as a flagship project of the African Union (AU). However, with the start of trading stuck on technicalities, the AfCFTA is yet to substantively take off' (Luke 2022). Nonetheless, as this chapter has discussed, much of the institutional infrastructure is now in place. The risk raised by some is that the 90 per cent target for liberalised tariff lines will never be met, meaning that the GTI would become the *de facto* AfCFTA, with countries joining gradually and in a limited number of sectors – a fear that has been expressed by analysts following the AfCFTA process (see, for instance, Erasmus 2022).

At the same time, for such a complex trade agreement among such widely varying countries and economies, each with very different political economies and histories, already engaged in varying regional economic integration processes, it would be surprising if progress were faster. That progress is being made slowly but surely and that lessons can be learned already from the pilot GTI are therefore positive steps. The hope is that with the 2023 'Theme of the Year' being 'Acceleration of AfCFTA Implementation' further progress will be made to further cement the AfCFTA as a fully functioning trade area, with all the promise that it offers for promoting economic transformation and inclusive development across the African continent.

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Strategic Partnerships

Ulf Engel

1 Introduction

Both the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, 1963–2002) and the African Union (AU), its successor, have forged alliances with multilateral and bilateral international partners to strengthen the pan-African globalisation project (on the concept see Engel 2023; on its historicity see Yusuf 2014). Over time, this project certainly has changed in substance. While the OAU primarily focused on protecting the newly won independence of its member states, establishing some form of pan-African identity, and fighting apartheid and colonialism, the AU has concentrated on grappling with the challenges of violent conflict (see Dawit Yohannes, this Yearbook, chapter 10) and changing the conditions for the integration of its member states into current processes of economic globalisation (see Bruce Byers, this Yearbook, chapter 11).

To briefly recap the history of the OAU/AU's strategic partnerships, in the 1960s and 1970s the OAU mainly established partnerships with Arab and Asian states, partly organised in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In the 2000s, this policy field was reorganised. Yet the term *strategic partnership* was not applied right away. After the transformation from the OAU to the AU, it took some time for the new continental body to settle in. In January 2007, the AU Executive Council received a report from a Task Force on Africa's Strategic Partnership with Emerging Powers of the South, established by the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC).[1] The task force requested the AU Commission (AUC) to develop a new type of mutually beneficial partnership. The year 2007 also marked the beginning of strategic partnerships with the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), respectively (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 203f.).

Historically, both multilateral and bilateral partnerships have followed different trajectories. Today, there are two main dimensions of what the AU

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[1] Spelling in AU documents varies between Permanent Representati*ves* Committee, Permanent Representati*ve's* Committee, and Permanent Representati*ves'* Committee (italics by the author).

describes as strategic partnerships: those with international organisations – the Arab League (or League of Arab States, LAS), the EU, and the UN – and bilateral ones with a number of individual countries. China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Türkiye (formerly: Turkey) are considered key bilateral strategic partners. However, others are sometimes added to this list. Some 'emerging powers of the South', however, are absent from this list – Brazil is a case in point (although in the past there was an attempt to include 'South America' and also Iran into the group of partnerships).

The criteria for when a country becomes a strategic partner are fuzzy and not clearly formulated. Also, the practical implications of maintaining a strategic partnership are somewhat nebulous. Finally, there is no established mechanism for implementing, monitoring, and evaluating strategic partnerships. So far, the AU has not published a coherent partnership strategy, or a related policy framework, as requested by the 36th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 6–7 February 2020). The AUC is still working on a policy framework on strategic partnerships. A first draft was available in November 2021, followed by a second draft in October 2022. The AU Executive Council noted 'with concern' the delays and requested to finalise this process by early 2023 (AU Council 2022b, §§60–61). It also decided that until a final document was adopted, the conclusion of new partnerships is suspended (ibid., §88).

Overall, the AU's multilateral and bilateral partnerships have increasingly been drawn into the escalating systemic global competition between the Global North, on the one hand, and – for different reasons – the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, on the other hand (see Tim Murithi, this Yearbook, chapter 2). While the Chinese government wants to assert the country as the single most important global power by 2049 (which marks the centenary of its revolution), the Russian government is trying by force to re-establish the lost pre-1991 Soviet empire, including the escalation of its military intervention in Ukraine (ongoing since February 2014), a hidden cyber war against the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and a series of opportunistic interventions through the private military company Wagner Group (*Группа Вагнера*) in parts of the African continent, among others, in the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, Mali, Mozambique, and Sudan. The Global North, which has neglected Africa's legitimate global claims for many years, finally seems to have woken up and started re-engaging with the political leadership of the continent. Within the context of a changing global condition (see also Oloruntoba and Falola 2022; and from a Chinese academic perspective Li and An 2022), the AU is trying to find and steer its course.

2   Multilateral Partnerships

2.1   *Arab League* (*LAS*)

The Arab League was founded in 1945; today it comprises 22 states in the broader Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.[2] The origins of the Afro–Arab cooperation can be traced back to 1974 when the OAU Council of Ministers called for its first joint ministerial conference with a view to developing an Afro-Arab development strategy. But as noted in the previous *Yearbook on the African Union 2021* (2022, 204f.), this strategic partnership has developed only very slowly. The 5th Arab–Africa Summit was supposed to be held in 2020, but because of the Covid-19 pandemic postponed (AU Council 2022a, §23); it has now been scheduled to be held in Saudi Arabia in 2023.

2.2   *European Union* (*EU*)

The cooperation between the AU and the EU is based on the 2007 *Joint Africa–Europe Strategy* (JAES) and the *Plan of Action* that was adopted at the 2nd EU–Africa Summit (Lisbon, Portugal, 8–9 December 2007). Within this framework, regular meetings are being held at several levels: summits; ministries; between the two commissions (called 'college-to-college' meetings); and between the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee (EUMC), and the AU Military Staff Committee (MSC), as well as crises management teams on both sides (the Joint Africa–EU Expert Groups, JEGs). In addition, regular consultations between African and European heads of delegation in Addis Ababa, Brussels, and New York take place (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 205–207).

The 6th EU–AU Summit was held in person (Brussels, Belgium, 17–18 February 2022). It was co-chaired by the president of the European Council, Charles Michel, and the AU chairperson, Senegal's president Macky Sall. In the lean final declaration 'A Joint Vision for 2030' (EU and AU 2022), the two sides committed to a 'renewed Partnership [that] will be founded on geography, acknowledgment of history, human ties, respect for sovereignty, mutual respect and accountability, shared values, equality between partners and reciprocal commitments', that is to say a catalogue of principles in which every side could read quite different things. The immediate task was to focus on the

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2   The member states are Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen. This means that 10 out of 22 member states are also belonging to the AU.

Covid-19 pandemic, but the long-term aim was 'full-fledged African health sovereignty' (ibid., 2).[3] The two sides supported the '*Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative* by the Group of Twenty (G20), together with the Paris Club, and further debt cancellations (ibid.). Countering the Chinese *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI; see Amineh 2023; Duarte et al. 2023), the European Commission offered a new investment package, the Global Gateway Africa-Europe, to the tune of €150 billion (EU and AU 2022, 4) (see du Plessis 2022; Furness and Keijzer 2022; see also Zajontz and Bagwandeen, this Yearbook, chapter 9). Partly, this offer was only repackaging the already dedicated European Fund for Sustainable Development+ (EFSD+), under which the EU had already committed $135 billion (see Goodman et al. 2022). Further areas of cooperation include peace and security, as well as migration and mobility. And less than a week away from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, both sides renewed their commitment to the principle of multilateralism in international relations. European observers, however, missed the strategic direction and pointed to the inherent limitations of the AU–EU strategic partnership, owing to on both sides the role of member states vis-à-vis the respective commissions (Erforth and Keijzer 2022), or questioning the viability of a new round of 'promises' (McNair 2022).

The 11th Commission-to-Commission meeting was held in Brussels, Belgium (28 November 2022). While the European Commission condemned 'in the strongest possible terms the war of aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine', the AU did not offer input on this topic (European Commission 2022a, §3). However, both commissions 'expressed deep concern with the challenges to global food and energy security exacerbated by current conflicts and tensions' (ibid., §4). And they underlined their 'shared commitment to promote multilateralism and the rules-based international order, with the United Nations at its core' (ibid., §18). The EU offered a €750 million programme in support of infrastructure investments in the areas of transport (including strategic corridors), digitalisation, and energy connectivity (ibid., §8). And in the field of governance and peace and security, the two commissions highlighted the €600-million commitment by the European Peace Facility (EPF) for 2022–2024, with a focus on AU-led peace support operations (PSOs), mediation, the Early Response Mechanism, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) (ibid., §15).

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3 This was against a backdrop of what South African president Cyril Ramaphosa referred to in the previous year during the Covid-19 pandemic as 'a situation tantamount to vaccine apartheid' (see Sowetan 2021).

In 2022, the EU continued to maintain 11 PSOs and other support missions on the continent. These were located in the CAR (EU Military Training Mission [EUTM RCA], established in 2016, and the civilian advisory mission EU Advisory Mission [EUAM RCA], 2019), Libya (the EU Border Assistance Mission [EUBAM Libya], 2013), Mali (EUTM Mali, 2013), Niger (EU Capacity Building Mission [EUCAP Sahel], 2012), and Somalia (EUTM Somalia, 2010, and EUCAP Somalia, 2012). In addition, the EU the Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell for the Sahel (RACC) in support of the Group of Five (G5) (2019). Furthermore, there are naval missions under the EU *Common Security and Defence Policy* (CSDP) off the coasts of Libya (EU Naval Force Mediterranean Operation [EUNAVFOR MED IRINI], 2020), and Somalia (EUNAVFOR, or Operation ATALANTA, 2008), respectively. In 2021, the EU began a new mission, EUTM Mozambique, to assist fighting the insurgency in the country's northern province of Cabo Delgado (European Commission 2022b).[4]

A report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on EU missions in Africa (Van der Lijn et al. 2022, III) argues that most of these missions have increasingly 'become bogged down by: (a) a lack of political will and ownership on the part of host governments and other conflict parties; and (b) the EU's unwillingness to use its political weight to impose conditionalities as part of its programmes'. Due to the increasing presence of the Russian Wagner Group in the CAR and Mali, EU activities in these countries have been partly suspended.

Apart from peace and security, the other major dimension of the Africa-EU agenda is trade (though this is not an AU dossier). As highlighted in the *Yearbook on the African Union 2021* (2022, 206), for two decades the EU is still negotiating so-called *Economic Partnership Agreements* (EPAs) with the former countries of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) to conform to the regulations of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Overall, only 14 African ex-ACP countries across the five African regions are already implementing EPAs: (1) Central Africa: Cameroon; (2) East and Southern Africa (ESA): Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe; East African Community (EAC): none;[5] the SADC: Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa; and West Africa: Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana (European Commission 2022c). The effects of these EPAs are quite detrimental to ongoing regional integration processes (see Bruce Byiers, this Yearbook, chapter 11).

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4   For an academic discussion of the AU-EU cooperation in this field, see Plank (2022).

5   Kenya and Rwanda signed the EPA in 2016, and Kenya has ratified it. For the EPA to enter into force, the (by now four) other EAC member states need to sign and ratify.

2.3   *United Nations (UN)*

Since 2007, a strategic partnership between the AU and the UN has developed, centring around peace and security (see UN and AU 2017). Regular management and working-level meetings have developed, including annual consultations between the AUC chairperson and UN secretary-general as well as the PSC and the UN Security Council (UNSC). The 6th AU–UN annual conference was held on 1 December 2022 in Addis Ababa, and the 16th meeting of the councils took place on 14 October 2022 in New York (see African Union 2022; AU and UN 2022). The next meetings are scheduled to take place in 2023. Both meetings took stock of joint actions to improve the peace and security situation on the continent.

In addition, regular meetings are held between the AU commissioner for political affairs, peace and security and the UN special representative for the AU. Furthermore, biannual desk-to-desk meetings are conducted. In New York, the UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa organises an annual event held during Africa Week, every year in October, alongside the UN General Assembly's 'Debate on the Development of Africa'. During the same period, along with the AU and the RECs, the UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa prepares the *RECs Briefing* for UN member states. Since 2009, the AU maintains a Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations, and in July 2010, the UN established an Office to the African Union (UNOAU) (see UNSG 2022). Since February 2022, the UNOAU has been led by Parfait Onanga-Anyanga (Gabon), who has switched positions as the UN secretary-general's special envoy for the Horn of Africa (2019–2022) with Hanna Serwaa Tetteh (Ghana), who had steered the UNOAU since 2019.

Throughout 2022, the UN maintained its seven peacekeeping operations (PKOs) on the African continent (see UNSG 2022, §§44–53).[6] The approved budget for all 12 UN peacekeeping missions for the financial year (FY) 2022/2023 was $6.45 billion (compared to $6.37 billion for FY 2021/2022) (see Table 12.1). UN missions in Africa account for 82.93 per cent of the overall UN PKO budget (compared to 88.63% for FY 2021/2022).

For Africa's global role, but also the peace and security situation on the continent (see Dawit Yohannes, this Yearbook, chapter 10), the UNSC remained an extremely important platform. The AU reaffirmed its commitment to a reform of the UNSC, the so-called *Ezulwini Consensus* and the *Sirte Declaration on the United Nations Security Council Reform*, both adopted in 2005 (see AU Assembly 2022, §§73). This common position includes the call for a minimum of two

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6   With a critical perspective on the role of the UN in Africa, see Nagar (2022).

TABLE 12.1   Budget for UN Peacekeeping Pperations in Africa, FY 2022/2023

UN mission acronym	UN mission	Budget (in $ million)
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	61.112
MINUSCA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic	1,074.388
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	1,245.045
MONUSCO	UN Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo	1,030.270
UNISFA	UN Interim Security Force for Abyei	259.663
UNMISS	UN Mission in South Sudan	1,116.609
UNSOS	UN Support Office in Somalia	521.697
RSCE	Regional Service Centre in Entebbe (Uganda)	43.100
Total UN PKOs (Africa)		**5,351.896**
Total UN PKOs (global)		6,453.391

SOURCE: UNGA (2022)

permanent seats, including the right of veto; five non-permanent seats; and the right of the AU to select its representatives 'in its name and on its behalf' (ibid., §77). Against the backdrop of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and the resulting global competition for the support of AU member states in the UN, this issue began to move in 2022. Some Western member states of the G20 group indicated that they would be ready for talks on UNSC reform (see under section 3.6 on bilateral partnership with the US). In any case, the AU's Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government on the Reform of the United Nations Security Council (C10), led by President Julius Maada Bio from Sierra Leone, was directed to remain engaged in the issue (ibid., §85).

In 2022, the non-permanent African members of the UNSC, the so-called A3, were Gabon (for the period 2022–2023), Ghana (2022–2023), and Kenya (2021–2022). Mozambique was nominated to follow Kenya for the period 2023–2024. The UNSC met on 153 occasions and adopted 52 resolutions in 2022. Three draft resolutions were vetoed, one adopted without vote, and three drafts were not adopted. Out of the 153 UNSC meetings, 99 (or 64.71%) dealt with peace and security issues on the African continent. The conflicts on the continent that required the most attention of the UNSC include Sudan and South Sudan (23 meetings), Libya (17), Somalia (12), the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(DRC) (9), Mali (8), and the CAR (6). The topic 'Peace and Security in Africa' was discussed nine times (see UN 2023). On most occasions the A3 voted in unison. However, the changed global condition and/or strong national interests also prompted variations in their vote (see also Ulf Engel, this Yearbook, chapter 4, section 5.4). On extending sanctions against South Sudan, Gabon and Kenya abstained (UNSC 2023a); on extending the mandate of UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), Kenya abstained (UNSC 2023d); on extending the mandate of Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA), Gabon abstained (UNSC 2023e); and on renewing the sanctions regime against Somalia (UNSC 2023f), Gabon and Ghana abstained. In some contested votes, the A3 collectively abstained and thus sided with Russia and China – for instance, on the renewal of sanctions against the DRC (UNSC 2023b) or the CAR (UNSC 2023c).

3   Bilateral Partnerships

Because of its previous overcommitment in summits and meetings, in 2016 the AU Executive Council approved a five-year cycle of meetings with bilateral partners, limited to two partnership meetings per year, starting in 2017 (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 210). In 2020, the AU Assembly decided that the 'African Union/African Continent shall be represented at the Statutory Meetings of partnership between the African Union/African Continent and a partner country by the Members of the Bureau of the Assembly of the Union, the Chairpersons of [the] Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the Chairperson of the Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC) of AUDA–NEPAD and the Chairperson of the AU Commission' (AU Assembly 2020, §6).

The scope and intensity of the AU's bilateral partnerships differ quite substantially. While there has been stronger engagement with China and Japan, relations with India, South Korea, and Türkiye have not achieved the same results or scale. Although not mentioned in the respective reports adopted by AU Executive Council on strategic partnership, one additional partnership is briefly highlighted: the United States, which organised the US–Africa Leaders Summit in 2022.

3.1   *China*
High-level consultations between the AU and the People's Republic of China are held every three years at the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The forum was launched in October 2000 in Beijing, China, with the AU as a

full member, although this is a bilateral format between China and AU member states. Some of the meetings were 'upgraded' to a summit level when the Chinese president participated. Currently, bilateral relations are guided under the FOCAC *Dakar Action Plan* (2022–2024) (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 210–212).[7]

In February 2022 the AU decided to take over the finances for a Permanent Representation Office in Beijing, with a staff size of 11 and at an estimated annual cost of $1,277,164 (AU Assembly 2022, § 2[a]). The office was originally established in September 2018, and the funding had been provided by China (africanews 2018). This office adds to the already existing six AU representations at multilateral and bilateral partners in Brussels (EU and ACP), Cairo (LAS), Geneva (UN and WTO), Lilongwe (Southern Africa), New York (UN), and Washington, DC (US).

The 11th China–Africa Think Tanks Forum (Beijing and Jinhua, East China's Zhejiang Province, China, 20–21 July) was attended by representatives from 19 African countries. Discussions revolved around the Chinese BRI; the *Global Development Initiative*, launched by China in September 2021; and the AU's *Agenda 2063*. The 5th Forum on China–Africa Media Cooperation (Beijing, China, 26 August 2022), founded in 2012, was co-hosted by the National Radio and Television Administration of China, the People's Government of Beijing Municipality, and the African Union of Broadcasting, and centred on the application of advanced audiovisual technologies and digital development integration. The 9th FOCAC Ministerial Conference is planned to take place in China in 2024 (AU Council 2022, §60).

3.2 *India*

The 1st India Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 2008. The 4th IAFS was postponed because of Covid-19 and is now expected to be held in Mauritania in 2023 (AU Council 2022a, §63). Bilateral relations are somewhat sluggish, with some observers harbouring quite positive expectations (see Bhatia 2022; Gopaldas 2022).

3.3 *Japan*

The 1st Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) was held in 1993, with meetings of heads of state and government following every five years to discuss African development initiatives. Then the format was

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7 On 9 December 2022, China also invited African leaders to the 1st China–Arab League Summit (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia), in which seven African heads of state and government participated.

changed to a meeting schedule every three years. The AU became a partner in this process in 2010.

The TICAD Ministerial Meeting was held on 26–27 March 2022 (virtual) (AU Council 2022b, §67), and the 8th TICAD took place in Tunis (Tunisia, 27–28 August). The 8th TICAD emphasised the need for structural global change (inter alia with reference to private sector development, climate change, the Covid-19 pandemic, and economic integration trough the African Continental Free Trade Area), the preconditions for a resilient and sustainable society (obviously this only referred to African countries), as well as peace and security (TICAD 8 2022). Against the backdrop of global disagreement on how to deal with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the *Tunis Declaration* was a little masterpiece of Japanese diplomacy. All participants expressed 'serious concern about the situation in Ukraine and its impact on African and global economies', and emphasised 'the importance of the preservation of peace, security and stability, through dialogue and respect for the principles of international law' (ibid., §2.3.4).

3.4 *South Korea*

Bilateral relations between the AU and South Korea are one of the less prominent AU strategic partnerships. As in the case of India, the emphasis is more on state-to-state relations. Bilateral ministerial meetings have been held, since November 2006, under the Africa–Korea Forum format. The 5th Africa–Korea Forum was held on 3 March 2022 (Seoul, South Korea). It resulted in a *Joint Declaration* as well as the *Korea–Africa Forum Framework of Cooperation* (2022–2026) (Korea Africa Forum 2022). The focus of this bilateral cooperation is on the five broad policy fields: (1) a joint response to Covid-19; (2) development cooperation (including public health; climate change resilience; digital innovation; youth and women empowerment; energy, infrastructure and industrialisation; human resource development; agriculture); (3) trade and investment (including holding ministerial meetings such as the Africa–Korea Forum on Economic Cooperation); (4) peace and security (including a focus on maritime security and safety in the Gulf of Guinea); and (5) cultural exchange. A follow-up to these commitments is planned to be organised through the bilateral Annual Policy Consultation Meeting (see also Kyung-jin 2022).

3.5 *Türkiye*

The partnership between the AU and Türkiye goes back to 2008 when the 1st Africa–Turkey Summit was held (Istanbul, Türkiye, 18–20 April 2008). An *Africa–Türkiye Partnership Joint Action Plan* (2022–2026) has been adopted in 2021 at the 3rd Africa–Turkey Summit. The 3rd Ministerial Review Conference

of the Partnership is scheduled for 2024, and the 4th Partnership Summit for 2026 (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 213f.). In 2022, Türkiye's efforts have mainly focused on developing bilateral relations with African countries (see Tanrıverdi Yaşar 2022; *Daily Sabah* 2022).

3.6   *United States of America*

Officially, the US does not belong to the list of bilateral strategic partnerships discussed by the AU Assembly, but it is listed on the AU's website under 'external partnerships'. Nevertheless, in 2013 the AUC and the US Department of State signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation on peace and security, democracy and governance, economic growth, trade and investment, and the promotion of opportunity and development. On this basis, by 2022, eight annual high-level dialogues had been held.[8] In a different format, closer to the Africa–China exchange, in 2022 the US president Joseph R. Biden invited African heads of state and government as well as the chairperson of the AUC to the 2nd US–Africa Leaders Summit (Washington, DC, US, 13–15 December 2022). The 1st US–Africa Leaders Summit was held in 2014 during the presidency of Barack H. Obama (Washington, DC, US, 4–6 August 2014). Its most visible outcome was the extension of the *African Growth and Opportunity Act* (AGOA), under which designated African countries enjoy duty-free trade access to the US for ten years, up until 2025. However, on many other issues there was no follow through.

The 2nd US–Africa Leaders Summit was attended by 45 African heads of state and government, that is to say more than those participating in any recent AU Assembly. The meeting, again, was a one-sided conversation: African leaders were not involved in the planning of the meeting, and there was no jointly developed agenda. President Biden did not engage in any one-to-one meetings, though the US secretary of state did. The US pledged a $55-billion package for food, trade, and investment in Africa, as well as an additional $2.5 billion to support food security. Hosting this summit clearly reflected the changed geopolitical context and the Biden administration's intention to rally African support for the West's position against the Russian aggression against Ukraine, but also vis-à-vis China's increasing dominance on the African continent.

Furthermore, Biden, Senegal's president Sall in his capacity as chairperson of the AU, and the AUC chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat signed a vision statement on the US-Africa partnership (15 December 2022). In this joint

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8   In 2020 and 2021, only interrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic. The most recent dialogue was held in Washington, DC (11 March 2022).

statement, the US, among other countries, supported the position that the AU should become a permanent member of the G20 (something China and France had already promoted at earlier occasions; see, for instance, SCMP 2022; Macron 2022).

4 Outlook

In 2022, global conditions have definitely changed and new challenges for the AU have emerged (see Tim Murithi, this Yearbook, chapter 2). The strategic partnerships are meant to strengthen the AU's global position in various policy fields. In the absence of a policy framework for strategic partnerships, which has not yet been published, the AU routinely continued its main multilateral strategic partnerships, that is to say those with the EU and the UN. In 2022, the greatest momentum in the bilateral arena was towards Japan, Korea, and the US (the latter being a unilateral format driven by the US). The 5th Arab–Africa Summit as well as the 4th IAFS are scheduled for 2023 and, following the triennial approach, the next FOCAC will be held in 2024.

The coming year will most likely be overshadowed again by the global impact of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, increasing global competition between China and the US, and attempts by various actors to win the support of African organisations and states in international fora. Developing more and more coherent common positions could help the AU navigate these murky waters. At the same time, the political space to develop these common positions is further limited by member states' insistence on their sovereignty – which in turn also reflects the increasing dependence of some member states on a competing group of external powers in terms of debt sustainability, regime survival, food security, and other issues.

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Women and Youth

Cheryl Hendricks and Ulf Engel

1 Introduction

Women constitute 50 per cent of Africa's population. The majority of people who live on the continent are also young, with more than 400 million people between 15 and 39 years of age (African Union 2023b). Women have been a key area of focus for the African Union (AU) since its inception, with youth receiving attention a few years later. The issues and concerns regarding women and youth have, however, largely been reflected in separate policy frameworks and institutional structures of the AU. With the establishment of a special envoy of youth in 2018, the AU has paid greater attention to youth. There has also been increasing cooperation and coherence as well as joint efforts within the AU organs on the issues of women and youth, particularly in relation to inclusion in governance and peace and security structures and processes. This chapter reflects on the key policy interventions and activities undertaken by the AU on women and youth in 2022.

The chapter builds on previous chapters in the *Yearbook on the African Union* and is divided into two sections, namely policies and decision-making as well as major policy developments in 2022. The first section outlines the key policies and frameworks adopted by the AU in relation to women and youth and the structures that have been institutionalised to implement them. It also details the relevant decision-making structure. The second section (1) reflects on new policies and programmes and then focuses on two priority areas of the AU – (2) trade and economic development, and (3) peace and security – that have a direct impact on women and youth. This section will (4) also review progress, or lack thereof, in ratifying and depositing key legal instruments in the area of AU women and youth policies. The chapter concludes by providing a 2023 outlook on women and youth.

2 Policies and Decision-Making

Gender equality is firmly entrenched in the institutional architecture of the AU. The *Constitutive Act of the African Union* (OAU 2000, §3) stipulates the

promotion of gender equality as one of the objectives of the organisation. The 2003 *Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa*, popularly known as the Maputo Protocol, and the 2004 *Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa* (SDGEA) are key AU documents guaranteeing the comprehensive rights of women on the continent (African Union 2003, 2004).

The Maputo Protocol outlines a wide range of rights for women in relation to the political, economic, social, domestic, and personal spheres as it seeks to ensure human dignity, equality, and opportunity for women. It, therefore, encompasses the right to life, integrity, and security of persons; rights during marriage and divorce; access to justice; right to take part in political processes and to have peace; the protection of women during armed conflict; education, economic and social rights; health and reproductive rights; and the right to food security, housing, and sustainable development (African Union 2003). The SDGEA sought to accelerate the implementation of gender equality and ensure women's full and effective participation and representation in peace processes, as well as protect women against sexual violence (African Union 2004). The declaration also calls for the establishment of an African Trust Fund for Women. Consequently, the Fund for African Women was launched in 2010 providing access to funds for projects and programmes related to the *African Women's Decade* (2010–2020).

At a meeting hosted by the AU Women's Directorate that brought together a number of women's organisations, held in Maputo, Mozambique, on 24 June 2003, the *Maputo Declaration on Gender Mainstreaming and the Effective Participation of Women in the African Union* (FDC 2003) was adopted. This declaration noted that there was no high-level dialogue mechanism for women's organisations and the AU to engage, that the directorate was under-resourced, and that there was an under-representation of women ambassadors to the AU. It recommended that the AU adopt a gender policy. The *AU Gender Policy* was formalised in 2009 and commits AU member states and organs to, among other aims, create an enabling and stable political environment; provide legal protection against discrimination; mobilise different players for gender equality; rationalise and harmonise the gender policies and programmes of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs); provide capacity-building for gender mainstreaming; and promote peace, security, and the settlement of conflicts (African Union 2009).

Agenda 2063, adopted during the Golden Jubilee celebrations of the formation of the OAU/AU in May 2013, is an important overarching framework of the AU, which, too, commits the organisation to promoting gender equality. This framework is viewed as a continental 'master plan for transforming Africa

into the global power house of the future' (African Union 2015a). The 10-year implementation plan of *Agenda 2063* commits the AU to, among others, several goals:

1. removing all obstacles related to women inheriting or owning property, a business, a bank account, or signing a contract by 2023;
2. ensuring that at least one in five women have access to and control of productive assets;
3. guaranteeing gender parity in AU organs;
4. reducing all forms of violence against women by 2023;
5. ending all harmful social norms and customary practices by 2023; and
6. facilitating the mobility of the African youth, with 15 per cent of all new businesses emanating from their ingenuity (African Union 2015b, 11f.).

The *Second Continental Report on the Implementation of Agenda 2063* (AUC and AUDA−NEPAD 2022) notes that 81 per cent of *Agenda 2063* Goal 17, which aims to achieve full gender equality in all spheres of life, has been reached. However, only 23 per cent of women had ownership of agricultural land, and only 27.6 per cent of seats in national parliaments were held by women in 2021. The report also recorded a reduction, from 41.6 per cent in 2013 to 21.2 per cent in 2021, of gender-based violence (GBV) (ibid., 56). These results seem to show progress in meeting the gender-related goals of the continent. However, the AU 2021 *Gender Score Card*, which also monitors gender equality and women's empowerment, shows that very few countries have reached gender parity and that GBV, female genital mutilation, and child marriage remain a challenge in many countries on the continent (African Union [2022b]).

In February 2019, the *AU Strategy on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment* (2018−2028) (GEWE) was launched, seeking to 'strengthen women's agency' and to 'ensure that women's voices are amplified' as well as ensure the implementation of legislation and the financing of gender equality work (African Union 2018, 2023b). The strategy acts as 'a roadmap for the gender-related commitments' (*Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 220). The strategy is anchored in four pillars: achieving economic autonomy for women, protecting their rights in times of peace and conflict, strengthening institutional capacities, and establishing women's leadership in all its dimensions (ibid.).

The AU also aims to include women in peace and security, which it made headway in 2014 by establishing the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (AUC) on Women, Peace and Security, with a mandate to implement the pillars of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (UNSC 2000) and subsequent UNSC resolutions on women, peace, and security (WPS). A key objective of the office, led by Bineta Diop (the Senegalese founder of the Geneva-based non-governmental organisation

[NGO] Femmes Africa Solidarité), is to monitor and report on the implementation of the WPS agenda, and in this regard, it developed a *Continental Results Framework* in 2018 with 41 indicators (African Union 2019). The report on the framework for 2020 noted that the AUC has instruments for integrating the WPS agenda into its peace and security endeavours, namely the *Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy* and the *AU Operational Guidance Note on Gender and Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes* (African Union 2021a). The AU is also developing a curriculum on gender and security sector reform. In addition, the AU also has a *Gender Programme* that strives to integrate gender into peace and security. In July 2017, it established a Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (FemWise–Africa).

These frameworks, policies, and institutional structures have been key for promoting gender equality on the continent. They continue to shape its implementation and are used to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness and achievements of gender equality in both the AUC and the broader political economic, social, and cultural spheres. But despite the AU frameworks, the programmes, and the organs promoting gender equality, implementation has been slow. There need remains to allocate adequate resources for the WPS agenda, to increase women's participation in peace and security decision-making, and to ensure a translation of policies into meaningful changes in the lived experiences of women.

The 2006 *African Youth Charter* frames the AU's engagement with youth issues (African Union 2006). It outlines the rights and duties of youth and seeks to have them included in government structures at national, regional, and continental levels. A *Youth Decade of Action* (2009–2018) was adopted by the AU in order to ensure the implementation of the charter. It entails a multi-sectoral and rights-based approach that focuses on education and skills development; youth employment and entrepreneurship; governance, peace and security, youth health, and sexual and reproductive health rights; and agriculture, climate change, and the environment (see African Union 2011). The *Malabo Declaration on Creating Employment for Accelerating Youth Development and Empowerment* was adopted at the 23rd AU Assembly (AU Assembly 2014). The declaration focuses on reducing youth and women unemployment, improving education and training, expanding social protection, and developing a comprehensive youth employment pact (see *Yearbook on the African Union 2021*, 221).

The inclusion of youth in AU policies and programmes has gained substantial traction over the last few years. The AU established an Office of the Special Envoy on Youth in 2018. Aya Chebbi, from Tunisia, was appointed the

first special envoy for youth. The current special envoy, Chido Mpemba, is from Zimbabwe and was appointed in November 2021. These special envoys for youth serve non-renewable two-year terms. The previous envoy focused on peace and security and established, similarly to the WPS agenda, a *Continental Results Framework for Youth Peace and Security* in 2020 (African Union 2020). Currently, the OSE on Youth is focusing on the development of National Action Plans (NAPs) on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS). It is unclear if there has been any sharing of lessons learnt in developing and implementing WPS NAPs (there are now 29 in Africa) as this remains a challenging task for the continent.[1] Nevertheless, the African Women's Leadership Network (AWLN), formed in 2017, now also has a Young Women Leader's Caucus and, in partnership with the OSE on Women, Peace and Security and the OSE on Youth as well as UN Women, organised as annual intergenerational retreat on leadership in Africa.

Political oversight of gender and women's policies is the responsibility of the ministerial Specialised Technical Committee (STC) on Gender and Women's Empowerment (STC–GEWE). It held its 6th Ordinary Session on 1 March and 7th Ordinary Session on 13 December 2022 (see AU STC–WGDD 2022). The bureau is chaired by Dr Mèdessè Véronique Tognifode Mewanou, the minister of social affairs and microfinance (Benin). Within the AUC, women policies are managed outside the six commissions in a separate Women, Gender and Youth Directorate (WGYD), which is led by acting director Ngwenya Nonkululeko Prudence (Eswatini). The directorate was created in January 2021 by integrating the Human Resources and Youth Development Division into the former Women, Gender and Development Directorate (WGDD). Apart from the coordination and outreach division, there are two divisions: women and gender policy and development, and youth development and engagement. In contrast, political oversight of youth policies is the responsibility of two STCs: the STC on Education, Science, Technology (STC–ESTI) and Innovation and STC on Youth, Culture and Sports (STC–YSC). The Women, Gender and Youth Directorate is mandated to lead, guide, defend, coordinate, and promote gender equality; ensure gender mainstreaming in all the organs of the AU; and promote women and youth empowerment. This directorate is responsible for the

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1   The list of AU member states that have developed NAPs includes Côte d'Ivoire, Uganda (all in 2008), Rwanda, Liberia, Guinea (2009), Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (2010), Senegal (2011), Gambia, Burkina Faso, Togo, Burundi, Mali, Ghana (2012), Nigeria (2013), the Central African Republic (2014), South Sudan (2015), Kenya (2016), Angola, Cameroon (2017), Congo, Tunisia, Mozambique (2018), Namibia (2019), Gabon, Sudan (2020), Malawi, South Africa (2021), and Morocco (2022).

implementation of the AU strategy on GEWE and for coordination of policies and programmes on youth in the AUC.

3 Major Developments in 2022

3.1 *Policies and Programmes*

In 2022, the AU implemented three major policy developments and/or programmes in relation to women and youth: the *What Women Want* campaign, the *Women and Youth Financial and Economic Inclusion Initiative,* and the *Positive Masculinity in Leadership to Eliminate Violence Against Women and Girls* conference.

3.1.1 What Women Want Campaign

In order to meet the broader commitments on gender equality, the AU adopted a What Women Want campaign, which is designed to spur action on meeting the GEWE targets by making women's issues more visible. The campaign was launched on International Women's Day on 8 March 2022, advocating the speedy and full implementation of GEWE and the implementation of programmes set out under the *African Women's Decade of Women's Financial and Economic Inclusion* (2020–2030) (African Union 2022a). It is largely a digital campaign distributing posters of the rights that African women would like to enjoy. It focuses on the strategic needs of women, such as ending child marriages and GBV, eradicating maternal mortality, and ensuring equal pay for equal work and responsive budgeting.

The AU established a Fund for African Women (FAW) in 2010 in order to provide funding for the implementation of projects and programmes promoting the African Women's Decade (2010–2020). This fund was then converted into a Trust Fund in 2021 to continue to provide funding for the new African Women's Decade, focusing on financial and economic inclusion.

3.1.2 Women and Youth Financial and Economic Inclusion Initiative

According to the 2023 World Bank's *Women, Business and the Law Report* African women still do not enjoy the same rights in mobility, pay, entrepreneurship, assets, workplace, etc. as men, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, which scores an average of 53.2 points on the *Women, Business and the Law Index* (sub-Saharan Africa, 72.6 out of a possible 100 points) (World Bank 2023, 3). In fact, sub-Saharan Africa made significant progress in 2022, accounting for more than half of all reforms worldwide (ibid., xiv). (On the role of women and youth in the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, see also Bruce Byiers, this Yearbook, chapter 11.)

In 2020, the 33rd AU Assembly (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 9–10 February) noted with concern the 'very limited access of women to finance, leadership and decision making institutions' and, in response, declared years 2020 to 2030 as the new African Women's Decade of Women's Financial and Economic Inclusion (AU Assembly 2020, §3). The first report on the implementation of this programme was due after two years but was not tabled or discussed in 2022. Leveraging and building on existing initiatives and financial instruments in both the public and private sector, the AU launched the *Women and Youth Financial and Economic Inclusion 2030 Initiative* (WYFEI 2030) in July 2022 (African Union 2023a). It aims at unlocking $100 billion of support for at least 10 million women and youth by 2030. In addition, at least 80 per cent of women and youth are to be enrolled in an insurance scheme and use e-banking services. And by 2030, also at least half of the AU member states should be implementing the initiative. This initiative is spearheaded by the AU champion for gender and development issues in Africa, Ghanian president Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, and the deputy chairperson of the AUC, Dr Monique Nsazabaganwa.

3.1.3 Positive Masculinity in Leadership to Eliminate Violence against Women and Girls

Africa continues to experience high levels of violence against women. Agenda 2063 identifies ending violence against women and girls (VAWG) as a priority area for achieving gender equality. The AU contends that men are the predominant perpetrators of this violence and therefore they need to be enlisted to end the scourge. Furthermore, the AU notes that 'involving men in the leadership to engage other men and boys in efforts to end VAWG is not only necessary but also critical to transforming structural and institutional inequalities that lead to VAWG' (African Union 2021b). Accordingly, the AU organised two Men's Conferences on Positive Masculinity in Leadership to Eliminate Violence Against Women and Girls. The first conference was held in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (25 November 2021), under the leadership of President Félix Tshisekedi Tshilombo and in collaboration with President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa (African Union 2021c). The second conference was held in Dakar, Senegal (10 November 2022), under the leadership of President Macky Sall. These conferences seek to provide political leadership in the struggle to end VAWG and are thus led and attended by presidents and other high-ranking officials. The *Kinshasa Declaration and Call for Action* was adopted at the first conference in 2021, at which they also launched a Circle of Champions (men's coalition) to encourage their peers to amplify the agenda on ending violence against women and children and also committed to adopt a Convention on Ending VAWG.

3.2   *Trade and Economic Development*

The African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) represents entrepreneurship opportunities for women and youth. The *Futures Report: Making AfCFTA Work for Women and Youth* (AfCTFA Secretariat and UNDP 2020) notes that the agreement is to create new trading and entrepreneurial opportunities for women and youth in the formal and informal sectors. However, the report also notes that this will not happen automatically as trading is not gender neutral (ibid., 62). Member states therefore must ensure that gender and youth are mainstreamed in their national action strategies for implementing the AfCFTA.

Youth face high rates of unemployment in Africa and, together with women, are predominantly in the informal sector. The explicit focus on youth and women in the AfCFTA is therefore welcome. An inaugural AFCFTA Conference on Women and Youth: The Engine of AfCFTA Trade in Africa was held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (12–14 September 2022) to develop a protocol on the subject. The plans of such a protocol takes place after many consultations with women and youth in countries across Africa. The protocol is meant to create an environment in which women and youth can access wider markets, improve their competitiveness, and participate in regional value chains (AfCFTA 2023).

3.3   *Peace and Security*

Peace and security remain key challenges for the Union and have a direct impact on women and youth. The *AU Youth for Peace Programme*, which aims to mainstream youth in peace and security, was launched in September 2018. This programme also aims to change the narrative about youth and to publicise the positive role that youth can play in peace and security. In February 2022, the AU also endorsed another initiative to facilitate the inclusion of youth in peace and security, that is to say WiseYouth. It seeks to create a network of young practitioners that can join AU conflict prevention and mediation efforts. It replicates the initiative to include women in these processes, that is to say FemWise, which was launched in 2017. These are subsidiary mechanisms of the Panel of the Wise. Although the FemWise mechanisms have been successful in facilitating the training of women on peace and security issues, it has not led to the desired impact of increasing women's actual participation in these processes.

At the 4th Open Session on Youth, Peace and Security, held on 3 March 2022, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) welcomed its second cohort of African Youth Ambassadors for Peace (AYAP) and sought to reflect on the implementation of the *Continental Framework of Youth Peace and Security* (AU PSC 2022a). There are currently five AYAP, one from each region in Africa, serving non-renewable two-year terms. These youth ambassadors have been active

in raising awareness about the potential role of youth in peace, security, and development on the continent.

On 3 November 2022, the 1118th PSC meeting dedicated an open session to youth, peace and security (AU PSC 2022c). At this meeting, the PSC expressed its support for the theme for the commemoration of *Africa Youth Month* (held in November): 'Breaking Barriers for Meaningful Youth Participation and Inclusion in Advocacy'. In doing so, the PSC underscored the critical role that youth play in the promotion of peace and security on the continent.

In relation to WPS, the AU PSC 1063rd open session, held at the ministerial level on the 8 February 2022, discussed the nexus between urbanisation and WPS and recognised the 'need to elevate urban planning and development to a national security issue and to empower women in decision-making and policy formulation in relation to urban planning and development' (AU PSC 2022a, 6[11]).

The Third Africa Forum on Women, Peace and Security (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 14–15 December 2022) reflected on the current strategies of enhancing women's participation in peace processes and on how to strengthen support for women's peacebuilding. The *Call for Action Outcome Document*, emerging from this meeting, calls on the PSC to 'pronounce a policy imperative for a minimum 30% quota system to ensure women's representation' in peace processes (African Union 2022s).

The calls to include women in all peace and security structures and processes has been on the agenda since the year 2000 when UNSCR 1325 was adopted. Although there is much more awareness about the impact of conflict on women and the contributions that women can make towards more sustainable peacebuilding, their inclusion in peace processes has not made substantial progress. There needs to be a radical shift from an emphasis on inclusion in dated peace structures and processes to the creation of new transformative and inclusive spaces that can respond more coherently and adaptively to changing conflict contexts. There can no longer be doing more of the same thing over and over again. We need a deep reflection on peace and security structures and processes and their continued patriarchal culture that both women and youth are merely seeking to be included in.

3.4   *Ratification of Legal Instruments*

Ratification of key legal instruments pertaining to either women or youth rights has made no progress in 2022. The 2003 Maputo Protocol, which entered into force on 25 November 2005, has been signed by 49 out of the 55 AU member states; 42 of them have also ratified and deposited the legal instruments. The last ones to do so were São Tomé and Príncipe and Ethiopia in 2019 (27 June and 19 October, respectively). Three countries still must sign, ratify, and deposit: Botswana, Egypt, and Morocco (while Cape Verde, Malawi, and

Mauritania have not signed, but ratified and deposited).[2] Some 25 AU member states still have to develop NAPs and prioritise women's empowerment programmes in their NAPs as well as service delivery programmes.

The 1990 *African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child*, which entered into force on 29 November 1999, has been signed by 44 AU member states and ratified/deposited by 50. Countries that have not ratified/deposited by 2022 include Morocco, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), Somalia, South Sudan, and Tunisia. The 2006 African Youth Charter, which entered into force on 8 August 2009, has been signed by 43 AU member states and ratified/deposited by 40. The following member states have not yet ratified/deposited: Algeria, Botswana, the Central African Republic, Comoros, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Liberia, Madagascar, Morocco, the SADR, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan.

4   Outlook

In 2023, the first ten-year plan (for 2013–2023) of the Agenda 2063 will enter its final year of implementation. This offers an opportunity to start not only taking stock of the implementation progress, but also identifying those factors that have impeded implementation of the objectives of the AU's master plan relating to women and youth. Regarding the GEWE, the operational plan, a results framework, as well as harmonisation plans and frameworks for effective implementation of the strategy still need to be adopted by AU member states and the ministers in charge of gender and women's affairs.

The year 2023 will also offer an opportunity to fully institutionalise the OSE WPS, including human resources and a budget line. The AU Convention on Ending VAWG still has to be finalised. Furthermore, the AU is supposed to develop a *Common African Position* (CAP) on climate change that will include, among other aims and groups, women and youth.

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PART 3

Book Reviews

∴

New Publications on Continental Matters

∵

Frank Aragbonfoh Abumere 2022. *African Identities and International Politics*. London: Routledge, XVI + 159 pp. ISBN: 978–1–032-01001-4 (hbk), £130.00; ISBN: 978–1–003-17673-2 (ebk), open access.

In the twenty-first century, the African continent and African states can no longer rely on analyses and theories produced in the previous century. This is the starting point made by Frank Aragbonfoh Abumere as he sets out in *African Identities and International Politics* to decipher the problems of Africa and propose a new course of action for Africans to live in the new century.[1] The book is grounded in political theory and mobilises canonical work of international relations (IR) theorists. It contributes to debates about positive African identities, which Abumere argues should be the basis of shared values for Africans in the twenty-first century.

The author begins with the fact that divisions and differences are part of Africa's problems in the twenty-first century. These are divisions such as 'geopolitical differences', 'Anglophone versus Francophone' differences, 'Christianity versus Islam', or even racial differences (pp. 5–6). He is not interested in gender or ethnic differences. Given that starting point, the book argues for a 'normative international politics in which the divisions and differences are superseded by non-discriminatory, unifying, positive identities and shared values', with cooperation as the organising principle (p. 3). Abumere's method is to focus on a regional level of analysis where he neither concentrates on state dynamics nor on the interactions between Africa and the West (pp. 19–21).

The nine chapters cover various themes, including African theorisation of identities, political theory, and IR theories (i.e. realism, liberalism, and constructivism). In chapter 1, Abumere sets the stage for the ensuing discussions and lays out his argument for normative international politics. In chapters 2

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1 Abumere is an adjunct professor at Arrupe Jesuit University in Harare and the 2021–2023 Zuzana Simoniova Cmelikova visiting international scholar at the Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, VA.

and 3, he delves deeper into the types of divisions that are characteristic of the current African condition. According to him, linguistic divisions (and other identity-based divisions) among francophone and anglophone speakers are more important than racial divisions, because they separate Africans from each other (e.g. West Africa from East Africa). In chapter 4, Abumere mixes a constructivist framework of IR with political theory. He brings in the social contract works of political theorists, such as Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In a nutshell, the author contends that African political entities can adopt the version of the social contract they see fit 'depending on what they make of the social contract and depending on which identities they form and which values they adopt through the social contract' (p. 52).

In chapters 5 to 8, Abumere focuses on IR theories, and he questions the adoption of either order or justice in the international system to propose an equilibrium path for positive interactions in Africa. Chapter 5 showcases what realism and institutionalism could look like in Africa if analysts take the context in which African states operate seriously. Depending on the context, African states could be realists or liberals. Chapters 6 and 7 concentrate on human rights as one aspect of the liberal international order. Abumere proposes that the question of the human rights should not solely be left to states. Dealing with human rights issues could be a regional matter and work through the subsidiarity principle. The author makes his case for not choosing order over justice in the international system, as the subsidiarity principle can accommodate different cases to balance order and justice. Chapter 8 describes a constructivist view of African regional relations, claiming that 'it is possible to transcend the divisions and differences on the continent if African states and Africans are willing to form positive identities and adopt positive values that enhance continental relations' (p. 124). Chapter 9 concludes the book.

The book's strength lies in its combination of political theory, ethics, and IR, which make it interesting for political analysts and ethical philosophers of the African condition in the twenty-first century. It would also be of interest to general IR scholars and specialists of philosophical ethics, as well as for African policy-makers. The general argument is well thought through and appealing. However, for a book that centres on African identities, other African conceptions of identity that could be worked out to act as the basis of cooperation have been left out of the discussion. Pan-Africanism is discussed but has not been given due space throughout the book, noting that there are several strands of pan-Africanism with global connections and implications for cooperation in Africa. Moreover, when the author discusses human rights and subsidiarity, the debates about the responsibility to protect (R2P) are not reflected upon. That the African Union (AU) has adopted a norm of non-indifference

towards member states in cases of grave human rights violations is also absent from the book's discussions.

Canonical authors in political theory and IR were carefully considered in all the chapters, while African theorists were only considered in the first chapter. Abumere mobilises obvious African theorists such as Ali Mazrui (Kenyan, 1933–2014), Valentin Yves Mudimbe (Congolese [Democratic Republic of Congo], born 1941), Kwame Anthony Appiah (British, born 1954), or Achille Mbembe (Cameroonian, born 1957), among others. In the ensuing chapters, it is difficult to understand why only theorists such as Thomas Hobbes (English, 1588–1679), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Swiss, 1712–1778), Immanuel Kant (German, 1724–1804), Hedley N. Bull (Australian, 1932–1985), Hannah Arendt (German-American, 1906–1975), or Alexander Wendt (German-American, born 1958) were considered to discuss the African condition. Moreover, the work of African women such as Adom Getachew, who has theorised about African's willingness to remake African nations, or Mahmood Mamdani's latest work have not been examined. The author missed the opportunity to shed light on the excellent work of many Africans who are thinking about the current African condition, even in regional terms as he chooses to do. In fact, Abumere skilfully downplays such contributions, claiming that a lot of literature on Africa is focused on national issues (p. 3). For him, when African literature tackles continental issues it is 'without considering the broader issue of continental relations' (ibid.). Through this framing, Abumere sidelines African contributions to the topic he sets out to discuss. That appears to be the African condition in the twenty-first century.

When it comes specifically to IR, many African and black IR theorists, such as Siba Grovogui or Robbie Shilliam, to name but a few, have worked to shift the focus of that discipline from its white-centred focus and lay the groundwork to theorise the world from an African and black perspective. In that sense, focusing on Rousseau, Hobbes, and Kant to show how their work on the social contract could be rethought and be useful in the twenty-first-century African condition is difficult to understand without more critical engagement. Of course, there is nothing wrong with relying on canonical authors. But one main question remains: how can the same authors (Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant) – who have been, historically the intellectual basis on which Africa was divided – remain at the centre of an African theorisation that will serve to 'creat[e] identities and values that can unite Africa as a continent and Africans as a people' (p. 3)? It seems that for such reconceptualisation, the departure point should have been radically different for Africans to see themselves through and in this work.

Gino Vlavonou

Bruno Charbonneau and Maxime Ricard (eds.) 2022. *Routledge Hand-
    book of African Peacebuilding.* London, New York: Routledge. ISBN:
    978–0–367-18194-9 (hbk), XIV + 293 pp., £205.

In view of the recent resurgence of violent extremism and terrorism (VET)
and unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs) on the African conti-
nent, together with parallel debates within the United Nations (UN), the Afri-
can Union (AU), and some of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)
about adjusting current peacebuilding strategies and instruments to these
challenges, the Routledge *Handbook of African Peacebuilding* is a timely pub-
lication. Edited by the Canadian scholar Bruno Charbonneau and the French
researcher Maxime Ricard, the handbook provides a rich overview of the
field.[2] It is characterised by a successful combination of experienced scholars
and emerging academics, a good mix of voices from the continent and con-
cerned scholars from beyond, and a focus on African experience and thoughts
on peacebuilding.

The *Handbook of African Peacebuilding* comes in 3 parts and 18 chapters. The
first part focuses on institutions, with chapters on the relation between peace-
keeping and peacebuilding (Alexandra Novosseloff), the relation between
the UN and the AU (Arthur Stein and Marie-Joëlle Zahar), the role of secu-
rity sector reform and governance in peacebuilding (Niagalé Bagayoko and
Eboe Hutchful), and the prevention of forced displacement in Africa (Marina
Sharpe). The second part of the handbook addresses 'themes and debates',
with chapters on African mediation (Laurie Nathan), the AU's transitional jus-
tice policy (Tim Murithi), politics of knowledge and African transitional jus-
tice (Ulrike Lühe and Briony Jone), the local turn in peacebuilding (Jeremy
Allouche and Patrick Zadi Zadi), women and gender in African peace agree-
ments (Nina Wilén), development and peacebuilding (Jonathan M. Sears),
peacebuilding and democracy (Daniel Eizenga), as well as the nexus between
climate change and peacebuilding (Charbonneau et al.). And the third part of
the handbook zooms in on various country or regional case studies: the Sahel
and the Group of Five (G5) (Ousmane Diallo), Somalia and Mali (Charbon-
neau and Louise Wiuff Moe), Gambia (Festus Kofi Aubyn), South Sudan (Kuy-
ang Harriet Logo), Guinea-Bissau (Fiifi Edu-Afful and Ruth Adwoa Frimpong),
as well as Côte d'Ivoire (Ricard). This is followed by a succinct conclusion on

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2   Charbonneau is a professor and the director of the Centre on Security and Crisis Governance
    (CRITIC) at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean in Montréal, Canada. Ricard is a researcher
    on the West African region at the Institute for Strategic Research (Institut de recherche
    stratégique de l'École militaire, IRSEM, Paris).

African peacebuilding in which Cyril Obi (head of the African Peacebuilding Network at the New York–based Social Science Research Council) raises the critical question of 'peacebuilding for whom', reinforcing the handbook's clearly compelling argument on the centrality of African agency, ideas, and practices to peacebuilding.

Each handbook is a natural invitation to search for the topics that the reviewer would also like to have analysed in a similarly competent manner as in the other chapters. I do not want to resist this temptation. Competing handbooks also point to gaps that the editors could perhaps have addressed more thoroughly (for example, Tony Karbo and Kudrat Virk's 2018 *Palgrave Handbook of Peacebuilding in Africa*). There is no doubt that the *Routledge Handbook of African Peacebuilding* has a bias towards francophone West Africa, which probably is owing to the editors' previous work. The Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa are absent from the volume. So what issues could still have been considered in the best of all cases and with a consideration of African agency? Obviously, the experience and practices of the RECs, first and foremost the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), but also the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and others, could have been examined more systematically. The same holds true for the frictions between their interventions and those of the UN and the AU (the European Union [EU] does not feature as a major peacebuilding actor in this handbook). Beyond transitional justice, it would also have been interesting to take a closer look at other peacebuilding policies of the AU, for example in the field of post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD). Another research gap relates to AU institutions, such as the African Court of Justice and Human Rights or the African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights. Dependence on external donors in financing AU-led Peace Support Operations (e.g. in Somalia or the Lake Chad Basin) is another issue that deserves more attention in the context of African peacebuilding. Finally, the role of youth in the peacebuilding debate is a common thread that is receiving increasing attention on the African continent but does not figure prominently in the handbook.

Moreover, the claimed focus on African peacebuilding could have been pursued more consistently throughout the handbook. The first part of the handbook in particular seems to suggest that the norms and practices of global peacebuilding are mainly developed in New York and not elsewhere. From a post-colonial perspective and looking at local practices as well as the co-production of knowledge between the UN and various African actors, more attention could have been paid to historical experiences and practices on the African continent in this regard (as indicated in chapter 7 on the politics of knowledge and transitional justice).

However, this discussion of 'shortcomings' should not obscure the fact that the *Routledge Handbook of African Peacebuilding* is a substantial, well-researched, and at times original contribution to the debate. Any serious publication that gets to the bottom of the actors in Africa's complicated peace processes is highly welcome to overcome the prevailing public ignorance of this field.

   Ulf Engel

Rita Kiki Edozie and Moses Khisa 2022. *Africa's New Global Politics: Regionalism in International Relations.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, VIII + 219 pp. ISBN: 978–1–955055-20-8 (hbk), $95.00; ISBN: 978–1–955055-54-3 (ebk), $95.00.

In their book *Africa's New Global Politics: Regionalism in International Relations*, Rita Kiki Edozie and Moses Khisa make a strong case for taking African agency in international relations (IR) seriously.[3] More specifically, they trace the historical emergence and contemporary expressions of African global politics – that is to say, active efforts of African actors to strengthen and improve 'Africa's' position in world order and to strategically influence norms and practices at transnational and global scales. To that end, the book discusses six different examples, straddling the emergence of pan-Africanism (Chapter 2), the formulation of an increasing number of Common African Positions (Chapter 3), the building of an African Peace and Security Architecture (Chapter 4), efforts to 'Africanize' transnational justice (Chapter 5), the more recent creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (Chapter 6), and the developing Africa–China relationship (Chapter 7). A concluding chapter in disguise brings these different examples together and reiterates what the authors call their 'nascent theory of African IR' (p. 168; see also p. 186).

   First of all, Edozie and Khisa need to be lauded for compiling a concise and convincing argument about the relevance of African actors and their agency in IR and global politics, emphasising the need for more research studying them in much more detail. In that, they heed recent calls for a more global IR and contribute to a burgeoning literature that aims to firmly establish Africa in respective academic debates. Although primarily a book about collective

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3   Edozie is the professor of global governance in the Department of Conflict Resolution, Human Security, and Global Governance and the associate dean at the McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, MA. Khisa is an assistant professor of political science and Africana studies, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC.

agency of African nation-states (p. 4), it also reflects upon the role of the African Union (AU) primarily as a platform and conduit for state efforts to 'pool' resources and 'caucus' positions, enabling what the authors call a particular kind of regional internationalism (p. 3). They argue that this reflects a new brand or genre (e.g. pp. 169, 4) and represents new distinctive practices (e.g. pp. 51, 169) of African global politics.

At this point, it is important to recognise that the account offered by Edozie and Khisa is mostly a rereading of existing scholarship. The book draws only on a very limited number of primary sources (e.g. only eight AU documents are listed in the references). Therefore, the authors bring together a very interesting collection of examples, which they nicely integrate into their overall narrative, but provide only very little new information. What is more, existing scholarship on the different topics is only reflected partially in the book, and the selected references are not always the most up to date. Most surprising in this respect is the relative neglect of academic works on the complex agency and politics of the AU on the African continent and in IR, as well as regarding African regional organisations and (new) regionalism more generally. Here, some key authors/references are suspiciously absent. Consequently, some of the authors' claims regarding the research gaps and the book's innovative contribution appear somewhat overstated.

Another limitation of the book is its overwhelming focus on states as the main actors, leaving only a very pale image of the complex collective agency of different state and non-state actors at the AU. For the most part of the book, 'the AU' appears as a 'platform' or a 'tool' for African states, which are largely depicted as monolithic/unitary actors. Where the authors explicitly accord agency to the AU, it remains mostly unclear who or what 'the AU' is in these cases, who exactly is acting, and how different AU actors exercise agency. The book, therefore, misses an opportunity to advance our knowledge and understanding of the actors and practices of African regionalism in global politics more decisively. In addition, the agency of 'states' is left without critical reflection, resulting in a rather (overly?) optimistic view of states generally acting on the behalf and in the interest of their citizens (p. 4) and inadequately accounting for tensions among different AU member states, as well as between member states and AU Commission staff. Both points to the critical importance of asking who exactly is acting and whose interests are being pursued at any given point, which is critical to understand different outcomes of African global politics better.

Overall, due to the rather broad consideration of six very different policy fields and historical examples, the account remains rather general and historically not as 'deep' as claimed by the authors (p. 168). Moreover, the use of concepts remains rather vague. For example, the terms 'geopolitics' and 'global politics' appear to be used interchangeably. The conceptual difference that the

authors make between the terms 'actors' and 'agents' as well as different combinations of the two (e.g. 'actor agent', 'agent actors', pp. 12–13) remains insufficiently explained. Likewise, how precisely the authors use and distinguish 'regionalism', 'institutionalism', and 'regional internationalism' has not really been clear to me. As a result, unfortunately, I have struggled to fully understand the theoretical innovation of the book and what exactly the authors identify as 'new' (since when?) in African global politics.

Despite these shortcomings, Edozie and Khisa do a good job in shining a light on different important practices that African actors have employed to advance their interests at regional and global scales (e.g. formulating common policy positions and caucusing in African groups). In this way, drawing on existing scholarship, the book offers a substantive collection of empirical observations to advance a very important argument that still needs to be anchored more firmly in mainstream IR debates. While scholars interested in the AU and African regionalism in more detail will have to complement the book with other works, it nevertheless is a good resource for students and scholars who want to get an overview of relevant debates that speak to the global dimensions of African politics.

Jens Herpolsheimer

Jonathan Fisher and Nina Wilén 2022. *African Peacekeeping*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. XVI + 242 pp. ISBN: 9781108499378 (hbk), £64.99; ISBN: 9781108713498 (pbk), £22.99; ISBN: 9781108606271 (ebk), $29.99.

Most contemporary books on African peacekeeping tend to focus on the increasingly complex political and security context in which peacekeepers are deployed and how this is undermining operational success. Others focus on contributions of individual African countries to different peacekeeping operations inside and outside the continent since the 1960s and the post–Cold War era. Books that holistically explore how contributing to peacekeeping has shaped Africa's national, regional, and international politics and history are rare to find. In this intellectually stimulating book, Jonathan Fisher and Nina Wilén explore the multiple but interlinked ways in which peacekeeping has become embedded in the present history and politics of most African countries.[4] Relying on a wide range of scholarship and extensive primary research, conducted across the continent between 2008 and 2020, the authors

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4   Fisher is the professor of global security in the International Development Department at Birmingham University; Wilén is the director of the *Africa Programme* at Egmont Institute

demonstrate persuasively how domestic and regional politics in countries and regions governed by both authoritarian and democratic governments have been influenced by peacekeeping in the longer term.

The book is framed around two core arguments. The first argument underscores the consequence of colonial legacies and practices on the evolution of African peacekeeping dynamics. According to Fisher and Wilén, some African countries contribute to peacekeeping due to their experiences of European imperialism and oppression in order to assert themselves internationally as independent actors who are contributing to global public goods. Nonetheless, the claim of independence is contested on the basis that peacekeeping on the continent is still being financed largely by Western states and the United Nations (UN). While this is accurate, it is important to recognise that peacekeeping is a shared responsibility between the most powerful states who often provide support through funding, on the one hand, and the less powerful states especially in Africa who mostly supply the highest number of troops/personnel needed on the ground to implement peacekeeping mandates, on the other hand, and whose agency, hence, cannot be disputed either.

The second argument is that African peacekeeping is best understood through the lens of practice theory. This perspective allows them to demonstrate how deeply peacekeeping is embedded in both domestic and foreign policy decision-making of states across the continent. For states like Rwanda and South Africa, which have experienced divisive and violent conflicts, Fisher and Wilén contend that peacekeeping has offered the opportunity to reshape and reframe their national identity. Other African states have used peacekeeping as a critical foreign policy tool to secure valuable international security assistance, training support, and diplomatic cover. More importantly, as a continent with the history of periodic unconstitutional changes of government through military coups, peacekeeping has also served as an avenue to circulate potentially troublesome armies and professionalise them through better remuneration, allowing for greater political control over the armed forces of states. What the authors fail to highlight, however, is the negative consequences of peacekeeping participation for African militaries, such as death, injury, and disease, and how armies often lose highly skilled staff to the UN. Thus, participating in peacekeeping is not always as positive as the authors portray.

The book is organised into six chapters, along with an introduction and a concluding chapter. In chapter 1, the authors provide two different historical trajectories of African peacekeeping, with emphasis on the dramatic increase in size and scale since the early 2000s. They trace the normative evolution of

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for International Relations and the associate professor in political science at Lund University. She also is the editor of the journal *International Peacekeeping*.

African peacekeeping from the principle of non-intervention of the Organisa-
tion of African Unity (OAU) to the notion of non-indifference of the African
Union (AU). They further link peacekeeping's 'prehistory' during the colonial
era to today's peacekeeping practices, using the case of Ghana to exemplify
how the present roles and status of militaries are a legacy of European colonial
powers' deployment of African troops for regional military 'pacification' cam-
paigns. Chapter 2 highlights the political and security implications of inter-
national peacekeeping deployments at the domestic level. Citing the cases of
Uganda and Burundi, the authors demonstrate how peacekeeping has become
a core mechanism for the consolidation and maintenance of political power
through the practices of illiberal, militarised state-building.

In chapter 3, Fisher and Wilén analyse how African peacekeeping is impact-
ing on the continents bilateral and multilateral relationships, particularly
since the disengagement of Western powers from direct military involvement
on the continent in the aftermath of the 1993 UN/US-led intervention in Soma-
lia and the 1994 Rwandan genocide. This inspired a greater role for African
troops in peacekeeping on the continent under the maxim of 'African solu-
tions to African problems', albeit it continued to be funded by international
partners. However, the actual peacekeeping operations in which African
troops were specifically deployed did not receive much attention in the analy-
sis. Nevertheless, the unintended consequences of the increased prominence
of African peacekeeping are the establishment of regional identities and blocs
across the continent. The authors underscore this point in chapter 4 and
further explain how peacekeeping has been incorporated into processes of
post-conflict and post-liberation identity-building. Building on this argument,
chapter 5 highlights how African involvement in peacekeeping has become
an avenue for transforming identities, reforming, restructuring, professional-
ising, and unifying post-conflict armies who often face budgetary constraints.
The conventional notion that African peacekeeping is not 'owned' by Africa
because of dependence on external funding is contested in chapter 6. The
authors argue that financial support cannot equate to lack of ownership due
to the various ways in which African states and governments exercise agency
in the peacekeeping sphere.

Generally, the book provides a timely, insightful, comprehensive and
nuanced analysis, and a critical contribution to contemporary debates and
policy discourse on African peacekeeping. It is exemplary in its critical diagno-
sis from a historical and political perspective, using a combination of empir-
ical evidence and the core literature in the field. Indeed, one of the critical
questions that readily comes to mind as one reads the book is the long-term

implications of the increasing budget cuts, reconfiguration, and downsizing of UN peacekeeping missions across the globe for the politics and stability of major African troop-contributing countries. Thankfully, the authors provide some useful reflections and suggestions on this that could provide critical insights and ideas for policy-makers on the continent. The book also reminds us of how colonial legacies and the power asymmetry in the global system continue to impact on the autonomy of African states as well as the significance of the potential gains behind altruistic actions such as peacekeeping contributions.

Although the book is on African peacekeeping, it pays less attention to its impacts on African countries that host the peacekeeping missions itself. The emphasis is more on the countries who contribute to peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, the focus on colonial legacies as inspiring African peacekeeping contribution is limiting in terms of analysis. First, it assumes that all African states have the same or similar colonial experiences – although there are significant differences. Second, it also ignores the multiple factors that inform the decision of African countries to contribute to peacekeeping. Therefore, while the influence of colonialism is a key factor, there are also other factors such as the need to extricate citizens caught up in conflicts; maintaining a peaceful neighbourhood to prevent the spillover effects of conflicts; the pan-Africanist ideals of some African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah in the post-independence period; and adhering to obligations of collective security arrangements as a member of the UN or a regional body like the AU.

Overall, presenting both general overviews and specific case studies with suggestions for additional readings, the book provides a brilliant introduction and a general reference source for academic enquiries into African peacekeeping for students and scholars who are unfamiliar or new to the subject matter. Scholars in the field will also find it thought-provoking and interesting to read as it systematically unpacks and provides fresh perspectives on the effects of colonial legacies on peacekeeping deployments and the link between peacekeeping and domestic, regional, and international politics of African states.

Festus Kofi Aubyn

Tshepo Gwatiwa 2022. *The African Union and African Agency in International Politics*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, XVII + 223 pp. ISBN: 978–3–030-87804-7 (hbk), €106.99; ISBN: 978–3–030-87807-8 (pbk), €74.89; ISBN: 978–3–030-87805-4 (ebk), €56.99.

The African Union and African Agency in International Politics by Tshepo Gwatiwa follows the recent agency turn in political science scholarship.[5] The author positions the book as the work of an African scholar joining an African conversation that is largely driven by non-Africans. He argues that the undue influence of outsiders over African agency discourses has encouraged a fictionalised narrative about what African agency is, what it is not, and what African actors, as well as processes, are able, unable, and unwilling to do in international affairs. The author reflects on interactions between the African Union (AU) and international partners, such as the European Union (EU), United States (US), United Nations (UN), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to provide what he considers to be a more realistic and non-fictionalised portrait of African agency.

Theoretically, the book attempts to apply the concept of 'agency slack', defined as a 'situation wherein an actor … such as the AU, takes independent action to produce [otherwise] undesirable or unexpected outcomes' (p. 4), to show how the AU exercises, or does not exercise, agency when dealing with its international partners. The main argument is that the AU engages in two main forms of agency slack, namely agency slippage, defined as an actor minimising the effort it is capable of exerting, and agency shirking, defined as an actor shifting policy away from a preferred outcome to its own preferences. The empirical chapters seek to provide evidence to show the extent to which interactions between the pan-African organisation and international partners reflect agency slippage, shirking, or both.

Methodologically, the book takes a qualitative research approach. The evidence used in the book is based on elite interviews of African and non-African diplomats in New York, Addis Ababa, Brussels, and Geneva conducted by the author while he was a doctoral student at the Geneva Graduate Institute. In addition, the book draws insights from discourse analysis of mostly secondary materials, such as newspaper publications and public policy documents, and soft primary materials, including AU resolutions, declarations, and outcome documents of meetings held by diplomats and politicians. The intellectual appeal of the book, which is essentially a revised version of a dissertation written in partial fulfilment of a requirement for the award of a doctorate degree at the Geneva Graduate Institute, lies in the relatively effective way the author combines primary and secondary materials to make a theoretical argument about the way the AU exercises its agency in international affairs.

However, the overreliance on elites as representatives of Africans and African agency raises a number of methodological challenges. For example, to

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5   Gwatiwa is a lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

what extent do the views of these elites reflect or capture the majority position of Africans? The huge gap between African political and diplomatic classes and the majority of Africans (e.g. in terms of age and political influence) questions the authenticity and accuracy of using elite perspectives as a barometer of African agency. Moreover, the sample size of interviews may seem a bit small and skewed. Interviews on African soil seem to have occurred in Ethiopia, Botswana, and South Africa, raising questions about how representative the views expressed are of the other 52 African states. In addition, many of the interviews took place outside the African continent, which might lead more discerning readers to legitimately wonder whether the selection of elites has been driven by convenience rather than systematic scientific sampling.

The methodological quibble aside, the book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on Africa's international relations (AIR) and African agency. While the claim that Africans have not had a major say on African agency is obviously an exaggeration, the effort made by the author to theorise African agency is an important step. It is to some extent a correction to the descriptive way in which African agency is often discussed and argues convincingly for the need of a sound theoretical basis for understanding and explaining African agency. The introduction of the concept of 'agency slack' to the lexicon of AIR is a helpful first step. It is however unclear how useful the concept is beyond the context of the book, as it is defined in a very complicated and broad way, making it difficult for others to use it to study other aspects of African political life. Perhaps a more disaggregated discussion and a more critical engagement with the concept would have been helpful. Agency slack is drawn from the literature on public administration and international organisations, and it is my understanding that the concept is driven by a rationalist assumption of international actorness. This appears to stand in contradiction to the major premise and underlying assumption of this book, which seem to be anything but a rationalist understanding of international actors. Therefore, Gwatiwa should have discussed how he changed the rationalist assumptions in agency slack to fit with his largely post-colonial rendition of AU agency.

Chapter 1 sheds light on what the author terms 'perceived perennial misfortunes' of the African continent in international politics, arguing that these misfortunes are an expression of the AU's agency in various multilateral partnerships. Building on this theme, chapter 2 outlines the concept of agency slack and argues that while AU actors have enormous leverage in their relationship with external actors, they deliberately choose not to maximise their advantages and influence. Chapter 3 historicises agency slack in African multilateralism, tracing it to power differentials developed during the colonial era. These power differentials positioned Africa in a defensive posture, making African agency 'largely a contest with the legacy of colonialism' (p. 41). Chapter 4 looks

specifically at what the author calls agential challenges within African region-alism and security. These challenges include Africa's 'inability to build effective security systems or emulate the West, as some expect' (p. 67), limited coercive power in African multilateralism, the absence of clear hegemonic leadership, difficulties in commitments to regional security, and decreasing ability to deal with conflicts and lack of political will. Chapter 5 turns attention to the insti-tutionalisation of different security arrangements within the AU, including the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), as evidence of African agency. The author uses the first decade of the AU and the institutionalisation of APSA to explore the origins of AU agency slack both in terms of slippage and shirk-ing. Taking a critical look at the various elements of APSA, the author suggests that AU actors had much room to develop an effective security architecture but settled for a relatively modest and weak institutional design.

Chapters 6 to 8 are empirical analysis of how African agency slack plays out in multilateral partnerships. Gwatiwa categorises the AU–EU partnership (Chapter 6) as a false appearance of agency slack, pointing to a 'rise-and-stag-nate' effect in the partnership, which led to scepticism on the AU side. Not showing enough evidence of shirking or slippage, the AU–EU partnership seems to show resilience and concrete efforts to protect African agency due to closely linked interests by both parties. The AU–UN partnership (Chapter 7), however, is a classic example of agency shirking. The author asserts that in cases where the AU differs from the UN in terms of approaches to peace and security, the pan-African organisation engages in forum shopping for another willing partner, such as NATO. The AU–NATO relationship is at a lower level, based on short-term thinking, and according to the author another example of agency shirking. This is reflected in the fact that the AU has not yet responded to NATO's desire to upgrade the partnership. Gwatiwa identifies a classical example of slippage in the AU–US Africa Command (AFRICOM) relationship (Chapter 8), evident in the AU's avoidance of partnering with AFRICOM (e.g. refusing to engage in high-level meetings). Summing up, in chapter 9, Gwatiwa ultimately finds that the AU's agency slack is a response to internal pressures generated by a huge, complex regional security order, and imperialism. In that sense, 'African shortcomings comprise its own agency in international politics' (p. 201).

Although the writing is a bit dense, it is an important book that should be read by students, scholars, and practitioners of diplomacy and AIR. It contains very valuable theoretical and empirical information on African agency that may advance the AIR conversation and scholarship. Perhaps understandably for a first book, it contains a few errors, inaccuracies, and repetitions of neg-ative Western media tropes about Africa. For instance, the author rehashed

the sensationalised, but largely inaccurate, Western media reports that the AU Commission building 'donated freely by China was bugged and sending computational data to [Chinese] servers for almost a decade' (p. 1). Giving legs to this rumour without acknowledging the African version seems to undermine the very spirit of this book, which seeks to tell the non-fictionalised version of African agency. The book also draws too much from non-African sources. Citation of works of African scholars, especially those operating outside of South Africa is very limited. The bibliographical entries offer not only good insights into why citation of African scholarship remain very low, but they provide a telling example of how a decolonial project, or African-centred project, sometimes unwittingly ends up reinforcing Western views on Africa. These missteps are perhaps understandable given that Western sources tend to be readily available and more convenient for financially challenged and time-limited graduate school projects. However, these limitations should not take anything away from the fact that this book is a welcome addition to the growing AIR scholarship and should be read and used more widely across the African continent and beyond.

Thomas Kwasi Tieku

Dawn Nagar 2022. *Challenging the United Nations Security Agenda in Africa*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, XXI + 397 pp. ISBN: 978–3–030-83522-4 (hbk), €106.99; ISBN: 978-3–030-83525-5 (pbk), €106.99; ISBN: 978–3–030-83523-1 (ebk), €85.59.

In her book *Challenging the United Nations Security Agenda in Africa*, Dawn Nagar endeavours to provide valuable analysis and perceptive insight into the contemporary peace and security challenges facing Africa and the multilateral system – where African peace and security institutions play important roles – with attention being paid to the history and conflict types of specific African countries.[6] Taken as a whole, the book aims to further a balanced critique of the multilateral system, and more concretely of the forms of United Nations' (UN) involvement that certain conflicts in Africa have experienced. In a few places, Nagar more explicitly discusses why UN involvement was inappropriate and certain aspects of that involvement even made the situation worse.

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6   Nagar was a senior researcher at the Centre for Conflict Resolution at Cape Town and is now with the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg.

While this overview is interesting and useful, it treads already quite familiar grounds in terms of academic literature on UN peacekeeping and multilateralism in crisis. Alternatives, such as African leadership on peace and security, or Pax Africana, could have been more developed analytically throughout the book. Towards the end, the book does take up the notion of Pax Africana as a normatively preferable alternative. However, it would have been good to know what exactly the author believes are the traits and characteristics of African regional institutions – the main challengers of the UN's role on the African continent – that make them more appropriate, legitimate, or effective than the UN in bringing about peaceful outcomes. Although the notion that regional actors have comparative advantages may seem apparent enough to policy-makers and practitioners that make the strategic partnership between the UN and the African Union (AU) operate, to the scholarly community this deserves careful reflection and problematisation.

In that respect, the book could have enquired more into the potential and aspirations for African peace and security institutions to take the lead on crises taking place on the continent. In my view, this requires an approach that can make sense of interrelations between global and regional actors and how they may complement each other. Some critiques of multilateral involvement might apply quite generally also to African organisations. To mention a few obvious examples, we may think of geopolitical divisions in Africa, acting as stumbling blocks for collective or united African crisis management, and regional-global mutual dependencies.

The book covers an impressive number of cases across the whole of Africa. In reviewing these cases, the author has made a very laudable effort, consulting a vast array of UN primary documents. Given the extensive use of such sources, a more thorough methodological discussion would have been warranted. This would have allowed more transparency for the academic reader to follow the choice of sources and to understand better how the author worked with them in analysis. Since the book's main objective is to critically appraise the UN's role on the continent, I would have been interested to learn more about the way the sources have been treated. For example, did the author believe it was important to keep the case narratives quite close to the UN's official description in favour of a factual writing style? If one section of a case narrative seeks to provide a neutral representation of facts, this can work well if this same narrative is then analysed and interpreted using certain text analytical tools, for instance. In my view, it helps if these are emphasised, easy to find, and followed throughout the whole book. Different signalling devices (e.g. double quotation marks) would have helped to identify the difference between official narrative and the analyst's critical take, highlighting when the use of words in

official documents is put into question from the scholar's perspective. I think it would have been very helpful to organise all the case chapters primarily by the strategies and tools used to operationalise and interpret the very rich empirical material.

Personally, I find that it is often useful to make one's own position a little bit clearer in the text by arguing what the contrast may be between what the UN says about its role in a specific setting and what the author finds during his/her analysis. For instance, in chapter 5, the author boldly claims that the UN's role in Somalia during the 1990s was inappropriate (p. 171) but does not clarify on what grounds she has reached this conclusion, based on the sources used here. A final point about sources: if the author did aspire to advance the argument about Pax Africana even stronger, I would have liked to see much more use of African primary sources.

On a more general note, the manuscript would have benefited from another round of careful review and steady-handed trimming down to clarify and strengthen the book's overarching argument. My feeling is that the book is overly long. The trouble with a lengthy book is that it sets the reader's expectations high in terms of depth of argument, and one might say that a lengthy book requires more input in every step of the book production process than a concise one. In the case of this book, I am left thinking that too many subsidiary arguments at work across the book, in effect, became distractions. To take one example, in the different cases there are sections that seem to have been kept there to describe the empirical setting at particular points of time. Yet, I have struggled to connect the reasons for doing so to the book's main line of argumentation.

What readers will enjoy about this book, despite all criticism, is that it achieves a well-grounded and detailed appraisal of the UN's involvement in Africa, covering a period of more than half a century. In this way, the book will serve as a valuable resource that sketches several critical cases where the UN's role on the continent has evolved and will likely benefit policy-makers and practitioners fundamental to UN–Africa partnerships.

Linnéa Gelot

Clarissa Correa Neto Ribeiro 2022. *Overlapping Regional Organizations in South America and Africa. Coexistence Through Political Crises.* Cham: Springer. ISBN: 978–3–030-98899-9 (hbk), 978–3–030-98900-2 (ebk), XVIII + 156 pp., €106,99.

Overlapping Regional Organizations in South America and Africa, by Clarissa Correa Neto Ribeiro, is a comprehensive study that delves into the intricate dynamics of regional organisations in two continents.[7] Based on her doctoral work, Ribeiro's research explores the phenomenon of institutional overlaps, which is particularly pronounced in Africa and Latin America due to a high number of organisations that co-exist, sometimes in cooperation but often in competition. Through a comparative analysis of case studies, Ribeiro sheds light on the complexities, challenges, and potential opportunities arising from the coexistence of multiple regional organisations.

In her book, Ribeiro seeks to address a fundamental question: how do overlapping scenarios impact regional cohesion and cooperation? With a nuanced understanding that there is no definitive answer, Ribeiro emphasises that the effects of overlapping regional organisations are not binary. Overlaps can be consequences of different visions between states regarding regional leadership and lead to frictions between regional formats. While member states' agency and power dynamics are important, Ribeiro's analysis centres on the actions and interactions of the regional organisations themselves.

One significant aspect explored by Ribeiro are the competition and cooperation dynamics, as organisations often engage in vertical overlaps, vying for influence and authority over the broader region. If coordinated purposefully, thematic and geographic complementarity can lead to cooperation. Ribeiro provides the example of the Gambian crisis, where organisational cooperation between the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) led to a relatively swift and peaceful solution. However, Ribeiro also highlights the potential for fragmentation stemming from overlaps, institutional blockages, and domestic agendas. Furthermore, Ribeiro highlights the interconnections of regional organisations in Africa and South America. She observes that both regions have demonstrated a certain degree of institutional learning, often prompted by critical moments of political crises.

Among the challenges faced by regional organisations in the wake of overlaps are the low levels of institutionalisation and intergovernmentalism. Ribeiro points out that the dependency of member states to act affects the outcomes of complementarity or fragmentation. Mechanisms such as norm ambiguity, interinstitutional strategies, and constant competition among member states can hinder cooperation and exacerbate overlaps. Ribeiro further highlights the negative consequences of uncoordinated overlaps, including rendering certain policy areas ungovernable. The author cites instances such as the

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7   Ribeiro is a consultant at the Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation of the Organization of American States, Washington, DC.

ongoing Venezuelan crisis and the prolonged Malagasy political crisis as examples of how overlapping actions can hinder conflict resolution and impede the efficiency of regional interventions.

The book acknowledges the limitations and criticisms of previous studies on comparative regionalism and highlights the need for a deep multidisciplinary understanding of complex contexts and peoples. It emphasises the importance of studying regional initiatives from non-European perspectives to avoid Eurocentrism and cultural relativism, which contributes to a more comprehensive analysis. To this end, the book adopts a comparative approach to study regionalism in South America and Africa, which offers the opportunity to avoid a narrow analysis. But while the book mentions the use of comparative regionalism, it does not provide a detailed explanation of the specific research methods employed. It would be beneficial to have more clarity on the data collection and analysis techniques used in the study. In addition, the editing and proofreading unfortunately did not manage to get rid of issues, such as duplicated tables. Nevertheless, overall, the book demonstrates a strong awareness of the complexities involved in studying regionalism and offers a comprehensive framework for analysing regional organisations in South America and Africa.

Frank Mattheis

Sören Stapel 2022. *Regional Organizations and Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law: The African Union, Organization of American States, and the Diffusion of Institutions*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, xx + 349 pp. ISBN: 978–3–030-90397-8 (hbk), €106.99; ISBN 978–3–030-90400-5 (pbk), €106.99; ISBN: 978–3–030-90398-5 (ebk), €85.59.

Regional Organizations and Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law: The African Union, Organization of American States, and the Diffusion of Institutions, by Sören Stapel, is an important contribution to the literature on the norm-setting and norm-diffusion responsibilities of regional organisations (ROs).[8] Employing a methodology that permits inductive and deductive research, the author provides insights into the origins, motivations, and justifications for ROs to adopt governance rules. Stapel focuses on three governance aspects, namely democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and provides

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8   Stapel is a post-doctoral researcher in the Institute of Political Science at the University of Freiburg i. Br. (Germany).

insights into how ROs negotiate the space to design and develop institutions to promote the three aspects and foster their adoption by member states. The author is able to provide empirically grounded explanations of the complex dynamics that guide and impact the norm-generation and norm-diffusion processes of ROs by collecting a broad range of data.

The book contributes to the discourse on norm setting and diffusion by evaluating existing ideas and creating new hypotheses, based on the available facts that support certain existing arguments and provide fresh insights into the function of ROs in promoting and safeguarding governance. It is commendable that it introduces the GTRO adoption and design databases, which utilise historical data to provide a full trajectory including the three aforementioned characteristics within RO institutions. The datasets contain information that, if made accessible to the public, can be utilised by others in comparable and related research. The conclusion of the book asserts that, regardless of differences between states regarding the norm creation process, ROs play a crucial role in norm generation, the provision of methods to enhance compliance, and enforcement measures in defined situations. A debt of gratitude is deserved for this significant addition to the empirical literature on regionalism and global governance.

Although the book does not discuss the consequences and efficacy of regional norms on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, it does cover a crucial but frequently difficult-to-measure aspect: eliciting compliance. Noting the limited authority of ROs to elicit compliance based on several factors, such as their founding charters and legislative instruments, as well as the dynamics of consent and its corollary sense of obligation, Stapel provides a menu of mechanisms that states use to elicit compliance with the three dimensions of governance discussed in the book. Without going into great depth, the author describes the numerous compliance-inducing strategies and the leverage each affords regulatory organisations. The absence of specific insights, including instances of how each method has been applied and its effects, detracts considerably from an otherwise superbly researched book. Despite this, the book provides a brief summary of enforcement measures and hints at the efficiency of each.

The author's recognition of the importance of the intersection of domestic demands and external pressures in the norm adoption of member states is a significant contribution to the debate on African ROs, regionalism, and governance, especially in non-Western spaces. The concept that the development of governance rules, particularly in Africa, has been at the behest of external powers is not only inaccurate, but also condescending; it robs national actors of their agency, whose multi-level efforts frequently result in reforms. While

acknowledging that external influences play a part in the transformation process, the author demonstrates the importance of national and regional players in norm creation and dissemination. The author also appreciates the importance of African ROs in developing somewhat more stringent governance, peace, and security criteria in certain circumstances. Although he does not mention it explicitly, he accepts the significance of African ROs in establishing the standards for military operations in cases of noncompliance.

While the norm production, norm setting, and norm adoption in African ROs are central throughout the book, chapter 6 provides a well-documented history of the evolution of norms in African ROs. Through curated examples, the chapter highlights leadership as an often overlooked yet vital element of norm formation. Leadership is required whether via demand or diffusion, as leaders can reject internal needs and external pressures to the detriment of the socioeconomic survival of their states. The book also mentions, albeit briefly, the role played by the employees of ROs in the development of standards, which is an additional significant element. Whether through diffusion or demand, it is the responsibility of RO staff to ensure that the institutions are built in a way that resonates with the sociopolitical ethos of the organisation in order to encourage buy-in by the majority of the organisation's members.

Although the primary focus of the book is on governance, it is also illuminating regarding subsidiarity in peace and security, notably in the African Union (AU). While the AU and the United Nations (UN) agree on the need for partnership peacekeeping and have collaborated on a number of occasions, the issue of subsidiarity has yet to be thoroughly articulated. The lack of clarity, especially in its application, causes sporadic difficulties between the two organisations. Stapel argues that ROs may be better equipped to address the challenges of peace and security in their regions, because they have access to multiple mechanisms, such as 'forums for dialogue and exchange with more intrusive instruments, such as sanctions, regional courts, and military force' (p. 8). This point emphasises the need for effective partnerships with clearly outlined processes that facilitate rapid decision-making between international organisations such as the UN, Regional Economic Communities, and Regional Mechanisms in order to determine the most suitable mechanism during a given crisis. As the AU reviews the concept of its standby force, which is based on regional economic communities and regional mechanisms and explores with the UN options to enhance the effectiveness of their partnership, experts working on the issues and scholars studying the processes will learn a great deal from Stapel's research.

Linda Darkwa

PART 4

Appendices

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Chronicle of Key AU Events, 2022

20–21 Jan.	43rd Ordinary Session of the Permanent Representatives Committee (Addis Ababa)
22–25 Jan.	High-Level Meeting on Financing the African Union (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia)
28–29 Jan.	8th Meeting of the AfCFTA Council of Ministers responsible for trade (Accra, Ghana)
31 Jan.	following a coup d'état, suspension of Burkina Faso from all AU activities
2–3 Feb.	42nd Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council (Addis Ababa)
5–6 Feb.	35th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly (Addis Ababa)
6 Feb.	Fiona Lortan appointed deputy special representative to Somalia and deputy head of AMISOM
17–18 Feb.	6th EU–AU Summit (Brussels, Belgium)
1 Mar.	6th Ordinary Session of the Specialised Technical Committee (STC) on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (STC–GEWE) (Addis Ababa)
10 Mar.	retreat between African Court and the AU PRC (Arusha, Tanzania)
15–17 Mar.	High-Level Meeting on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (Accra, Ghana)
21–26 Mar.	9th World Water Forum (Dakar, Senegal)
31 Mar.	end of the AMISOM mission, as of 1 April replaced by the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)
4–8 Apr.	4th Ordinary Session of the STC on Social Development, Labour and Employment (STC–SDLE) (hybrid, Addis Ababa)
6 Apr.	AU Special Representative Francisco Madeira, head of AMISOM, declared a persona non grata by the Somali government
20 Apr.	the DRC deposited the legal instruments regarding the ratification the *Protocol on the Establishment of the PSC* (becoming the 53rd member state to do so)
1 May	Ms Nardos Bekele-Thomas succeeds Ibrahim Assane Mayaki as CEO of AUDA–NEPAD
5 May	21st Consultative Meeting of the UN–AU Joint Task Force on Peace and Security (virtual)

9–12 May	14th Ordinary Session of the STC on Defence, Safety and Security (STC–DSS) (Addis Ababa)
11 May	17th Meeting of African Chiefs of Defence and Heads of Safety and Security (Addis Ababa)
16–20 May	40th Ordinary Session of the (renamed) African Union Advisory Board Against Corruption (Arusha, Tanzania)
23–24 May	4th Ordinary Session of the STC on Migration, Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (Malabo, Equatorial Guinea)
25 May	meeting of the Executive Council (Malabo)
27 May	Extraordinary Humanitarian Summit and Pledging Conference (Malabo)
28 May	16th Extraordinary AU Assembly on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government (Malabo)
30 May–1 Jun.	4th Ordinary Session of the STC on Health, Population and Drug Control (STC–HPDC) (virtual)
3 Jun.	joint visit by the AU chairperson and the AUC chairperson to Russia
6–8 Jun.	AU–RECs consultative meeting on the implementation of the *AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silencing the Guns* (Lusaka, Zambia)
13–14 Jun.	High-Level Meeting on Financing the African Union (Rabat, Morocco)
13–14 Jun.	High-Level Conference on the Promotion of Good Governance and Fight against Corruption (hybrid, Gaborone, Botswana)
14–16 Jun.	2nd Extraordinary Session of the STC on Transport, Transcontinental and Interregional Infrastructure, and Energy (STC–TTIIE) (virtual)
15 Jun.	7th Ordinary Session of the Specialized Technical Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs (STC–JLA) (hybrid, Addis Ababa; ministerial continuation of the meeting of government experts held on 26–29 Nov. 2021)
29 Jun.	election of Fortune Charumbira (Zimbabwe) as president of the Pan-African Parliament
20 Jun.–8 Jul.	44th Ordinary Session of the PRC (Addis Ababa)
30 Jun.	AU Peace Fund Board of Trustees meeting to review progress on operationalisation (Addis Ababa)
4 Jul.	6th Extraordinary Session of the STC on Justice and Legal Affairs (STC–JLA) (hybrid, Addis Ababa; ministerial continuation of the meeting of government experts held on 28–29 Jun.)
14–15 Jul.	41st Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council (Lusaka)
17 Jul.	4th Mid-Year Coordination Meeting of the AU and the RECs (Lusaka)
18–22 July	5th Ordinary Session of the STC on Finance, Monetary Affairs, Economic Planning and Integration (Lusaka)

28 Jul.	2nd Special Summit of the APR Forum (virtual)
8 Aug.	3rd Annual Consultative Meeting between the PSC and RECS/RMS Policy Organs (virtual)
27–28 Aug.	8th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD 8) (Tunis, Tunisia)
29–31 Aug.	4th Ordinary Session of STC on Public Service, Local Government, Urban Development and Decentralization (Cairo, Egypt)
1–2 Sep.	4th Ordinary Session of the STC on Education, Science, Technology and Innovation (STC ESTI) (virtual)
20–21 Oct.	7th Retreat of the Pan-African Network of the Wise (PanWise) (Windhoek, Namibia)
21–23 Oct.	13th High-Level Retreat on the Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa – 'Transformative Mediation for Africa's Effective Governance and Peace Dividends' (Windhoek)
25–27 Oct.	1st Continental Policy Conference 'Promoting the Peace, Security, and Development Nexus: The Promise of Regional Integration' (Tangier, Morocco)
6–20 Nov.	UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) 27 (Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt)
7 Nov.	Joint Meeting of AU Ministers in charge of industry and economic diversification (Niamey, Niger)
10 Nov.	2nd Men's Conference on Positive Masculinity 'Advancing Actions and Promoting Positive Masculinity to End Violence against Women and Girls' (Dakar, Senegal)
14–15 Nov.	2nd Annual Joint PSC-APRM Retreat (Durban, South Africa)
17–19 Nov.	14th PSC Annual Retreat on Working Methods (Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe)
20–25 Nov.	17th Extraordinary Session of the Conference on Industrialization and Economic Diversification and the Extraordinary Session on the Free Trade Area (Niamey)
23 Nov.	Regional Summit on the Situation in the DRC regarding M23 (Luanda, Angola)
28 Nov.	5th Annual Consultative Meeting between PSC and the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) (virtual)
28 Nov.	11th AU–EU Commission-to-Commission meeting (Brussels)
30 Nov.	6th African Union–United Nations Annual Conference (Addis Ababa)
7 Dec.	4th ECOSOCC Permanent General Assembly (Nairobi, Kenya)
12 Dec.	extension of the mandate of the Multilateral Joint Task Force (MNJTF) by one year until 31 Jan. 2024
13 Dec.	7th Ordinary Session of the STC on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (STC–GEWE) (virtual)

13 Dec.	8th Ordinary Session of the STC on Justice and Legal Affairs (STC–JLA) (virtual)
13–15 Dec.	2nd US–African Leaders Summit (Washington, DC, United States)
13–16 Dec.	1st AU Exporters Conference (Nairobi)
14–15 Dec.	3rd Africa Forum on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) (Addis Ababa)

Inventory of AU Decisions, 2022

General Notes

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, in March 2020 the African Union (AU) started adopting decisions by Online Silence Procedure (OSP).

Peace and Security Council (PSC): reference is to 'communiqués' and 'press statements' only (in addition there is a considerable amount of dated, but not numbered 'press releases'). In 2022, PSC meetings number 1057 (14.01.) to 1129 (20.12.) were held. For the following PSC meetings, no documentation is available at ULR: <http://www.peaceau.org/en/resource/documents>: 1058–1059, 1065–1066, 1074, 1083–1085, 1088–1089, 1098–1099, 1104, 1113, and 1125 (usually this implies that a meeting was held, but no formal decision was adopted).

Abbreviations
A   AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government
C   AU Executive Council
EO   extraordinary meeting
MYCM   AU/RECs Mid-Year Coordination Meeting
PSC   AU Peace and Security Council

Syntax
Year: number (volume and, in the case of the PSC, exact date):
Dates are referenced: (DD/MM).

Key AU Office Holders, 2022

Chairs of Assembly of the African Union, 2022

Feb. 2021–Feb. 2022	Félix Antoine Tshisekedi (DRC)
Feb. 2022–Feb. 2023	Macky Sall (Senegal)

Chairperson of the AU Commission and Commissioners, 2022

Chairperson	since Mar. 2017	Moussa Faki Mahama (Chad)
Deputy Chairperson	since Feb. 2021	Monique Nsanzabaganwa (Rwanda)
Commissioner Political Affairs, Peace and Security	since Feb. 2021	Bankole A. Adeoye (Nigeria)
Commissioner Infrastructure and Energy	since Jan. 2017	Amani Abou-Zeid (Egypt)
Commissioner Economic Development, Trade, Industry and Mining	since Jan. 2017	Albert M Muchanga (Zambia)
Commissioner Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment	since Jan. 2017	Josefa Leonel Correa Sacko (Angola)
Commissioner Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development	Jul. 2017–Jul. 2021[a] since Jul. 2021	Amira Elfadil Mohammed (Sudan) Minata Samate Cessouma (Burkina Faso)
Commissioner Education, Science, Technology and Innovation	Jul. 2017–Oct. 2021 since Oct. 2021	Sarah Anyang Agbor (Cameroon) Belhocine Mohammed (Algeria)

a Official handover only in Jan. 2022

Members of the Peace and Security Council, 2022

Central Africa	Burundi[a]	2022–2024	
	Cameroon[a]		2022–2025
	Congo (Brazzaville)	2022–2024	
East Africa	Djibouti[a]		2022–2025
	Tanzania	2022–2024	
	Uganda	2022–2024	
North Africa	Morocco		2022–2025
	Tunisia	2022–2024	
Southern Africa	Namibia		2022–2025
	South Africa	2022–2024	
	Zimbabwe	2022–2024	
West Africa	Gambia	2022–2024	
	Ghana[a]	2022–2024	
	Nigeria[a]		2022–2025
	Senegal[a]	2022–2024	

Note: Changes are effective as of 1 April 2022.

a   Re-elected.

Members of the Panel of the Wise, 2022

Central Africa	since Feb. 2022	Domitien Ndiayizaye (Burundi)
East Africa	since Feb. 2022	Justice (rtd) Effie Owuor (Kenya)
North Africa	since Jul. 2017	Amr Mahmoud Abu Moussa (Egypt)[a]
Southern Africa	since Jul. 2022	Dr Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka (South Africa)
West Africa	since Feb. 2022	Professor Babacar Kante (Senegal)

Note: Members are eligible for reappointment only once.

a   Re-elected.

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YEARBOOK ON THE AFRICAN UNION

VOLUME 3 | 2022

This is the third edition of the *Yearbook on the African Union* (YBAU). The YBAU is first and foremost an academic project that provides an in-depth evaluation and analysis of the institution, its processes, and its engagements. Despite the increased agency in recent years of the African Union in general, and the AU Commission in particular, little is known – outside expert policy or niche academic circles – about the Union's activities. This is the gap the *Yearbook on the African Union* wants to systematically address. It seeks to be a reference point for in-depth research, evidence-based policy-making and decision-making.

Contributors are Festus Kofi Aubyn, Mandira Bagwandeen, Habibu Yaya Bappah, Bruce Byiers, Annie Barbara Hazviyemurwi Chikwanha, Dawit Yohannes Wondemagegnehu, Linnea Gelot, Cheryl Hendricks, Jens Herpolsheimer, Aïssatou Kanté, Tim Murithi, Edefe Ojomo, Thomas Tieku, Gino Vlavonou, Tim Zajontz.

Ulf Engel is Professor of 'Politics in Africa' at Leipzig University. He is also a Visiting Professor at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies at Addis Ababa University and the Department of Political Science at Stellenbosch University, respectively.